ŚABDAPRĀMĀṆYAM IN ŚABARA AND KUMĀRILA

TOWARDS A STUDY OF THE MĪMĀṂSĀ EXPERIENCE OF LANGUAGE

BY

FRANCIS X. D'SA, S. J.

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TO

GERHARD OBERHAMMER

sasnehādaram

PREFACE

The feeling that like a fool I have rushed in where angels have feared to tread has accompanied me from the day I began this work. It has not only not left me but has grown on me as the work proceeded. And now as I complete what I set out to write, it is with uneasiness that I allow these pages to leave the privacy of my room. However, lest there be any misunderstanding, I must add that this is not a *captatio benevolentiae.* My uneasiness has reference to the complexity of the Mīmāṃsā intricacies and I am afraid, I may not have either understood or may even have overlooked important aspects of the whole system because of my limited and limiting preoccupation with Śabdaprāmāṇyam.

It is one of the striking characteristics of speculation in India that the study of language formed a prominent part of theological philosophy. This is especially true of the Mīmāṃsā. Śabdaḥ is understood as the bridge between the visible and the invisible, between life and liturgy, between the temporal and the tempiternal. In my study I have attempted to locate the 'component parts' of the Śabdaprāmāṇya-doctrine and their field of activity and influence. But the various chapters of this work, I must confess, have turned out to be somewhat uneven. This has been due to not only my manner of treatment but also to the matter that is available.

The term *pramāṇam* refers primarily to the source of experience. The kind of experience we have is determined by the source it springs from. Hence a study of the various *pramāṇa*-s is a study of the different sources of our experience. Accordingly Śabdapramāṇam is Śabdaḥ in as much as it is the source of experience. Therefore the peculiar Mīmāṃsā understanding of Śabdaḥ has first of all to be studied. This, as will be seen, has a number of aspects like *śabdaḥ*, *śabdārthaḥ*, *śabdārthasaṃbandhaḥ* and *vākyārthaḥ*.

The theme of Śabdaprāmāṇyam in the Mīmāṃsā seemed to me to offer a different view of Language and Reality. I have not been disappointed on this score; only awed by the depth and drive of the Mīmāṃsā quest. At the start both the questions and the answers of the system appeared strange and sterile; now my own questions and answers appear no less strange and sterile, if looked at from the 'outside'. This is what has prompted me to see if a view from the 'inside' would be possible. The fruit of this attempt is the first chapter. Though sketchy and somewhat superficial I consider it all the same important for the direction which any meaningful interpretation of the Mīmāṃsā has to take. I have then added an analysis of the Tarkapādaḥ of the Śābarabhāṣyam with a view to showing at a glance the difference as regards the content and the context of the problems of the Bhāṣyam and the Vṛttiḥ. The chapter on Dharma is a study of the original understanding of

the foundation of the Mīmāṃsā. If we are to interpret the Mīmāṃsā-theories in a significant manner then we cannot afford to neglect the Significance the Mīmāṃsaka-s attached to this fundamental term.

Part Two deals with the early Mīmāṃsā understanding of Śabdaprāmāṇyam. We have two views here: one of the Bhāṣyakāraḥ and the other of the Vṛttikāraḥ quoted in the Śābarabhāṣyam. Though not always different or divergent the views they offer correspond to two different stages in the development of the Mīmāṃsā. I have included in my study whatever is relevant from the Vṛttikāragranthaḥ, though it is clear that the material is not enough to work out a whole theory of Śabdaprāmāṇyam. Most, if not all, of the later Mīmāṃsā-doctrines, we notice, are here in the germinating stage about to blossom thematically. Mine being a study of the Tarkapādaḥ (except for the Ākṛtivādaḥ and the Bhāvanā-doctrine where I have had recourse to the other Adhyāya-s), the themes for our investigation were given there; they were neither invented nor discovered by me.

This is equally, if not more, true of Part Three. But that I have not treated of all the chapters of the Ślokavārttikam needs, I think, no special apology. Kumārila makes use of the opportunity to answer the various adversaries of his school; all these sections however are not essentially to his exposition of the Śabdaprāmāṇya-doctrine. The titles of the chapters of Part Three will point out, I hope, to the progress in the Mīmāṃsā thinking as compared to the earlier thinkers. Thematization and systematization are Kumārila's chief characteristics. True, he has not articulated one total system in which all the doctrines fit in. But in each of them Kumārila specifically mentions their purpose which is Vedaprāmāṇyam. This means that Kumārila was consciously arguing from Vedaprāmāṇyam which he took as the centre and source of ultimate intelligibility. My task however has been to make explicit the system which Kumārila was implicitly presupposing. How far I have succeeded is for the discerning reader to judge.

Publications on the Mīmāṃsā are rare; from this perspective I know my contribution will be welcome to the Scholar. Whether he will welcome my interpretations is not equally certain. But I hope that this study will create interest in a school that has been important for the development of various thought-patterns but which has been generally neglected. Should this be the case, I think, I shall have achieved a major objective.

If at the start of my search for the Mīmāṃsā-concept of 'Revelation' I had an inkling as to what lay in store for me, I must admit, I do not think I would have had the courage to enter on such an enterprise. It is here that Professor Dr. G. Oberhammer comes into the picture. His foresight and forbearance were not the only virtues. In spite of pressure of work he accompanied me through passages of which I could make neither head nor tail. Above all, I shall always be grateful to him for his sympathetic but severe criticism of my initial efforts in the field of research. From this I have learnt (among other things) two important lessons: one on the professional level: *amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas*, and the other on the personal level: *amica veritas sed magis amicus Plato*! Paradoxical as it might sound, he

has shown the skill to combine both the professional as well as the personal aspects of a work like this without sacrificing the one or the other. That I have dedicated the book to him is a measure of my gratitude to him.

Writing a book like this is a community project, except for the fact that the writer alone is in the lime-light. This should not mean that those behind the scenes are either superfluous or secondary. It is therefore with a profound sense of gratitude that I acknowledge the assistance (*dṛṣṭādṛṣṭa-*) from all those who helped me understand the relevant texts, discussed with patience difficult and disputed points, and all those who helped in the first stages of typing the various chapters, especially Mrs. M. Praxeres. Above all, I must mention by name Miss Bhagyalata Jategaonkar M. A. who checked up the references, saw to the transliteration and the bibliography and in general was available for all kinds of tasks. But for her timely and tenacious help I would still have been at work on the book. I am at a loss as to how I could adequately thank her for such selfless and spontaneous service.

The Editor of this Series, Prof. Dr. G. Oberhammer deserves my thanks on another count. He not only showed readiness to include this book in the Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, he has been patient even though I twice failed to keep to the dead-line. That he has, in spite of the credibility gap between my promise and fulfillment, been encouraging is an experience all students hope for but few have the good fortune of enjoying. I also thank his assistant Dr. L. Soni-Scharfetter who saw to the proof-reading and other uninspiring tasks connected with printing and publishing.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
ASS	Ānandāśrama Saṃskṛta Series
BDCRI	Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute
JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society
Materialien	Frauwallner: Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā
NR	Nyāyaratnākaraḥ
NSū	Nyāyasūtram
PM	Pūrvamīmāṃsā
ŚBh	Śābarabhāṣyam
ŚV	Ślokavārttikam
ŚV Ākṛti.	Ślokavārttika-Ākṛtivādaḥ
ŚV Codanā.	Ślokavārttika-Codanāsūtram
ŚV Pratyakṣa.	Ślokavārttika-Pratyakṣasūtram
ŚV Śabdani.	Ślokavārttika-Śabdanityatādhikaraṇam
ŚV Sphoṭa.	Ślokavārttika-Sphoṭavādaḥ
ŚVTṬ	Ślokavārtikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā
TS	Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ
TV	Tantravārttikam
WZKM	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes
WZKS(O)	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd(- und Ost)asiens
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

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Ṭupṭīkā. See Mīmāṃsādarśanam.
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Part One

INTRODUCTION TO THE MĪMĀṂSĀ

CHAPTER 1
MEANING AND METAPHOR IN THE MĪMĀṂSĀ

The world-view which was superseded by the Mīmāṃsā, though not 'naturalistic' as it was once the fashion to label it[1], made no separation between the natural and the supernatural, between the sacred and the profane, between higher and lower nature[2]. It abounded not only in gods and their super-exploits[3]; it showed the same personal relation to the element world as to the divine[4]. There was no one-way traffic in any sphere: men communicated with the gods as freely and as temperamentally as did the gods with men. The world of the animals was familiar (= part of the family) as the world of the sun and the dawn, of the rain and the rivers. Man was not lonely nor was he isolated; he was neither the crown of creation nor was he called upon to subjugate the rest of creation. He was simply part of a larger whole where everything and everybody had an appointed place and a regulated task[5].

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[1] See R. N. DANDEKAR, Vedic Religion and Mythology, esp. his remarks on MAX MÜLLER (P. 9), A. BERGAIGNE (P. 18), HILLEBRANDT (P. 23), etc. Also H. AGUILAR, The Sacrifice in the Ṛgveda. Delhi/Varanasi, 1976. Ch. IV. The Naturalistic Interpretation. J. GONDA, Die Religionen Indiens. P. 23: "Die ältere Ansicht, daß die Mythen eine Art Paraphrase von Naturphänomenen seien, eine plastische und populäre Physik und Astronomie, und Götter Personifikationen der in der Natur wirksamen Kräfte und Mächte, hat sich schon lange als unrichtig erwiesen." Ibid. Pp. 48f.: "Daß mancher altindische Gott eine Naturkraft repräsentiert, hat man längst und mit Recht erkannt. Die bis heute auf diese Einsicht sich gründende Schlußfolgerung, daß einige Götter ursprünglich auch nur mit einer Naturerscheinung verbunden gewesen seien, mit der Zeit aber eine immer stärker hervortretende ethische Bedeutung erlangt hätten, ist dennoch nicht statthaft... Dabei ist anzuerkennen, daß die Naturmächte als göttliche Mächte aufgefaßt wurden, daß aber keineswegs die großen vedischen Götter einfach Naturmächte waren."

[2] J. GONDA, Die Religionen Indiens. P. 29: "... so müssen wir daran erinnern, daß der alte Inder noch nicht scharf zwischen Geist und Stoff, zwischen lebend und leblos, Person und Nicht-Person, zwischen Abstrakta und Konkreta, zwischen Substanzen und den an diesen zutage tretenden Eigenschaften, Vorgängen und Zuständen unterschied."

[3] Cfr. GONDA, Die Religionen Indiens. Ch. I Die Götter.

[4] Cfr. GONDA, Die Religionen Indiens. P. 50. Also P. 45: "Ebensowenig gab es eine feste Grenze zwischen Gott und Mensch; die Eigenschaften, durch die besondere Menschen sich auszeichnen, sind auch den Göttern eigen."

[5] This implied a mutual dependence in the whole universe. The idea of mutual dependence is one of the chief characteristics of the Indian world-view. "Diese gegenseitige Abhängigkeit von Menschen und Devas, d. h. besonders mächtigen, verehrungswürdigen oder zu fürchtenden Wesen, auf deren Gunst der Mensch sich angewiesen fühlte, diese wesentlich amoralische, auf einem Austausch von Diensten beruhende Beziehung ist eines der wichtigsten Fundamente der altindischen 'Religiosität' und die bedeutendste Triebfeder des Gottesdienstes." GONDA, Die Religionen Indiens P. 41. Also H. OLDENBERG, Die Religionen des Veda. Pp. 591 ff.

When the originary experience which lay at the root of the Mīmāṃsā began to make itself gradually felt through the myth of the cosmic sacrifice a thorough process of trans-mythologization was initiated[6]. The gods lost both their jobs and their jurisdiction. Men changed their attitude to nature because it had now become a store-house supplying the things needed for man's main task, namely, the sacrifice. It was no more *ṛtam* which saw to order in the cosmos. Sacrifice was seen as the significant structure in which the cosmos was woven; its maintenance was believed to be the means not only of universal order and growth but of individual prosperity in this life and of the attainment of the highest good in the next. The supreme value in life was not God or some such Being, but an impersonal unconditional imperative prescribed by the Scripture to attain Svargaḥ through sacrificial acts. This imperative corresponded to man's innate desire for *prītiḥ*, for Svargaḥ was understood as the state of pure *prītiḥ*. Thus man's search for Significance, the symbols through which Scripture spoke and the substances of this world, all formed part and parcel of a holistic enterprise called sacrifice. Though man's relation to the various members of the cosmos was no more as before, still he was related in and through the sacrifice to the total cosmos, for in and through sacrifice was communicated to him the Significance of the cosmos. It was sacrifice which made everyone and everything singularly significant though not in the same manner or degree.

The arresting thing about the Mīmāṃsā world-view is that though the externals of its significant structures are taken from ritual, its internal core is consistently secular, that is, this-worldly. The sacrificial structure is the warp and woof of this world-view but it must be pointed out that such a sacrifice is not so much a ritual as a cosmic and communitarian action which makes and maintains cosmos as community. Such action, whatever its outer clothing, will always be full of meaning, meaningful. An action becomes significant in as much as it contributes to the building up and the maintenance of the cosmic community[7].

Today, no doubt, we might think of other ways of doing this but for the Mīmāṃsaka the action of sacrifice (in the Mīmāṃsaka vocabulary both are expressed by the same word: *karma*) was, so to speak, salvific. That is the reason why it became for him the sign of Significance. This sign made his daily life and duties meaningful. The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā world-view had place neither for God nor for any other Supreme Being. Instead Svargaḥ or *niḥśreyasam* or *prītiḥ* was the hub of the sacrificial wheel.

Our investigation of the Mīmāṃsā has to start from this centre. However sparse the sources concerning this centre may be, we shall have to consider carefully all that is available on the subject. In this connection there is in the Śābara-Bhāṣyam a short but substantial treatment of the meaning and Significance of *prītiḥ* in the Mīmāṃsā.

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[6] For what follows see J. GONDA, Die Religionen Indiens, Ch. IV. Religiöse und weltanschauliche Vorstellungen und Heilsbestrebungen, esp. pp. 174—197.

[7] See R. PANIKKAR, The Vedic Experience, pp. 346—356.

"That in which man [finds] *prītiḥ*, [that is to say,] that significant thing (*padārtha-*) which when accomplished gives rise to *prītiḥ*, that significant thing [is known as] *puruṣārthaḥ*. Why? The innate longing for it [is] caused by *arthaḥ*; the innate longing for it [is] due to *arthaḥ* alone. But *kratvarthaḥ* is known from Scripture, not from anywhere else. For *puruṣārthaḥ* is not unconnected (*avibhakta-*) with *prītiḥ*. Whatever brings about *prītiḥ*, that is *puruṣārthaḥ*. *Puruṣārthaḥ* being [thus] described, *kratvarthaḥ* [is said to be] its opposite. Thus the description of *kratvarthaḥ*, too, is achieved."[8]

The striking thing here is that *prītiḥ* is explained in the context of *puruṣārthaḥ*. If I am not very mistaken, the following seem to be the more important meanings of *puruṣārthaḥ* here: 'the purpose or aim of man' (substantival usage), and 'the thing that is significant to, or for the sake of, man' (adjectival usage). *Puruṣārthaḥ* then is a generic name for a reality whose specific name is *prītiḥ*. *Prītiḥ* is a specific instance of *puruṣārthaḥ*. But what is the meaning of *arthaḥ* in *tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇā*; *tasya lipsārthenaiva bhavati, na śāstreṇa*; *kratvartho hi śāstrād avagamyate, nānyathā*? I must confess, I do not have a satisfactory answer. And GAṄGĀNĀTH JHĀ's translation, too, "because its undertaking is due to the Man's desire to obtain happiness" is not of much help here. Śabara makes a contrast between *arthena* and *śāstreṇa*. The *kratvarthaḥ* is known from the Śāstram, not from anywhere else. The case with *tasya* [*puruṣārthasya padārthasya*] *lipsā* is different; of it it is said: *arthena bhavati*, 'objectively at work' within, not known from outside (not known, for example, from the Śāstram). Thus, whenever a person acts, the innate desire for *puruṣārthaḥ padārthaḥ* is objectively at work. There seem to be two aspects here: one, the subject-view where the significant object 'draws' the subject towards itself. The object which brings about *prītiḥ*, 'attracts' the subject desiring *prītiḥ*. And the subject desiring *prītiḥ* feels drawn towards any object which offers to produce *prītiḥ*. In the wording of our text *arthaḥ* appears to be the meeting-point of *puruṣārthaḥ padārthaḥ* and its corresponding *lipsā*. Specifically *arthaḥ* here seems to refer to the final aim of man which is *prītiḥ*. We could tentatively translate the relevant phrases thus:

tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇā: the innate desire for it [is] caused by the final aim [which is *prītiḥ*].

tasya lipsārthenaiva bhavati: the innate desire for it is just due to the final aim [which is *prītiḥ*].

This final aim is as a matter of fact a kind of final cause that is objectively at work in every activity of man. In other words, *prītiḥ* which is the ultimate aim and purpose of man is at work in his being and in his activity. In everything that man undertakes it is *prītiḥ* which is the

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[8] ŚBh 1194, 2—7; 4.1.2.2.
yasmin prītiḥ puruṣasya, yasmin kṛte padārthe puruṣasya prītir bhavati, sa puruṣārthaḥ padārthaḥ. kutaḥ? tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇā, tasya lipsārthenaiva bhavati, na śāstreṇa. kratvartho hi śāstrād avagamyate, nānyathā. avibhakto hi puruṣārthaḥ prītyā. yo yaḥ prītisādhanaḥ sa puruṣārthaḥ. puruṣārthe lakṣite tadviparītaḥ kratvartha iti kratvarthasya lakṣaṇaṃ siddham.

motivating source. We could now try out our translation of the whole passage:

"That in which man [finds] *prītiḥ*, [that is to say,] that significant thing which when accomplished gives rise to *prītiḥ*, that significant thing [is known as] *puruṣārthaḥ*. Why? The innate longing for it [is] caused by the final aim [which is *prītiḥ*]; the innate longing for it comes to be, just because of the final aim [which is *prītiḥ*], [but] not because of the Śāstram. *Kratvarthaḥ* on the other hand is known [only] from the Śāstram, not from anywhere else. Now *puruṣārthaḥ* is not unconnected with *prītiḥ* [for] whatever brings about *prītiḥ*, that is *puruṣārthaḥ*. *Puruṣārthaḥ* being [thus] described, *kratvarthaḥ* [is stated to be] its opposite. Thus the description of *kratvarthaḥ* too, is, accomplished."[9]

We can now go over to the content of the passage. More than the traditional teaching of the *puruṣārtha*-s the Mīmāṃsā has put forward here a thesis that could well be considered a fair justification of the four traditionally accepted and explained *puruṣārtha*-s. *Prītiḥ*, it is said, is what is sought for in everything that one does. If we take the traditional *puruṣārtha*-s, then it means that whether it is *arthaḥ* or *kāmaḥ* or *dharmaḥ* that we are involved in, it is fundamentally *prītiḥ* that one is striving for. Unlimited and uninterrupted *prītiḥ* would then be said to be *mokṣaḥ*. The teaching in the above passage is that man has an innate longing for *prītiḥ* which is his final aim (*puruṣārtha-*) and that he seeks it in everything that he does. There is in us a spontaneous striving for *prītiḥ*, or more precisely, for those things which produce *prītiḥ*. There is in us however no such innate desire, no spontaneous striving for *kratvarthaḥ*. It is only from the Śāstra-s that we come to know about *kratvarthaḥ*; because of this it is understandable why those things which are meant for the *kratvarthaḥ* do not produce *prītiḥ* directly as do the *puruṣārthaḥ padārthaḥ*.

Śabara has still something more important to say about *prītiḥ*.

"That [result] should be Svargaḥ since it [is] relevant to all without exception (*sarvān praty aviśiṣṭatvāt*). For all men long for Svargaḥ. Why this? Because *prītiḥ* [is] Svargaḥ and everyone strives for *prītiḥ*. What of this? If this [is] so, a word with a general content may not be restricted to [one with] a particular [content], as in the case of *kuryāt* [which cannot be restricted to the particular meaning of] *yajeta*. Hence the result *svargaḥ* is of this kind."[10]

One thing is doubtless clear here: Svargaḥ is identified with *prītiḥ* and this, it is said, is something which every human being strives after. This longing that throbs in the heart of all men cannot be identified with any one particular object. Hence sacrifices like the Viśvajit (which do not mention the

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[9] Ibid.

[10] ŚBh 1256, 5—9; 4.3.7.15.

sa svargaḥ syāt sarvān praty aviśiṣṭatvāt. sarve hi puruṣāḥ svargakāmāḥ. kuta etat. prītir hi svargaḥ. sarvaś ca prītiṃ prārthayate. kim ato yady evam. aviśeṣavacanaḥ śabdo na viśeṣe vyavasthāpito bhaviṣyati yajeta kuryād iti. tasmāt svargaphalam evañjātīyakam iti.

result) are prompted by the innate desire for Svargaḥ (which is the same as *prītiḥ*) and hence they all produce the one result: Svargaḥ.

On Svargaḥ Śabara has this to say: "And there is the idea among the people with regard to an action whose result is not specified [that] Svargaḥ is the result. Thus one says: 'Devadatta has built a park, Svargaḥ is his lot; Devadatta has dug a tank, Svargaḥ is his lot.' What if this is so? According to this rule such is the idea of Svargaḥ [among the people]. Thus with regard to actions that have to be done [and that] have Svargaḥ as their result, they do not mention anything about the result; it is simply taken for granted. [Thus] from this too we know that the result Svargaḥ is of this kind."[11]

Probably Śabara wants to stress that no specific result is mentioned for actions that are meant for the common good. It is normally taken for granted among the people that the fruit of such actions is Svargaḥ. Here, no reasoning is involved; rather it is a sort of intuitive instict that leads the people to think this way. We might not be far wrong, if we surmise that it is the innate longing for Svargaḥ that is responsible for such an intuitive judgement prevalent among the people.

In another context two questions are discussed, namely, is it *yāgaḥ* that is to be realized or is it *kāmaḥ* and is Svargaḥ *prītiḥ* or is it a *dravyam*? Both are allied questions in the sense that if Svargaḥ is *prītiḥ* then *yāgaḥ* becomes subordinate to Svargaḥ; that implies that *yāgaḥ* is to be considered the principal element and Svargaḥ the means to it since a *dravyam* being a *siddhārthaḥ* is always a means towards realising the *sādhyārtha*-s.

Here Śabara argues that what is common to all striving is not *dravyam* but *prītiḥ*, because nothing can be fully identified with *prītiḥ*, since every such thing when absolutised is seen to fail in certain situations. Hence Svargaḥ can refer to *prītiḥ* alone.

"If [Svargaḥ] denotes *prītiḥ*, [then] *yāgaḥ* becomes secondary [and] *prītiḥ* [becomes] primary. How? Because a person's efforts are for that purpose (*tādarthyāt*). For a person strives for *prītiḥ* hence we know that *prītiḥ* [can] not be the means for *yāgaḥ*. The means for *yāgaḥ* [is] namely a *dravyam*; without a *dravyam* no *yāgaḥ* is possible because the [very] word *yajati* is with reference to any activity [where] *dravyam* and *devatā* [are involved]. There is [sometimes] a *yāgaḥ* even when there is no *prītiḥ*. And if *yāgaḥ* were not for the purpose of *prītiḥ*, the act would not be performed, there would be no performer [at all]. For what is for the sake of *prītiḥ*, that is performed, nothing else."[12]

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[11] ŚBh 1256, 11—16; 4.3.7.16.
bhavati cānādiṣṭaphale karmaṇi svargaḥ phalam iti pratyayo loke. evam ucyate. ārāmakṛd devadattaḥ, niyato'sya svargaḥ. taḍāgakṛd devadattaḥ, niyato'sya svarga iti. kim ato yady evam. ittham anena nyāyena svarge sampratyayo bhavati. yasmāt svargaphaleṣu karmasu kartavyeṣu phalavacanaṃ naivoccārayanti, gamyata eveti. tasmād apy avagacchāma evañjātīyakeṣu svargaḥ phalam iti.

[12] ŚBh 1351, 1—8; 6.1.1.2.
prīti-vacanaś-cet, yāgo guṇa-bhūtaḥ, prītiḥ pradhānam. kutaḥ. tādarthyāt puruṣa-prayatnasya. prītyarthaṃ hi puruṣo yatate. tena na prītir yāga-sādhanam iti vijñāyate.

Śabara's thinking on the matter is quite clear and does not require any detailed comment. What is to be noted is his insistence that all men seek *prītiḥ* and that when they do something, they are in fact striving for *prītiḥ*. Anything that does not point to *prītiḥ* in some way or the other is of no interest to man: "For what is for the sake of *prītiḥ* that is performed, nothing else!" Without it no action is possible. Thus:

"Even though the Scriptures say (*śrūyate*) that *yāgaḥ* is to be performed, yet it is not to be performed [for its own sake]; what brings happiness is to be performed; *yāgaḥ* [however] causes discomfort. Hence [merely from the view-point] of perception, [one might say,] it is not to be performed; again [from the view-point of perception] it causes discomfort. [One might say] that because of the fact that it is to be done one could conclude that it brings happiness. The reply to this is that [such] reasoning goes against perception and hence cannot be valid. Therefore *yāgaḥ* is not to be performed if [it is] not for the sake of *prītiḥ*."[10].

Lastly, it is not the 'longing' that is prescribed. But Scripture, taking note of this longing, enjoins *yāgaḥ* as a means towards fulfilling it. That is to say, Scriptural injunction is seen here as of service to the needs of man.

"In this view it is with reference (*anūdya*) to the realization of the striving for Svargaḥ that *yāgaḥ* is prescribed as a means to it."[14]

That is to say, Scriptural injunction shows the way how one's innate longing for *prītiḥ* can be realized. And it must be added that according to Śabara, *prītiḥ* is produced by *yāgaḥ*, not because it is prescribed but because it corresponds to the longing for Svargaḥ (*lipsā*) that is common to all men.

How should one translate *prītiḥ*? G. JHA has consistently rendered it as happiness[15]. Though I have retained *prītiḥ* throughout, my preference is for ,ultimate Significance'. If we remember that *prītiḥ* is synonymous with Svargaḥ (as we just saw) and that it is rooted deep in the nature of man, so that all men without exception long for it and that it becomes the motive-force of all our actions, then this translation will not be too much of a strain on our imagination. Even for the Mīmāṃsā the term *prītiḥ* did not become technical. As a matter of fact in the philosophical part of the Bhāṣyam (that is, in the Tarka-pādaḥ: first *adhyāyaḥ*, first *pādaḥ*), the word does not occur

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dravyaṃ hi yāga-sādhanam. na ṛte dravyād yāgo bhavati. yasmād dravya-devatā-kriye yajatiśabdo vartate.

asatyām api prītyāṃ bhavati yāgaḥ. yadi ca yāgo na prītyartho bhavet, asādhakaṃ karma bhavet. sādhayitāraṃ nādhigacchet. yo hi prītyarthaḥ, sa sādhyate, nānyaḥ.

[13] ŚBh 1351, 11—15; 6.1.1.2.

yadyapi yāgaḥ kartavyaḥ śrūyate, tathāpi na kartavyaḥ. sukhadaḥ kartavyo bhavati. duḥkhado yāgaḥ. tasmāt pratyakṣeṇākartavyaḥ. pratyakṣeṇa ca duḥkhadaḥ. kartavyatāvacanād anumānena sukhado bhavati iti. ucyate. anumānaṃ ca pratyakṣavirodhān na pramāṇam. tasmād akartavyo yāgaḥ, yadi na prītyarthaḥ.

[14] ŚBh 1354, 4—5; 6.1.1.3.

tasmin khalu pakṣe svargaṃ prārthayamānasya anuṣṭhānam anūdya yāgas tasyopāyatvena vidhīyata iti.

[15] G. JHĀ, Śābara-Bhāṣya. Translation, Vol. II, pp. 965ff.

at all. Instead the expression '*niḥśreyasam*' is used[16]. Throughout the following pages I shall be employing the term Significance and Meaningfulness (and their adjectival forms) as synonymous with 'ultimate Significance'. To be distinguished from these is 'meaning' by which I refer to the lexical meaning.

Throughout I have resorted to Significance with special purpose. Significance is not a category that is relevant only in a religious context. Significance is exclusive neither to the sacred nor the secular. It conveys a depth of meaning both to the believer and to the non-believer. It is the meeting-field not only of varying views vying with one another but of differing world-views as well.

By Significance I mean that experience which produces in us a care and concern for someone or something; an experience which moves us deeply and touches our inner core. When someone becomes significant to us, our attitude towards this person undergoes a profound change; the very name of the person produces a twinkle in the eye, warms the heart, makes one look at things and happenings and persons in a bright and positive way; pain is forgotten, worries disappear and difficulties do not seem insurmountable. The reason for all this cannot be categorised in descriptive language. We are aware that the externals of the person are not identical with Significance, since a change in the externals through age or sickness or misfortune does not diminish this special relationship. As a matter of fact, the opposite is the case in such instances. From this we conclude that the externals are both the manifestations as well as the means of such Significance, not the origin or cause. The level at which Significance operates is quite different from the one at which space-time categories function. Significance does not signal otherworldliness nor a neglect of this world. It makes us look at this world and its happenings through a depth-vision. That is why, it communicates tranquility and equanimity on the one hand, and genuinely active concern on the other. In fact an authentic experience of Significance distinguishes itself from a passing sentimental episode by its continuing and committed concern translated into deeds. The full circle of Significance is drawn only when word, intention (purpose) and action are of a piece. Significance is either an attraction or a repulsion; it is never neutral. To say that someone has become significant to one is to say that one has been caught up in the movement which has manifested itself in that person: and the mood of this movement is imperative, not indicative because one experiences an urge to translate this Significance into action. Because of this, words (like love, religion, prayer, involvement) which refer to Significance are not so much states as movements. States are static and therefore they are in the indicative mood, whereas movements are motivated by an imperative.

Can such an understanding of Significance be said to be the same reality which the Mīmāṃsaka-s were after and by which they were motivated? My formulation of it is surely a formulation of what Significance means to me.

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[16] ŚBh 18, 2 and 6; 1.1.1.2.

However, I take it that it acts as a paradigm in the case of anyone who should care to read these lines. He will know the direction in which the word is supposed to point, because when discussing the Mīmāṃsā it is the direction of the pointer that will be of importance. Significance like love is a *notio prima* and cannot be explained. At the most we can give examples of it. But examples do not explain; they exemplify.

Ultimate Significance is not an abstract concept; it is an active commitment that is constantly striving to concretise itself in aspiration and ambition, in value and venture, above all, in our religion and philosophy. Our study is of the 'physics', as it were, of Significance as the Mīmāṃsaka-s experienced it[17].

The Original Mīmāṃsā

At the source of every significant system there is an originary experience which makes itself felt through a set of symbols. As these become gradually coherent, the experience is made more articulate through doctrinal, and, later through dogmatic formulations. If the focus is exclusively on doctrines, and if its original symbol-character is not taken note of, the danger is that doctrines become descriptions of the originary experience and these are then made to do duty as the criteria of orthodoxy. When such a stage is reached,

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[17] In my understanding of things, any 'scientific' study must contribute towards our coming in contact with the 'Significance' of the subject that is being studied. It may be an ideal that is difficult to realize but that ideal has to remain. Because of this basic methodological perspective I have, whenever the opportunity has presented itself to me, tried to go beyond the 'physics' of a metaphor to its 'meta-physics', as it were. It is this consideration that has prompted me to work out the present chapter right at the beginning of my study. I am aware that the genus litterarium of my study is different but I am equally aware that without the kind of general direction presented in this chapter, the study will ultimately be sterile, not significant. Hence I cannot but heartily endorse J. GONDA's remarks made in a similar context at the beginning of his study of the Vedic Gods. "Die Versuche, zu der hypothetischen Urform einer Gottheit durchzustossen und daraus dann die historisch bekannten Teilaspekte ihrer Gestalt entwicklungsgeschichtlich zu erklären, hat die Aufmerksamkeit von anderen sehr wichtigen Fragen abgelenkt. War ein vedischer Gott wirklich für seine Verehrer ein zum Regenspender gewordener Mond oder Sonnengott, war er hier und gestern ein Kampfgott, dort und heute eine Gewittermacht? Ist doch ein Gott für diejenigen, die an ihn glauben, kein Aggregat einiger Wesenszüge und weder durch eine aneinanderreihende noch durch eine mehr oder weniger gelungene historische Beschreibung seiner Eigenschaften zu erfassen! Muß man sich nicht mit Lommel und Lüders die Frage vorlegen, was die Götter für die vedischen Menschen selbst bedeuteten, das heißt: muss man nicht versuchen, die Gestalt oder die Idee herauszuarbeiten, die ein Gott als ein lebendiges Ganzes, als organisches Glied der ihn tragenden Weltanschauung repräsentierte, zu erfassen versuchen, wie er vor der Seele seiner Verehrer stand? Kommt es in einer Schilderung der altindischen Religion nicht in erster Linie darauf an, das einheitliche Bild, den einheitlichen 'Begriff' kennenzulernen, welche der Gott im Geiste der Verfasser unserer Texte wirklich repräsentierte? Muß nicht auch die gründliche zuständliche Beschreibung eines Gottes, eine 'Gesamt- und Wesensschau', die Grundlage zu entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Untersuchungen bilden? Sind für die Angehörigen einer Religion die Götter nicht unveränderlich und bildet ein 'Polytheismus' wie der vedische nicht ein zusammenhängendes Ganzes, das im Sein erfasst werden muss?" in: Die Religionen Indiens, p. 52.

the originary experience has by then become a neat system that is logically consistent. The system can then be differentiated from others through the set of categories it employs and the conclusions it comes to.

When logic and reason take over as the final arbiter of the relationship between experience and expression, then the latter becomes logical and reasonable: which is another way of saying that reason dictates what experience should be and which expression should correspond to which experience. With that, of course, the originary experience becomes a far cry indeed.

It is not that doctrine and dogmas are entirely empty of Significance. Existentially, I think, the energy that the originary experience emits, is at work, in that it makes the doctrines, at least partially, significant. Add to this the emotional attraction contributed by the aura of orthodoxy which is attached to the claim of an uninterrupted tradition. This is one of the reasons why doctrinal descriptions can still (and probably always will) attract even intellectuals. The tendency to decry adherents of dogma as naive people who blindly 'swallow anything' if offered in the garb of religion is an over-simplification from the view-point of both social psychology and philosophy of language.

One should really start the other way round, i. e. from the presupposition that dogmas are somehow still significant and that the originary experience which is at the root of such dogmas, though thematically either neglected or ignored, keeps on existentially nourishing them. On the side of the 'faithful' what is often not realised is that these doctrines are drought diet of husks meant for swine, in spite of the fact that there is an abundance of food in the Father's house even for the servants.

An apt illustration of all this is the Mīmāṃsā. In spite of the step-motherly treatment accorded it by the histories of Indian Philosophy, I believe, that it was originally a very significant system at least to its adherents. Without such an hypothesis, we are confronted with the alternative that the Mīmāṃsaka-s were generally unreasonable people who wasted their time, energy and resources with matters that did not mean a thing to them. Such a position implicitly states that whatever is not meaningful to oneself could never be meaningful to anybody else — this, of course, spells the start of sheer subjectivism. It stands to reason then to accept the proposition that the Mīmāṃsā system was meaningful to its adherents, especially to its early followers.

As I understand it, the basic 'insight' that we have inherited from the Mīmāṃsaka-s could be formulated thus: w h a t i s m e a n i n g f u l t o u s b o t h a s i n d i v i d u a l s a n d a s a c o m m u n i t y c a n n o t b e u l t i m a t e l y e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h a n y s p a c e - t i m e c a t e g o r y[18]. It is something that is 'given', not created; something that is naturally bound to its expression. We are part of a larger tradition which makes explicit what was implicit, and which reveals what always existed. Poets, prophets and philosophers do not

[18] When I say 'formulated' I do not mean 'mathematically' formulated. For, in this realm every formulation is a tentative verbalization.

create but only mediate Meaningfulness; they merely point to what was there already; they only initiate us into the Mystery of what is. This 'is' that is experienceable, through a thousand and one different ways remains in the last analysis, inexplicable. Significance cannot be adequately rendered in terms of space and time. We become or are made aware that this or thct is a bearer of Significance; but we are never aware that this or that person is the cause of Significance.

When something or someone begins to mean so much to us that we discover a value, which claims priority in our lives, then it means that we have come in contact with a type of Significance which the Mīmāṃsaka-s proclaimed was the primary meaning of Dharma. Such Significance can never be justified, verified, proved, adequately expressed, or articulated once-and-for-all. We have no explanation why goodness appeals, and why evil repels. True, we may not be agreed as to what is good and what is evil but still, we shall be of one mind as regards the fact that goodness attracts and that evil does not. When we are convinced (not merely know notionally) that something is good then we allow it to goad us and push us towards its realisation; we get satisfaction and pleasure out of it. The experience of goodness is, so to speak, an imperative, not an indicative (= descriptive); we are impelled to act and implement. And for this there is ultimately no rational explanation. The theistic thesis that God is the ultimate explanation, is good as far as it goes — especially logotherapeutically — but it does not go far enough if by theism we mean theistic expressions. If however by theism we refer to a positive experience beyond all space-time categories, then it is in the same boat as any other thesis which admits the Mystery that is embodied in the experience of ultimate Significance.

It is the merit of the Mīmāṃsā that its originary experience can be inherited by any and everyone who is serious about his search for Significance. It is of relative importance how such Significance is systematised; but it is an absolute imperative that it be experienced. It would, I am convinced, be an impossible task to find a human being to whom nothing whatever is meaningful. The experience of Significance which is both the final and the efficient cause and which makes a person out of a human being is accessible to all. To be a human being is to be an heir to an heritage of Significance that is as endless as it is beginningless.

Though Significance has no cause, and its origins are inexplicable, tradition is its vehicle. Though it is not bound to the present, nor is it lost in the past, yet the future can always reveal hitherto unknown aspects of it. Just as it is not a captive of time, so too is it free of any spatial restrictions. Any man anywhere at any time is free to have access to it. This does not mean however that any and every one will be assured of success. Because of this, we require both *śrutiḥ* and *smṛtiḥ* since, as the authoritative concretisations of tradition, they are the bearers of ultimate meaning[19].

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[19] BETTINA BÄUMER: Die Bedeutung der Tradition in Hinduismus. In: Kairos 3, 1978, pp. 218—233.

Now, is all this highflying, a projection of what is not there in the Mīmāṃsā, an exercise in phantasy?

The following pages should provide the answer: their task is to illustrate from the texts and to show that the interpretation that is here offered, far from being fanciful, illumines Mīmāṃsā concepts that have been neglected or treated as being of little or no worth, and highlights coherence in general and connections in particular among the different doctrines of the system.

The Mīmāṃsā complex of symbol-expressions

The gist of the major Mīmāṃsā doctrines has to be interpreted first and foremost on the symbol level. It is not their descriptive quality that is primarily important; we have to become familiar with their symbol-character. For these doctrines are based on symbol-experiences: each of them is a complex set of metaphors. Concomitant with the growth in our experience and understanding of a particular metaphor is the increase in our formulations attempted to capture the inner atmosphere created by the metaphor. It is here that danger lurks. The preoccupation to formulate precisely and aptly, to justify one formulation and to set it above others as a model and a criterion, can lead into temptation, the temptation to look at language in a mathematical manner.

Literal interpretations are late arrivals in the history of symbol-expressions. To discover their symbol-character therefore, is to attempt an access to the originary experience which gave birth to the symbol-expressions. This is what we have to keep in mind when we study the more important tenets of the Mīmāṃsā.

It is with this purpose in mind that I want to linger a little on the element common to all of them because that seems to me to be a pointer to the experience. There are two aspects to this common element: the one is the aspect of givenness and the other is the self-explanatory aspect. About the first we have already spoken a little earlier. In each and every one of the major Mīmāṃsā doctrines we discover that they are given, not made; explained and exposed but not composed or created.

The second aspect is in fact the other side of the first. All the above doctrines enjoy the attribute of self-dependence, that is, they are not dependent on an extrinsic element to justify them. They are intelligible in themselves and therefore do not stand in need of someone or something to explain their existence or their essence.

Let us now briefly survey the main doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā from the view-point of these aspects.

Śabdanityatvam

Language in its phenomenal aspect is both a given and an independent 'entity'. It is beginningless and without end. That is, as long as man has existed language has existed. Man without language is an impossibility; man exists only and as long as language exists. This profound insight of the Mīmāṃsā is similarly but independently being proclaimed by one of the

greatest philosophers of our century. In his essay "...Poetically Man Dwells..." MARTIN HEIDEGGER has the following pertinent remarks to make. "Man acts as if he were the shaper and master of language, while it is language which remains mistress of man. When this relation of dominance is inverted, man succumbs to strange contrivances. Language then becomes a means of expression. Where it is expression, language can degenerate to a mere impression (to mere print). Even where the use of language is no more than this, it is good that one should still be careful in one's speech. But this alone can never extricate us from the reversal, from the confusion of the true relation of dominance as between language and man. For in fact it is language that speaks. Man begins speaking and man only speaks to the extent that he responds to, that he corresponds with language, and only in so far as he hears language addressing, concurring with him. Language is the highest and everywhere the foremost of those assents which we human beings can never articulate solely out of our own means"[20].

Our own experience of language is that we receive it from others. We may make transpositions in what we have been given but we are far from creating language. In HEIDEGGER's words, language is the house of being. In their own way, the early Mīmāṃsaka-s were saying the same thing.

That the later Mīmāṃsaka-s reduced Śabdanityatvam to Padanityatvam is not accidental in both the senses of the word. Firstly a pedantic perspective of language is bound, sooner or later, to lead to an exclusive preoccupation with words and meanings as the constituents of language: language is considered as consisting of sentences made up of words each of which is connected with its own meaning; and the totality of these word-meanings produces the sentence-meaning. Secondly the shift from Śabdanityatvam to Padanityatvam is not accidental in the sense that the change is essentially a different understanding of language. Whereas the essence of the Śabdanityatva-symbol is poetic, that of the Padanityatva-doctrine is pragmatic. The pragmatic and the poetic need not be exclusive, and in an integral understanding they are the two ends between which the whole of human existence is enveloped. But to explain either of them at the expense or exclusion of the other, or in the same terms, that is, by reducing the one to the other, is to ignore the nature of the one or the other. Historically, Padanityatvam has been expounded more on the background of a materialistic (or substantialized) rather than a meta-physical understanding of language. Throughout the development of Śabdanityatvam its symbol-character has been continually overlooked. It is therefore not surprising that it degenerated into the Padanityatva-doctrine[21].

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[20] Quoted in GEORGE STEINER, After Babel, Aspects of Language and Translation. Oxford, 1977, p. xi. The passage is from M. HEIDEGGER: "...Poetically Man dwells..." and is to be found in his collection of essays in: Poetry, Language, Thought. Translations and Introduction by ALBERT HOFSTADER, New York, 1952.

[21] That Śabdaḥ is more comprehensive than *padam* is not my convention but an accepted element of Saṃskṛta usage. Thus Śabdaḥ can be used for *padam*, Śrutiḥ, *bhāṣā*, or word in general but the same cannot be said of *padam*.

Autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ and Akṛtivādaḥ

The *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ* referred more to the relation between Śabdaḥ and Significance than to the relation between Śabdaḥ and object. The Mīmāṃsā view of language was founded not so much on the information that it provided as on the transformation it worked; and transformation is caused not so much by the meaning part of language as by its Meaningfulness. We shall discuss this in detail in a later chapter. If this is agreed upon, then the thesis that the *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ* is primarily about Śabdaḥ and Significance will not, sound far-fetched. The relation Śabda-Significance is both given and self-explanatory. To explain the *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ* we do not need to have recourse to something else. To come to know significant Śabdaḥ is to come to know Dharma and Dharma is not created, it needs no further justification. Either it stands by itself or it falls.

The Ākṛtivāda as it has come down to us, belongs to a period in which concern for the 'parts of language' loomed larger than the language of concern. Though its grammatical importance is undeniable, its core symbolism was of a piece with that of the *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ*. Whereas *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ* focused on the givenness of the Śabda-Significance the *ākṛtivādaḥ* stressed the universality of the Significance inherent in a Śabdaḥ. Obviously this is not unconnected with the scholastic question, is the meaning of Śabdaḥ an universal or a particular? But when language became reified, the question of the Significance of universality was posed without that of the universality of Significance. These two doctrines however are intimately connected with each other like the blind and the lame.

Bhāvanā and Abhihitānvayavādaḥ

That language can move and motivate and provoke one to action is the insight that is symbolised through *bhāvanā*. This power of language is best illustrated through an imperative which when clothed in words is called *vidhiḥ*. The efficient force that is at work in language in general and in an imperative in particular and which is expressed as the *bhāvanā* is also a given and is self-explanatory. The characteristic of Significance is that it incorporates *bhāvanā* in the highest degree and that its primary form of expression is the *vidhiḥ*.

The discussion in the later Mīmāṃsā is reduced to a scholastic disquisition on the location of this *bhāvanā* in the sentence, whether, that is, the *bhāvanā* is located in the verbal root or in the verbal suffix. But bh*āvanā* as Significance is not taken cognisance of at all.

The core of Abhihitānvayavādaḥ stresses the fact that Meaningfulness is always mediated through a totality and that Meaningfulness itself is a totality. More than that: Meaningfulness does not fall from the sky; it is not an element alien to this world. The parts that make up the totality are the only means which mediate Meaningfulness, which in turn is not to be identified with the parts.

The way in which sentence and its meaning function is analogous to the way in which Significance and its expression function. The Abhihitānvayavā-

daḥ, which is available to us in the texts, belongs to the period in which language was looked at in a substantialized manner. Hence there is no trace in the discussions of the way in which Significance and its expression function.

There is one last thing to be said of *bhāvanā* and Abhihitānvayavādaḥ: both of them are made use of in the scholastic period of the Mīmāṃsā to support the contention that an imperative can convey its meaning independently of a personal purpose. In spite of its scholastic slant, the symbol character of the teaching is still recognizable: the inherent ability of language to touch and to move a person, an ability which is employed, but not introduced, by men.

Svataḥprāmāṇyam

My thesis that the basic symbolism produced by the originary experience of the Mīmāṃsā is characterized by givenness and self-explanatoriness is very simply, but nonetheless convincingly, exemplified in the doctrine of Svataḥprāmāṇyam. Our knowing does not need external credentials to justify its validity. It can stand its ground without any prop. And the interesting thing about every act of our knowing is that we experience both its givenness and its self-validity. Any type of dependence in either of its aspects would make the process of our knowing impossible and unattainable. Actually it is the instance where we have an opportunity to come to know first hand the symbol-character of the concepts of 'givenness' and 'self-explanatoriness'. Because of the very nature of this symbol it is not surprising that Svataḥprāmāṇyam was one of the first formulated fruits of the Mīmāṃsā. That it escaped the fate of reification that befell other doctrines is to be attributed to its experiential character and not to any special consideration accorded it by the Mīmāṃsaka scholastics.

The later specifications of *prāmāṇyam*, truth or correctness, certainty and the experience of the act of knowing (which was afterwards abbreviated as 'newness of knowledge') are merely explicitations of the early symbol-content and refer basically to one and the same thing. Any genuine and direct experience contains correctness and certainty. The latter are possible only in an experiential act, because they are attributes of the very process of knowing. Significance is genuine only if experienced, and in the act of experiencing it it is accompanied by truth and certainty.

Vedāpauruṣeyatvam and Vedaprāmāṇyam

The Significance that the Vedas conveyed, according to the early Mīmāṃsaka-s, is uncaused and uncreated: it has been handed down from generation to generation; and its validity is very real and 'tangible' — this is the gist of these doctrines. The historical fact that these significant scriptures have been regarded as authorless is as much of a symbol-expression as the Naiyāyika contention that they have Īśvara as their author. Later Mīmāṃsaka-s took this symbol-expression as a description of an historical fact. In understanding these expressions we have constantly to keep before

our minds the fact that the early Mīmāṃsaka-s were trying to articulate a world-view in which they were at home and which therefore was meaningful to them. In this world-view the Veda-s monopolized the realm of Meaningsfulness; that is, Significance was restricted to the Veda-s. All that we have been repeatedly saying about Significance, its source-lessness, its self-validity, its non-restrictability in space and time all this is expressed through Vedāpauruṣeyatvam, Vedānādinityatvam and Vedaprāmāṇyam. But these doctrines too, had in the course of history to suffer their share of systematization and conceptualization.

The various attempts to capture the m y t h o s of the Mīmāṃsā have given birth to a variety of metaphors. But metaphors if not taken seriously get metamorphosed into descriptions. These, like sycophants, lend themselves to systematization and the security they offer is false. To build on them is to build on sand. The following study is not of the Mīmāṃsā metaphors but of the Mīmāṃsā system. It is a study of the reflection, not of the reality, of the Mīmāṃsā m y t h o s.

CHAPTER 2 ŚABARA'S TARKAPĀDAḤ: AN ANALYSIS

Śabara's scheme of things in the Tarkapādaḥ of his Bhāṣyam is transparent enough to disclose not only the more original beginnings of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā but also the later additions into the system. Of the 32 Sūtra-s that make up the Tarkapādaḥ, the first five are concerned with Vedaprāmāṇyam, Sūtra-s 6—23 treat of Śabdanityatā, Sūtra-s 27—32 treat of Vedapauruṣeyatvam. Of these sections E. FRAUWALLNER has shown (as we shall see later) that Sūtra-s 6—23 (Śabdanityatā) do not belong to the original scheme. If we now consider the remaining three sections, one thing (among others) is striking: they all are concerned with the Veda, albeit from a different angle. This is characteristic of the original Mīmāṃsā since the Veda was the centre of gravity of its praxis. Due to this it was but natural that in the course of time various aspects of the Vedic praxis were gradually questioned and consequently thematized. This was the birth of the Tarkapādaḥ.

The first problem to be articulated was that of Vedaprāmāṇyam particularized in the context of the *codanā*. The effect of this was the appearance of the Apauruṣeya-doctrine because it was intimately connected with the peculiar Mīmāṃsaka understanding of Vedaprāmāṇyam. This in turn raised a further but nonetheless connected problem, namely, that of the expressiveness of the Vedic sentences. For, if the Veda is *apauruṣeyaḥ* then the signification of sentences becomes problematic since there can be neither purpose nor purport in *apauruṣeyaḥ* sentences. Lastly, the problem of the eternality of the Veda had to come to the fore since vedic sentences like human utterances could be understood as human compositions.

The footprints left by such a marching development can still be located. E. FRAUWALLNER has already pointed to the glaring interpolation of the Śabdanityatā section which like a new patch on an old piece of cloth cannot be overlooked. It stands out as it does not hang together with what has preceded or with what follows. Its purpose which was to prove the eternality of the Veda (from the fact of the eternality of Śabdaḥ) remains like a promise made but not kept. And the mystery heightens when we notice that it has little to do with anything that is genuinely and characteristically part of the system. On the contrary, it introduces a strange element called Śabdaḥ which, if it had not been for the skill and ingenuity of a Kumārila, would have become a contender to the throne occupied by the Veda.

The growth of the other sections was more homogeneous. The challenges posed by the problems of Vedaprāmāṇyam and Vedāpauruṣeyam were constructive and the seed they sowed fell on good ground bringing forth fruit that was consistent with the fundamental atmosphere and climate of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.

Unlike the later Mīmāṃsā (which because of its historical situation had the advantage of being able to sort out and systematise consistently and coherently), the early Mīmāṃsā had, so to speak, to live from hand to mouth. It had to tackle the problems of survival and growth without the advantage of previous experience and so it ran the danger of assimilating into the system doctrines which it would not be able to digest. And even in the case of those additions which were of a piece with the general direction of the Mīmāṃsā, it was not to be expected that they would be polished and perfected. We have evidence for this in the manner and order of treatment of topics.

In the Śābara-Bhāṣyam we see this clearly. In the first five Sūtra-s Śabara exposes the thesis of vedic validity (*prāmāṇya-*) simply and soberly. But just before his time this simplicity and sobriety had given way to sophistication as is evidenced by the Vṛttikāra's treatment of Sūtra-s 3—5 which Śabara seems to quote *verbatim* and at length. This change becomes more marked in Kumārila who takes off from the Vṛttikāraḥ more than from the Bhāṣyakāraḥ both as regards the treatment of problems as also of positions. Kumārila, for instance, composed his Śloka-vārttikam in such a way that it gathers momentum in each succeedings section so that the final chapter is a real crescendo. All this is quite the opposite of Śabara's treatment. Here the real bang, so to speak, is in the beginning which peters out by the time we reach the Vedāpauruṣeya-section. The connection between the succeeding sections is usually implicit, but sometimes artificial. Kumārila, by comparison, is both systematic and scholarly, critical and coherent, and though rebellious in some instances he is reverent throughout. His sections are like storeys neatly built one over the other. But there is no mistaking the material he uses; it is all from the store-house of the early Mīmāṃsā. Even what appears new in Kumārila is, as a matter of fact, nothing but a bringing to light of what lay hidden in the early construction.

The above remarks may appear arbitrary; what follows, I hope, will substantiate with text and context.

Śabara's treatment of the first *pādaḥ* of the first *adhyāyaḥ* is concentrated from beginning to end on Dharma. And this, not only because such an intention is programmatically announced at the start but because both the method and the manner of treating the topics make his choice clear.

The purpose of the following analysis of ŚBh 1.1.1—32 (Tarkapādaḥ) and the Vṛttikāragrantha (1.1.3—5) is to offer a detailed conspectus of the basis of my study. Hopefully it will help in contextualizing and clarifying my interpretations.

Analysis of Śābara-Bhāṣyam (1.1.1—32) 9, 1—25, 2; 72, 4—104, 8.

1.1.1	
9, 1—7	Comment on *dharma-jijñāsā* and programmatic sketch of the Sūtra-s as answering different questions on various aspects of Dharma.
10, 1—2	PP. There is no point in examining Dharma.

10, 3—11, 1—3	Dharma puts one in contact with *niḥśreyasam* but since there is disagreement about its exact nature, *dharma-jijñāsā* is justified.

1.1.2

12, 1—2	Definition of Dharma as *codanā-lakṣaṇo'rthaḥ*.
12, 1—2—13, 1—3	The two characteristics of the *codanā* are: i) it moves and motivates (*pravartaka-*) and ii) it makes known whatever is significant, be it past, present, future, etc.
13, 4—5	PP. The *codanā* is like any other *laukikaṃ vacanam*, sometimes true, sometimes false.
14, 1—5	To speak thus of the *codanā* is a contradiction. In the matter of ultimate Significance to 'know' means to 'know' something significant. The *codanā* makes known Significance that is not accessible to the senses. The contradiction consists in this: it makes known something significant which does not exist. Moreover there is no criterion for the falsity of a *codanā*.
15, 1—4	The 'knowledge' conveyed by a *codanā* is not doubtful, it is known as certain and it can never be *mithyā*. This type of knowing cannot change, whatever the time, or the other circumstances.
15, 5—7	There are four kinds of *laukikaṃ vacanam*: *pratyayitāt puruṣāt*, *indriya-viṣayam*, *apratyayitāt puruṣāt* and *anindriya-viṣayam*. The first two can be *avitatham* but the last two are always *apramāṇam* because they are *puruṣa-buddhi-prabhavam*.
16, 1—3	Except for the *codanā* no other type of *vacanam* can know 'objects' like Dharma: just as the blind cannot know colour.
16, 3—6	The fact that Manu, etc. taught about Dharma does not prove that they were original authorities on the subject. Genuine teaching about Dharma can only be from the Veda.
16, 6—17, 1	In the matter of Dharma the difference between *pauruṣeya-vacanam* and *veda-vacanam* is substantial: The *pauruṣeya-vacanam* says: this person knows thus. The *veda-vacanam* says: the object is thus.
17, 2	In the case of the *puruṣa-vacanam* there is always the possibility of falsification.
17, 2—3	In case of the Veda however there is no falsification possible.

17, 3—4	PP. Every type of *vacanam* can go wrong. From the falsity of a *pauruṣeya-vacanam* we conclude to the falsity of a *veda-vacanam.*
17, 5—6	There is a substantial difference between a *pauruṣeya-vacanam* and *veda-vacanam.*
17, 7—9	Besides such an argumentation is indirect and hence cannot militate against a direct means of knowing like the *veda-vacanam.*
17, 9	The conclusion: *tasmāc codanā-lakṣaṇo'rthaḥ śreyaskaraḥ.*
17, 9—11	PP. If this is so, what is *śreyaskaraḥ* should be examined, not Dharma.
17, 10—11—18, 1—5	Dharma is the same as *śreyaskaraḥ* and has three meanings. i) One who performs *yāgaḥ* is called a *dhārmikaḥ.* ii) Both in the Veda as well as in everyday language Dharma is what is expressed by the word *yajati.* iii) What puts one in touch with *niḥśreyasam* is what is meant by Dharma.
18, 5—7—19, 1—5	Both *arthaḥ* and *anarthaḥ* are characterized by the *codanā* but *arthaḥ* leads to *niḥśreyasam, anarthaḥ* to *pratyavāyaḥ.* Whereas the former is proclaimed in order that it be performed, the latter is in no way prescribed.
19, 6—7—20, 1	If the sentence would speak of Dharma and its characterisation, as well as *arthaḥ* as leading to *niḥśreyasaḥ* and *anarthaḥ* as leading to *pratyavāyaḥ,* there would be *vākya-bhedaḥ.*
20, 1—5	The rules applying to sentences need not necessarily apply also to the Sūtra-s. But one can interpret the present Sūtra as made up of two parts of two sentences. One could also interpret it as one sentence without committing *vākya-bhedaḥ.*

1.1.3

21, 1—4	Up to now *codanā-nimittaṃ dharmasya jñānam* has merely been stated. Now the *nimitta*-part of it has to be examined.

1.1.4

21, 5—8—22, 1—7	*Pratyakṣam* cannot be the *nimittam* of Dharma-knowledge because the object of perception is a reality which is present during the perceptive act. The other *pramāṇa*-s cannot be the *nimittam,* since they, too, are built on perception.

1.1.5	
23, 1—5—24, 1—6	The *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ* between Śabdaḥ and *arthaḥ* is the source of Dharma-knowledge which is called *upadeśaḥ*. Such cognition that has once arisen is infallible and does not turn into its opposite.
24, 6—25, 1—2	The *codanā* is *pramāṇam* because its cognition is independent of all other cognitions and of all other men. It is, as it were, cognition from within.
1.6.6—11	
72, 4—75, 8	PP. Śabdaḥ is a product; it is perishable. The phenomenon of language proves the production of Śabdaḥ. It cannot be one and eternal since it is uttered in many diverse places at the same time. Furthermore there is modification in Śabdaḥ as proved by examples like *dadhyatra*. Finally Śabdaḥ can increase in volume as happens when many speak at the same time.
1.1.12	
75, 10—76, 15	Śabdaḥ is manifested, not produced.
1.1.13	
76, 6—80, 3	Śabdaḥ is not perishable. Śabdaḥ is eternal but not its manifestation. This manifestation depends on *nādaḥ*, the manifesting agency.
1.1.14	
80, 4—7	Śabdaṃ *kuru* is merely an idiom and hence it cannot be interpreted literally.
1.1.15	
80, 8—82, 5	Śabdaḥ like the sun is one and can be heard in different places at the same time.
1.1.16	
82, 8—83, 3	*Dadhyatra* is not a modification but a different syllable.
1.1.17	
83, 4—84, 4	Only the *nādaḥ* increases, not Śabdaḥ.
1.1.8	
84, 5—86, 4	Śabdaḥ is eternal because it is meant to reveal not so much itself as its meaning.

1.1.19	
86, 5—87, 3	Śabdaḥ denotes *ākṛtiḥ* and hence it is eternal like the *ākṛtiḥ*.
1.1.20	
87, 4—90, 4	The same Śabdaḥ is manifested again and again. The fact that it is re-cognized as the same Śabdaḥ is proof of its eternality.
1.1.21—22	
90, 5—91, 5	Śabdaḥ is eternal because it is not dependent on any cause, efficient or material.
1.1.23	
91, 6—8	Even Scripture speaks of the eternality of Śabdaḥ.
1.1.24	
91, 9—95, 6	PP. Śabdaḥ, *arthaḥ* and their *saṃbandhaḥ* may be eternal but the grouping of the words of a vedic injunction is either artificial or illusory.
1.1.25—26	
95, 7—100, 3	The sentence-meaning arises through and from the word-meanings because of mutual qualification and restriction. This being so, the grouping of the words of a vedic statement need not be either artificial or illusory. Human compositions are possible in matters of sense-perception.
1.1.27—28	
100, 4—101, 10	PP. The Vedas must have been composed since they are named after various authors. They also mention ephemeral happenings. This implies, that the Vedas are not eternal.
1.1.29	
101, 11—102, 2	The Veda-tradition is beginningless, hence it cannot have an author.
1.1.30	
102, 3—10	The names in the Veda are not those of authors but of those who were excellent exponents.
1.1.31	
102, 11—103, 5	The happenings spoken of in the Veda are not historical and hence not limited to a definite period in time.

1.1.32

103, 6—104, 8	The Vedic sentences are not like utterances of lunatics and children, since they show a consistency and coherence that does not characterize children and lunatics. The apparently absurd sentences are as a matter of fact sentences pointing through praise to the Significance of the Vedic injunctions. "Thus it is established that Dharma is that Significance which is characterized by the Vedic statements."

Analysis of the Vṛttikāra-granthaḥ (1.1.3—5) 25, 4—72, 3

1.1.3

25, 4—26, 4	Whether the cause of Dharma should be examined or not.

1.1.4a

26, 5—27, 2	Definition and explanation of *pratyakṣam.*
27, 2—28, 6	Explanation of *tatsaṃprayogaḥ* and *satsaṃprayogaḥ.*
28, 7—30, 9	Discussion of *nirālambanavādaḥ.*
31, 1—35, 6	Discussion of *śūnyavādaḥ.*
36, 1—37, 2	The two kinds of *anumānam.*
37, 3—39, 2	Definitions of the remaining four *pramāṇa*-s.

1.1.4b

39, 5—41, 7	PP. Śabdaḥ is *apramāṇam.*

1.1.5a

41, 8—42, 2	The *apauruṣeya-saṃbandhaḥ* between Śabdaḥ and *arthaḥ* is real *jñānam.*
42, 2—4	If however the *saṃbandhaḥ* had been *pauruṣeyaḥ* then the resulting cognition would be *parapratyayaḥ.*
42, 5—7	When Śabdaḥ speaks there is knowledge from within, not from outside. When Śabdaḥ enlightens, there can be no error.
42, 7—9	The cognition produced by the *codanā* is neither doubtful nor erroneous in spite of change in time, persons or circumstances.
42, 9—12	An inferential cognition cannot militate against the direct cognition of the *codanā*. Hence *codanālakṣaṇa*-alone is Dharma.
43, 1—4	There can be no relation betwenn Śabdaḥ and *arthaḥ*, because if such a relation were to be admitted Śabdaḥ would always have to be there where *arthaḥ* is found.

43, 5—6	The relation between Śabdaḥ and *arthaḥ* is between what leads to cognition (*saṃjñā*) and that which is known (*saṃjñī*).
44, 1—6	It is true that a word when heard for the first time does not lead to the cognition of its meaning. But this is a fact of experience according to which we have to formulate our theory.
45, 1—6	PP. Because of this fact we have to conclude that the relation between word and meaning is artificial.
45, 7—48, 12	By Śabda we mean the *varṇa*-s of which it consists and these are that which is heard by the ear. A reality over and above the *varṇa*-s cannot be admitted.
49, 1—52, 5	The meaning of a word denotes the *ākṛtiḥ* which is perceived and is not a matter of illusion. The cognition of an *ākṛtiḥ* is not like the cognition of '*paṅktir, yuthaṃ, vanam*'. Their cognition can be erroneous but not that of the *ākṛtiḥ*.
52, 6—55, 8	There is no one who created the relation between word and meaning, since one does not remember him, though in such a case, one should have, if there had been one.
1.1.5b	
55, 8—56, 9	The process of learning a language.
1.1.5c	
56, 10—57, 2	Comment on *avyatirekaś ca*. In places difficult of access how could one or more creators of the relation between word and meaning spread their conventions regarding word and meaning.
57, 2—58, 3	There cannot have been a time in which the relationship at least between some words and their meanings did not exist. The opposite thesis cannot be proved.
1.1.5d	
58, 3—6	Comment on *arthe'nupalabdhe*, and refers to the relationship between words and invisible objects like the *devatā*-s.
1.1.5e	
58, 6—8	Comment on tat *pramāṇam, anapekṣatvāt*.
58, 9—60, 3	Reply to objection: *animittaṃ, śabdaḥ*.
60, 4—72, 3	*Ātma-vādaḥ*.

CHAPTER 3 DHARMA IN THE EARLY MĪMĀṂSĀ

There are in the Śābara-Bhāṣyam a variety of statements about Dharma[1].

i) We have, first of all, statements which are either scholastic and/or stylized and which for our purpose are of minor importance:
   (i) *ko dharmaḥ, kathaṃlakṣaṇaḥ ity ekenaiva sūtreṇa vyākhyātaṃ codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ*[2]
   (ii) *dharmaṃ prati hi vipratipannā bahuvidaḥ kecid anyaṃ dharmam āhuḥ, kecid anyam so 'yam avicārya pravartamānaḥ kaṃcid eva upādadāno vihanyeta anarthaṃ ca ṛcchet tasmād dharmo jijñāsitavyaḥ*[3]
   (iii) *tatra anartho dharma ukto mā bhūd ity arthagrahaṇam*[4]

ii) Secondly, we come across statements which point to a meaning based on function:
   (i) *yo hi yāgam anutiṣṭhati, taṃ dhārmika iti samācakṣate*[5]

iii) Thirdly, there are texts which explicitly state the traditional usage of Dharma: (*samāmananti*)
   (i) *yajñena yajñam ayajanta devāḥ*
   tāni dharmāṇi prathamāny āsan
   iti yajatiśabdavācyam eva dharmaṃ samāmananti[6]
   (ii) *codanālakṣaṇo dharma nendriyādilakṣaṇaḥ arthaś ca dharmo nānartha iti*[7]
   (iii) *uktam asmābhiḥ codanānimittaṃ dharmasya jñānam'iti*[8]
   (iv) *autpattikaḥ śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasya agnihotrādilakṣaṇasya dharmasya nimittaṃ pratyakṣādibhir anavagatasya*[9]

iv) Lastly, we have a group of statements which speak of Dharma in what I prefer to call, eschatological terms:
   (i) *tasmād dharmo jijñāsitavyaḥ, sa hi niḥśreyasena puruṣaṃ saṃyunakti iti pratijānīmahe*[10]

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[1] All the references to the Tarkapāda of the Śābara-Bhāṣya in this chapter are to FRAUWALLNER's text in his Materialien.

[2] ŚBh 14, 16—17 (1.1.1.1).

[3] Ibid. 16, 3—5 (1.1.1.1).

[4] Ibid. 20, 14—15 (1.1.2.2).

[5] Ibid. 20, 5—6.

[6] Ibid. 20, 9—11.

[7] Ibid. 20, 20—21.

[8] Ibid. 22, 4 (1.1.3.3).

[9] Ibid. 24, 5—6 (1.1.5.5).

[10] Ibid. 16, 5—6 (1.1.1.1).

(ii) *tayā (codanayā) yo lakṣyate, so'rthaḥ puruṣaṃ niḥśreyasena saṃyunakti*[11]

(iii) *ya eva śreyaskaraḥ, sa eva dharmaśabdenocyate*[12]

(iv) *tena yaḥ puruṣaṃ niḥśreyasena saṃyunakti, sa eva dharmaśabdenocyate*[13]

For our discussion, I suggest, groups iii) and iv) are of importance. What is striking is that almost all, both friends and followers of the Mīmāṃsā as well as its opponents, have thoroughly overlooked (or ignored) statements of group iv). Those of group iii) have been taken as the meaning of Dharma as understood by the Mīmāṃsā. Furthermore even the statements of group iii) have not been carefully analysed.

We first turn our attention to group iv). There is no doubt whatever that Dharma is that which *puruṣaṃ niḥśreyasena saṃyunakti*. The phrase occurs thrice and the fourth time it is condensedly rendered as *śreyaskaraḥ*. For the Mīmāmsaka-s *niḥśreyasan* is the highest aim of life. It is the *puruṣārthaḥ*. In other words, Dharma is that which puts one in touch with *niḥśreyasaḥ*, the final fulfillment of man. Already in this life man can be connected with his final fulfillment by means of Dharma. Whatever the particular process through which this happens, it is stated by the Bhāṣyam that Dharma joins the one who practises in with *niḥśreyasam*. If this phrase, which must have been of striking Significance to the early Mīmāṃsaka-s (otherwise it is hard to see why it should occur so often in one and the same context), is to mean anything to us, then we shall perforce have to examine the different possibilities which could enlighten the phrase.

Before I proceed further, I wish to digress a bit in order to see if there is any connection of meaning between groups ii), iii) and iv). We have to examine whether the Mīmāṃsaka-s arbitrarily attributed different meanings to the word Dharma or whether there was, at least implicitly, a principle that justified and joined together their multiple usage.

If we keep before our eyes the actual assumption of the Mīmāṃsaka-s that Dharma is not amenable to the senses[14] then there should be no difficulty in conceding that *yāgādi* cannot be the primary meaning of Dharma. If the *yāga*-ritual were the chief meaning of Dharma, then the assumption (that Dharma is not amenable to the senses) will be rendered both senseless and superfluous. And this, for the simple reason that the *yāgādi*-ritual is obviously amenable to the senses. On the other hand, if the assumption that Dharma is not amenable to the senses is given its due, (which means that Dharma is beyond the ken of the senses) then the primary purpose and meaning of Dharma cannot be reduced to the *yāgādi*-ritual. Thus

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[11] Ibid. 16, 11—12 (1.1.2.2).

[12] Ibid. 20, 4—5 (1.1.2.2).

[13] Ibid. 20, 7—8 (1.1.2.2).

[14] Ibid. 22, 9—10 (1.1.4.4): *satsaṃprayoge puruṣasyendriyānām buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittaṁ, vidyamānopalambhanatvāt.*

Ibid. 22, 14—15 (1.1.4.4): *bhaviṣyaṃś caiṣo 'rtho na jñānakāle'sti. sataś caitad upalambhanaṃ, nāsataḥ ataḥ pratyakṣam animittam.*

negatively, we conclude that, if the assumption of Dharma's non-amenability to the senses is to be upheld, then that which puts one in touch with *niḥśreyasam* is what is primarily meant by Dharma.

If this is granted, then the meaning of the statements in group iii) also becomes intelligible. The primary meaning of Dharma is related to its primary purpose which is to connect one with *niḥśreyasam*. The secondary meaning is then attributed to the means through which the primary purpose is achieved. And these means are the *yāgādi*-ritual. Connected with the primary and the secondary meaning of the Dharma is a third usage: the one who performs the *yāgādi*-ritual is named a *dhārmika*. To summarise, the primary meaning of Dharma refers to something supersensible, the secondary to the means through which the primary purpose is achieved and the third meaning is extrinsically attributed to the one who makes use of these means.

These distinctions may seem elementary but they are essential for an adequate understanding of the Mīmaṃsā. At the same time they are useful in drawing our attention to the fact that, though the practical preoccupation of the Mīmaṃsā was the interpretation of the ritual texts and the articulation of the principles on which such interpretations were based, yet this was not their primary purpose; I think, it would not be an exaggeration to state that this fact has been overlooked all along in the history of the Mīmāṃsā, both within and outside the system[15].

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[15] Friend, follower and foe of the Mīmāṃsā seem to be agreed on this one point: the Mīmāṃsā understanding of Dharma is ritualistic. Whereas friends and followers go to the extent of showing the righteousness that is involved in the enterprise, foes are quick to demonstrate its ridiculousness. "There is little room for real Philosophy in all this, but there are questions such as that of Dharma or duty, including sacrificial duties, which offer an opportunity for discussing the origin of duty and the nature of its rewards; while in accounting for seeming contradictions and in arriving at general principles concerning sacrificial acts, problems would naturally turn up which, though often in themselves valueless, are generally treated with considerable ingenuity... Dharma, here translated by duty, refers to acts of prescriptive observance, chiefly sacrifices... This Dharma or duty is enjoined in the Brāhmaṇas, and these together with the Mantras are held to constitute the whole of the Veda, so that whatever is not Mantra is Brāhmaṇa, whatever is not Brāhmaṇa is Mantra. The Brāhmaṇas are said to consist of Vidhis, injunctions, and Arthavadas glosses. The injunctions are meant either to make us do a thing that had not been done before, or to make us know a thing that had not been known before." MAX MÜLLER, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1973 (Reprint), pp. 186—187.

"Ihr Ziel ist die Erforschung der religiösen Pflicht (dharma), wie es das erste Sūtra ausspricht. Der Inhalt dieser Pflicht ist bestimmt durch die rituellen Gebote (codanā) des Veda." O. STRAUSS, Indische Philosophie, München 1925, p. 171.

"Die Mīmāṃsā ist von Hause aus eine Ritualwissenschaft. Der ganze Veda (mit Ausnahme der Upanishaden) handelt nach den Mīmānsakas (Mīmānsā-Lehrern) von religiösen Pflichten, und jeder Satz in ihm nimmt Bezug auf diese. Das gilt nicht nur für die Vorschriften (*vidhi*) und Verbote (*nishedha*), sondern auch für die Sprüche (*mantra*), die Namen (*nāmadheya*) und die Sinneserklärungen (*arthavāda*), die er enthält... Inhaltlich hat das meiste, was in den Mīmānsā-Sūtren und ihren Erläuterungsvorschriften dargelegt wird, mit Philosophie hingegen wenig zu tun, da es der Ermittlung der durch die rituellen Gebote (*codanā*) des Veda bestimmten religiösen Pflicht (*dharma*) dient... Die Idee der Erlösung ist dem alten System von sich aus

One cannot sufficiently stress that the primary meaning of Dharma is what motivated the Mīmaṃsā search for interpretation of the rubrics and the formulation of their principles. This was so obvious that it ran a danger common to all similar predicaments: out of the shyness to stress the obvious arises a situation in the succeeding generations where the obvious becomes obscure and sinks into oblivion. This is the reason why only the second group of texts has become the basis for all appreciation or criticism of the Mīmaṃsā.

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fremd; für den, dem sich praktisch alle Ethik in der Erfüllung ritueller Pflichten erschöpft, kann nur die Gewinnung himmlischer Lust das höchste Ziel sein." HELMUTH VON GLASENAPP, Die Philosophie der Inder, Stuttgart [2]1958, pp. 143, 145. "The entire Veda (excluding the Upanishads) is declared to treat of Dharma, i. e. acts of duty foremost among which are sacrifices." G. THIBAUT, Arthasamgraha. An Elementary Treatise on Mīmāṃsā of Laugākṣi Bhāskara. Chaukhamba Amarabharati Prakashan, Varanasi, [2]1974, p. vii.

"Though the Dharma of the Mīmānsakas was confined to sacrifice, we must not forget that the performance of it entailed strict adherence to precepts of morality. We know how the Mīmānsaka is emphatic in enforcing a meticulous abstention from the things that have been prohibited. This was no mean contribution to Law." S. S. SUKTHANKAR, Arthasamgraha of Shri Laugākshi Bhāskara with the Kaumudī of Shri Rameshvara Bhikṣhu. Edited with an Introduction, Translation, Notes and Sacrificial Charts. Bombay, 1931, p. xvi.

"The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of Dharma ... It is needless to dilate upon these, for the voluminous works of Śabara and Kumārila make an elaborate research into the nature of sacrifices, rituals, and other relevant matters in great detail, which anyhow can have but little interest for a student of philosophy." SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, A History of Indian Philosophy, Cambridge 1969, Vol. I, p. 405. "The entire Veda, excluding the Upaniṣads, is said to deal with Dharma or acts of duty, of which the chief are sacrifices ... The avowed aim of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is to examine the nature of Dharma. Its interest is more practical than speculative. The philosophical speculations found in it are subordinate to the ritualistic purpose ... The Mīmāṃsā welcomes all philosophical view so long as they do not injure its central theme, viz. the transcendent importance of Dharma interpreted in the ritualistic sense." S. RADHAKRISHNAN, Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2, London [9]1971, pp. 374, 375. "It is unnecessary to say much about the unsatisfactory character of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā as a system of philosophy. As a philosphical view of the universe it is strikingly incomplete. It did not concern itself with the problems of ultimate reality and its relation to the world of souls and matter. Its ethics was purely mechanical and its religion was unsound. The performance of the sacrifice was regarded as the most essential thing, and the devatās disappeared from the sight of the sacrificers." Ibid. p. 429. "The Mīmāṃsā teaches ritualistic morality and religion, and enjoins the performance of sacrifices to gods." JADUNATH SINHA, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Calcutta 1956, p. 854.

"The doctrines of the early and principal writers on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā are rather quaint and startling. Their arguments about the eternality and self-existence of the Veda are fallacious and were not accepted even by other ancient Indian systems. Both Prabhākara and Kumārila have in their scheme no place for God as the dispenser of rewards or as the ruler of man's destiny as being pleased with men's prayers. They do not expressly deny the existence of God, but they assign to God or the deities mentioned in the Vedic texts a secondary role or rather practically no role at all. They raise *yajña* to the position of God and their dogmas about *yajña* seem to be based upon a sort of commercial or business-like system, viz. one should do so many acts, dispense gifts to priests, offer certain offerings, observe certain ethical rules and other rules of conduct (such as not eating flesh, subsisting on milk) and then

Let us now return to the implications of the primary meaning of Dharma: *yaḥ puruṣam niḥśreyasena saṃyunakti*. Till now I have deliberately refrained from introducing the Mīmāṃsā's main statement about Dharma: *codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ*. An examination of this very ancient Sūtram will contribute substantially to our understanding of the original meaning of Dharma.

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the reward would follow without the intervention of God. There is hardly any appeal to religious emotions, there is no omniscient Being, no Creator and no creation of the world." P. V. KANE, History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. V. Part II, Poona 1962, p. 1217.

"Dharma is the subject of inquiry in Mīmāṃsā. Jaimini defines Dharma as a command or injunction which impels men to action... But Dharma and Mokṣa which deal with true spirituality are revealed only by the Veda. Dharma is supra-sensible and consists in the commands of the Veda... The earlier Mīmāṃsakas believed only in Dharma (and not in *mokṣa*) and their ideal was the attainment of heaven (*svarga*)." CHANDRADHAR SHARMA, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Delhi 1973 (Reprint), pp. 236, 237.

"*tasmāc codanālakṣaṇa eva dharmaḥ śreyaskara ity arthaḥ yad eva śreyassādhanarūpaṃ yāgahomādi tad eva dharma ity ucyate loke, nā'pūrvam antaḥkaraṇavṛttyādi vā lokaprasiddhivirahāt.*" Pārthasārathimiśra, Śāstradīpikā, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1916, p. 67.

"*ādiśabdena viśeṣopādānaṃ pramāṇam eveti pramāṇavidher evārthāt tadgamyasyāgnihotrāder dharmatvam asty eva na tu nāstīti dharmasvarūpasiddhiḥ. saiva pramāṇam ity avadhāraṇā ca tadgamyasyāgnihotrāder dharmatvaṃ na caityavandanāder atadgamyatvād iti dharmaviśeṣasiddhir iti. viparītā vā vacanavyaktir ity āha svarūpaṃ ceti. yaś codanālakṣaṇo'gnihotrādiḥ sa dharma eva nādharmaḥ sa eva ca dharmo na caityavandanādir ity evaṃ dharmasvarūpatadviśeṣasiddhir iti.*" Pārthasārathimiśra, Nyāyaratnākara, Ślokavārttikam Codanā-Sūtra 1, 44, 17—45, 10.

"*tatra vedena prayojanam uddiśya vidhīyamāno 'rtho dharmaḥ: yathā yāgādiḥ.* EDGERTON's edition of Āpadeva's Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśa, New Haven 1929, p. 193.

"*atha ko dharmaḥ kiṃ tasya lakṣaṇam iti ced ucyate. yāgādir eva dharmaḥ. tal lakṣaṇaṃ vedapratipādyaḥ prayojanavad artho dharma iti.*" THIBAUT's edition of Laugākṣi Bhāskara's Arthasamgraha, Varanasi 1974, p. (1).

"*kiñ ca, athāto dharmajijñāsā iti prathamasūtreṇa jaiminiḥ dharmasya jijñāsaṃ prastauti. dharmas tu vedārthaḥ ity atra na ko 'pi saṃśayaḥ... vārttikakāro 'pi —*

codanety abravīc cātra śabdamātravivakṣayā /
na hi bhūtādiviṣayaḥ kaścid asti vidhāyakaḥ //

ityādinā sandarbheṇa dharmasya vedārtharūpatvaṃ manyate. prabhākaro 'pi dharmajijñāsāpadena vedārthajijñāsāṃ codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ ity atra dharmapadena vedañ cābhipraitīti spaṣṭaṃ pratīyate. mādhavācāryaḥ jaiminīyanyāyamālāyāṃ vedārthasyaiva dharmatvaṃ svīkaroti. pārthasārathimiśras tu śāstradīpikāyāṃ prābhākarābhimataṃ vedārthasya kāryarūpatvaṃ nivārayan dharmaśabdasyārthaṃ vedārthaparatvam anaṅgīkṛtya śabdasyaiva vedaśabdavācyatvaṃ vyavasthāpayati. VĀCASPATI UPĀDHYĀYA, Mīmāṃsādarśana-vimarśaḥ, Varanasi 1976, pp. 14—15.

"For it (Mīmāṃsā) is an inquiry into righteous action (dharma); it believes in a real objective universe as well as in a plurality of selves, although these are admitted as eternal and omnipresent; and it glorifies heaven, to which the performance of rituals is held to be the way... The whole emphasis of the Mīmāṃsā is on the mechanical performance of rites, and it has no use for God as the author of the periodical manifestation and dissolution (sṛṣṭi and pralaya) of the world, nor does it believe in them." SWĀMI MĀDHAVĀNANDA, Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā of Kṛṣṇa Yajvan, p. iv.

"*tatra vedabodhiteṣṭasādhanatāko dharmaḥ; yathā yāgādiḥ.*" Ibid. p. 2. This is only a sprinkling of the type of treatment given to the understanding of Dharma in the PM. It is difficult to explain how a spurious tradition has acquired a reputation for

Codanā means vedavacanam in general and not vidhiḥ in particular

One of the main difficulties that have obscured the original meaning of Dharma has been the equation of *codanā* with *vidhiḥ*. In the Bhāṣyam *codanā* means *vedavacanam*[16]. Since there are different types of *vedavacanam*, *codanā* too has these diverse meanings. The problem can best be clarified by stating the two major usages of *codanā* in the Bhāṣyam: in the first instance it is an imperative, a command: *codanā iti kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ vacanam āhuḥ. ācāryacoditaḥ karomi iti hi dṛśyate*[17], and in the second it is a simple indicative (informative) statement: *codanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantaṃ bhaviṣyantaṃ sūkṣmaṃ vyavahitaṃ viprakṛṣṭam ity evañjātīyakam arthaṃ śaknoty avagamayitum*[18]. Now the question is, is *codanā* an imperative or an indicative; a command or a statement?

Kumārila, it would seem, would implicitly prefer both the meanings[19]. When commenting on the sentence *codanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantam* etc. he states: "The [Bhāṣyakāra] intended to speak of codanā as mearly Śabdaḥ. For, there is no imperative which has the past, etc. as its subject-matter." Similarly Umbeka and Pārthasārathimiśra[20].

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authenticity. As shown in the corpus of my text, the primary meaning of Dharma as is evident in the Śābarabhāṣyam is for this tradition as good as non-existent. I have yet to come across either a text or a study on the Mīmāṃsā which has sorted out all the different types of statements made by Śabara on Dharma. There are texts which go to the extent of completely ignoring the whole discussion on Dharma. See for instance, Sāyaṇa-Mādhava's Sarva-darśanasaṃgraha, Poona 1924, pp. 257—287.

[16] The terms *codanā*, *vedavacanam* and *vacanam* occur four times in the discussion 16, 9—20, 2. *Codanā*: 16, 9, 12, 15 and 21; *vedavacanam*: 18, 14, 17, 20 and 20, 1; *vacanam* (alone without any qualification): 16, 9, 24; 18, 6, 8. A juxtaposition of these statements clearly shows that *codanā* means *vacanam* (e.g. 16, 24: *na ca "svargakāmo yajeta" ity ato vacanāt*...) and that *vacanam* means *veda-vacanam*. See also 1354, 5—6 (6.1.1.3): *tadanuṣṭhānaṃ svargaṃ pratīti nāsti vacanam iti cet.*

[17] ŚBh 16, 9—10 (1.2.2.2)

[18] ŚBh 16, 12—13 (1.1.2.2).

[19] ŚV Codanāsū. 7: *codanety abravīc cātra śabdamātravivakṣayā* /
na hi bhūtādiviṣayaḥ kaścid asti vidhāyakaḥ //

[20] ŚVTṬ p. 34: *nātra codanāśabdena vidhāyakaṃ vākyam ucyate; kiṃ tarhi, codanāśabdo viśeṣavacanaḥ san śabdamātraṃ lakṣayati*: "Here the word *codanā* does not express an imperative sentence. But the word codanā being a special [type of] sentence [here] merely means 'Word'." Pārthasārathimiśra (NR 47, 10—11; 12—19) has this to say: *bhāṣye codanāpadaṃ śabdaviśeṣasya vidhāyakasya vācakam api lakṣaṇayā śabdamātraparaṃ vyākhyeyaṃ ity āha codaneti. Pramāṇaviśeṣasya hi pratyakṣādeḥ sāmarthye vyudaste tadviśeṣāntarasyaiva śabdasya bhūtādiṣu sāmarthyaṃ darśayitavyaṃ, na śabdaviśeṣasya codanāyāḥ. kiṃ ca śabdasāmānyaprayuktam idaṃ yad bhūtānāgatādiṣu sāmarthyaṃ na codanātvaprayuktam, ataḥ sāmānyamukhenaiva tatsāmarthyaṃ vaktavyam. tenaivaṃ bhāṣyārthaḥ. codanāyāḥ prāmāṇyaṃ dharme. kutaḥ? śabdasya hi sarvasyaiva jñānajanakatvena prāmāṇyaṃ saṃbhavati śabdaś codanā, tenāsyāḥ saṃbhavaty atīndriye 'pi dharme prāmāṇyaṃ iti.* "Having excluded the capability of the species of pramāṇam like perception and the rest [of the means of knowledge], the capability of *śabda* which is a different species of *pramāṇa* with regard to the past, etc. has to be shown, [but] not [the capability] of codanā [which is] a species of Śabdaḥ. Further, the capability with regard to the past, etc. is connected with Śabdaḥ in general, it is not connected with the state of being *codanā*. Now this capability has to be explained from the general point of view. Such therefore is the

What these commentators mean is that if *codanā* in this particular context meant a command, the sentence *codanā hi bhūtam*, etc. would make no sense, since commands cannot refer to the past. It would therefore be natural, in their opinion, to argue that here *codanā* refers to Śabdaḥ in general.

This interpretation if it is to be accepted has to answer a number of questions: Does the context unambiguosly prove that Śabara was concerned about Śabdapramāṇam, why does his argument say nothing about it and why does it concentrate only on *codanā*, *vedavacanam* and *laukikaṃ vacanam*? If Śabara wanted to prove the validity of Śabda in general, why does he use the word *codanā* at all, since it only adds to the confusion? Furthermore, taking into account the fact that Śabara is commenting on the Sūtram *codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ* one could have expected Śabara to make a clear distinction between Śabdapramāṇam and Vedapramāṇam. As a matter of fact these two terms do not appear at all in the discussion. What is concretely being discussed is the *prāmāṇyam* of the *vedavacana*-s and the *laukikavacana*-s, but not once does he say anything about Śabdaprāmāṇyam as such.

My own contention is as follows: *codanā* in the Bhāṣyam is a much broader term then *vidhiḥ* and is equivalent to *vedavacanam*. All *vedavacana*-s, according to the teaching of the Mīmāṃsaka-s, motivate one, directly or indirectly, to act. If a *vedavacanam* or *codanā* directly provokes one to action then it is a *vidhiḥ*, if it does so merely indirectly then it is an *arthavādaḥ*. The generic name for *all* of them is either *vedavacanam* or *codanā*.

In Śabara's discussion we come across first, *yadi ca codanāyāṃ satyām agnihotrāt svargo bhavatīti gamyate* etc.[21] and a little later, "*na svargakāmo yajeta*" *ity ato vacanāt saṃdigdham avagamyate bhavati vā svargo na vā bhavatīti*[22]. Though the first example is introduced with the name *codanā* it is as a matter of fact an indicative sentence, a *vedavacanam*. And though the second instance is an injunction, a *vidhiḥ* strictly so-called, yet it is called a

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meaning of the commentary. With regard to Dharma *codanā* is the means of right knowledge. Why? Every word, because of its capability of producing knowledge, is a means of right knowledge. And *codanā* is a [a species of] Śabdaḥ. Therefore with regard to Dharma which is inaccessible to the senses, the [*codanā*] is a means of right knowledge."

All these attempts of Kumārila, Umbeka and Pārthasārthimiśra, it must be remembered, are concentrated on the word *codanā* as it occurs in ŚBh 16, 12—13 but not on its others occurrences: 16, 9, 12, 15 (pūrvapakṣaḥ) and 21. It is argued that in this particular instance *codanā* means *śabdapramāṇaṃ*. And *śabdapramāṇaṃ* possesses the speciality of producing knowledge even about an object which is utterly non-existent (*atyantāsaty api jñānam arthe śabdaḥ karoti hi*: ŚV Codanā 6). Such an interpretation of the word *codanā* might fit in *codanā hi bhūtaṃ* etc. but this is a position prejudiced by a later problematic. Śabdaḥ meaning Veda would be contextually unobjectionable but not Śabdaḥ in general. Śabara is primarily concerned about Veda-pramāṇam and not Śabda-pramāṇam.

[21] ŚBh 16, 20—21 (1.1.2.2).

[22] ŚBh 16, 24—25 (1.1.2.2). This interpretation satisfactorily explains ŚBh 16, 12—13 (1.1.2.2).

vacanam. This usage itself indicates that Śabara used *codanā* and *vacana* synonymously. What is equally striking is that he does not employ the term *vidhiḥ* at all in the whole context. All this leads one to the conclusion that Śabara is mainly concerned with the *prāmāṇyam* of *codanā* and *vedavacanam*, and that *codanā* and *vedavacanam* mean for him one and the same thing.

This line of reasoning is moreover supported by the fact that Śabara consistently uses the term *vacanam* for *vedavacanam* and when he discusses *laukikavacanam* it is always unambiguously qualified as *laukikaṃ vacanam* or *pauruṣeyam vacanam.*

To our question, is *codanā* an indicative or an imperative, the answer must be that it can be either. If we keep in mind that for the Mīmāṃsaka-s every *vedavacanam* directly or indirectly moves one to act, then it stands to reason to argue that Śabara's aim is to justify the *prāmāṇyam* of every *vedavacanam.* At this juncture he is in no way concerned with either the *prāmāṇyam* of *vidhiḥ* (= injunction) in particular or of Śabdaḥ in general. Hence it is not consistent to hold that for Śabara *codanā* meant either Śabdaḥ in general or *vidhiḥ* in particular. My conclusion is that *codanā* is synonymous with *vedavacanam* and that every *vedavacanam* either directly or indirectly provokes one to action. Hence tentatively we could translate *codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ* as Dharma is that *arthaḥ* whose *lakṣaṇam* is a *vedavacanam* (= *codanā*).

Lakṣaṇam means nimittam for Śabara

There is no need of any elaborate argument on this score. Śabara himself says: *uktam asmābhiḥ "codanānimittaṃ dharmasya jñānam" iti*[23]: "We have stated that the knowledge of Dharma has as its cause the *codanā.*" He identifies *lakṣaṇam* with *nimittam.* This might be supported by arguing that for the Sūtrakāraḥ himself *lakṣaṇam* meant *nimittam* since Sūtra-s 1.1.3—4, (being a continuation of the discussion in Sūtra 1.1.2 where the word *lakṣaṇam* occurs), uses the word *nimittam* to all appearances as a synonym. Obviously, *nimittam* is not being used in a strictly philosophical sense. Rather it is vaguely meant to signify cause, characteristic, reason, source, instrument, etc. Accordingly I continue my tentative translation of Sūtram I.1.2 with: Dharma is that *arthaḥ* whose characteristic is a *vedavacanam.*

With arthaḥ Śabara meant primarily 'Significance'

The word *arthaḥ* is polyvalent and in the Mīmāṃsā tradition it has at least three meanings: thing, its meaning and its aim or purpose. Commentators have kept on repeating this in the succeeding centuries. However, a fourth and more important meaning seems to have escaped the Indian schoolmen, though its experience is necessarily connected with the other three. I am referring to 'Significance', 'Meaningfulness', as I have explained it earlier[24].

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[23] Ibid. 22, 4. ŚV Codanā 9—10.
[24] See Ch. 1 Meaning and Metaphor in the Mīmāṃsā, pp. 29ff.

Gaṅgānāth Jhā has interpretatively translated *arthaḥ* (i) as 'something conducive to the highest good'[25]; and (ii) as 'moral' as distinct from *anarthaḥ* (immoral)[26], and (iii) without any specific meaning as when translating the sentence, *codana hi bhūtam, bhavantam*, etc. E. Frauwallner on the other hand has translated it consistently with a non-committal 'Nützliches'[27]. Unfortunately neither of them comments on or gives reasons for the translation. Hardly anyone, I think, will dispute the importance of *arthaḥ* in *codanālaksano 'rtho dharmaḥ*. That it is not a mere decorative word is obvious from the contrast that is later on made between it and *anarthaḥ*. From this contrast it becomes clear that *arthaḥ* has a positive meaning compared to *anarthaḥ* which has a negative meaning. If we recall that Dharma is that which puts one in touch with *nihśreyasam*, then the next step is not difficult. For *nihśreyasam* is, as we have seen, synonymous with *prītiḥ*, the highest aim in life, which I have translated as 'ultimate Significance'[28]. Hence Dharma will be that *arthaḥ* which puts us in touch with ultimate Significance. Now what can put us in touch with ultimate Significance if not proximate Significance, the Significance which is available to us here and now, in and through religion and ritual? Because of this I take *arthaḥ* to mean proximate Significance which is accessible to us through the Vedic prescriptions. *Arthaḥ* then is a means to the realization of the Puruṣārthaḥ. Their relationship is like the one between the spark and the flame.

We could now try to complete our translation of Sūtram I.1.2: Dharma is that Significance whose characteristic is a *vedavacanam*. This by itself does not deny that there can be Significance outside the *vedavacana*-s. What is being stated here is that Significance which is conveyed by a *vedavacanam* is called Dharma.

This is interesting for our whole discussion. We have repeatedly pointed out that for the Mīmāṃsaka-s every *vedavacanam* directly or indirectly motivates to action. We can now connect and state that 'Significance' (like a *vedavacanam*) motivates and moves. Dharma is nothing else but that Significance which is revealed to us by the Veda and which motivates us to act. Secondly, Significance is not something that is amenable to the senses. It can neither be seen nor heard nor touched; it is not hot, nor cold. But it can be experienced through what is seen, heard, touched, hot, cold, etc. This clearly shows the connection between groups iii) and iv) of texts dealing with Dharma. Dharma, that is, vedic Significance, is basically what is beyond the realm of the senses but is communicated through this realm. Hence, though the primary purpose and meaning of Dharma refers to what transcends the *yāgādi*-ritual it is attained through the *yāgādi*-ritual. Because of this, the *yāgādi*-ritual, too, comes to be called Dharma through attribution.

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[25] G. Jhā's Translation of the Śābara-Bhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 4.
[26] Ibid. p. 6.
[27] E. Frauwallner, Materialien, p. 17.
[28] See Ch. 1 Meaning and Metaphor in the Mīmāṃsā, pp. 26ff.

This brings us back to Dharma, our starting point: *so 'rthaḥ puruṣaṃ niḥśreyasena saṃyunakti*[29]: "[Dharma] is that Significance which puts one in touch with [one's] final fulfillment." The other description of Dharma which is complementary to this is: "Dharma is [that] Significance (*artha-*) whose characteristic is a *vedavacanam*"[30]. Whereas the former is a eschatalogical statement about Dharma, the latter is a phenomenological one. *Codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ* tells us where Dharma is traditionally to be found; *sa hi niḥśreyasena puruṣaṃ saṃyunakti* tells us what the inner working of Dharma is; we require both these statements in order to work out the different aspects of the Mīmāṃsā understanding of Dharma.

Arthaḥ and Anarthaḥ

Śabara makes another point about Significance (*artha-*). We observe that it is not only *arthaḥ* that is made known by the vedic sentences; we have there instances of *anarthaḥ*, too, like *śyenenābhicaran yajeta*. Of course *anarthaḥ* is not to be interpreted here in the same sense as *ānarthakyam*. Here it is clear that it is a contrary, not a contradictory, of *arthaḥ* which in this context cannot mean anything other than Significance, or more precisely, positive Significance. Accordingly *anarthaḥ* is to be translated as negative Significance. If we were to consider the other usual meanings 'aim, purpose, meaning or thing' for *arthaḥ* we would make nonsense of the text.

"Both are made known here by the vedic statement, positive Significance (*artha-*) and negative Significance (*anartha-*) [as well]. Which positive Significance? [The one] which like *jyotiṣṭomaḥ* leads to *niḥśreyasam*. Which negative Significance? [The one] which like *śyenaḥ*, *vajraḥ*, *iṣuḥ* lead to *pratyavāyaḥ*. The word *arthaḥ* [has been taken into the Sūtram] so that Dharma may not be said to be *anarthaḥ*. Why is it [said to be] negative Significance? Because it [is] violence (*hiṃsā*) and this is forbidden. How then is negative Significance taught as something that must be done (*kartavyatayā*)? The reply is: *śyenaḥ* etc. are not understood as something that must be done. For their teaching (*upadeśa-*) is: should one wish to harm [someone], then this is the means for it. For the commonly accepted teaching (*samāmananti*) is: who wishes to harm [someone] should offer a *śyenaḥ* sacrifice, not: one must harm!"[31].

The point Śabara is making introduces into the discussion an element that cannot be overlooked. There is no gainsaying the fact that negative

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29 ŚBh 16, 11—12 (1.1.2.2).

30 Ibid. 16, 8 (1.1.2.2).

31 Ibid. 20, 12—19 (1.1.2.2).
ubhayaṃ iha codanayā lakṣyate, artho'narthaśca ko'rthaḥ? — yo niḥśreyasāya jyotiṣṭomādiḥ — ko'narthaḥ? — yaḥ pratyavāyāya śyeno vajra iṣur ity evamā diḥ. tatra anartho dharma ukto mā bhūd ity arthagrahaṇam. kathaṃ punar asau anarthaḥ? hiṃsā hi sā, sā ca pratiṣiddhā. kathaṃ punar anarthaḥ kartavyatayā upadiśyate? — ucyate: naiva śyenādayaḥ kartavyatayā vijñāyante. yo hi hiṃsitum iccet tasya ayam abhyupāya iti hi teṣām upadeśaḥ. "śyenenābhicaran yajeta iti hi samāmananti, na abhicaritavyam." iti.

Significance is at work in this world, and, what is more important, that it is s i g n i f i c a n t. This means that negative Significance, too, can move and motivate a person. It, too, can exercise a strange fascination and lead people to ruin, that is, to *pratyavāyaḥ* as the opposite of *niḥśreyasam*. But only positive Significance is prescribed as something that must be realized, not negative Significance. One is merely aware here of the consequences of negative Significance because it is well known that it is to be avoided (*sā ca pratiṣiddhā*).

The Pratyakṣa-Sūtram (i. e. 4) may sound negative for two reasons: because it is said that it is not the cause (*animitta-*) of Dharma-knowledge and because of this, the other *pramāṇa*-s too which are based on *pratyakṣam* cannot be the cause of Dharma-knowledge. But the core of Śabara's comment is right in the middle:

"This Significance is of the future, [as it were], it is not present [like an object] at the time of the cognition. And this perceiving (*upalambhana*) [is] of something [tangibly] present (*sataḥ*), not of something not [tangibly] present (*asataḥ*)."[32]

The Significance that Dharma is, is not of the world of space and time and hence it is not amenable to sense-perception (*sataś caitad upalambhanam*). It is of the nature of a final cause which though of the future makes itself felt in the present. By stating that perception and all the other *pramāṇa*-s that are based on it are *animittam* with regard to Dharma Śabara is implying that Dharma belongs to a dimension, that is independent of space and time. In other words, the point in introducing Pratyakṣam into the discussion was originally not to hold forth on the nature and functioning of perception but to make clear (negatively) that the kingdom of Dharma is not of this world. The later disquisitions of the Vṛttikāraḥ and Kumārila on perception do not correspond to the original scheme and purpose of Sūtram 4.

The statements about Dharma inform us not only w h a t Dharma does, but w h e r e it is to be found. This becomes clear if we remember that the world of sacrifice played an important role in the lives of people. This people had discovered not only a realm which made their existence meaningful: they had even discovered the means (= the *yāgādi*-ritual) which could give them an entry into it. Every authentic ritual act enabled them to have a *darśanam* of this realm. An unending vision of such Significance is what the Mīmāṃsaka-s called *niḥśreyasam*. Of course, for us who are living a couple of millenia later, the *yajñaḥ* might seem a rite without rhyme or reason. But if we are to be just to the people of the *yāgādi* world-view, we have to look at it from 'within'. The world-view of the *yajñaḥ* is a comprehensive one. It comprehends the complete cosmos in as much as it is a community. For, in a genuine ritual it is not so much the individual symbol-acts that are significant as the extensiveness and the intensiveness of the daily life that is symbolized in order to be vivified by the divine life. If *yajñaḥ* is not to degenerate into magic and ritualism, then the totality of individual, social

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[32] Ibid. 22, 14—15 (1.1.3.3). See footnote 14 of this chapter.

and cosmic existence has to be symbolized so that through this symbol-act the source and substance of existence itself is experienced. This is a mythical and tempiternal act. Mythical, because in this symbol-act the ephemeral discloses the eternal and the finite is seen on the background of the Infinite. Tempiternal, because it is through time that the temporal is transcended and eternity is experienced. To allow oneself to be taken up in the world-view of the *yajñaḥ* is to discover oneself as part of a total and tempiternal dynamics of Being, outside of which there is nothing whatever[33].

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[33] R. PANIKKAR, The Vedic Experience, pp. 352—353: For a profound exposition of Sacrifice see Ibid.: "Sacrifice is that which preserves the universe in existence, that which gives life and the hope of life. The Universe in its totality does not repose on the shoulders of any extracosmic reality; if it did, it would not be the whole universe, but only an appendix to it. Reality has to include all that of which we can be aware. Neither God nor the Gods can be excluded from it. Now this Universe is neither reposing on another Ground, nor reposing on itself, as if it were just a 'mechanical' or 'automatic' Being, as if freedom- and thus the freedom to cease to be-were not at the very core of reality. The universe does not repose on anything other than itself and its own structure. This ultimate structure is not to be regarded as 'another' or 'deeper' 'thing' or substance; it is in fact sacrifice, which is, precisely, the internal dynamism of the universe, universal ṛta, cosmic order itself. This order, this sacrifice, obviously cannot be a static result of an already performed action. Sacrifice is the act that makes the universe. It does it, not through an external agent, but by the self-cooperation of the universe itself. Men alone cannot accomplish this, and the Gods left to themselves are equally impotent. The highest God, the supreme Being, is equally incapable of performing this act alone, for he is not God for himself but for the "creatures". In point of fact he is never alone; he is relational and belongs to reality, in spite of all the provisos and distinctions that a thinking philosophical and theological mind is bound to make in order not to fall into an oversimplified monism or an unsustainable dualism.

"To perform the sacrifice is not to participate in a good act or to do good to the Gods, to mankind, or to oneself: it is to live, to "make" one's own survival and that of the whole universe. It is the act by which the universe itself continues in existence. Any analysis of the different texts would help us to discover a double stage and a double team of agents in the unfolding of this sacrifice. The one stage is *ayaṁ lokaḥ*, this word of Men; the other is *asau lokaḥ*, the world beyond, the place of the heavenly beings. Moreover, of the two "teams", one consists of Men and the other of Gods and *asuras*. The cosmic liturgy that holds the world together and keeps it in existence is performed (1) by Men trying to ascend to the world of the Gods to celebrate the sacrifice there; (2) by the Gods responding to the call of Men and celebrating the sacrifice here on earth; (3) by Men performing it here also; and finally (4) by the Gods celebrating this lifegiving sacrifice in heaven. A meditation on the texts will lead us to discover this four-fold conception.

"If sacrifice is the ultimate and supreme principle, superior thus, to the Gods and derived from God but not separable from either, it is understandable that some of the texts may sound magical to those who can accept only anthropomorphic world views. If the notion that God acts is not considered magic, the fact that sacrifice is efficacious cannot be said to be magical either. It would certainly be so if it did not constitute the ultimate structure of reality; but it is constantly taught in the Vedas down to the Upaniṣads, and it is repeated subsequently in philosophical works, that sacred science consists in the knowledge of sacrifice and that sacrifice is the ultimate principle."

It is probably this that the Mīmāṃsaka-s meant when they declared that Dharma is that Significance which is characterised by a *vedavacanam* and which puts one in contact with *niḥśreyasam.*

However there was a danger inherent in such an outlook and history is a witness to the fact the Mīmāṃsā fell a prey to it. "The deterioration of this world-view begins when sacrifice is interpreted in a substantialized way, that is, when it is reified and thus permits the introduction of magical interpretations."[34] That is to say, when the Mīmāṃsā metaphors gave way to magic, and sacrifice became not a means to but the master of the Deity, Dharma came to be understood as the performance, not the purpose, of ritual. And thus it has remained even today, as the standard histories of Indian Philosophy learnedly testify.

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[34] Ibid. p. 353.

Part Two

ŚABDAPRĀMĀṆYAM IN ŚABARA AND THE EARLY MĪMĀṂSĀ

CHAPTER 4 CODANĀPRĀMĀṆYAM

Śabara on Codanā-pramāṇatvam

Śabara introduces the discussion on the validity of the *codanā* with a Pūrvapakṣaḥ which attacks the very essence of such a *pramāṇam.*

"The *codanā* could go wrong, too, just as any ordinary statement like *nadyās tīre phalāni santi.* [A statement like] that can be right, it can be false as well."[1]

The implication is that since human statements can be right and they can be wrong, the *codanā* shares similarly in the same fate. The *codanā* as such does not and cannot enjoy any priviledged status. The reasoning behind this is that the *codanā* is like the everyday statement which stands in continual need of correction.

Throughout the discussion that follows from this Pūrvapakṣaḥ Śabara's leit-motif is that the veda-vacanam is altogether on a different level as compared to the *puruṣavacanam.*

"The following contradiction is expressed [when one says]: 'The [*codanā*] speaks' and 'falsely'. 'The [*codanā*] speaks' means it enlightens, it is the cause of one's being enlightened. He enlightens, whose presence is the cause of one's being enlightened. If because of the presence of the *codanā* one comes to know that 'Svargaḥ is attainable by means of the *agnihotram*' how [can] one say that '[Svargaḥ] is not attainable in this manner'? Now, *how* can one be enlightened [and still assert] that '[Svargaḥ] is not attainable in this manner'? [When one states that] one is enlightened about a significant thing [which] is non-existing, [then this is] a contradiction."[2]

The nature of a *codanā* is such that it makes known Significance, that is, it enlightens. This is not the same thing as making something known, or as making one know something. Hence if the *codanā* speaks, it means, it is enlightening. There are two points about an enlightenment: first, there can be no error or falsity in such a process and second, it can never be

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(In this chapter all the references to the ŚBh are from the ASS edition. Those in brackets refer to FRAUWALLNER's ed.)

[1] ŚBh 13, 4—5, 1.1.2.2:

nanv atathābhūtam apy arthaṃ brūyāc codanā yathā yat kiṃcana laukikaṃ vacanaṃ nadyās tīre phalāni santi iti. tat tathyam api bhavati vitatham api bhavati iti.

[2] ŚBh 14, 1—5, 1.1.2.2:

vipratiṣiddham idam ucyate bravīti vitathaṃ ca iti bravīti ity ucyate'vabodhayati budhyamānasya nimittaṃ bhavati iti. yasmiṃśca nimittabhūte saty avabodhayati so'vabodhayati. yadi ca codanāyāṃ satyām agnihotrāt svargo bhavati iti gamyate katham ucyate na tathā bhavati iti. atha na tathā bhavati iti katham avabudhyate. asantam artham avabudhyata iti vipratiṣiddham.

disproved. The first is the reason for the second. For, enlightenment does not have an object. Though grammatically it has an object as in the case of a transitive verb yet the nature of enlightenment is such that it functions on a dimension which is trans-spatio-temporal, where knowing is intransitive. Here knowing means coming in touch with Significance (*niḥśreyasena saṃyunakti*!). When someone is enlightened in this way, there is no way of disproving it. If a man has come in touch with Significance and makes an attempt to express this experience in words, then such a statement can never be disproved. The *vedavacanam 'agnihotrāt svargo bhavati'* is of this nature. Obviously then it is a sheer contradiction to say that someone is enlightened about a significant 'thing' that does not exist! One is using words here without meaning them in their proper sense. The 'things' (like Svargaḥ, etc.) that a *codanā* speaks of are not 'objective' realities; they are rather 'subjective' realities which function at the level of Subject. To speak thus is not to reduce them to a subjectivistic level (that is, a level of pure fantasy)! The subjective level is one at which knowing takes place in such a way that 'what is being known is not reduced to an 'object'. It is known in its 'subjective' nature.

After having shown that the Pūrvapakṣaḥ is caught up in his own contradiction, Śabara proceeds to discuss very briefly the characteristics of a Vedavacanam.

"The knowledge that arises from a statement (*vacanam*) like *svargakāmo yajeta* is not doubtful: Is Svargaḥ attainable or not attainable [in this manner]? When this [*vacanam*] is being known (*avagamyamāna-*) as definite (*niścita-*) it cannot go wrong (*mithyā*). For, a false cognition (*mithyāpratyayaḥ*) is one which after it has arisen perishes (*pradhvaṃsate*) [because] this [object] is not as [described]. But a [true cognition] does not undergo change; [not even when there is] a change in time, person, state or place. Because of this [it can] not [be] false (*avitathaḥ*)."[3]

A statement like *svarga-kāmo yajeta* does not give rise to doubtful knowledge. There is no ground at all for any doubt in the matter. To doubt any statement there must be some 'reason' for 'suspicion'. In the matter of the Veda however there can be no factor whatever which could make it suspicious.

In what follows Śabara treats first of two characteristics of a Vedavacanam. The first is the factor of '*niścitam*' and '*na viparyeti*', and the second is that of '*avagamyamānam idaṃ* [*vacanam*] and '*janitvā*'. Śabara stresses (albeit in passing) the act of knowing, the process of cognition that takes place when the *codanā* speaks: *na ca niścitam avagamyamānam idam* [*vedavacam*] *mithyā syāt*. 'When this [Veda-vacanam] is being *known* it cannot go wrong.' One of the factors necessary for validity of knowledge is the *birth* of

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3 ŚBh 15, 1—5, 1.1.2.2:
na ca svargakāmo yajeta ity ato vacanāt saṃdigdham avagamyate. bhavati vā svargo na vā bhavati iti. na ca niścitam avagamyamānam idaṃ mithyā syāt. yo hi janitvā pradhvaṃsate naitad evam iti sa mithyā pratyayaḥ. na caiṣa kālāntare puruṣāntare'vasthāntare deśāntare vā viparyeti. tasmād avitathaḥ.

the knowledge; the act of knowing *has* to take place if the result is to be valid. If, for example, one merely remembers some past experience, then there being no act of knowing it becomes a mere piece of information. And, though the information may be correct, the knowledge that is the outcome of such an act of the memory is not *pramāṇam*. This shows that *pramāṇam* is not identical with true or correct cognition. Only when the act of knowing is 'fresh', as it were, can it make claim to *prāmāṇyam*. Hence Śabara's brief but bold observation quoted above. It is worth remarking that Śabara's formulation is merely 'cannot go wrong' instead of 'must be valid' or some such thing. This is so because in order to be valid two other conditions have to be fulfilled[4].

A third characteristic of a genuine Vedavacanam (of the type *svargakāmo yajeta*) is its unalterability, that is, it does not change into its opposite. When once one has 'touched' Significance, it cannot return to the stage where it did not mean anything, where it was just 'neutral'. Once a thing has become significant it cannot become insignificant. The nature of Significance is such that it is beyond all processes of verification and falsification. It is not of such a nature that one fine day one could say of it: *viparyeti*, it has turned into its opposite!

Interestingly enough Śabara has been talking about *prāmāṇyam* throughout this discussion in such a way that most of the expressions he has employed are negative: *na saṃdigham* (not doubtful), *na mithyā* (not false), *avitathaḥ* (not incorrect), *na viparyeti* (does not turn into its opposite). The only two positive expressions are *avagamyamānam* (that is being known) and *janitvā* (after its brith). Only where we can use the process of verification and falsification, can we speak in positive terms of something and say 'this is true' and 'this is sure'. But in the case of the Vedic statements, the only precise way of speaking of them is to say that there is no reason for doubting them and there is no reason why they should be wrong. Since there is no positive criterion for examining the truth or falsehood of these statements, we can only speak from the negative side. Only in human matters where we experience something as contrary to what has been expressed can we say, 'this is not true', 'this is sure'. But with Vedic statements, where no falsification is possible we shall never be in a position to make such statements. It can happen that a person does not experience the Significance that these statements speak about. The only logical conclusion to be drawn from such instances is that the person has not experienced their Significance. It would be a non sequitur to say that they are false.

One might object here that when one says that the vedic statements are not false since there is no evidence for their falsehood, how can one possibly

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[4] *Pramāṇatvam* is not the same as what one would call truth/veritas. The discussion of *pramāṇatvam* in the Bhāṣya is one of the first discussions on the subject. The Mīmāṃsaka-s, as we shall see, required the fulfillment of three conditions before a cognition could qualify for *pramāṇatvam*: stability (non-changeability), indubitability and a fresh act of knowing.

conclude that they are *pramāṇam*? Implied in the Mīmāṃsā position is another vital thesis, namely, that of *svataḥprāmāṇyam* according to which every cognition is per se valid provided no extrinsic factors disturb the intrinsic validity. On this thesis is supported the validity of the Veda[5]. For, when it is said that there is no evidence for the falsehood of the vedic statements what is meant is that there are no extrinsic factors disturbing the inherent validity of the Veda.

There is one more thing in this connection and that is about the positive expressions *avagamyamānam* and *janitvā*. Both these word refer to the 'fresh' act of cognition that must be there if *prāmāṇyam* is to be attained. If there is no act happening, then the content of the cognition is mere information. When, for example, I see the typewriter as I write, then this act of perception makes my cognition a valid act of cognition. If however a little later I remember my type-writer or remember the way I looked at it and handled it, then such an act is an act of remembrance but not of perception. Hence it cannot qualify for *pramāṇam*. It is the process of cognizing in actu that is being referred to by *avagamyamānam* and *janitvā* and these have to be positive.

Śabara now proceeds to study the problem of a *laukikavacanam*[6]. He begins with the statement that such a *vacanam* can be 'not-false' (*avitatha-*) in two types of instances. First, when the *vacanam* originates from a person who is trustworthy and competent (*pratyayitāt puruṣāt*) and second, when the subject-matter belongs to the realm of the senses (*indriyaviṣaya-*). Though Śabara does not go into a detailed study of the *laukikavacanam* the following aspects emerge from his dense remarks:

i) A *laukikavacanam* can be correct if it originates from a trustworthy and competent person when he treats of a matter pertaining to sense-perception[7].

ii) A *laukikavacanam* is definitely invalid (*apramāṇam* — the word appears for the first time here in the Śābara-Bhāṣyam), if it originates from an untrustworthy and/or incompetent person, or if it is beyond the realm of sense-perception; the reason for this, according to Śabara, is that in such a case the source is merely fantasy (*puruṣabuddhiprabhava-*) which of course has to be disqualified[8].

iii) What is beyond sense-perception cannot be known by a human being except with the help of a Vedavacanam. All human beings are in the same boat, simply because human means are insufficient in this matter.

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[5] The beginnings of the doctrine of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* are recorded to us in the passage we are studying. Its cardinal thesis is that a cognition or a criterion is intrinsically valid and therefore is in no need of any extrinsic justification. *Anapekṣatva* is the seed of the *svataḥ-pramāṇa* doctrine.

[6] ŚBh 15, 5—17, 9, 1.1.2.2.

[7] ŚBh 15, 5—6, 1.1.2.2.

[8] ŚBh 15, 6—7, 1.1.2.2.

"With regard to these kinds of objects no human statement can ever claim validity just as the statement of men born blind [can never claim validity] with regard to shades of colour."[9]

Śabara does not elaborate but if we are to take this *dṛṣṭāntaḥ* seriously, it implies that human beings can never be a source of valid knowledge where Dharma is concerned. They can at the most, like blind men, receive statements about Dharma but of their own they cannot produce valid statements. Men born blind can neither verify nor falsify the statements they are told about shades of colour. Similarly human beings cannot verify or falsify the vedic statements. If therefore one does know about Dharma then depending on the competence and trustworthiness of the knower, one will have to verify the source. If it is anything other than the Veda, then we can straight away disqualify the informant.

iv) We do have people like Manu who have proclaimed Dharma and we know definitely, they were competent and trustworthy. But even so when we speak of the Dharma-knowledge of people like Manu we are aware that they knew about Dharma (*evam ayaṃ puruṣo veda!*), unlike in the case of the Dharma-knowledge of the Veda which is of the type: this object is thus (*evam ayam arthaḥ*). In the case of Manu, etc. their knowledge was indirect, hence they cannot claim to be the source of their Dharma-knowledge; but with regard to the Veda we have to say that it is the source of Dharma-knowledge[10].

v) Knowledge from human sources can go wrong. The possibility of going wrong is intrinsic which means we can have valid criteria to falsify statements from human sources. This is not the case with the Veda. To falsify the Veda-statements we do not possess any valid criteria![11]

vi) We cannot argue from the falsity of human statements to the falsity of the Veda-statements by way of analogy[12]. The two types of statements are on completely different levels. From the fact that Devadatta is black one cannot conclude that Yajñadatta, too, must be black. What is true of one individual qua this individual need not be true in the case of the other in matters which concern their individual, not their specific, nature. Besides, this is an inferential argument which being based on direct perception cannot challenge a Veda-statement which is independent of any other *pramāṇam*, just as perception being independent of any other *pramāṇam* cannot be challenged in its field by another *pramāṇam*.

"Knowledge from a Veda-statement is self-evident. And [so] no inference [which] contradicts [what is] self-evident can be valid."[13]

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[9] ŚBh 16, 1—3, 1.1.2.2:
aparasmāt pauruṣeyād vacanāt tad avagatam iti cet, tad api tenaiva tulyam. naivañjātīyakeṣu artheṣu puruṣavacanaṃ prāmāṇyam upaiti. jātyandhānām iva vacanaṃ rūpaviśeṣeṣu.

[10] ŚBh 16, 6—17, 1.1.2.2.

[11] ŚBh 17, 2—3, 1.1.2.2.

[12] ŚBh, 17, 3—6, 1.1.2.2.

[13] ŚBh 17, 8—9, 1.1.2.2:
pratyakṣas tu vedavacanena pratyayaḥ. na cānumānaṃ pratyakṣavirodhi pramāṇaṃ bhavati.

It is generally overlooked that the Autpattika-Sūtram is the Mīmāṃsā's definition of a *pramāṇam* as applied to the *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ* with regard to Significance that is not perceived through sense-perception (*arthe'nupalabdhe*); this is in fact the vedic *codanā* itsellf. The conditions requisite for *pramāṇatvam* are summarised under: *jñānam*, *upadeśaḥ* (*asaṃdigdha-*) and *avyatirekaḥ*. All of them are fulfilled in the case of the *codanā* because it is totally independent of all space-time limitations as regards its origin (*anapekṣatvāt*).

Śabara's concern, it must be repeated, in Sūtram 5 is the *autpattika*-relation between Śabdaḥ and *arthaḥ* in the matter of non-perceptible Significance. Dharma is based on such a relation and hence it is *jñānam*, *upadeśaḥ* and *avyatirekaḥ*. This is therefore a *pramāṇam* because it is independent.

What this boils down to is this. Dharma in as much as it points to non-perceptible Significance is expressed by words which are autpattikally connected with their meaning. Such a sentence being really *jñānam*, *upadeśaḥ* and *avyatirekaḥ* it qualifies for *pramāṇatvam* because it is independent in its origin.

Knowledge of Dharma is of two types: the first referring to a suprasensible dimension and the second to the realm of sense-perception. The first is Dharma per se and it is the one which puts one in touch with *niḥśreyasam* (*yaḥ puruṣaṃ nihśreyasena saṃyunakti*[14]). The second is per attributionem and is applied to the visible aspects of the sacrificial ritual (*yajatiśabda-vācyam eva dharmaṃ samāmananti*[15]). The phrase *arthe 'nupalabdhe* is used in the Sūtram to make it clear that the discussion is about Dharma per se, and not of Dharma per attributionem. The words *jñānam*, *upadeśaḥ* and *avyatirekaḥ* are about Dharma per se and are to be interpreted as participating in *pramāṇatvam*: *jñānam*, stressing the freshness and genuineness of the cognitive act, *upadeśaḥ* laying stress on its definite nature and *avyatirekaḥ* indicating both its correctness and its exclusion of any possibility of doubt. All three have the characteristic of 'independence' (*anapekṣatvāt*), that is to say, they are independent of any other cognition (*pratyayāntaram*) or any other person (*puruṣānataram*). Because of this, the *codanā* qualifies for *pramāṇatvam*. This is the first time that the word *pramāṇam* appears in the discussion. As a matter of fact, the discussion up till now has led up to three important terms with which Śabara's comment comes to a close. And they are *pramāṇam*, *anapekṣatvam* and *svayaṃ-pratyayaḥ*. This is not surprising in the least, since the deliberations have been intentionally leading upto this. For, a *pramāṇam* has of necessity to be characterised by these two qualities: 'Givenness' and 'Independence'. Independence does not connote here a declaration of monad-ism but rather the freedom to be oneself, to be and to remain true to one's nature. This means, when, for example, we take the eye, that (when the seer focuses it on an object) it is free in its activity of seeing, that its activity of seeing qua seeing is

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[14] ŚBh 11, 3, 1.1.2.2.
[15] ŚBh 18, 4—5, 1.1.2.2.

unhampered and that it is actively and directly involved in the act of seeing. That the eye depends on the will and whim of the seer what object and when to see does not militate against its 'natural' freedom, for the simple reason that no seer can make the eye hear or smell. The eye cannot be made to change its nature. This is necessary in order to qualify for *pramāṇatvam*. If we take a photograph, it cannot be *pramāṇam* as regards the person whose photograph it is, since the eye is directly involved not with the person but with his photograph. With regard to the photograph the activity of seeing is a *pramāṇam* but not with regard to the person. Our knowledge of the person is not through direct perception (which would have been a *pramāṇam*) but indirectly through a photograph.

Connected with this is the second quality of a *pramāṇam*, namely, *svayaṃ-pratyayaḥ*: cognition from within. It is a positive formulation of the negative '*anāpekṣa-*'. The nature of the eye's activity of seeing is determined by itself. Neither the external light nor the object determine the nature of seeing; they may influence the quality of seeing; but they cannot determine whether the nature of the eye is to see or not. The nature of the eye contains within itself its explanation, this is from within, this is *svayaṃ-pratyayaḥ*. One might object, that to say this is to stress the obvious. Not quite, what is being implied here is that the validity of the eye does not stand in need of an 'outside' justification; and that it is its own justification. If there were need of an external justification for the eye, there would be no end to this process.

Śabara's distinction between the type of knowledge where (in the matter of Dharma!) one says '*evam ayaṃ puruṣo veda*' and the type of knowledge where one says '*evam ayaṃ arthaḥ*' is worthy of a philosopher[16]. The type of knowledge which is characterised by '*evam ayaṃ puruṣo veda*' can never be a *pramāṇam*. The Veda on the other hand which gives us knowledge of the type '*evam ayaṃ arthaḥ*' is always a *pramāṇam*. This epistemological difference with regard to Śrutiḥ (whose content is Dharma) is important to the Mīmāṃsaka-s. Our understanding of Dharma (according to this school) will always be notional, never experiential, because we depend on the Veda, but the vedic statements themselves belong to a different category. They are not a mere reporting of someone else's experience; nor are they founded on some other source.

This line of thinking is further substantiated by Śabara's polemic against the Vaiśeṣika-s who argued that from the falsehood of the *puruṣavacanāni* one could analogically (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*) conclude to the falsehood of the *vedavacanāni* because both make use of something common: the *vacanāni*. Śabara's curt reply is: *anyatvāti*. The vedic statements belong to a different category! *na hy anyasya vitathabhāve 'nyasya vaitathyaṃ bhavitum arhati, anyatvād eva*. 'For, one cannot argue from the falsity of one thing to the falsity of another, because of [their] very difference.' And Śabara proceeds: 'For from the fact that Devadatta is black one cannot conclude that Yajñadatta too black!'[17]

[16] ŚBh 16, 6—17, 1, 1.1.2.2.
[17] ŚBh 17, 3—5, 1.1.2.2.

Furthermore, Śabara's added argument that the Vaiśeṣika's reasoning about the falsehood of the vedic statements is in reality an inference (hence only indirect) but that the knowledge produced by these statements is direct and that thus no inference can be valid against what is directly evident, amply confirms the view that the vedic statements belong to an altogether different category. It might be argued that Śabara's illustration of 'difference' (*anyatvāt* = otherness) shows rather difference in individuals than of species; but that does not hold water! Just as in the realm of human beings one cannot conclude from an individual difference to a specific difference, so too with *pramāṇatvam* one cannot conclude from an individual difference to a specific difference. Here it is obvious that falsity is not specific to any statement as such; it is merely characteristic of one particular statement. Apramāṇatvam can be attributed to a *laukikaṃ vacanam* but there is no reason why it should also be attributed to the *vedavacanam*![18]

For good measure there is Śabara's doctrine about the different way in which vedic and human statements are valid. For there is no criterion for the falsity of the Vedavacanam. Falsification is possible only in the case of *laukika-vacana-s*. All this confirms the view that the vedic statements are of a different category altogether![19]

Vṛttikāra's Veda-pramāṇatvam

Not much is known of the Vṛttikāraḥ but the long quote that we find in the Śābara-Bhāṣyam gives us enough instances of his philosophical interests[20]. He begins his discussion on perception, for example, thus: "What is perception does not go wrong and what goes wrong is not perception."[21] With that he proceeds to comment on the first part of Sūtram 4 thus:

"Real sense-perception (*sat-pratyakṣam*) is the birth of a cognition (*buddhi-janma*) from the contact of a person's sense-organs with that (*tenaiva saṃprayoge indriyāṇām puruṣasya*) which is the object of the cognition (*yadviṣayaṃ jñānam*). That cognition whose object is different (*anya-viṣayaṃ jñānam*) from the object of contact (*anya-saṃprayoge*) is not perception."[22]

The diverse elements involved in an act of perception are here mentioned both as regards their function and as regards their effects. For perception to be valid there has to be as object which is in contact with the sense-organ(s) of a person and this object has at the same time to be the object of the cognition which has arisen from such a contact. If the contact is

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18 ŚBh 17, 3—9, 1.1.2.2.

19 ŚBh 17, 5—6, 1.1.2.2.

20 ŚBh 25, 4—72, 3. See G. JHA's Translation of Śābara-Bhāṣya, Vol. I, 9—10. Also E. FRAUWALLNER, Materialien, pp. 107—113; and F. ZANGENBERG, Śabaraḥ und seine philosophischen Quellen. In: WZKSO 6 (1962) 60ff.

21 ŚBh (24, 24—25); 26, 4—5; 1.1.5.5:
naitad evam. yad pratyakṣam, na tad vyabhicarati. yad vyabhicarati, na tad pratyakṣam.

22 ŚBh (26, 3—4); 26, 6—27, 2; 1.1.5.5:
yadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tenaiva saṃprayoge indriyāṇāṃ puruṣasya buddhijanma sat pratyakṣaṃ.

with one object and the cognition is about another, then this is not true perception. This is a sensible explanation and the Pūrvapkṣaḥ lets it pass without comment. He merely poses a harmless question:

"How does one ascertain this (*kathaṃ punar idam avagamyate*): this [cognition arises] from the contact with that [real object] [whereas] that [cognition arises] from the contact with another [object]?"[23]

What the Pūrvapakṣaḥ wants to know is the method or the criterion which helps distinguish the *buddhi-janma* in the case of *tat-saṃprayoge* from the buddhi-janma of *anya-samprayoge*? How do we know this?

"That [cognition] which does not [arise] from the contact with another [object], [arises] from the contact with that [real object]. The opposite of this [arises] from the contact with another [object]."[24]

Since this answer is merely a paraphrase of the earlier statements, the Pūrvapakṣaḥ illustrates his objection:

"How is this known (*kathaṃ jñāyate*), when, for instance, a person taking a shell to be silver thinks: 'My eye is in contact with silver'?"[25]

The man who mistakes a shell for silver thinks that he sees silver. Hence at this juncture he is unable to know that he is mistaken. Here is a concrete instance where one cannot distinguish *idaṃ tat-saṃprayoge* from *idaṃ anya-saṃprayoge*.

"Where a correcting cognition (*bādhakaṃ jñānam*) is born: 'This is not thus, this is a false cognition', it [is born] from the contact with another [object], the opposite [cognition has arisen] from the contact with that [real object]."[26]

We discover here (surprisingly) a slight shift in the argumentation. Whereas the Pūrvapakṣaḥ was arguing about the moment in which and during which the *buddhi-janma* takes place, the moment, namely, in which the person mistakes a shell for silver and is convinced of the correct nature of his cognition, the Vṛttikāraḥ has brought in a new element, the *bādhakaṃ jñānam*, which as a matter of fact comes in only afterwards. The *bādhakaṃ jñānam* is posterior to spontaneous knowing and hence is no answer to the problem that is posed! That is why the Pūrvapakṣaḥ comes back to the same point:

"Before the birth of a correcting cognition (*prāg bādhakajñānotpatteḥ*) how does one know (*kathaṃ avagamyate*) [this] since at that moment (*tatkāle*)

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[23] ŚBh (26, 5—6); 27, 2—3; 1.1.5.5:
kathaṃ punar idam avagamyate, "idaṃ tatsaṃprayoge, idaṃ anyasaṃprayoge" iti.

[24] ŚBh (26, 6—7); 27, 3—4; 1.1.5.5:
yan nānyasaṃprayoge tat satsaṃprayoge. etadviparītam anyasaṃprayoge iti.

[25] ŚBh (26, 7—9); 27, 4—5; 1.1.5.5:
kathaṃ jñāyate, yadā hi śuktikāyāṃ api rajataṃ manyamāno, "rajatasaṃnikṛṣṭaṃ me cakṣur" iti manyate?

[26] ŚBh (26, 9—11); 27, 6—7; 1.1.5.5:
bādhakaṃ hi yatra jñānaṃ utpadyate, "naitad evaṃ mithyājñānaṃ" iti, tad anyasaṃprayoge, viparītaṃ tatsaṃprayoga iti.

there is no difference (*viśeṣa-*) between a true cognition and a false cognition?"

But the Vṛttikāraḥ does not see the point. Again his answer is off the mark.

"When the *manas* is afflicted because of hunger, etc. or a sense-organ by *timira* etc. the external object is [characterized] by extreme minuteness, etc. (*saukṣmyādibhir*), then the cognition [is] false: if [all these are] not afflicted [by the above-mentioned disadvantages], the cognition is true. The cause of a cognition is the contact between the sense-organ, *manas* and the object, because there [is] no cognition when this [contact] is absent. The cause of a false cognition [is any] defect that has entered into [these]. For, if these [that is: contact, object, sense-organ and manas are] defective, the cognition is false."[28]

The point is not when and how a cognition can be false, but how does one know at the moment of cognition that the cognition is false. To enumerate the possible causes of a false cognition is praise-worthy but not practical in the present predicament. The simple reason is that at the moment when a cognition is born, the person does not know whether hunger, or minuteness of the object are actually misleading him. Because of this the Pūrvapakṣaḥ tenaciously repeats his question:

"How does one know this?"[29]

To which the Vṛttikāraḥ replies:

"Because, when the defect disappears, one sees [that] a cognition that is generally accepted [by all] (*saṃpratipattiḥ*) [arises]."[30]

The Vṛttikāraḥ has once again avoided the issue. Hence the Pūrvapakṣaḥ makes a last effort:

"How does one ascertain what is defective [and] what is not defective (*duṣṭāduṣṭāvagama-*)?"[31]

The final answer of the Vṛttikāraḥ springs no surprise.

"If in spite of strenuous effort we do not discover any defect, then we hold that there [is] no defect, since there is no *pramāṇam* [for it]. Because of this [we can say that the cognition] whose cause is defective, or in whose case

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[27] ŚBh (26, 11—12); 27, 2—8; 1.1.5.5:
prāg bādhakajñānotpatteḥ kathaṃ avagamyate, yadā na tatkāle samyagjñānasya mithyājñānasya ca kaścid viśeṣaḥ?

[28] ŚBh (26, 12—17); 27, 7—28, 3; 1.1.5.5:
yadā kṣudādibhir upahataṃ mano bhavati, indriyaṃ vā timirādibhiḥ, saukṣmyādibhir vā bāhyo viṣayas tato mithyājñānaṃ, anupahateṣu samyagjñānaṃ. indriyamano'rthasaṃnikarṣo hi jñānasya hetuḥ, asati tasmin ajñānāt. tadantaragato doṣo mithyājñānasya hetuḥ. duṣṭeṣu hi jñānaṃ mithyā bhavati.

[29] ŚBh (26, 17); 28, 3; 1.1.5.5:
katham avagamyate?

[30] ŚBh (26, 17); 28, 3; 1.1.5.5:
doṣāpagame saṃpratipattidarśanāt.

[31] ŚBh (26, 18); 28, 3—4; 1.1.5.1:
kathaṃ duṣṭāduṣṭāvagama iti cet.

there is [another correcting] cognition [that states that it is] 'false', that cognition alone, none other, is wrong."[32]

Not less than five times the Pūrva-pakṣaḥ has posed the question 'how can one know' and every time the Vṛttikāra's answer has side-tracked the issue. The final answer is at best a pragmatic procedure, not a philosophical principle.

The reason for such a disappointing performance is not far to find. He is loath to admit that in practical life we have no certainty in the realm of human affairs. Basically he is unwilling to grant that *pratyakṣam* can function in its own way which is specifically different from the manner in which Śabdaḥ functions. Such a position does not permit him to take full note of their specificity. This explains the two peculiarities of his exposition: first, he takes Śabdaḥ as the model when discussing *pratyakṣam* and second, he takes *pratyakṣam* as the model when discussing Śabdaḥ.

The first peculiarity has been partly illustrated above and will be further illustrated in what follows. Because Śabda-pramāṇam is the model in the discussion on *pratyakṣam*, the Vṛttikāraḥ is unable to answer satisfactorily the opponent's question as to the method of verification in the moment of cognition. In the case of Vedapramāṇam every individual act produces in the very act of cognition its verification. This is not possible in the case of *pratyakṣam*. Unfortunately the Vṛttikāraḥ is unable to accept this. Hence, as the above discussion has shown, he neither answers the opponent's question convincingly nor does he explain his own position satisfactorily.

In the following discussion on Vedapramāṇam the model is *pratyakṣam*, as the concluding words of the argumentation, which feature a play on the word *pratyakṣam*, demonstrate. The "directness" that *pratyakṣam* connotes is the infra-structure of Vedapramāṇatvam.

"The *apauruṣeyaḥ* relationship between word and meaning is knowledge about that Significance [which] is characterized by *agnihotram*, etc. [and which] cannot be known through perception, etc. In this way a cognition characterised by the *codanā* is right. For, if the relationship [between word and meaning] were man-made (*pauruṣeya-*), [any] cognition [based on such a relation] could be suspected of being wrong. For, it would be a cognition from another [source]. Now, when Śabdaḥ [itself] speaks, how can it be false? For in this case the cognition is not from another man. '[The Śabdaḥ] speaks' means, it enlightens, it is the cause of one's being enlightened. Now, if with Śabdaḥ as the cause, enlightenment takes place by itself (*atha Śabde cen nimittabhūte svayam avabudhyate*) how can one call [it] an illusion [and say]: 'It is not thus.' Also the *codanā* does not produce in [any] one a doubtful cognition 'could it be or [could it] not [be]'? And furthermore a direct cognition [does not say]: 'This is false', when there [is] a change in time,

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[32] ŚBh (26, 18—21); 28, 4—6; 1.1.5.5:
prayatnena anvicchanto na ced doṣam upalabhemahi, pramāṇābhāvād aduṣṭaṃ iti manyemahi. tasmād yasya ca duṣṭaṃ karaṇaṃ yatra ca mithyeti pratyayaḥ, sa eva asamīcīnaḥ pratyayaḥ nānya iti.

place, state (condition) or person. A syllogistic cognition, which arises when seeing the falsity of one cognition, and [asserts]: 'this [vedic cognition] too will go wrong', is contradicted and rejected by this direct cognition. From this [it follows] that Dharma is made known by the *codanā* alone."[33]

Significance (*arthaḥ*) is characterized by *agnihotram*, etc. in the form of a *codanā*. On the one hand, this is not known through perception or *anumānam*, etc. and on the other, the words of a *codanā* are autpattikally connected with their meanings. That means, being independent by nature of all space-time categories as regards its Significance, the *codanā* makes known its meaning independently and because of this the cognition it conveys is right.

The second step in the argumentation is negative: if the relationship between word and meaning were of human origin, then all knowledge based on it would be of an unstable nature (*mithyābhāva-*). The reason for this, according to the Vṛttikāraḥ, is that it would mean dependence of the cognition on another person. Though it is not spelled out, dependence here probably means the dependence of the cognition as to its very quality of being true or false, a sort of intrinsic dependence in contradistinction to extrinsic dependence, where the former refers to what it is, the latter to how it is used by the speaker. The traditional Mīmāṃsā objection to the *pauruṣeyasambandha*-theory has been that it is impossible to prove that such a relationship can be established and that it can be made generally known and accepted[34]. But the Vṛttikāraḥ introduces a slight change of stress. If all words and their meanings were connected with each other through human convention then such a language would from the very start betray its *mithyābhāvaḥ* in the matter of Dharma. The Vṛttikāra's formulation is ambiguous but he is probably implicitly applying the *pauruṣeya*-theory to the *codanā*. Only thus is the flow of thought ensured. The Vṛttikāraḥ makes an interesting nuance by using *mithyābhāvaḥ* and not simply *mithyā* in this context, because a state or condition in which the meanings of words are conventionally connected would itself become suspect when speaking about Dharma. Not only would there be the possibility of error, there would be the impossibility of validity at all. Unfortunately the reason given here (*parapra-*

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[33] ŚBh (34, 15—36, 5); 41, 9—42, 12; 1.1.5.5:
tuśabdaḥ pakṣaṃ vyāvartayati. apauruṣeyaḥ śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasya agnihotrādilakṣaṇasya arthasya jñānaṃ pratyakṣādibhir anavagamyamānasya. tathā ca codanālakṣaṇaḥ samyakpratyaya iti. pauruṣeye hi sati saṃbandhe yaḥ pratyayaḥ, tasya mithyābhāva āśaṅkyeta. parapratyayo hi tadā syāt — atha śabde bruvati kathaṃ mithyā iti? na hi tadānīm anyataḥ puruṣād avagamaḥ. "bravīti" ity ucyate, "avabodhayati, budhyamānasya nimittaṃ bhavati" iti. Śabde cen nimittabhūte svayaṃ avabudhyate, kathaṃ vipralabdhaṃ brūyān "naitad evam iti. na cāsya codanā, "syād vā na vā" iti sāṃśayikaṃ pratyayam utpādayati. na ca "mithyaitad" iti kālāntare, deśāntare 'vasthāntare puruṣāntare vā punar avyapadeśyaḥ pratyayo bhavati. yo'py anyapratyayaviparyāsaṃ dṛṣṭvā "atrāpi paryasiṣyati" ity ānumānikaḥ pratyaya utpadyate. so'pi anena pratyakṣeṇa pratyayena virudhyamāno bādhyate. tasmāc codanālakṣaṇa eva dharmaḥ.

[34] ŚV Saṃbandhākṣepa-parihāraḥ 12—39.

tyayo hi syāt) by the Vṛttikāraḥ is, I think, a product of his prejudice. His primary concern is to prove *svataḥprāmāṇyam* and so exploits this occasion to bring it in here. The real reason however which Śabara puts foward is:

"That is *apramāṇam* because it is a product of human phantasy. For it is impossible for a human being to know this [Dharma] without the [vedic] *vacanam*."[35]

The third step in the Vṛttikāra's argument returns to Śabdaḥ which from all appearances means the Veda-*vacanam*. Of it, it is said that it enlightens and this happens without any intermediary, so that one can say, that one is enlightened directly by the Śabdaḥ itself. Actually this is one of the conditions for validity (*pramāṇatvam*). The cognitive act (in this case, the codanā enlightening the hearer directly), fulfills the first condition necessary for validity. At this juncture the Vṛttikāraḥ introduces a question which in a slightly different formulation is the leit-motif of the Bhāṣyakāraḥ: *kathaṃ vipralabdhaṃ brūyān naitad evam iti*. "How can one call [it] an illusion [and say]: 'It is not thus?'"[36] Surprisingly the Vṛttikāraḥ does not make capital of this line of attack, as the Bhāṣyakāraḥ does: Given the nature of the Veda-vacanam how can anyone at all contradict it? But the Vṛttikāraḥ does not appear either to have laid to much store by this argument or to have appreciated its strength.

He then proceeds to state the second requirement for *pramāṇatvam*: the absence of doubt. This has been formulated negatively but it is obvious that there is a purpose behind it. Absence of doubt means merely absence of any reason for doubting and this can always be ascertained both in the case of the *laukika-vacanam* and of the Veda-vacanam. Here, absence of doubt, I think, is not so much a psychological state as an epistemological pre-condition. In the case of the *codanā* there is no reason to doubt its validity since it does not depend on any extraneous conditions. The implication is that it is the extraneous conditions, and not the inner nature, that are ultimately responsible for any doubt that might arise. With the exclusion of the a priori condition for the possibility of doubt, the *codanā* has fulfilled the second qualification necessary for *pramāṇatvam*.

But *pramāṇatvam* has a third condition and that is exclusion of falsity. Stability, not change, is expected of a valid cognition. But possibility of error connotes change and lack of stability. Hence, it is argued by the Vṛttikāraḥ that the kind of cognition conveyed by the vedic collections is not susceptible to any kind of change. This is due to its independence from all causes of change, both external (time, place and person) and internal (state). The Vṛttikāraḥ does not elaborate. As a matter of fact, it is the first time that there is a low-pitch reference to the internal aspect of the *codanā*. Even in the case of the first two *pramāṇa*-requisites the internal aspect was, at the

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35 ŚBh (18, 4—6); 15, 6—7; 1.1.2.2:
tat puruṣabuddhiprabhavam apramāṇam. aśakyaṃ hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum ṛte vacanāt.

36 ŚBh (34, 22); 42, 6—7; 1.1.5.5.

most, implied but never explicitly elaborated. Nowhere do we find in the early Mīmāṃsā a discussion on this point. It is to be met with only in the later systematizers like Kumārila who correct, complement and elaborate wherever necessary.

Now that the *pramāṇatvam* of the *codanā* has been thus established the Vṛttikāraḥ takes the offensive:

"An inferential cognition which arises on having seen the falsity of one cognition [and concludes] 'This cognition, too, will be wrong', [will] itself be contradicted and rejected by this direct [vedic] cognition."[37]

The objection is probably the same mentioned by Śabara:

"[One could argue that] one notices an analogy (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*). Having perceived that a human statement [can be or is] wrong, one concludes that a Veda-vacanam [too, can be or is] false, because of similarity in [the fact that they both are] statements."[38]

I should remark in passing that the fact that this objection is nowhere mentioned in the Vṛttikāraḥ and that he formulates it in a manner that presupposes acquaintance with it, is one of the reasons which lead me to believe that such an objection was part of the 'Vorlage' used by the Vṛttikāraḥ and the Bhaṣyakāraḥ. The scholastic approach here of the Vṛttikāraḥ as compared to the simple argument of Śabara gives the lie to the assumption that Śabara borrowed from the Vṛttikāraḥ.

The Vṛttikāraḥ attacks the above mentioned argument from analogy as a piece of inference, and inference being indirect and secondary can never supercede *pramāṇam* (like Śabdaḥ) which by nature is direct and immediate.

With this the Vṛttikāraḥ concludes: "From all this we conclude that the characteristic (*lakṣaṇā-*) of Dharma is the *codanā.*" Since both Śabara and the Vṛttikāraḥ interpret *lakṣaṇam* as *nimittam*, it would be more precise to translate the above conclusion thus: "From all this we conclude that the cause of Dharma is the *codanā.*" Here only the immediate section is concluded.

We have however a similar but more comprehensive conclusion again in the following context:

tat pramāṇam, anapekṣatvāt
na hy enaṃ sati puruṣāntaraṃ pratyayāntaraṃ vā apekṣate
tasmāc codanā-lakṣaṇa eva dharmo nānya-lakṣaṇaḥ[39]

The primary purpose of Sūtram 5 was to explain the *autpattika-* nature of the relationship between words and their meanings, this in turn was intended to be complemented by the *anapekṣa*-nature of the *codanā*, as is amply testified by the fact that the Sūtram begins with *autpattikaḥ* and ends

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[37] ŚBh (36, 2—4); 42, 9.11; 1.1.5.5:
yo'py asya pratyayaviparyāsaṃ bādhyate. See note 14 of this Ch.

[38] ŚBh (18, 16—17); 17, 3—4; 1.1.2.2:
nanu sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ bhaviṣyati. pauruṣeyaṃ vacanaṃ vitatham upalabhya vacanasāmānyād vedavacanaṃ mithyety anumīyate.

[39] ŚBh (48, 12—14); 58, 6—8; 1.1.5.5.

with *anapekṣatvāt*. More precisely: the *anapekṣa*-nature of the Veda-*vacanam* is (at least in the Sūtra-wording) meant to give the reason both for the *autpattika*-nature of the word-meaning relationship as well as for the consequences that flow from it.

As far as I am aware, the Vṛttikāraḥ does not use the word *autpattikaḥ* at all, instead he substitutes it with *apauruṣeyaḥ*. That it was originally not simply identical with *autpattikaḥ* is attested to by Śabara himself.

autpattika iti nityaṃ brūmaḥ
utpattir hi bhāva ucyate lakṣaṇayā[40]

Thus the Vṛttikāraḥ introduces into the discussion the nuance of *a-pauruṣeyaḥ* (= not human, not man-made), pushing into the background the meaning 'by its very nature' that is indicated by the word *autpattikaḥ*. Because of the new shade of meaning, the Vṛttikāraḥ comments on the word *apauruṣeyaḥ* by first exposing the consequences of a *pauruṣeyaḥ sambandhaḥ*. Even if one were prepared to admit that *apauruṣeyaḥ* could be treated as vaguely synonymous with *autpattikaḥ*, the explicit contrast with a *pauruṣeya-vacanam* definitely brings into the discussion finally the pair 'made, not-made' (*kṛtākṛta-*) and this is what eventually both *pauruṣeyaḥ* and *apauruṣeyaḥ* have come to mean. That Śabara does not use the word *apauruṣeyaḥ* at all in the parallel passages but limits *pauruṣeyaḥ* really to the 'human' reality is also evidence for the thesis that the School of the Bhāṣyakāraḥ (not the Bhāṣyakāraḥ himself), is anterior to that of the Vṛttikāraḥ. Add to this the fact that it does not even occur to Śabara to contrast *autpattikaḥ sambandhaḥ* with *pauruṣeyaḥ sambandhaḥ*, the reason being that the word *apauruṣeyah* retains for him the meaning of *autpattikaḥ* ('by its very nature') and not of *akṛtaḥ*. Because of this the Bhāṣyakāraḥ does not bring in the argument of '*pauruṣeya hi sati sambandhe*[41], as the Vṛttikāraḥ does'.

Having taken the step of contrasting *pauruṣeyaḥ* with *apauruṣeyaḥ* with the consequence of bringing in the nuance of *kṛta-* and *akṛta-*, the Vṛttikāraḥ begins to fortify his gains by explaining the *akṛta*-shade of meaning by taking a further step, namely, that of '*svayam*': *atha śabde cen nimitta-bhūte svayam avabudhyate* . . .

"Now, if, with Śabda as the cause [of enlightenment], enlightenment takes place by itself. . ."[42]

The *svayam*-element is obviously in contrast to the para-element that is intrinsic to the *pauruṣeya*-aspect. If this is so, it is but logical that the two negative characteristics (doubt and falsity) that are connected with the *pauruṣeya*-aspect should be discounted in the case of the *svayaṃ*-factor. And this is in fact what the Vṛttikāraḥ does. Hence with the *autpattika*-element

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[40] ŚBh (24, 3); 23, 3; 1.1.5.5.
[41] FRAUWALLNER, Materialien, p. 34, 17–18.
[42] ŚBh 34, 21; (42, 6); 1.1.5.5:
śabde cen nimittabhūte svayam avabudhyate.

on the one hand and the exclusion of doubt and falsity on the other, it becomes conclusive: *codanā-lakṣaṇa eva dharmaḥ*[43].

Thus what the Vṛttikāraḥ is actually working out is the theory of *svataḥpramāṇam* as applied to the *codanā*, though it is an intriguing fact that throughout the discussion the word *pramāṇam* does not occur!

If we now revert to *tat pramāṇam anapekṣatvāt* we shall first of all notice that the last words of the comment on the previous section are of interest to us:

tasmād apauruṣeyaḥ śabdasya arthena saṃbandhaḥ
ataś ca tat pramāṇam anapekṣatvāt.
na hy evaṃ sati puruṣāntaraṃ pratyayāntaraṃ va apekṣate.
tasmāc codanā-lakṣaṇa eva dharmo nānya-lakṣaṇaḥ[44].

In other words, the gist of the whole Sūtram is rendered by the two words: *apauruṣeyaḥ* and *anapekṣaḥ*. And since the term *anapekṣaḥ* is a clear reference to the factors excluding doubt and falsity (as the comment on it indicates), and since the word *apauruṣeyaḥ* stresses the *svayam*-functioning of the *codanā*, at this juncture an over-all conclusion is called for. As a matter of fact, it is the conclusion of Sūtra-s 2, 3, 4 and 5, as confirmed by the phrase *nānyalakṣaṇaḥ*.

I have time and again hinted or stated that I think that both the Bhāṣyakāraḥ and the Vṛttikāraḥ have taken their material from a common source to which the former is more faithfully than the latter. It is not possible here to go into details, I can merely enumerate my reasons briefly, at the risk of appearing arbitrary.

i) The topics and their treatment in the Vṛttikāragranthaḥ indicate that their appearance in the history of ideas is chronologically posterior to that of their counterparts in the Bhāṣyam. Though it is certain that the Bhāṣyakāraḥ is later than the Vṛttikāraḥ the latter's ideas and the way they are explained show that Śabara belonged to the 'old school'.

ii) My analysis of Sabara's treatment of the Tarka-pāda shows, I hope, that there is a unified conception, except for the Śabdanityatā section (1.1.6—23). The same cannot be said of the long quotation ascribed to the Vṛttikāraḥ. The rise of new problems and perspectives makes itself felt here and the effort to 'modernize' but not to systematize, is unmistakable.

iii) Consequent on the effort to modernize was the effort to rearrange the treatment of the Sūtram in the Vṛttikāragranthaḥ. The same is not true of Śabara since his only effort at modernization is to quote the modernizing Vṛttikāraḥ. The Vṛttikāraḥ has rearranged both as regards details and as regards the general scheme of treatment. An example for the first: when discussing *dharma-jijñāsā* (in the Codanā-sūtram), the adversary objects that, whether Dharma is known or not, there is not much sense in discussing it. Here Śabara replies that there are many opinions as to what is Dharma. One must learn to discern. For, *so 'yam avicārya pravartamānaḥ kaṃcid eva*

43 ŚBh 42, 11—12; (36, 4—5).
44 ŚBh (48, 9—14); 58, 6—8; 1.1.5.5.

upādadāno vihanyeta anartham̐ ca ṛcchet[45]. The Vṛttikāra uses a similar argument when discussing the necessity of examining the *nimittam* of Dharma (in Sūtram 3): *tatrāparīkṣya pravartamāno'rthād vihanyeta anartham̐ cāpnuyāt kadācit*[46]. If we keep in mind that *anarthaḥ* means negative Significance, then it is clear that basically both the Vṛttikāraḥ and the Bhāṣyakāraḥ are using one and the same argument but in different contexts. The Bhāṣyakāra's context however is the older of the two, because it belongs to an earlier problematic. The question 'what is Dharma and what is Adharma?' seems to me to be earlier than the question 'what is the justification, and proof for the validity of Dharma?'

As examples for major rearrangement by the Vṛttikāraḥ of the treatment of the Sūtra-s, we have two of them: The Pratyakṣa-Sūtram is turned into a Pūrvapakṣaḥ which in the first part treats of the *pratyakṣādīni* as *pramāṇāni* whose justification need not be examined, and in the second rejects Śabdaḥ as a *pramāṇam.* Whereas the second half of the Autpattika-Sūtram deals with topics that were unknown to the early Mīmāṃsā, the first half of the same Sūtram brings a comment on the *codanā* which belongs to the Codanā-Sūtram where it has its parallel in the Śābara-Bhāṣyam[47].

iv) There is some evidence in support of my thesis also from the vocabulary of the Vṛttikāraḥ. I have already remarked that he does not even mention the word *autpattikaḥ* (which in his school must have been by then considered to be archaic) and that instead he introduces the term *apauruṣeyaḥ* together with the new nuances consequent on it. When discussing the *codanā* he employs the term Śabdaḥ as a synonym for it, apparently deliberately in order to lead the discussion into the more general direction of Śabda-pramāṇam and not merely codanā-pramāṇam. The sophistication in his thinking is evidenced by his changing: Sutram 4 from *satsam̐prayoge... tat praytakṣam* to *tatsam̐prayoge... sat pratyakṣam*; Sūtram 5 from *upadeśo* to *siddhavad, upadeśāt* and by his leaving out altogether '*bādarāyaṇasya*' from the Sūtram.

v) In general Śabara's style is characterized by his pre-occupation to work out principles which help in upholding the authority of the Veda and in the interpretation of the ritual-texts! In contrast, the Vṛttikāraḥ is more speculative, less inhibited by tradition and bold enough to go his own way.

E. FRAUWALLNER and F. ZANGENBERG have both observed the similarity in idiom and ideas between the Vṛttikāraḥ and the Bhāṣyakāraḥ and have argued that Śabara has both borrowed from and bungled the argumentation of the Vṛttikāraḥ[48]. ZANGENBERG has summarized his results thus:

"Die Ergebnisse lassen sich auf drei Hauptpunkte reduzieren:

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[45] ŚBh (16, 4—9); 11, 1—2; 1.1.5.5.

[46] ŚBh (24, 22—23); 26, 3—4; 1.1.5.5.

[47] Compare ŚBh (14, 1—15, 6) with (41, 9—42, 1—9) and (17, 2—9) with (42, 9—11); and (23, 4—24, 1) with (41, 9—42, 2).

[48] E. FRAUWALLNER, Materialien, 107ff. F. ZANGENBERG, Śabaraḥ und seine philosophischen Quellen, in WZKSO 6 (1962) 60ff.

1. Aus stilistischen und inhaltlichen Kriterien kann erschlossen werden, daß Śabaraḥ sich in seinen philosophischen Argumenten an Vorlagen anlehnt.
2. Śabaraḥ gibt den Gedankengang der Vorlage nicht exakt wieder, er entstellt ihn vielmehr, ohne dabei zu wesentlichen eigenen Ergebnissen zu gelangen.
3. Bei aller Verzerrung des Texts behält Śabaraḥ gewisse Formulierungen der Vorlage mehr oder weniger wortgetreu bei, wenn diese auch nicht in sein eigenes Schema passen."[49]

Though this is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of these questionable conclusions, I would like briefly (and hence not satisfactorily, I am afraid) to put down my reasons for rejecting part of these conclusions.

1. That the Vṛttikāraḥ is temporally prior to Śabaraḥ is no reason for assuming that the similarities of expressions and arguments are best explained by assuming that Śabaraḥ borrowed from the Vṛttikāraḥ. There is another possibility: both could have used a third source (which is what I think was really the case)[50].

2. Implicitly ZANGENBERG takes the Vṛttikāra's argumentation as a model[51]. And before he has proceeded to prove that the Bhāṣyakāraḥ has actually borrowed from the Vṛttikāraḥ, he states (surprisingly) that the arguments of the former have been modelled on those of the latter! In this manner he proceeds with two assumptions:

i) that the Vṛttikāra's argumentation is logical and complete and

ii) that Śabara borrowed from, but did not keep to, the Vṛttikāra's arguments. On both counts I find ZANGENBERG's statements wanting. The Bhāṣyakāraḥ (at least in the passages under consideration) is more logical and seems to be more faithful to the original source than the Vṛttikāraḥ[52].

3. A cursory glance through the Bhāṣya-passages (which we are discussing) and through their parallels from the Vṛttikāraḥ is enough to convince anyone that the reasoning in the former is simple, sometimes even simplistic, and in the latter, sophisticated. This is clear both from the fragmentariness of the Bhāṣya's comments and the detailed discussions of the Vṛttikāraḥ, as well as from the nature of these passages. The Bhāṣyakāraḥ comments in such a way that he does not philosophize more than is necessary for his purpose. But the Vṛttikāraḥ waxes eloquent at every opportunity. Thus when comparing their comments on the Pratyakṣa-Sūtram, we find that

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[49] F. ZANGENBERG, Śabaraḥ und seine philosophischen Quellen, in WZKSO 6 (1962) 77.

[50] "Schon ein flüchtiger Blick auf die beiden Abschnitte zeigt gewisse Entsprechungen in Aufbau und Argumentation, die den dringenden Verdacht nahelegen, daß Śabara als der jüngere Autor hier den Vṛtti-Abschnitt als Vorlage benutzt." Ibid. p. 70.

[51] "Aus diesem klar und zwingend durchgeführten Gedankengang ergibt sich deutlich die Absicht des Verfassers." Ibid. p. 71.

Further: "Damit ist die klar durchgeführte und in sich durchaus folgerichtige Argumentation des Vṛttikāraḥ abgeschlossen." Ibid. p. 73.

[52] I hope my discussion of both Śabara's and the Vṛttikāra's explanations about codanāpramāṇatvam has to some extent shown this.

Śabara is merely concerned about proving that *pratyakṣam* cannot be the cause of Dharma-knowledge, whereas the Vṛttikāraḥ is only too glad to make hay and to launch out into a relatively lengthy discourse on perception and related problems.

ZANGENBERG does not explain why, if Śabara basically borrowed his arguments from the Vṛttikāraḥ, he (Śabara) still quoted those portions from which he borrowed. I think, there are two possible answers: either Śabara was *minus habens*, and did not realize that there would be people who would see through his arguments and so went ahead and quoted even the Vṛtti-passages from which he borrowed. Or, there was a different tradition to which he belonged, and therefore wanted his readers to get the benefit of both. In this case the similarities are to be explained as the common property of the Mimāṃsā-school. Śabara's was a more conservative group than the Vṛttikāra's. But conservative or progressive, both had to fall back on a tradition and this explains the common and the similar passages. Śabara is more faithful to the original tradition than the Vṛttikāraḥ. Whereas the former belonged to a school where philosophical problems were introduced according to the principle *quantum requiritur et sufficit*, the main thing being the interpretation of the ritual-passages of Scripture, the latter launched out into philosophy without let or hindrance.

4. The Bhāṣyakāraḥ is out to prove *codanā-pramāṇam*, whereas the Vṛttikāra's main thrust is the thesis of *svataḥ-pramāṇam* of which the *codanā-pramāṇam* is an application. Keeping this in mind, it can be shown (as I hope to do elsewhere) that the Bhāṣyakāraḥ is as logical in his treatment as the Vṛttikāraḥ. It would furthermore not be too difficult to pick holes in the Vṛttikāra's arguments, if one took the Bhāṣyakāra's argumentation as a model.

5. Even on his own ground the Vṛttikāraḥ, it seems to me, fails to pass muster. Take the following passage, for example:

"For, if the relation [between word and meaning] were of human origin a cognition [based on such a relation] could be suspected of being wrong. For, it would be a cognition from another [source]."[53]

The usual Mīmāṃsā argument with regard to the relation between word and meaning is that the creation of such a relation is impossible, and not that it implies that the cognition would be from another source! If the Vṛttikāra's argument were valid, the whole process of Vṛddha-vyavahāraḥ from which both the word-meanings and the Vedic *saṃhitā*-s are learnt would be *para-pratyayaḥ* since both the cases presuppose the *prāmāṇyam* of the *puruṣa-vacana*-s.

6. One of the valuable contributions of the Mīmāṃsā school was the discovery of the two levels at which Śabdaḥ functions: *Codanā* and *laukika-vacanam*. Śabara (carrying on the tradition, I think, of the early Mīmāṃsā)

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[53] ŚBh (34, 17—19); 42, 2—4; 1.1.5.5:
pauruṣeye hi śabde yaḥ pratyayas tasya mithyābhāva āśaṅkyeta parapatyayo hi tadā syāt.

asserted that the process of falsification obtains only in the realm of the *laukika-* and not of the Veda-vacanam. There is no way to falsify a Veda-vacanam. If the Vṛttikāraḥ could have assimilated this principle, he would have saved himself a lot of trouble. He would have, for instance, been in a position to distinguish the type of *pramāṇam* a *codanā* is (as Śabara does) from the type of *pramāṇam* a human statement is. And from this he could have proceeded to state that whereas it is possible in the case of the Veda-*vacanam* to prove in every instance its *pramāṇatvam*, it is neither possible nor necessary to prove the actual *pramāṇatvam* of every individual act of perception without jeopardising the *pramāṇatvam* of every act of perception in general.

7. Lastly, there are a number of things wherein I do not agree with E. FRAUWALLNER and F. ZANGENBERG.

i) Both translate *bravīti ca vitathaṃ ca* as if it were a general statement. Both the context as well as the concept that is being discussed here show that '*codanā*' is the subject. Hence: [*codanā*] *bravīti ca vitathaṃ ca.* GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ has: "The Veda asserts, and asserts what is false."[54]

ii) *Śabde cen nimittabhūte svayam avabudhyate*... (34, 21) Both, I feel, are completely off the mark in their translations. FRAUWALLNER: "Wenn man nun, weil das Wort Ursache ist, selbst erkennt . . ." and ZANGENBERG: "Wenn nun das Wort (spricht, d. h.) Ursache dafür ist, daß jemand selbst erkennt..." G. JHĀ's translation though free is faithful to the idea: "...so that as soon as the means in the shape of the Word is there, what is spoken of by it becomes known by itself (without any extraneous help)."[55] FRAUWALLNER's and ZANGENBERG's translations do not seem to take into account the argument. The thrust of the Vṛttikāra's reasoning is as follows: when the *codanā* which is *apauruṣeya-*, whose words are autpattikally connected with their meanings, speaks, it means that there is no human or divine element involved in its task of making known something, and that something becomes known by itself. One has to keep in mind, that the implicit contrast is with sentences composed by human beings where the validity of the words depends on the speaker. Here in the case of the Vedavacanam there is no speaker. For, when Śabda speaks, that is, when it makes known something, that something is known by itself, without the mediation of a speaker. The nature of the Vedavacanam is such that its meaning becomes apparent by itself.

iii) There is furthermore a misunderstanding on ZANGENBERG's part. The two *pramāṇa-*s Śabdaḥ and Pratyakṣam are similar in one respect and that is directness (which in Samskṛta has the same name as perception: *pratyakṣa-*). This directness excludes, for example, the type of process involved in

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[54] FRAUWALLNER, Materialien, p. 17: "Mit den Worten 'er sagt' und 'etwas Unrichtiges' ist etwas Widersprechendes gesagt." ZANGENBERG, Śabaraḥ und seine Philosophischen Quellen, p. 69: "Wenn behauptet wird 'er spricht Unwahres', so ist das ein Widerspruch. JHĀ, Translation of ŚBh Vol. I, p. 4.

[55] FRAUWALLNER, Materialien, p. 35. ZANGENBERG, op. cit. p. 68. JHĀ, Translation of Śābara-Bhāṣya, p. 18.

anumānam or *arthāpattiḥ*. The cognition is immediate and direct. ZANGENBERG interpretes the similarity of the two *pramāṇa-s* in a different manner. "Die gleiche Evidenz aber die der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung gegenüber dem Wahrnehmbaren zukommt, besitzt das Wort gegenüber den Dingen, die es aussagt..."[56] I think, this is not merely inaccurate, this is not Mīmāṃsā at all. The objects ('die Dinge' in ZANGENBERG's translation) to which the *codanā*-s refer are not *siddhārthāḥ* but *sādhyārthāḥ* hence it is ruled out of court that there can be between the *codanā* and its objects the type of relationship that exists between perception and its objects. To repeat, what the Vṛttikāraḥ is stressing is the directness with which both Pratyakṣam and Śabdaḥ convey their cognition. By the way E. FRAUWALLNER, too, seems to share in ZANGENBERG's understanding of 'Pratyakṣam' since he translates *pratyakṣas tu... pratyayaḥ* as "Die Erkenntnis... ist Wahrnehmung." and *anena pratyakṣena pratyayena* as "durch ebendiese wahrnehmende Erkenntnis."[57]

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[56] ZANGENBERG, op. cit. p. 73.
[57] FRAUWALLNER, Materialien, pp. 21 und 37.

CHAPTER 5 THE DOCTRINE OF ŚABDAḤ

The brief section on Śabdaḥ in the Vṛttikāragranthaḥ quotes a much earlier authority, thus proving that the doctrine was part of an ancient heritage of the school.

"When one utters [the word] cow, what is Śabdaḥ here? Bhagavān Upavarṣa answers: '[The syllables] g, au and ḥ.' For in daily life the word Śabdaḥ is used for the 'thing' that is grasped with the help of the ear. And the [syllables] are grasped by the ear."[1]

A little later the Vṛttikāraḥ adds:

"Also, there is no word [that is] different from the syllables g, etc., since one does not see any difference [on the one hand] and one does see the difference [on the other]. For, it is the syllables g, etc. that are perceived. Thus the word cow that begins with the syllable g and ends with ḥ is [identical with] the syllables. A word over and above and different from them does not exist."[2]

Clearly the Sphoṭa-doctrine is being attacked. Though the Sphoṭavādī insists that it is not possible to arrive at the meaning of a word through the syllables either singly or collectively the Vṛttikāraḥ replies that:

"The last syllable together with the impressions produced by the previous syllables makes known [the word-meaning]."[3]

Unfortunately we do not have much more than this from the Vṛttikāraḥ about his understanding of Śabdaḥ. However, we shall not be far off the mark if we take it that Śabara's teaching was basically in line with the ancient Mīmāṃsā teaching on the matter.

Though the main lines of Śabara's Śabda-doctrine are not unclear, the gaps are far too glaring to be filled in by guesses. His main thesis is unambiguous but its structure is sketchy, not systematic: Śabdaḥ cannot be produced but is manifested[4]. Its 'home' is the *ākāśam*[5]. Like it, it is without

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In this chapter all the references to the ŚBh are from the ASS edition.

[1] ŚBh 45, 7—9, 1.1.5.5:

atha gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ. gakāraukāravisarjanīyā iti bhagavān upavarṣaḥ. śrotragrahaṇe hy arthe loke śabdaśabdaḥ prasiddhaḥ. te ca śrotragrahaṇāḥ. Cfr. G. V. DEVASTHALI, Mīmāṃsā, The Vākyaśāstra of Ancient India. Pp. 18—21.

[2] ŚBh 48, 7—10, 1.1.5.5:

na ca pratyakṣo gakārādibhyo'nyo gośabda iti. bhedadarśanābhāvād abhedadarśanāc ca. gakārādīni hi pratyakṣāṇi. tasmād gaur iti gakārādivisarjanīyāntam padam akṣarāṇy eva. ato na tebhyo vyatiriktam anyat padaṃ nāmeti. See also 45, 10—13, 1.1.5.5.

[3] ŚBh 46, 1—2, 1.1.5.5. Cfr. BETTY HEIMANN, Sphoṭa and Artha, in: A Volume of Studies in Indology. Pp. 221—227.

[4] ŚBh 76, 3—4, 1.1.6.12.

[5] ŚBh 82, 3, 1.1.6.15.

parts; hence there is no increase in it or of it[6]. It is the *akṣarāṇi* that undergo augmentation or its opposite, or become soft or loud but because of this, Śabdaḥ can appear as loud and as having parts[7].

Śabara's main thesis with regard to Śabdaḥ is that it is unproduced, that is to say, it is eternal, one without parts, not limited to any one place, and indestructible. It is manifested by *nādaḥ* (sound) in the form of conjunctive air-particle waves made up of air-particles which impinge on the *ākāśa*-in-the-ear[8]. The model for imitation was clearly the Vaiśeṣika-theory of sound. For the latter, Śabdaḥ was a perishable property of ether and syllables were thought of as manifestations of this property. In contradistinction to this, the Mīmāṃsaka-s were tenacious in their belief that Śabdaḥ is imperishable, though they kept to the other doctrines that Śabdaḥ is 1) manifested 2) by conjunctions and disjunctions of *nādaḥ* 3) in the *ākāśa*-of-the-ear. The Vaiśeṣika held that Śabdaḥ is perishable and that it manifests sometimes this syllable and sometimes that[9]. But since for the Mīmāṃsaka-s Śabdaḥ was *kūṭasthanitya*- no such explanation would fit in their conception of things. Unfortunately for us, there is in the early Mīmāṃsā no explanation as to the nature of Śabdaḥ in relation to the *varṇa*-s and to the *ākāśaḥ*. It is true that the Vṛttikāraḥ had stated contrary to the Sphoṭa-doctrine that there is no reality called Śabdaḥ over and above the syllables that make up a *padam*[10]. But the question about the relationship of Śabdaḥ (not *padam*) to the *varṇa*-s remains unanswered. Finally, Śabdaḥ does not have the kind of cause, which when it perishes, could also destroy Śabdaḥ[11].

But this is not all. In the course of his exposition Śabara makes some remarks which tend to confuse the issue. If we keep in mind that Śabara is explaining all this in the Śabdanityatā-section, then remarks like 'the word cow is uttered eight times'[12] or, 'when the word cow is uttered there is simultaneously cognition of all cows. Hence this [word cow] is expressive of the *ākṛtiḥ*'[13], raise the question how is Śabdaḥ which is eternal and without parts and is manifested by *nādaḥ*, connected with words like cow? The fact that Śabara further argues that words like cow are eternal, seems to show that they are (somehow intimately) connected with each other[14]. But how? The question remains unresolved.

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6 ŚBh 83, 6—8, and 84, 3—4, 1.1.6.17.

7 ŚBh 83, 8, and 84, 1—2, 1.1.6.17.

8 ŚBh 84, 2—3, 1.1.6.17. The Mīmāṃsā expressly refutes the Vaiśeṣika-claim that Śabdaḥ is made up of air-particles. In our perception of Śabdaḥ, it insists, we do not observe any such constituent as we do, for instance, in the case of a piece of cloth. Besides, if air-particles were to constitute Śabdaḥ we would perceive it with the sense of touch, not with the ears! ŚBh 90, 12—91, 5; 1.1.6.22.

9 FRAUWALLNER, Geschichte II, pp. 32ff.

10 ŚBh 48, 7—10 and 45, 10—13; 1.1.5.5.

11 ŚBh 90, 6—11, 1.1.6.21.

12 ŚBh 87, 5, 1.1.6.20.

13 ŚBh 86, 6—7, 1.1.6.19.

14 ŚBh 87, 5; 88, 1—3; 1.1.6.20.

In order to prove that Śabdaḥ is eternal, Śabara offers, in all, five proofs.

i) The most important is the one which asserts that Śabdaḥ cannot perish since its purpose is to reveal, not so much itself, as its meaning[15]. Were the Śabdaḥ perishable, then the implication would be that since it perishes the moment it is uttered, it would be incapable of making its meaning known. The reason for this is simple: since it is perishable, one would not be able to repeat it. This would raise all sorts of difficulties about how to know the meaning of the new word and communicate it to one's listeners before it perishes, etc. For, according to the Mīmāṃsā, a perishable word means a word that cannot be revivified, and hence any word in its place would be an altogether new word which would have nothing to do with the previous one. If that is so, our troubles will increase in geometric proportion since the meaning of the word will also be different. A different word will necessarily have a different meaning as there is a natural relationship between word and meaning. The consequence that is drawn from this is that the word has a purpose that is different from itself; its one and only purpose is to reveal its meaning. Should it perish the moment it is uttered, it would not be able to fulfil its purpose. Thus it would be impossible either to know or to make known to others the meaning of a word[16]. It would not do to suggest that the different words referring to cow and used at different times though not the same are similar. For similarity can in many cases be misleading. Besides if it were a new word each time, the problem of knowing its meaning and of using it at the same time, would be insoluble. Hence, since word is meant to reveal its meaning, it is clear that eternality will be one of the conditions of its possibility of being faithful to this role.

ii) The next argument for the eternality of word starts from the fact that when the word cow is uttered, the *ākṛtiḥ* cow is denoted.

"When the word cow is uttered, there is a simultaneous cognition with regard to all cows. From this [it is clear], that this [word cow] denotes the *ākṛtiḥ*. And it is not possible to establish a relationship between word and *ākṛtiḥ*. For, the producer [of the relationship] would be able to relate, [only] when he points to the *ākṛtiḥ*. But since there are many *ākṛti*-s [aspects] in the individual cow, in what way could one denote the [special] *ākṛtiḥ* expressed by the word cow, without [however employing] the word [cow]?"[17]

The Mīmāṃsaka-s hold that a word denotes an *ākṛtiḥ*, that is to say, the *arthaḥ* is really an *ākṛtiḥ*. Since there is a natural (*autpattika-*)relationship between word and *ākṛtiḥ*, word, like *ākṛtiḥ*, must be eternal. Otherwise it would be indeed difficult to establish that a perishable word is related to an

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[15] ŚBh 84, 5; 86, 4; 1.1.6.18.

[16] ŚBh 84, 6—8, 1.1.6.18.

[17] ŚBh 86, 6; 87, 1; 1.1.6.19:

gośabda uccarite sarvagavīṣu yugapat pratyayo bhavati. ata ākṛtivacano'yam. na ca ākṛtyā śabdasya saṃbandhaḥ śakyate kartum, nirdiśya hy ākṛtiṃ kartā saṃbadhnīyāt. gopiṇḍe ca bahūnām ākṛtīnāṃ sadbhāvāc chabdam antareṇa gośabdavācyāṃ vibhaktām ākṛtiṃ kena prakāreṇa upadekṣyati.

imperishable *ākṛtiḥ*. There is the added difficulty of explaining how a particular *ākṛtiḥ* is expressed by a word which refers to the total *ākṛtiḥ* (say, cow) and not to an *ākṛti*-aspect (say, dewlap) of it. If, however, the word is eternal, one has the possibility of repeatedly experiencing it as often as is necessary to come to know an *ākṛtiḥ* more closely.

iii) There is even in common language the practice of saying that the same word has been repeated eight times: we do not say that eight words (cow) were uttered to express the same meaning (cow). The reason for this is the re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā-*) that takes place when the same word is uttered. Similarity cannot explain the situation because one does not find the word similar to but identical with (say) the word uttered yesterday. Śabara argues that the re-cognition of a word cannot be based on similarity. First, of all, the very re-cognitive act asserts the sameness of the word, not its similarity. Secondly, in the case of a word to conclude to its similarity is an inference which cannot militate against re-cognition which is a form of perception.

iv) The following proof for the eternality of Śabdaḥ states clearly where the stress of the argumentation is to be laid. Śabara insists that when proving the eternality of Śabdaḥ one cannot rest content with the fact that one does not see any instance of the Śabdaḥ being produced. For there are things like mountains, etc. whose production no one has witnessed but no one in his senses, would affirm that they are not perishable. These things consist of different materials and hence are perishable because whatever is composite is perishable. When the material from which a thing is made begins to give way, the thing, too, perishes[19].

"In the case of Śabdaḥ we do not observe any such [material-] cause, at whose disintegration [Śabdaḥ too] would perish[20].

v) The last proof is really no proof, since it merely cites a scriptural phrase *vācā virūpantyayā* as implying the eternality of Śabdaḥ[21]. For non-Mīmāṃsaka-s, this might seem a small matter but it would be a mistake to underestimate the effect of such proofs on the faithful.

This then is the teaching of the early Mīmāṃsā on Śabdaḥ. The doubts that arise in this connection are: what is the relationship between Śabdaḥ (that is eternal, unchangeable and without parts) with the Śabdaḥ cow? How are Śabdaḥ, the *varṇa*-s and the *padam* related? When it is said that it is the same word cow that is re-cognized every time it is heard, how is it eternal and what kind of eternality is it? How is Śabdaḥ to be understood ontologically? What is its 'inner' nature? How are Śabdaḥ, its manifestation and *nādaḥ* connected ontologically, not merely phenomenologically (as has

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[18] ŚBh 87, 5—90, 4, 1.1.6.20.
[19] ŚBh 90, 5—11, 1.1.6.21.
[20] ŚBh 90, 10—11, 1.1.6.21:
naivaṃ śabdasya kiñcit kāraṇam avagamyate. yad vināśād vinaṅkṣyati ity avagamyate.
[21] ŚBh 91, 7—8, 1.1.6.23.

been described by Śabara (1.1.13). Questions connected with the relationship of Śabdaḥ, *varṇaḥ*, *padam*, *nādaḥ* and the *ākṛtiḥ* will have to be asked towards the end of our study. Here we are concentrating only on what concerns Śabdaḥ directly. However, we cannot conclude without remarking that neither the Vṛttikāraḥ nor the Bhāṣyakāraḥ have given us an idea as to how they envisaged the connection of their theory of Śabdaḥ with the Veda!

CHAPTER 6 ŚABDAḤ, ARTHAḤ AND SAṂBANDHAḤ

Patañjali when discussing the *ekaśeṣaḥ*[1] refers to two views on the denotation of a word. When commenting on Vārttikam 35 *ākṛtyabhidhānād vāikaṃ vibhaktau vājapyāyanaḥ*, he says *ākṛtyabhidhānād vāikaṃ śabdaṃ vibhaktau vājapyāyana ācāryo nyāyyaṃ manyate*[2] and about Vārttikam 45 *dravyābhidhānaṃ vyāḍiḥ* he says *dravyābhidhānaṃ vyāḍir ācāryo nyāyyaṃ manyate*[3]. Earlier in the Mahābhāṣyam there is another reference to the *padārtha*-problem: "Now what is the denotation of a word (*padārthaḥ*), [is it] *ākṛtiḥ* or *dravyam*?"[4] Commenting on this Bhartṛhari states in his Mahābhāṣyadīpikā: "[The teaching] about *ākṛtiḥ* is Vājapyāyana's but [the teaching] about *dravyam* is Vyāḍi's."[5]

A little later Patañjali begins his comment on the dictum *siddhe śabdārtha-saṃbandhe*. When discussing the meaning of *arthaḥ* he again broaches the problem of *dravyam* and *ākṛtiḥ*. Again the above two views reappear. The first view is that it must be the *ākṛtiḥ* since it is permanent (*nitya-*) whereas the *dravyam* is impermanent (*anitya-*)[6]. The second states that the *dravyam* alone is the *padārthaḥ*. The justification is of interest to us.

"For a *dravyam* is constant (*nityā* = unchangeable) and the *ākṛtiḥ* is changeable (*anitya-*). How does one know this? In everyday life the following is observed: [a piece of] clay when given a particular form becomes a lump (*piṇḍam*). Changing the lump-form pots are made. Changing the pot-form flower-pots are made. Similarly gold, when given a particular form becomes a lump. Changing the lump-form *rucaka* [-ornaments] are made. Changing the *rucaka*-form armlets are made. Changing the armlet-form *svastika*-s are made. Again returning [to the original form] the gold-lump, when given another form, becomes a pair of gold ear-rings like Khadirawood on fire. The *ākṛtiḥ* keeps on changing but the *dravyam* (gold) remains the same. In spite of the change of form the *dravyam* remains unchanged."[7]

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[1] KIELHORN ed. Mahābhāṣyam I.2.64, Vol. I, pp. 242, 10—247, 16. See also GAURINATHA SASTRI, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning, pp. 136—171; G. V. DEVASTHALI, Mīmāṃsā, The Vākya-Śāstra of Ancient India, pp. 27—36.

[2] Ibid. 242, 10—11.

[3] Ibid. 244, 8—9.

[4] Ibid. 6, 7.

[5] Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā 17, 17.

[6] Mahābhāṣyam Vol. I, p. 7, 9. Cfr. M. BIARDEAU, La Connaissance dans le Brahmanisme, pp. 43—63.

[7] Mahābhāṣyam Vol. I, p. 7, 11—18.

dravyaṃ hi nityam ākṛtir anityā. kathaṃ jñāyate. evaṃ hi dṛśyate loke. mṛt kayācid ākṛtyā yuktā piṇḍo bhavati. piṇḍākṛtim upamṛdya ghaṭikāḥ kriyante. ghaṭikākṛtim upamṛdya kuṇḍikāḥ kriyante. tathā suvarṇaṃ kayācid ākṛtyā yuktaṃ piṇḍo bhavati. piṇḍākṛtim upamṛdya rucakāḥ kriyante. rucakākṛtim upamṛdya kaṭakāḥ

The point of the discussion is to show that *dravyam* is *nitya-* and *ākṛtiḥ* is *anitya-*. The examples are clay and gold but the problem of *dravyam* and *ākṛtiḥ* is not to be restricted only to things like clay and gold. For, the proof for the *nityatvam* of clay and gold is, mutatis mutandis, applicable to all *dravya-*s because the *satkāryavāda*-model is here implicit. In other words *dravyam* is the unchangeable essence, (or in the terminology of the Mīmāṃsā, the *ākṛtiḥ*) and what the passage calls *ākṛtiḥ* is in fact the *vyaktiḥ* of the Mīmāṃsā![8]

The contention of Vyāḍi that *dravyam* is what a word denotes and that it is eternal must have alienated him from the Mīmāṃsaka-s. From their point of view neither statement could have elicited sympathy for him, though it is strange that differences in vocabulary could have mattered so much[9]. To make things worse, the term *dravyam* which they must have used over a long period of time would because of Vyāḍi, sooner or later bring in misrepresentations. It is therefore not in the least surprising that they changed it to *vyaktiḥ*.

In the Vṛttikāragranthaḥ we do not find either the term *dravyam* or the term *vyaktiḥ*. Does this betray a period of hesitation as regards the terminology? Our suspicion gets confirmed by the Vṛttikāra's use of the term *ākṛtiḥ*. For he clearly refers *ākṛtiḥ* to the external structural characteristics: *sāsnādiviśiṣṭā ākṛtiḥ*[10] as well as to a realm of knowing where there is neither *vyāmohaḥ* nor *viparyayaḥ*[11]. Furthermore he makes use of the examples '*rucakaḥ, svastikaḥ, vardhamānakaḥ*' to prove that the *ākṛtiḥ* is perceptible[12]. The fact of the two similarities to Vyāḍi's teaching (the reference of *ākṛtiḥ* to the external characteristics and the example), and the fact of Vṛttikāra's own teaching on *ākṛtiḥ* lends support to our suspicion that it was a period of transition that he belonged to. All this is further strengthened by the

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kriyante. kaṭakākṛtim upamṛdya svastikāḥ kriyante. punarāvṛttaḥ suvarṇapiṇḍaḥ punar aparayā ākṛtyā yuktaḥ khadirāṅgārasavarṇe kuṇḍale bhavataḥ. ākṛtir anyā ca anyā ca bhavati dravyaṃ punas tad eva. ākṛty upamardena dravyam eva avaśiṣyate.

8 "According to him (Helārāja), the import of a sentence is bheda in Vyāḍi's view and saṃsarga is Vājapyāyana's view. As explained there, bheda should be understood as equivalent to 'exclusion' or 'dissociation'. Now in Vyāḍi's view, as we know, the meaning of a word is dravya, and its main function is to distinguish the thing it means from all similar things. Thus a 'cow' means here not so much what is characterised by 'cowness' as what is distinguished from a 'horse' (say). When words with such a function combine to form a sentence, they come to signify a thing not as possessing certain attributes but rather as excluding some. In Vājapyāyana's view, on the other hand, words signify qualities; and when such words combine to form a sentence, the import becomes inclusion or a combination of the qualities which they respectively connote." Prof. M. HIRIYANNA: Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana, in: Indian Historical Quarterly XIV (1938), p. 264.

9 See previous note.

10 ŚBh 50, 1, 1.1.5.5. All references in this chapter to the ŚBh are from the ASS ed. Cfr. M. BIARDEAU, op. cit., pp. 161—177.

11 ŚBh 50, 3—4, and 52, 1—2, 1.1.5.5.

12 ŚBh 50, 2—3, 1.1.5.5.

novelties introduced by the Vṛttikāraḥ[13]. It was a time when old positions came up for revision and new ones for assimilation. Changes meant choices. It is also probable that the period after the Vṛttikāraḥ definitively opted for the term *vyaktiḥ* instead of *dravyam*. It was not a new term; the Nyāyaḥ had been using it together with *jātiḥ* and *ākṛtiḥ*.[14] That saved the Mīmāṃsaka-s the trouble of coining a new one. Moreover, *vyaktiḥ* introduced an element of unambiguity which *dravyam* had brought along with it since it (*dravyam*) was also used in opposition to *guṇaḥ* and *kriyā*.

E. FRAUWALLNER has shown that the above Mahābhāṣya-passage[15] is made up of what are in fact fragments of a larger Mīmāṃsā discussion on *dravyam* and *ākṛtiḥ*[16]. This means that after the Sūtra-s of Jaimini this is the oldest extant Mīmāṃsā text that we possess. FRAUWALLNER rightly points out that it must be several centuries older than Śabara. Before we proceed, let us recall that for our present discussion we have the following most ancient Mīmāṃsā works. I note in brackets their terminology on the subject.

1.	Jaimini-Sūtra-s	(*ākrtiḥ*, *dravyam*)
2.	Mahābhāṣya-frament	(*padārthaḥ*, *ākrtiḥ*, *dravyam*)
3.	Vṛttikāragranthaḥ	(*śabdārthaḥ*, *ākṛtiḥ*)
4.	Śābara-Bhāṣyam	(*śabdārthaḥ*, rarely *padārthaḥ*, *ākṛtiḥ*, *sāmānyam*, *vayktiḥ*)
5.	Kumārila Bhaṭṭa	(*śabdārthaḥ*, *ākṛtiḥ*, *sāmānyam*, *jātiḥ*, *vyaktiḥ*).

There is a general tendency to overlook shades of meaning and to reduce similar meanings to synonyms. We shall see how pertinent this is when we study Śabara and Kumārila. SREEKRISHNA SARMA has studied the *jāti-ākṛtiḥ* terminology of the Mahābhāṣyam and come to interesting conclusions[17]. I bring them in here because of their relevance to our discussion. S. SARMA first introduces us to Patañjali's implicit distinction of *pravṛttinimittam* and *padārthaḥ*. "Dividing words into four classes on the basis of their significance, Patañjali uses the word *jātiśabdaḥ*. *Jātiśabda-s* are those words which signify a *jāti*. For example, the word 'cow' (*gauḥ*) is a *jātiśabda*, whereas *nīla* (black) is a *guṇaśabda* (signifying a quality), *pācaka* (cook) is a *kriyāśabda* (signifying an action) and Ḍittha is a *yadṛcchāśabda* (a proper noun). The word 'cow' is a *jātiśabda*, because it signifies a kind consisting of several individuals, who, even though varying from each other in certain respects, can be brought under the same class and recognized as belonging to the same kind. So *jāti* means here only 'kind'."[18] "A word is

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[13] This is abundantly proved by his lengthy comment on the Autpattika-Sūtram which brings in topics for discussion which were new in the Mīmāṃsā.

[14] Nyāya-Sūtra-s II. 2. 61, 66, 67, 68 (Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series).

[15] Mahābhāṣyam Vol. 1. 242, 10—247, 16.

[16] E. FRAUWALLNER: Sprachtheorie und Philosophie im Mahābhāṣyam des Patañjali, in WZKSO 4 (1960), pp. 92—118.

[17] SREKRISHNA SARMA: The Words ākṛti and jāti in the Mahābhāṣya, Adyar Library Bulletin, XXI, Pt. 1—2, May 1957.

[18] Ibid. p. 62.

called *jātiśabda* or *guṇaśabda* with reference to its *pravṛttinimitta* (the reason for its being currently in use, literally) and not because it denotes a *jāti* or a *guṇa*. The *pravṛttinimitta* and *padārtha* are different. When we say the universal is the denotation of words we mean the *padārtha* and not the *pravṛttinimitta*."[19] Further: "The word *jāti* occurs in the *Mahābhāṣya* more than sixty times and in all places it refers to the kind and not to the universal which is the meaning of *ākṛti*. The above-mentioned definition of *jāti* given by Patañjali can now be better understood[20]. It means that the kind to which a particular individual belongs is comprehended through its structural pattern which is common to all the individuals forming that kind... In any case the import of words is *ākṛti*, the structural form viewed as one and permanent and hence universal. This conclusion shows that *jāti* in the *Mahābhāṣya* is a concept, whereas *ākṛti* is a reality."[21] Finally: "The outcome of this investigation can be summed up thus: In the *Mahābhāṣya* the term *ākṛti* means 'structural pattern'; it can be viewed as permanent or temporary. In the former case it means the universal, which is *jāti* according to the Naiyāyika-s and Mīmāṃsaka-s, and in the latter it is the form that varies from individual to individual, which is termed *ākṛti* by the later writers; *jāti*, according to Patañjali, is the kind or class and is an abstract concept."[22]

In the discussion that follows we shall have to keep the distinction between *jātiḥ* and *ākṛtiḥ* in mind. Of course, it would be an a priori assumption on my part to say that this distinction is there in the Mīmāṃsā. What I am suggesting is, if we keep this distinction and its explanation before our eyes, our task will be easier in what follows.

Unlike the Vṛttikāraḥ who first discusses this problem in MS 1.1.5.5. Śabara who quotes him still sticks to the scheme of things worked out by the Sūtrakāraḥ. According to the latter's arrangement the discussion of *vyaktiḥ* and *ākṛtiḥ* takes place MS 1.3.30—35[23]. Right at the very start Śabara presents us with his understanding of *ākṛtiḥ* and *vyaktiḥ*. Let us begin with his definition of *vyaktiḥ*:

"Vyaktiḥ [is that] whose characteristics (*viśeṣa-*) are uncommon (*asādhāraṇa-*)."[24]

What in our perception appear as the characteristics of a particular individual object are, we are told, unique. It is of course not that the individual qualities or properties of the said object are unique; rather it is the

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[19] Ibid. p. 62.

[20] The reference is to Mahābhāṣyam Vol. II, p. 225: *ākṛti-grahaṇā jātiḥ*.

[21] Ibid. p. 63.

[22] Ibid. p. 65.

[23] That Sabara's the more original scheme is evident from this that his discussion on the *ākṛtiḥ* comes up in an altogether different context. The Vṛttikāraḥ in that he reacts to contemporary problems also profits from them by assimilating whatever does not go against his system. This is clear from his discussion of the *ākṛti*-problematic in the Autpattika-Sūtram.

[24] ŚBh 296, 1; 1.3.9.30: *asādhāraṇaviśeṣā vyaktiḥ*.

total concretised combination that is unique. The name for this is *vyaktiḥ*, that is, a concretised 'manifestation'.

According to one school it is the particular, the *vyaktiḥ*, that is the denotation of a word[25]. But Śabara rejects this view.

"If *vyaktiḥ* were the *śabdārthaḥ*, it could not be employed in the case of another *vyaktiḥ*. Now, if it is used in the case of another *vyaktiḥ*, still the *śabdārthaḥ* [could] not [be] the *vyaktiḥ*, because *vyaktiḥ* is free of all common characteristics."[26]

Vyaktiḥ, by definition, is something so unique that it cannot possibly be predicated of any other thing because this latter thing also is so unique that no 'foreign' predication would be applicable to it either.

The Mīmāṃsā position in this matter is that only *ākṛtiḥ* is the denotation of a word. Śabara gives us this definition of *ākṛtiḥ*:

"*ākṛtiḥ* is [that] sheer commonality (*sāmānyamātram*) [which consists] of substance, qualities and action."[27]

This explanation of *ākṛtiḥ* offers us a clear idea of the Mīmāṃsā understanding of it. If we take anything, say, a cat or a cow, and apply the above definition to it, then it means that the *ākṛtiḥ* cat or cow is all that (substance, qualities, actions) which is included in our understanding of cat or cow. The difference between *vyaktiḥ* and *ākṛtiḥ* in such an explanation is to be sought in the fact that the former is concretised (=particularized, individualized) whereas the latter is not. More precisely, *ākṛtiḥ* is the way of looking at things in such a manner that the individualization is not taken note of; one prescinds from the individualisation. And *vyaktiḥ* is not mere individualization but the individualized *ākṛtiḥ*. Strictly speaking *ākṛtiḥ* and *vyaktiḥ* are two closely related moments in the process of knowing. Not every act of knowing goes as far as ending in a *vyaktiḥ*; it can be that it stops short of the *ākṛtiḥ*. But there can be no process of knowing, not even in perception, where the moment in which *ākṛtiḥ* is cognized is absent. As we shall see later on, no cognitive process is at all possible without any *ākṛtiḥ*.

But *ākṛtiḥ* and *vyaktiḥ* are closely related. As a matter of fact Śabara calls them relatives, *saṃbandhī*.

"*ākṛtiḥ* is always bound up with *vyaktiḥ*, [in such a way that] when one 'relative' (*ākṛtiḥ*) is known, the other relative (*vyaktiḥ*) is [also] known."[28]

This being so, what exactly is the problem? If *ākṛtiḥ* and *vyaktiḥ* are relatives and both are known in the cognitive process, what special difficulty is there in this matter? Śabara formulates the problem thus:

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25 See pages 83—84 of this chapter.

26 ŚBh 303, 9—11; 1.1.9.33:
yadi vyaktiḥ śabdārtho bhaved vyaktyantare na prayujyeta. atha vyaktyantare prayujyate, na tarhi vyaktiḥ śabdārthaḥ sarvasāmānyaviśeṣavinirmuktā hi vyaktir ity ucyate.

27 ŚBh 294, 2—3; 1.3.9.30:
dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ sāmānyamātram ākṛtiḥ.

28 ŚBh 304, 14—15; 1.3.9.33:
ākṛtir hi vyaktyā nityasaṃbaddhā, saṃbandhinyāṃ ca tasyāṃ avagatāyāṃ saṃbandhyantaram avagamyate.

"Why is there doubt? Because, when the word cow is pronounced, the cognition is common (*sāmānyapratyayād*) and because [there is] a relation to action [only] in the case of the *vyaktiḥ*."[29]

This is not Śabara's view but it is the starting-point for the discussion that follows. It is not surprising however that the formulation of the problem includes the two most important concepts of the Mīmāṃsā understanding of *ākṛtiḥ*. And in addition, one reads in-between the lines the ritualistic concern that is at the back of Śabara's thinking.

In contrast to Śabara's order of treatment I would like to begin by recalling how the Mīmāṃsaka-s explain the process through which all human beings learn language:

"In the case [of the process of human discourse] one observes: through perception words, elders and object; through syllogistic reasoning, that the hearer has grasped [the command] and through *arthāpattiḥ*, since there is no other possibility, that he recognizes the power based on both [word and meaning]. [Thus] he comes to know the relationship [between word and meaning] through the triple means of knowledge."[30]

This is how Kumārila has described it but it is common teaching of the Mīmāṃsā. Perception is the first step in the process. Children hear certain words, notice certain responses and their effects, and gradually they get involved in inferential thinking. What is worthy of note for our purpose is that all children learn through such a process which word refers to which object. And the object they get familiar with together with its name is not merely the external structure but its *ākṛtiḥ* as well, so that in course of time when they hear a word they begin to understand its meaning (= *ākṛtiḥ*) independently of any individual object, or when they see an individual they recognize the *ākṛtiḥ*.

We are now in a position to understand Śabara's views on the subject.

First and foremost we have an argument whose ritualistic thrust is as evident as broad daylight.

"*ākṛtiḥ* is the denotation of the word. Why? Because [its] purpose is action. The statement *śyenacitaṃ cinvīta* is possible [only] with regard to *ākṛtiḥ* (that, too, only] if the word *śyenaḥ* denotes the *ākṛti*. But if [*śyenaḥ* were to] express a *vyaktiḥ*, [as such] it would be impossible to construct by building a [definite] individual *śyenaḥ*. Thus [this would be] meaningless since [such] a statement would be impossible. Hence [the word] denotes the *ākṛtiḥ*."[31]

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29 ŚBh 296, 1—2; 1.3.9.30:
kutaḥ saṃśayaḥ. gaur ity ukte sāmānyapratyayād, vyaktau ca kriyāsaṃbandhāt.

30 ŚV Saṃbandhākṣepaparihārah 118—119.
pratyakṣādau upakṣīṇe yo'numānena ḍitthavat /
saṃbandhitvān niyoktāraṃ gavādau api kalpayet //
gavādiśabdasaṃbandhaṃ sarvo'nyasmāt prapadyate /
madvat tadvyavahāritvāt tasyaitat pratisādhanam //

31 ŚBh 302, 7—10; 1.3.9.33:
ākṛtiḥ śabdārthaḥ. kutaḥ? kriyārthatvāt. śyenacitaṃ cinvīta iti vacanam ākṛtau

Language, according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, is meant to be at the service of action (*kriyārthatvāt*), especially ritual action. Only that can be the denotation of a word which fulfills the aim of language. And this, it is argued, is the *ākṛtiḥ*. The ritual injunctions of the Veda have to be implemented not once but repeatedly. If the denotation of a word were the *vyaktiḥ*, this major condition would not be fulfilled. Hence *ākṛtiḥ* alone can be the word-denotation. Śabara argues his point from the opposite position as well:

"But if [*śyenaḥ* were to] express a *vyaktiḥ* [as such], it would be impossible to construct a [definite] individual *śyena* with the help of an errection."[32]

This sentence makes sense only if by *vyaktiḥ* we mean an irrepeatable individual since an irrepeatable individual is unique and hence not amenable to repetition. Thus (if *vyaktiḥ* were the word-meaning) the purpose of the Veda would be defeated. Furthermore, if the injunctions denoted an irrepeatable individual, it could not be realised since what would be realised would again have nothing in common (*ex praemissis*) with the injunction to realize a particular irrepeatable individual.

"If *vyaktiḥ* were the *śabdārthaḥ*, it could not be employed in the case of another *vyaktiḥ*. If it is used in the case of another *vyaktiḥ*, still *vyaktiḥ* [can] not [be] the *śabdārthaḥ*, since *vyaktiḥ* is free of all common characteristics."[33]

An irrepeatable individual cannot be rendered in words this is Śabara's contention. However, we know from experience that actions are repeatable, and so we are forced to conclude that this is so because only the *ākṛtiḥ* is repeatable. The element that is common to all the repeatable actions is the *ākṛtiḥ* which, however, in its concrete existence is never found to be without its correlative, namely, the irrepeatable individual. This does not go against the above teaching, since the injunction to ritual action cannot be from the view-point of its irrepeatable individuality but only from that of the *ākṛtiḥ*.

At the back of this reasoning the ritualistic concern is clear: the Mīmāṃsaka is in search of a thesis which would make sense of the Veda and help in the constant performance of the vedic ritual. However, in the same Sūtram which we have been discussing (i. e. 1.3.9.33) we find an argument which throws some more light on his understanding of *ākṛtiḥ*. It is part of the answer given to the question why if *ākṛtiḥ* is denoted by the word, the *vyaktiḥ* cannot be denoted at the same time.

"Because *ākṛtiḥ* is always bound up with *vyaktiḥ* [so that] when one relative (*ākṛtiḥ*) is known, the other relative (*vyaktiḥ*) [too] becomes known. It is a self-evident fact that when a word is pronounced the *vyaktiḥ* becomes known. Whether [the *vyaktiḥ* is known] because of the word or because of the *ākṛtiḥ*, this distinction is not obvious. It can be known through *anvayaḥ* and

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saṃbhavati. yady ākṛtyarthaḥ śyenaśabdaḥ vyaktivacane tu na cayanena śyenavyaktir utpādayitum śakyata ity aśakyārthavacanād anarthakaḥ. tasmād ākṛtivacanaḥ.

32 ŚBh 302, 9—10; 1.3.9.33.

33 ŚBh 303, 9—11; 1.3.9.33.

vyatirekaḥ. [Thus, for instance] one who comes to know the *ākṛtiḥ* even without the word, he also knows the *vyaktiḥ*. One who because of a mental defect does not perceive the *ākṛtiḥ* even though the word has been uttered, he can never perceive the *vyaktiḥ*. Can not [the word-denotation] consist in the *ākṛtiḥ* specified by the *vyaktiḥ*? If [the word-denotation] would consist [in the *ākṛtiḥ*] specified by [one] *vyaktiḥ*, then [the *ākṛtiḥ*] specified by another *vyaktiḥ* could not be known. Hence a word is the cause of the cognition of an *ākṛtiḥ*. [And] the cognition of an *ākṛtiḥ* [is the cause] of the cognition of the *vyaktiḥ*."[34]

The important points are the following: one, the *ākṛtiḥ* is always bound up with the *vyaktiḥ*; two, a word causes the cognition of an *ākṛtiḥ* and finally, the cognition of the individual is not because of the word but because of the cognition of the *ākṛtiḥ*. The last point is again presented by Śabara in a slightly different form in the same Sūtram. A word is never used of a *vyaktiḥ* without some relation to its *ākṛtiḥ*.

Though the principle of the epistemological importance of the *ākṛtiḥ* is not articulated by Śabara it is evident that it is implicit in his epistemology. To some extent it will become more explicit in the Vṛttikāraḥ though still not fully. It is only Kumārila who will thematically formulate the function of *ākṛtiḥ*. Here we are told that without the *ākṛtiḥ* we cannot know the *vyaktiḥ* but the epistemological implications are not explicitated. Though the definition of *vyaktiḥ* is such that the *vyaktiḥ* cannot be the denotation of a word, the above passage makes it clear that it is more a reasoned out conclusion than an assumption arbitrarily made. Implicit in the above points is also the distinction between an abstraction and a real *ākṛtiḥ*. It is only the latter that has concrete instances in the form of the *vyakti*-s; this is not the case with an abstraction (like beauty or being). For, it is not through being that we cognize, for instance, the being tree. We cognize the being tree through the *ākṛtiḥ* tree! But, as I just stated, all this is merely implicit in Śabara.

The advance made by the Vṛttikāraḥ over the Bhāṣyakāraḥ in the understanding of *ākṛtiḥ* is reflected in the short discussion in 1.1.5.5. I am taking only the more relevant sentences, leaving out the scholastic arguments:

"Now what is the meaning of the word cow? We say that it is the *ākṛtiḥ* specified by dewlap, etc. Is the *ākṛtiḥ* to be realised (*sādhya-*) or not? Being perceptible it does not have to be brought into being. For it is obviously perceived [when one says:]: *rucakaḥ, svastikaḥ, vardhamānakaḥ*. Is this not

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[34] ŚBh 304, 14—15; 1.3.9.33. See Note 28 of this Ch. Also ŚBh 304, 15—317, 3; 1.3.9.33:

tad etad ātmapratyakṣaṃ yac chabda uccarite vyaktiḥ pratīyata iti. kiṃ śabdād uta ākṛter iti vibhāgo na pratyakṣaḥ. so'nvayavyatirekābhyām avagamyate. antareṇāpi śabdaṃ ya ākṛtim avabudhyeta, avabudhyeta eva asau vyaktim. yas tūccarite'pi śabde mānasād apacārāt kadācit ākṛtiṃ nopalabheta na jātucid asau imāṃ vyaktim avagaccheta. nanu vyaktiviśiṣṭāyām ākṛtau vartate. vyaktiviśiṣṭāyāṃ cet varteta vyaktyantaraviśiṣṭā na pratīyeta. tasmāc śabda ākṛtipratyayasya nimittam. ākṛtipratyayo vyaktipratyayasya iti.

an illusion? No. In the absence of a contradicting cognition one cannot say that [it is] an illusion. But even though there is no separate object of this kind, there is the cognition [like]: 'series', 'group', 'forest'. No, the argument [that is] brought forward [is] inconsistent. By stating [that] though there is no forest, there is the cognition of a forest, is perception being attacked [by concluding that] the trees too do not exist? ... Because no forest apart from the [individual] trees is perceived, one does not conclude from that that there is no forest. If because of another reason there arises a cognition that contradicts the existence [of a forest] [by saying]: this cognition forest is false, then we [can] conclude that there is no forest. But in the case [the *ākṛti*-s] cow, etc. [their] cognition is not rejected. Hence [there is] no similarity [between a cognition like series etc. and a cognition of an *ākṛtiḥ*]. If in the case of forest, etc. there is no contradicting cognition, [then one can] not [say] that the [forests] do not exist. Hence the putting forward [of examples like] series, forest, etc. is inconsistent. Thus Jaimini's thesis: 'the meaning of a word [is] the *ākṛtiḥ*' [is] established. In what way the *ākṛtiḥ* is the meaning of a word, we shall explain in detail later."[35]

The whole passage speaks only of *ākṛtiḥ*. The terms *dravyam*, *vyaktiḥ* and *jātiḥ* do not occur at all. Further, the discussion is merely about what *ākṛtiḥ* is and not whether *ākṛtiḥ* or *vyaktiḥ* is the denotation of *śabdaḥ*. The answer to this question is taken for granted. Hence the term *vyaktiḥ* (*dravyam*?) does not occur at all.

The question *atha "gaur" ity asya śabdasya ko'rthaḥ?* is answered phenomenologically, not ontologically. *Ākṛtiḥ* is understood (if I am not mistaken) in a dual manner: as the external structural pattern and as the internal structural form which is present in each of the individuals of which it is predicated. Whereas *ākṛtiḥ* as the external structural pattern is explicitly referred to (*sāsnādiviśiṣṭā ākṛtir*) the internal structural form is implied only.

It is true that the *ākṛtiḥ* of a cow is not a conventional label for a multitude of cows and that it has to do with any individual cow. It is equally true that one could sometimes be wrong about the existence of the forest. But what is the reason why such a conclusion is not warranted in the case of an *ākṛtiḥ*? The Vṛttikāraḥ is silent on this point. From the context we could surmise and on the basis of it, perhaps, speculate on the reasons. There is, for instance, his thesis that the *ākṛtiḥ* is directly perceptible and hence does not stand in need of being proved. Since the perception of a cow is different in nature from that of a *vanam* (because the former has to do with each individual and the latter with a group), and since the *ākṛtiḥ* is said to be perceived, one could surmise that for the Vṛttikāraḥ, the concrete experience (of a cow whether in a dream or in reality) can never be mistaken because all positive and negative statements are based on it. When one sees an individual cow and later on one begins to doubt whether or not it was a cow, still the experience of that 'that' is not wrong; it is the identification that may be wrong. Truth and falsehood do not apply to the perception of an

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[35] ŚBh 49, 1—52, 5; 1.1.5.5.

ākṛtiḥ, because it is part and parcel of the process of our knowing, indeed even of the process of distinguishing between truth and falshehood but it is not an external part like the eye or the ear which could malfunction. It is such that no act of knowing is possible without it. I know, I am bringing in later ideas. I am also aware of the added difficulty that the Vṛttikāraḥ characterizes the *ākṛtiḥ* of *gauḥ* as *sāsnādiviśiṣṭā* which seems to go directly against what I have been suggesting about the *ākṛtiḥ* being part and parcel of the process of knowing.

It might help to remember at the very start that we are here dealing with a topic, speculation on which had been restricted mostly to the grammatical and phenomenological aspects. The Mīmāṃsā, it seems to me, was one of the pioneers to make a break-through by introducing an epistemological perspective into the discussion. However, the terminology available at the time did influence its thinking and it had to take a stand with regard to it. The Nyāyaḥ, for example, already possessed the terms *jātiḥ*, *ākṛtiḥ* and *vyaktiḥ*[36]. According to it, *ākṛtiḥ* meant the visible form, *jātiḥ* the universal concept and *vyaktiḥ* the concrete individual; and the denotation of a word was understood as connected with all these three. When reacting to the Nyāyaḥ the Mīmāṃsā not only strengthened its own convictions; its clarifications become more articulate. It rejected the Nyāyaḥ position that *jātiḥ*, *ākṛtiḥ* and *vyaktiḥ* are all denoted by a word; but (at the same time) it took over from the Nyāyaḥ, its understanding of *ākṛtiḥ* as the external form or configuration of the individual of a species. But this was only one aspect of the Mīmāṃsā's understanding of *ākṛtiḥ*. The other more important aspect however was an epistemological one. In the matter of *ākṛtiḥ* it stated, there is no possibility of error or illusion though it (the *ākṛti*) is perceived! This seems to be paradoxical: Is it possible for anything to be perceptible and still be beyond illusion and error? This is possible only if in all our knowing, be it verbal or perceptible, there is a common element which makes us know what we are talking about or what we are perceiving. That is to say, when we speak about a cow there must be an element in our cognition of cow which makes us know that we are speaking of a cow. Similarly, when we are perceiving (or even when we are imagining or dreaming that we are perceiving) a cow, there must be in this act of perception a factor which enables us to be conscious of what we are perceiving (or what we are imagining or dreaming to be perceiving). To deny this common factor (which according to the Vṛttikāraḥ seems to be the *ākṛtiḥ*), is to deny there is any commonness at all. To be able to know any commonness one will have to admit the above reasoning. Last there be a misunderstanding, I hasten to add that when it is stated that in the matter of *ākṛtiḥ* there is no possibility of error, what is meant is this: with regard to perception there is a distinction to be made between awareness of perception and articulation of perception. The awareness of perception is infallible; not, however, the articulation. *Ākṛtiḥ* is at the level of the awareness of perception. It is this

[36] NSu II. 2. 61, 66, 67, 68.

element that enables us to know what we are talking about. When I hear the word cow and I understand it, I have come to know the *ākṛtiḥ* cow. This does not by any means ensure that when I begin to articulate my experience of *ākṛtiḥ*, my articulation will be right or adequate. As a matter of fact my articulation may be all wrong. But even here, the element of experience which is at the basis of my attempt to articulate it, is what is meant by *ākṛtiḥ*. This *ākṛtiḥ*, if it is experienced, cannot go wrong. Only articulations and verbalisations can go wrong. Experience because it is experience is always and everywhere infallible! When because of jaundice a man begins to see everything as yellow, then this is not wrong, since perception is never wrong. It would be false to assert that everything he sees is yellow. But it is correct to say that he sees everything yellow.

For the Vṛttikāraḥ then, *ākṛtiḥ* seems to be that element in our perception which makes us aware of what we hear, or see, or feel, etc. This explanation salvages the Vṛttikāra's statement that in the matter of *ākṛtiḥ* there can be no question of error. But how does it explain his description of *ākṛtiḥ* as characterised by the external form? Given the above explanation, this should no more be difficult. Our awareness of an *ākṛtiḥ* must sooner or later be verbalised and articulated. When we repeatedly perceive similar individuals, then we invariably connect the external appearances with the internal awareness of the *ākṛtiḥ*. This is how a concept is formed.

In the realm of perception there cannot be any exception to this. Perception is after all an integral experience in which sensation and internal awareness form one whole. One knows of the external sensation only through the internal awareness but one can refer to the internal awareness only through the external sensation. The statement *sāsnādiviśiṣṭā ākṛtiḥ* is an illustration of this last part: one can refer to the internal awareness of the *ākṛtiḥ* cow only through the external sensation of *sāsnādiviśiṣṭā*.

Śabdārthasaṃbandhaḥ

We shall now proceed to examine the relationship that is said to obtain between word and meaning, since it is this that, according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, is the reason for the 'infallibility' (*avyatireka-*) of the vedic statements.

The queer thing about the teaching of the early Mīmāṃsā on the Autpattikasaṃbandhaḥ is that neither Śabara nor the Vṛttikāraḥ has much to offer by way of comment. In fact this is all the more surprising since the later system is built on this corner-stone.

The Bhāṣyakāraḥ says:

"With *autpattika-* we mean *nitya-* (= constant, eternal). For *utpattiḥ* refers to *bhāvaḥ* (= nature) indirectly. *Saṃbandhaḥ* [means] the not-unconnected nature of word and meaning; [and] not a relation [of the two] after they have arisen. The *autpattika-* relation between word and meaning is the cause of that Dharma [which is] characterized by agnihotram, etc. [but which is] not known by means of perception, etc."[37]

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[37] ŚBh 23, 3—24, 1; 1.1.5.5:
autpattika iti nityaṃ brūmaḥ. utpattir hi bhāva ucyate lakṣaṇayā. aviyuktaḥ

We have here a concise but clear explanation of the original meaning of *autpattika-*. *Autpattika-* means 'originary', referring to the origin. According to Śabara the origin of word and meaning is not-unconnected (*avibhakta-*). That he connects *autpattika-* with *nitya-* is not surprising, since *nitya-* too originally had the same meaning; it is only later that it came to have the meaning of eternal[38]. In the present context of the Autpattikasaṃbandhaḥ we are dealing with a metaphor, not with a description, much less with a metaphorical description. Basically a metaphor functions through evocation, whereas a metaphorical description is primarily intended to be 'comparative'[39]. Already here in the Bhāṣyam we see how a metaphor is reduced to a description.

What is still more striking is that the Autpattikasaṃbandhaḥ is made use of by Śabara to explain the *apauruṣeya-* nature of the vedic sentences. His reasoning is that since the connection between a word and its meaning cannot be anything other than *autpattika-*, it (that is, the connection) is the cause of Dharma-knowledge. Śabara does not expatiate on this except to state that such knowledge is an *upadeśaḥ* and that it is a *pramāṇam* because it is independent of other cognitions and of other human beings[40]. There is however here a 'leap' from the *autpattika-* relation between a word and its meaning, to the *autpattika*-relation between sentence and its meaning. Apparently this did not worry Śabara or his predecessors.

The Vṛttikāraḥ begins his discussion of the *saṃbandhaḥ* like the Bhāṣyakāraḥ, except that he omits the word *autpattika-* altogether:

"The relation of word with meaning is a-personal (*apauruṣeya-*, i. e. non man-made). The knowledge of this Significance (*arthasya*) [which is] characterized by *agnihotram*, etc. is not known by means of perception, etc. In this way [Significance] characterized by the *codanā* is true knowledge."[41]

The reasoning of the Vṛttikāraḥ is similar to that of Śabara. From the fact of the *apauruṣeya*-nature of the relationship and from the fact of its not being accessible to sense-perception he concludes that the knowledge of Significance which is characterized by the *codanā* is correct. In what follows he argues from the independence of the vedic statement to its validity. The lacuna which we noticed in Śabara's reasoning is also noticeable here.

Thus both in the case of the Bhāsyakāraḥ and of the Vṛttikāraḥ the Autpattika-saṃbandhaḥ is the reason for the independence of the vedic statements from all factors that could invalidate them. The argumentation

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śabdārthayor bhāvaḥ saṃbandho notpannayoḥ paścāt saṃbandhaḥ. autpattikaḥ śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasya agnihotrādilakṣaṇasya dharmasya nimittaṃ pratyakṣādibhir anavagatasya.

[38] Cfr. M. BIARDEAU: op. cit. pp. 155—161. See M. HARA's interesting article: Note on the Sanskrit word nitya, JAOS 79, 1959.

[39] The originary experience gives birth to metaphors and not to metaphorical descriptions, since the concern there is neither intellectual nor academic but with experience that is beyond space and time.

[40] ŚBh 25, 1—2; 1.1.5.5: Cfr. G. V. DEVASTHALI: Mīmāṃsā, The Vākya-Śāstra of Ancient India, pp. 37—47.

[41] ŚBh 41, 9—42, 2; 1.1.1.5.

though not explicit is the seed of the later system as it blossomed in Kumārila. For, he makes it a point to develop this aspect of independence in each of his doctrines. But as far as the Bhāṣyakāraḥ and the Vṛttikāraḥ are concerned they do not have much more to say about the *autpattika-* part of the relationship. We do not have Śabara's views on the nature of the relationship between word and meaning but we can take it that he and the Vṛttikāraḥ must have held similar views. The Vṛttikāraḥ explains what this *saṃbandhaḥ* is both positively and negatively. First of all, it is not a physical contact (*saṃśleṣalakṣaṇaḥ saṃbandhaḥ*) since such an explanation would imply that meaning would always have to be physically there where word is. And this would create more difficulties than explain what it set out to. Rather this relationship between word and meaning is of the nature of that which leads to cognition and of that which is cognized (*pratyāyasya pratyāyakaḥ*), and is called a relationship between that which signifies and that which is signified (*saṃjñā-saṃjñi-lakṣaṇaḥ saṃbandhaḥ*). The word is what signifies and its denotation is what is signified. Once the relationship is known then the signifying factor leads us to the cognition of what is signified[42].

If word leads to the knowledge of its meaning how can one explain the fact that at the first hearing a word does not lead to the knowledge of its meaning? The Mīmāṃsaka-s are made of sterner stuff and hence do not allow themselves to be discouraged by facts however embarrassing they might turn out to be. The Vṛttikāraḥ takes it in his stride that such facts are part of the larger and ultimately inexplicable 'given' that we call the process of human discourse.

"For us experience is in all cases [our] criterion. Because we see [that the knowledge] of the word comes from hearing [it,] we know [that the word] leads to a cognition of it; however because we notice [this] cognition [does not arise] at the first hearing, [we hold that] the number of times one requires to hear in order to ascertain 'This [is] the signified, this the signifier' is the number of times one requires to hear [in order to come to] know the meaning [of the word], just as the seeing eye does not become un-seeing merely because there is no external light that makes things visible."[43]

This relationship, it is asserted, is not a product of any being, be it human or divine. The reasoning behind such a stance is this:

i) The relationship is not a product of human beings, because one does not perceive such a process. One should either observe this or one should, at least, remember the creator of such a relationship.

"For if a human being should have created the relationship [between word and meaning] and seen to its usage, then of necessity he is to be remembered at the time of the usage. For only when there is agreement

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[42] ŚBh 43, 2—6; 1.1.5.5.

[43] ŚBh 44, 2—6; 1.1.5.5.

sarvatra no darśanaṃ pramāṇam. pratyāyaka iti hi pratyayaṃ dṛṣṭvāvagacchāmo na prathamaśruta iti prathamaśravaṇe pratyayam adṛṣṭvā yāvatkṛtvaḥ śruteneyaṃ saṃjñāyaṃ saṃjñīty avadhāritaṃ bhavati tāvatkṛtvaḥ śrutād arthāvagama iti. yathā cakṣur draṣṭṛ na bāhyena prakāśena vinā prakāśayatīty adraṣṭṛ na bhavati.

between the one creating and the one making use [of the relationship] is the aim [of an enterprise] achieved, not when there [is] disagreement."[44]

ii) Furthermore, even if such a creator were forgotten, one would have to substantiate this assumption, just because the concept of a hare's horn is not a contradiction in terms, one cannot assert that there is such a thing as a hare's horn[45].

iii) Even *arthāpattiḥ* is of no use in this matter, since without assuming a creator for such a relationship, we can very well explain the usage of words and their meanings. We have the phenomenon of what is called *vṛddhavyavahāraḥ*, through which children learn and get involved in the process of human discourse.

"There is however another way [of explaining the relationship between word and meaning]. When elders speak of an object, the children [first] hear [the word], [then] they see directly [before them] the object that is referred to. These elders too [learnt this process the same way] from other elders when they were children. These also [learnt] from others. Thus there is no beginning [for such a process]. It could have been thus."[46]

Further:

"If there is [such a thing as] the process of human discourse among elders, a creator of the relationship [between word and meaning] cannot be taken for granted."[47]

The assumption of a creator for the relationship is further weakened by the Mīmāṃsaka-s reminder that the former's argument is, after all is said and done, indirect, while his own is directly based on perception![48]

iv) If one assumes a creator for such a relationship the major weakness of this assumption turns out to be the difficulty of explaining convincingly how this uniform tradition could be carried to areas which are difficult of access[49].

v) In addition the Vṛttikāraḥ puts forward another argument to confirm the Mīmāṃsā-thesis. The stress in the argument is on the difficulty, or more precisely, the impossibility of communicating to others both the process as well as the product of creating a relationship. Such communication presupposes by its very nature words with definite meanings as known both to speaker and to hearer as well.

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44 ŚBh 53, 9—54, 2; 1.1.5.5:
yadi hi puruṣaḥ kṛtvā saṃbandhaṃ vyavahārayet, vyavahārakāle'vaśyaṃ smartavyo bhavati. saṃpratipattau hi kartṛvyavahartror arthaḥ siddhyati na vipratipattau.

45 ŚBh 55, 2—4; 1.1.5.5.

46 ŚBh 56, 3—5; 1.1.5.5:
vṛddhānāṃ svārthena saṃvyavahāramāṇānām upaśṛṇvanto bālāḥ pratyakṣam artham pratipadyamānā dṛśyante. te'pi vṛddhā yadā bālā āsaṃs tadā anyebhyo vṛddhyebhyas te'pi anyebhya iti nāstyādir ity evaṃ vā bhavet.

47 ŚBh 56, 7—8; 1.1.5.5.

48 ŚBh 56, 8—9; 1.1.5.5.

49 ŚBh 56, 10—57, 2; 1.1.5.5.

"Hence one must of necessity agree that [at least] in the case of some words the relationship was not created by an agent but that it was known through the process of discourse among the elders. If however such cognition is possible through such a process, there is no necessity for a creator; and the [use of] *arthāpattiḥ* is [thus] not [possible]."[50]

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[50] ŚBh 57, 7—9; 1.1.5.5.
tasmād avaśyam anena saṃbandhaṃ kurvatākṛtasaṃbandhāḥ kecana śabdā vṛddhavyavahārasiddhā abhyupagantavyāḥ. asti ced vyavahārasiddhir na niyogataḥ saṃbadhrā bhavitavyam ity arthāpattir api nāsti.

CHAPTER 7 VĀKYĀRTHAḤ AND BHĀVANĀ

It has been repeatedly stressed that the Mīmāṃsaka-s were not primarily interested either in epistemological or linguistic speculations. Their concern was first and foremost dharma-logical. This concern is again observed in Śabara's teaching on *vākyārthaḥ*. Thus even the opponent proposes a doctrine of *vākyārthaḥ* which is meant primarily to upset the Mīmāṃsā-thesis about the revelatory character of the Veda with regard to Dharma.

"Hence the sentence-meaning is not produced by the word-meanings. Therefore [the *vākyārthaḥ*] is a product [of man's effort]. Indeed these [Vedasentences are] mere word-groupings, and groupings are seen to be produced by men."[1]

The conclusion of this argument is: because the vedic sentences are man-made they are not eternal and, hence, where Dharma is concerned, they cannot be authoritative.

Similarly Śabara has to propose a *vākyārtha*-theory which can ultimately contribute towards the two main dogmas of the school, namely, Vedāpauruṣeyatvam and Vedapramāṇatvam. Thus in this tradition, too, we find that philosophical reflection is but an ancilla theologiae![2]

Śabara formulates his *vākyārtha*-thesis thus: "The prediction (*samuccāraṇam*) of past and present words, along with just their word-meanings, with action as their purpose (*kriyārthena*), [produces the sentence-meaning]. A sentence is not known [to have] another meaning [which] in no way refers to the word-meanings. Why? Because there is not way of knowing [such an altogether different sentence-meaning]. [That is to say,] we have no *pramāṇam* whatever, by means of which we could know [this]. If it does not take note of the word-meanings, even the last syllable of a sentence together with the impressions produced by the previous syllables has no capability (*śaktiḥ*) to function, [i. e. to produce] a meaning different from the word-meanings."[3]

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[1] ŚBh 95, 3—5; 1.1.7.24 (ASS ed.)
ato na padārthajanito vākyārthaḥ. tasmāt kṛtrimaḥ. padasaṃghātāḥ khalv ete saṃghātāś ca puruṣakṛtā dṛśyante. yathā nīlotpalavaneṣv adya carantaś cārusaṃravāḥ.

[2] "Die vedische Grammatik hat sich immer als ancilla theologiae gefühlt." BRUNO LIEBICH, Über den Sphoṭa, ZDMG 77, 1923, p. 209.

[3] ŚBh 95, 8—96, 3; 1.1.7.25
teṣv eva padārtheṣu bhūtānāṃ vartamānānāṃ padānāṃ kriyārthena samuccāraṇam. nānapekṣya padārthān pārthagarthyena vākyam arthāntaraprasiddham. kutaḥ? pramāṇābhāvāt. na kiṃ cana pramāṇam asti yena pramimīmahe. na hy anapekṣitapadārthasya vākyāntyavarṇasya pūrvavarṇajanitasaṃskārarahitasya śaktir asti padārthebhyo'rthāntare vartitum iti.

Śabara is, of course, reacting to the Sphoṭavādin-s on the one hand and on the other proposing a theory which though apparently similar to theirs is still substantially different from theirs. Whereas for the Sphoṭavādin-s the meaning bursts forth (*sphoṭaḥ*)[4] (not because of but) at the utterance of the word, though it has nothing to do with it, for Śabara though the sentence-meaning is not identical with the sum of the word-meanings, yet it is occasioned by the latter. There is no other cause to explain the rise of sentence-meaning (*nānyan nimittam avakalpyeta*).

"For, the words after they have singly denoted their word-meaning, they (i. e. the words) cease to function. From then on the word-meanings being known lead to the cognition of the sentence-meaning. How? Because where a quality (*guṇaḥ*) white or black is known, the possessor of the quality (*guṇavati*) can also be made known. Because of this, those desiring a knowledge of the possessor of the quality utter only the *guṇa-* word. They [thus] attain what their desire intended. The cognition of the qualified object takes place. For the sentence-meaning is [nothing other than] the cognition of the qualified object."[5]

Śabara's contention is that words have each their separate meaning and when they are in a sentence the function of the words (*padāni*) is merely to make known their word-meanings (*padārthāḥ*). With that their role is over and they cease to function. At this stage the *padārthāḥ* take over. The word-meanings mutually qualify each other. Just as we never have in life merely white or black but a white thing or a black thing, (that is to say, when we have the cognition of white, implicitly there is in it the thing that is qualified by white,) so too when we have word-meanings in a sentence they begin to qualify each other. Surprisingly, Śabara either overlooks or ignores fully in his explanation that element which would initiate and see to the mutual qualification that takes place between word-meanings, namely, *kriyārthena* 'with a view to action'. Actually he begins his comment on the Sūtram with a

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4 *varṇātirikto varṇābhivyaṅgyorthapratyāyako nityaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭa iti tadvido vadanti. Sarva-darśana-saṃgraḥ*: by *Sāyaṇamādhava*, ed. with an original commentary in Sanskrit by Vasudev Shastri Abhiankar. Government Orient. (Hindu) Series, Nr. 1, Poona 1924. P. 300, 135—137.

For a concise and clear historical introduction see BRUNO LIEBICH: Über den Sphoṭa, ZDMG 77, 1923, pp. 208ff. For the overall context see OTTO STRAUSS: Altindische Spekulationen über die Sprache und ihre Probleme, ZDMG 81, 1927, pp. 99—151. Also an excellent treatment of Sphoṭa in J. BROUGH: Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians, Transactions of the Philological Society, Oxford, 1951, pp. 27—46.

5 ŚBh 96, 8—97, 4; 1.1.7.25.

padāni hi svaṃ svaṃ padārtham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi. athedānīṃ padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārthaṃ gamayanti katham?yatra hi śukla iti vā, kṛṣṇa iti vā guṇaaḥ pratīto bhavati, bhavati khalv asau alaṃ guṇavati pratyayam ādhātum. tena guṇavati pratyayam icchantaḥ kevalaṃ guṇavacanam uccārayanti. saṃpatsyata eṣāṃ yathāsaṃkalpito'bhiprāyaḥ. bhaviṣyati viśiṣṭārthasaṃpratyayaḥ. viśiṣṭārthasaṃpratyayaś ca vākyārthaḥ.

mention of this. But the explanation that follows never once makes use of it. Sūtram 25 on which Śabara is here commenting contains the phrase *kriyārthena* and this would suggest that there was some speculation on the semantic function of the verb in a sentence. From Śabara's exposition one can guess the general tenor of the discussion centering on the activity that a verb tries to express, but that is all that we can get. The fact that the later Mīmāṃsaka-s concentrated so massively on the function of the verb both in their theory of sentence-meaning in general as well as in the *bhāvanā*-theory in particular supports the view that there must have been reflection going on on the subject.

This lacuna in Śabara's explanation is further intensified by a similar but more detailed statement of his theory of mutual qualification of word-meanings, where surprisingly the whole of Sūtram 25 is quoted but the function of '*kriyārthena*' is again not discussed at all. It appears that whatever the explanation for '*kriyārthena*' that existed or was handed down at his time, it did not impress Śabara to the extent that he would have thought it worth referring to it.

For a word has a universalizing function (*sāmānyavṛttiḥ*), a sentence a particularizing function (*viśeṣa-vṛttiḥ*). The purpose (or meaning) of a sentence (*vākyārthaḥ*) [consists in] the pin-pointing (*avasthāpanam*) of a particular meaning of the word-meanings which [usually] function [by themselves] with a general meaning. This is [what] has been stated [earlier by the Sūtram 1.1.7.25]: *tadbhūtānāṃ kriyārthena samāmnāyo-'rthasya tannimittatvāt*: "There the word-meaning [is] from perception, whereas the the sentence-meaning [is] inferential. [But] one should know the following: a word functioning for its own self alone (*kevalasvārthavṛttiḥ*) does not teach anything new. [But] with another syntactically coonnected word it attains the state of *ekavākyam*, not in any other way."[6]

A *padam*, according to Śabara, has the function of pointing to a commonality. Its only limiting aspect is really its commonality. The word cow, for instance, limits its own denotation by asserting it. It refers (unlike an individual cow) to any and every and all cows but not to horses, for example. Still its explicit function is to universalize. This is the *sāmānya-vṛttiḥ* Śabara is referring to in the above quotation. But the function of a sentence, even of a general statement, is to particularize (*viśeṣavṛttiḥ*). The moment words come together syntactically, their meanings begin to 'qualify' each other. Each word reveals a meaning that is universal but in the context of syntactical connection the process of particularization begins. The words: *śukla-*, *gauḥ* do not refer to any one particular instance; on the contrary, they are universals. But once they are put together, the specification-process

[6] ŚBh 689, 1—6; 3.1.6.12.
sāmānyavṛtti hi padaṃ, viśeṣavṛtti vākyam. sāmānyenābhipravṛttānāṃ padārthānāṃ yad viśeṣe'vasthānaṃ sa vākyārthaḥ. tad etad uktaṃ tadbhūtānāṃ kriyārthena samāmnāyo'rthasya tannimittatvāt, iti. tatra pratyakṣataḥ padārtho, vākyārthaḥ punar ānumānikaḥ. tad etad avagamyatām. kevalasvārthavṛtti padam anupadeśakam iti padāntareṇa saṃnihitaikavākyatvam abhyupaiti nānyatheti.

starts. It is no more any and every *śuklaḥ* that is being referred to but only that *śuklaḥ* which qualifies a *gauḥ*; thus it is restricted only to the denotation of *gauḥ* which, before such restriction, could have been applied to *aśvaḥ*, *māṣāḥ*, etc. But all these have been eliminated. Similarly the word *gauḥ*, which by itself would apply not only to other colours but also to other qualifications (like fat, heavy, etc.) is here limited to *śukla-*. The mutual qualification is in fact a process of particularization. According to Śabara a sentence-meaning is just this: *viśiṣṭārthasampratyayaś ca vākyārthaḥ*: 'sentence-meaning is the cognition of a qualified object'.

Śabara's interpretation is, I think, more akin to the Bheda-theory of Vyāḍi than the Saṃsarga-theory of Vājapāyana[7]. For his explanation of *viśeṣa-* and *viśiṣṭa-* is nothing but a process of exclusion. *śukla-* and *gauḥ* are relatively unrestricted in their denotation, but they immediately exclude a good number of species when syntactically brought together.

After this, Śabara proceeds to show that it is the word-meanings alone that give rise to the sentence-meaning. He uses the *anvaya-vyatireka*-form of argument. It happens sometimes, he says, that one does not understand the words that are uttered. In such a case, the sentence-meaning does not emerge. Only when the word-meanings are grasped. does one understand the sentence-meaning. This proves, according to Śabara, that sentence-meaning can arise only from word-meanings[8].

Just as the adversary had concluded at the end of his objections to the 'artificial' (*puruṣakṛta-*) character of the vedic statements, so too Śabara concludes his arguments (in the section on 'sentence-meaning') by stating that this objection has already been refuted and that further the subject-matter of the Veda-s cannot be an object or fruit of human experience. Hence they could never be able to compose such sentences. It is not surprising, given the theological bias of Śabara, that in a section like the one on sentence-meaning the question as to whether the Veda is a human composition or not should crop up again. For, Śabara's theory was meant to explain the authorless character of the Veda since the ultimate validity of the Veda was supposed to rest on such a stand[9].

One of the important aspects of the later Vākyārtha-theory is the doctrine of the *bhāvanā*[10]. It is interesting to note that the first traces of the *bhāvanā* doctrine are to be found not in the Vākyārtha-section but in the Apauruṣeya-chapter.

"For [a *vedavacanam*] is seen to be well-knit through mutuality for the purpose [of producing one single] relation. How? Having said *jyotiṣṭomaḥ* etc. *kartavya* (=should be performed) is added. To the expected [question] *kena* (=with what)?) the answer is *somena* (=with Somaḥ). For what

[7] M. Hiriyanna: Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana in Indian Historical Quarterly, XIV, 1938, pp. 261—266; K. Kunjunni Raja: Indian Theories of Meaning, pp. 191—193.

[8] ŚBh 97, 7—98, 3; 1.1.7.25.

[9] Ibid. 99, 2—5; 1.1.7.25.

[10] V. A. Ramaswami Sastri: Bhāvanā, the leading Concept of verbal Cognition, Bharatīya Vidyā XIII (1952), pp. 169—176.

purpose? For the sake of Svargaḥ. How? Thus is the procedure. Thus seeing that the [vedic] sentence-meaning is well bound together through the word-meanings, how can one say that it is similar to the utterances of the insane and the inarticulate?"[11]

The thinking here is simple and straight-forward compared to the scholastic disquisitions of Kumārila. At the beginning of the so-called Bhāvārthādhikaraṇam (right at the beginning of the second *adhyāyaḥ*) there is again an explicit treatment of *bhāvanā* in the Śabara-Bhāṣyam[12]. It is to this that we now turn.

The main purpose in introducing the *bhāvanā*-theory into the Mīmāṃsā is clear. The by nature hypothetical injunctions of the Veda had to be given an absolute character. And this absolute character had to be founded, if possible, on reason. Necessity is the mother of invention, and so we meet here with first-rate discoveries (from the view-point of what I would call philosophy of language). In their search for an absolute foundation for their ritualistic world-view the Mīmāṃsaka-s discovered the reality of *bhāvanā*, the 'efficient-force'.

They first were struck by the differences between (what they called) *bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdāḥ* and *dravyaguṇaśabdāḥ*. The latter category, they found, consists of substances, qualities, etc. which stand in no need of being brought into existence. They exist already and hence there is no 'demand' from their side and no 'urge' on the side of man to see to their being brought into existence (*bhāvayet*). The former category, on the other hand, is made up of *bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdāḥ*, which 'clamour' to be brought into existence (*bhāvayet*). They are basically expressed in verbs (*karmaśabdāḥ*) but only such verbs which unambiguously express an urge (*bhāvārthāḥ*) to be produced.

"*Bhāvārthāḥ* are verbs: it is from these [verbs] like *yajeta*, etc. that the *kriyā* has to be known. Why? Because it is their very nature to urge to bring about (*bhāvārthatvād eva*). Those [verbs] which say that something has to be brought about (*kim api bhāvayet*), [are the very verbs] that would say that [it is] Svargaḥ [that] is to be brought about because of the relationship to the word *svargakāmaḥ*. Therefore [it is] from these [verbs] that what is to be brought about has to be known."[13]

First of all *bhāvārthāḥ* are verbs like *yajati*, *dadāti*, *juhoti*, etc. and more specifically in their form *yajeta*, etc.[14] Their *bhāvaḥ* which is best expressed in

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[11] ŚBh 103, 10—14; 1.1.8.32.
viniyuktaṃ hi dṛśyate paraspareṇa saṃbandhārtham. Kathaṃ, 'jyotiṣṭomaḥ' ity abhidhāya 'kartavyaḥ' ity ucyate. kenety ākāṅkṣite someneti. kim artham iti svargāyeti. katham iti. ittham anayetikartavyatayeti. evam avagacchantaḥ padārthair ebhiḥ saṃskṛtaṃ piṇḍitaṃ vākyārthaṃ katham unmattabālavākyasadṛśam iti vakṣyāmaḥ.

[12] Ibid. 370—389; 2.1.1.1—4.

[13] Ibid. 375, 5—8; 2.1.1.1.
bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdās tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyeta, yajetetyevamādibhyaḥ. kutaḥ? bhāvārthatvād eva. ya āhuḥ kim api bhāvayed iti, te svargakāmapadasaṃbandhāt svargaṃ bhāvayed iti brūyuḥ. tasmāt tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyeta.

[14] Ibid. 374, 1—2; 2.1.1.1.

this form (*yajeta*) is to be paraphrased as "Offer sacrifice in such a manner that something is brought into existence".

The interesting thing about these *bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdāḥ* is that they not only make us know what is to be brought about, they urge us to translate this into action. There is a relation between the '*bhāvaḥ*' of the verb (*yajeta*) and the word *svarga-kāmaḥ*. If, as is clear, *yajeta* is really *yāgena bhāvayet* then the object of the *kāmī* is Svargaḥ. Hence *svargaṃ yāgena bhāvayet* is what the injunction is about. But there is no relation between two nouns which are not brought together through a *bhāvaḥ*, that is, 'through an urge to be produced, to be brought into being'. Nouns as such are not possessed of a *bhāvaḥ*, hence their coming together (without it), is mere juxtaposition[16].

The difference between *bhāvārthāh śabdāḥ* and *dravyaguṇaśabdāḥ* consists in the fact that whereas the former clamour to be brought into being, the latter are already produced. Hence the former because of their *bhāvaḥ* affect the person uttering or hearing them and urge him to act and to bring their 'object' into being. The *bhāvanā* of such verbs is bound up with the persons who come in contact with it (*puruṣeṇa saṃbaddhā bhāvanā*)[17] because "their realization depends on a person" (*eteṣāṃ prayogaḥ puruṣeṇāśrite bhavati*). The moment a *bhāvanā* enters the scene then the relation between the person and the sacrifice becomes apparent[18].

If we reflect on what is being said here, two things will strike us: first, an action is stated to be clamouring to be realised, and the 'cry', it is said, is addressed to the listening person. Second, there is in such a person a *kāmaḥ* for Svargaḥ. *The moment we hear the imperative (yajeta)*, there is immediately born in him a syntactical expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) which makes him ask the question *yajeta kiṃ kena katham iti*[19]. This expectancy is satisfied by the answer *svargakāmo* etc. Hence when two nouns like, for example, *svargakāmo dravyeṇa* are brought together, they make no sense because there is no *bhāvanā* which could make them enter into a relationship.

What is worthy of our attention is that the 'cry', the 'urge', the 'demand', the 'exigency' (*bhāvanā*) expressed in verbs like *yajeta* corresponds to the 'urge', the 'desire' (*kāmaḥ*) etc. for Svargaḥ in any man. However one may express their relationship, that is, whether one considers man as part of language or language as part of man, one thing is undeniable: for this school there is an intimate connection between both of them. Both are members of the same movement and are mutually dependent[20]. They are, to use an

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15 Ibid. 375, 3; 2.1.1.1.
16 Ibid. 386, 9—10; 2.1.1.1.
17 Ibid. 389, 1—2; 2.1.1.4.
18 Ibid. 389, 3; 2.1.1.4.
19 Ibid. 376, 4; 2.1.1.1.
20 It is an interesting though not a surprising circumstance that in the Mīmāṃsā, discussion of the definition of a sentence takes place in the context of the questions about the meaning of a Mantraḥ, Brāhmaṇam, Ṛk, Sāma, etc. All this, it is to be noted, is the tail-end of the first *pāda* of the second *adhyāya*, which means two things: the discussion could not have originally formed part of the Ur-Mīmāṃsā, and two, the

analogy employed by Śabara, like the man whose chariot is burnt but has a horse and the man whose horse is dead but has a chariot: both have to hang together (*naṣṭāśvadagdharathavat*).

The merit of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of *bhāvanā* is that it caught the importance of language for man in that it articulated the praxis of his self-understanding. It laid bare the fact that the activity involved in *yajeta* is not an extrinsic command but one corresponding to an intrinsic need. Language is a thematization of the innermost needs of man. Man and his world find themselves and each other only in and through language. The imperative which man feels compelled to obey needs no extrinsic justification, the purpose of his existence is to experience the totality of his needs (and not merely the superficial ones). No articulation will ever satisfy him and he will rarely, if at all, be content with any one formulation, because the language of experience is not identical with the language of expression. Thus the merit of the *bhāvanā* doctrine lies in the fact that it l o c a t e s the imperatives, that is, it finds their locus not in a source extrinsic to man but in his very being. This yearning is expressed in an imperative form because it is through obedience to the imperatives that man attains perfection. Thus, what the Mīmāṃsā was after, namely, an explanation for the vedic imperatives without appealing to an external Absolute or to a transcendental God, it discovered in the reality of language and man.

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thematization of the question of Vākyam must have had its repercussion in other groups like the speculatively interested but ritualistically engaged Mīmāṃsā. Evidence for this is ŚBh 2.1.32—39. That the Mīmāṃsā discussion of Vākyam is nevertheless much older than Śabara's time is to be deduced from the fact of its being understood as subserving vedic, not philosophic ends. The main Sūtram in this matter is MS 2.1.14.46: *arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syāt*. That is, two conditions have to be fulfilled in order to qualify for *ekavākyatā*: the presence of one *arthaḥ*, and in case of sentence-truncation, the presence of syntactic expectancy. Later Mīmāṃsaka-s interpret the word *arthaḥ* as *prayojanam*. (See G. Jhā's *note in his Translation of the* Śābarabhāṣya Vol. I, p. 215). The sentence as a one-meaning unit came to be felt as too broad and hence the addition regarding the presence (or absence) of syntactic expectancy in case of separation of words from the said sentence. If removal of certain words creates a sense of incompleteness in the sentence-meaning then it means that it is part of the sentence. See G. V. DEVASTHALI, Mīmāṃsā — The Vākyaśāstra of Ancient India, pp. 186—201.

CHAPTER 8 VEDĀPAURUṢEYATVAM

The theme of this chapter could perhaps lead us to expect a discussion on two major aspects of it: one, a-theism and two, a final and combined argument from the previous theses of Codanāprāmāṇyam, Autpattikasambandhaḥ, Śabdanityatā, Abhihitānvayavādaḥ and Bhāvanā and Svataḥprāmāṇyam. On both counts we shall be disappointed.

Of the last six Sūtra-s of the Tarkapādaḥ devoted to Vedāpauruṣeyatvam the first two are Pūrvapakṣa-s[1]. The first (Sūtram 27) attempts to disprove the main thesis of the Mīmāṃsā, namely, *codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmaḥ*. The Veda-s which are a collection of codanā-s are, it argues, really *pauruṣeya-* since they are named after persons who composed them. That they were the authors of the sections which are named after them is evident from the kind of naming which can be justified only if they were the authors[2]. The second Sūtram (28) tries to demolish the eternality of the Veda. The attack is based on the fact that the Veda refers to people and these must have been historical people. If this is so, then the Veda is posterior to them[3].

The Uttarapakṣaḥ is a good example of Śabara's usual order of argument. The 'big bang' comes first and what follows is a series of refutations. In this case Sūtram 29 is the big bang but it is so enigmatic that it hardly makes any impression. "The fact that Śabdaḥ is presupposed by the learners has been asserted by us." Because of this, it is stated, that what follows will merely be a refutation of the above objections[4].

Thus Sūtram 30 is an answer to the objection in Sūtram 27 where it was said that the names of the sections must be the names of their authors. The reply is a mere re-statement of the Mīmāṃsā position that these names are not of those who composed the sections but of those who excelled in explaining them[5]. The next Sūtram (31) refutes the objection formulated in Sūtram 28. The examples of *pravāhaṇiḥ* and *babaraḥ* are interpreted by the Siddhāntaḥ as names not of historical persons but of realities of this world which are beginninglessly eternal[6]. Lastly we have Sūtram 32[7] which begins with an reiterated attack on the vedic statements as being *unmattabālavākyasadṛśyam*: similar to the statements of the insane and the inarticulate. To

(All references in this chapter to the ŚBh are to the ASS ed.)

1 ŚBh 100—104; 1.1.8.27—32.

2 Ibid. 100, 4—101, 5; 1.1.8.27.

3 Ibid. 101, 6—10; 1.1.8.28.

4 Ibid. 101, 11—102, 1—2; 1.1.8.29.

5 Ibid. 102, 3—10; 1.1.8.30.

6 Ibid. 102, 11—103, 5; 1.1.8.31.

7 Ibid. 103, 6—104, 8; 1.1.8.32.

add insult to injury he illustrates from the *saṃhita*-s with quotations like, 'trees sat at the sacrificial session', 'the old bull sings maddening songs'[8]. The answer to this is given in two stages: first, a brief sketch of the working of the *bhāvanā*-doctrine (without mentioning it by name) is put forward to illustrate how the vedic sentences are coherent and consistent and hence cannot be called *unmattabālavākyasadṛśyam*[9]. Second, the above illustrations are argued as serving a definite purpose, namely, that of praising the sacrificial session[10].

For our purpose two Sūtra-s are of interest: 29 and 32. Sūtram 29 which begins the Siddhāntaḥ with *uktaṃ tu śabdapūrvatvam*, though merely touched upon superficially by Śabara could probably enlighten the whole discussion and help focus on the essentials. Let us begin with Śabara's comment on Sūtram 29.

"We have already stated that Śabdaḥ is presupposed by those who learn to recite the Veda-s. Here, merely the objections have to be refuted. And this is intended in what follows."[11]

It is obvious from this that *uktam asmābhiḥ śabdapūrvatvam adhyetṝṇām* is meant to bear the burden of the proof. Two problems arise in this connection: one concerns the context to which reference is being made and the other is about the meaning of *śabdaḥ* in *śabdapūrvatvam*. In the whole of what has preceded in the Bhāṣyam I have not been able to locate the reference either as regards the idiom or the idea. Is the reference perhaps to the process of *vṛddhavyavahāraḥ* in which one learns the relationship between word and thing?[12] Whatever the answer, it is clear that the phrase has to do with a process in which *śabdaḥ* is presupposed. Along with '*adhyetṝṇām*' it could mean the process of Veda-recitation. This process presupposes the whole structure of language in which the teacher was once a learner at the feet of his own teacher. 'Teach yourself Veda-recitation' would be an impossibility in the vedic tradition. It could be learnt only in the company of a teacher. Furthermore, a teacher imparted what he had learnt. The structure of vedic recitation did not have any place, according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, for independent composition. It was literally a 'traditio'. In such a tradition there can he no trace of any author and since the tradition is without a beginning (every teacher having once himself been a student), the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the Veda-s have no author, that is, they are *apauruṣeya-*.

The second point of interest is the way the unusual statements (like 'trees sat at the sacrificial session') are explained. The later doctrine of the *arthavāda*-s is here mentioned very enigmatically: *stutayo hy etāḥ satrasya*:

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[8] Ibid. 103, 8; 1.1.8.32.
[9] Ibid. 103, 10—14; 1.1.8.32.
[10] Ibid. 104, 1—8; 1.1.8.32.
[11] Ibid. 102, 1—2; 1.1.8.29.
uktam asmābhiḥ śabdapūrvatvam adhyetṝṇām. kevalam ākṣepaparihāro vaktavyaḥ so'bhidhīyate.
[12] Ibid. 56, 3—9.

'for, they are praises of the *satram*'.[13] This is a fore-runner of the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtram 1.2.1.7 *vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnām syuḥ.*[14] Briefly Śabara's teaching on *arthavādaḥ* is this:

i) "Though from the sentence '*vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā*' there is no cognition of what has to be performed, yet because it is construed with an injunctive sentence, it is a *pramāṇam*."[15]

ii) "Because there is syntactical expectancy between the words of the injunction and those of the praise there is *ekavākyatvam* between them."[16]

iii) "What is the purpose of the praise (*stutiḥ*)? The purpose is to make the injunction attractive to us so that it can be performed."[17]

iv) "Thus when there are no words of praise, then the commendation-and-persuasion (*prarocanam*) is done through the injunction alone, but when there is a word of praise, then it is done by the praise."[18]

v) "Words of praise in that they praise what has to be done persuade the performers and thus contribute towards what has to be performed. Thus all these words in as much as they praise some thing they enjoin indirectly what has to be performed."[19]

We have here a real rarity: a sketch of a philosophy of praise! On reflection we realize that it is nothing really strange, since all that helps in getting the vedic injunction obeyed and executed is grist to the mill. What is being stated here is not merely a piece of human psychology, it is a study of the role of praise in human motivation. More still: the accent here is on the epistemological dimension of praise.

Vidhiḥ and *arthavādaḥ* form one whole (*ekavākyatā*) and if *vidhiḥ* points to what is to be performed, *arthavādaḥ* leads to the cognition of the why and how of it. We have moreover, a hermeneutical principle involved here: Values, (be they implicit or explicit), have to be known if the meaning of a context is to be understood. When values are made explicit, even apparently senseless sentences like 'trees sat at the sacrificial session' begin to make sense. Without a knowledge of the speaker's values it is ultimately impossible to understand him.

Since the Mīmāṃsā does not believe in an Absolute-Being who could command and commend, this role had to be given over to some other instance that would fit in with the world-view of the Mīmāṃsaka-s. The *arthavāda*-doctrine is intelligible only in such a context.

To come back to our discussion of the Veda's *apauruṣeya*-condition, we notice that the proofs for it are more negative than anything else. The origin

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[13] Ibid. 104, 1—6.

[14] "Being construed along with Injunctions, they could serve the purpose of commending those Injunctions." G. JHĀ's Translation of Śābara-Bhaṣyam, Vol. I, p. 55.

[15] ŚBh 116, 1—2; 1.2.1.7.

[16] Ibid. 117, 2—3; 1.2.1.7.

[17] Ibid. 117, 6; 1.2.1.7.

[18] Ibid. 117, 12—13; 1.2.1.7.

[19] Ibid. 119, 5—7; 1.2.1.7.

of such a position was the absence of remembrance regarding the author[20]. Given the a-historical, conservative and communitarian attitudes inherent in the Mīmāṃsā world-view, such a lack of remembrance had sooner or later to be transformed into the *apauruṣeya*-doctrine.

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[20] It is interesting to note that the main argument of the Mīmāṃsā for Vedāpauruṣeyatvam is nowhere in evidence in this *adhikaraṇam*. As a matter of fact it is merely hinted at once in the Pūrvapakṣaḥ (*ato'smaryamāṇo'pi*, 101, 4) and there is a passing reference to it in the previous Vākyārtha-adhikaraṇam: *parihṛtaṃ tad asmaraṇādibhiḥ*, 99, 3.

CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION I

If there is any feature distinctive of our meandering through the manifold Mīmāṃsā metaphors, then it is this: a lack of a sense of direction and unity. True, there is a vague feeling of togetherness in the various doctrines but the direction is not verbalised. They somehow hang together but it needs no great effort to find out that Śabara's system was more implicit than thematically organized, more interested in interpreting the ritual-texts than in speculating on philosophical problems.

What is equally evident is that the various doctrines came into the school sporadically and not systematically, that is to say, they evolved less from an internal exigency than from an external attack. As the need of the hour manifested itself, an answer had to be found. Sometimes the answer was a happy discovery as in the case of the doctrines of Svataḥpramāṇam or Bhāvanā but sometimes it appears to have been a sort of occupational therapy as in the case of the doctrines of Śabdaḥ and Śabdanityatā. For except in these two instances, there is constant reference to the Veda and its *prāmāṇyam* when exposing the other doctrines, which means they could easily integrate themselves into the system. Verily this turns out to be a kind of criterion for determining doctrines germane to the system, as also for ascertaining their relative chronology. It is not merely the fact of constant reference to the Veda that is a criterion, rather the fact of its existential meaningfulness in its different aspects that is taken for granted but never demonstrated and of which the reference to the Veda is merely a symptom that functions as a criterion.

The reference to the Veda's meaningfulness is not always explicit, sometimes it is extremely indirect as in the sentence *autpattikaḥ śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasya agnihotrādilakṣaṇasya dharmasya nimittaṃ pratyakṣādibhir anavagatasya*. Here we have a mere mention through the phrase *agnihotrādilakṣaṇasya*[1]. The other extreme is the explicit formulation of the presupposed principle as in: *anatikrāmanto vedam arthavantaṃ santam anarthakaṃ kalpayema*[2].

In that sense the thinking of the Vṛttikāraḥ is one removed from that of the 'original' Mīmāṃsā. His thinking is not theological as in the case of Śabara but philosophical. Rarely does he make references to the Veda or its *prāmāṇyam* in the course of his argumentation. And this seems to corroborate my thesis that his school is thematically posterior to that of Śabara.

References to the ŚBh are from FRAUWALLNER's ed. Those in brackets refer to the ASS ed.

[1] ŚBh 24, 5—6; (23, 4—24, 1); 1.1.5.5.

[2] Ibid. 12, 11—12; (5, 12—6, 1); 1.1.1.1.

As regards Śabara's doctrine of Śabdaḥ it is conspicuous by its absence. The term *śabda-pramāṇam* does not occur in his comments. There is no thematic awareness of it, so that all speculation on Śabdaḥ as *pramāṇam* is missing. We have, as we have seen, a well reasoned out stand on *codanāpramāṇam* and in its wake an implicit but nonetheless clear position on the understanding of a *pramāṇam*. We have a relatively discerning exposition of the merits of *codanāpramāṇam* in contrast to those of *pauruṣeyaśabdaḥ*. Moreover we find in Śabara the teaching that Śabdaḥ is one and eternal and unchangeable and that it only manifests itself. There is, above all, the doctrine of the *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ* which guarantees the *prāmāṇyam* of the *codanā*. And in spite of all this, the contention that there is no systematic doctrine of Śabdaḥ stands. First of all, there is missing in Śabara an understanding of Śabdaḥ which would, so to speak, take under its cover all the different factors like *apauruṣeya-* and *pauruṣeyaśabdaḥ*, *śabdanityatā*, *padam*, *dhvaniḥ*, *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ* etc. which would come under *śabdapramāṇam*. Secondly there is a complete lack of thematization of the relationship between the different possible components of a Śabda-doctrine. Finally, and this I think is the weakest trait of the Bhāṣyakāraḥ, no attempt at all is made to work out any of the implications of the various doctrines that he puts forward. Śabara is soon satisfied if he notices that the doctrine is of avail for his system but he does not delve deep as the Vṛttikāraḥ usually does.

From the little material we have about the teaching of the latter it is difficult to speak about his doctrine of Śabdaḥ. However it appears as if the problem of *śabdapramāṇam* were about to become thematic. In fact he quotes an adversary who says: *śabdas tu na pramāṇam*. But he too disappoints even when he has a genuine opportunity to explain his position as regards *śāstrapramāṇam*. With a mere phrase *śāstraṃ, śabdavijñānād asannikṛṣṭe'rthe vijñānam* he goes over to comment on *upamānapramāṇam*[3]. In some respects our disappointment with the Vṛttikāraḥ is greater because given his philosophical bent greater things were expected of him. Though, for instance, he carries on a lengthy discussion on the cognition of the criterion between truth and falsehood in human knowing, he lets us down on every score. He does not even discuss the problem of the *prāmāṇyam* of the *pauruṣeyaśabdaḥ*. Like Śabara he does not discuss *śabdapramāṇam* at all. Though it might appear sometimes that he is discussing *śabdaḥ* in general, it is really *codanā* that he is talking about. There is however a definite move on his part to talk of *codanā* in a more general manner than did Śabara. And if Kumārila develops the doctrine of Śabdaḥ in an elaborate way it is due in no small measure to the various hints thrown out by the Vṛttikāraḥ. But he too, like Śabara does not point to any implications that might be there in the various doctrines that he proposes.

The merit and the weakness of the early Mīmāṃsā will become apparent by contrast when we turn our attention to the development of the various facets of the *śabdapramāṇa*-doctrine in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

[3] Ibid. 32, 3; (37, 3); 1.1.5.5.

Part Three

ŚABDAPRĀMĀṆYAM IN KUMĀRILA

CHAPTER 10 ŚABDANITYATĀ

Against the Mīmāṃsā the following charge has been levelled: "The doctrine of the eternality of sound is not only one of the most controversial but also one of the queerest doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā... The queerest thing about this doctrine is the following: It was supposed to help in proving the eternality of the Veda. That it attempts to prove the eternality of the spoken word for this purpose would be understandable in India, where the genuine holy Tradition was always an oral one. But it does not prove the eternality of the vedic words at all, to say nothing of the vedic collections. Its argumentation concentrates on the eternality of word, that is to say, of each individual syllable."[1]

I think, Kumārila was aware of this weakness in the early Mīmāṃsā. It was with this in view that he conceived an elaborate set-up for his doctrine of Śabdaḥ on the foundation of the eternality of Śabdaḥ. The result was that he not only incorporated into his thinking the principles of his predecessors but he worked out their implications with such rigour and consistency that the old system was rejuvenated with a new lease of life[2].

At the very start of the Śabdanityatva-chapter Kumārila discusses the purpose of the doctrine of the eternality of Śabdaḥ. He makes an opponent formulate his objection thus:

"If one [can] know the meaning with the help of Śabdaḥ even [though one holds on to the view] that [Śabdaḥ] is non-eternal and [there is moreover the fact of] the process [of human discourse having] no beginning, then why does one [need to] prove the eternality [of Śabdaḥ]?"[3]

The Pūrvapakṣaḥ is pointing out here that the view that even a non-eternal Śabdaḥ can reveal its meaning is quite consistent. Besides, the phenomenon of human discourse in as much as it does not allow us to fathom the mystery of its origin, acts as a firm foundation for the theory of word and meaning, even when the word is held to be ephemeral. This being so, there is no reason why one should go to such lengths to prove the eternality of Śabdaḥ.

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[1] E. FRAUWALLNER: Mīmāṃsāsūtram I, 1, 6—23, WZKSO V (1961) 113—124.

[2] B. LIEBICH remarks in this connection: "Schon die Annahme von der Ewigkeit des Wortes, in der ja die Grammatiker mit Mīmāṃsā und Vedānta übereinstimmen, war wie gesagt mehr eine Sache des Glaubens und Gefühls als eine durch logische Gedankengänge gewonnene oder erweisbare Erkenntnis." Über den Sphoṭa, 210. I think LIEBICH is mistaken, but I shall let the textual evidence speak for itself.

[3] ŚV. Śabdani. 1:
yady anityatvapakṣe'pi śabdād artho'vagamyate /
anādir vyavahāraśca nityatvaṃ kiṃ nu sādhyate //

For Kumārila the very major of the opponent is untenable. If Śabdaḥ is not eternal no word could ever reveal its meaning.

"If the expressive potency (*vācakasāmarthyam*) of Śabdaḥ could be justified [whether Śabdaḥ] is permanent or impermanent, of [for that matter] merely impermanent, then one would have to admit a defect [in our reasoning]."[4]

Kumārila further elaborates this thus: "If Śabdaḥ [were] momentary, it [would be] incapable of establishing [its] meaning. Then one [would] establish [it] by means of reasoning [alone] [and] vedic-ideas would have no foundation. Due to [these] foundationless notions, one would [rather] have recourse to [and put one's hope in] visible things [than in invisible things like the *apūrvam*, etc.]. But Dharma, being based on Śrutiḥ alone, would fall on evil days. [Thus] a beginningless process [of human discourse if conceived as] based on a reality that has a beginning [is] to be rejected. For, such [a process though valid] in the case of *jāti*-s like jarhood, etc. [would be] an error in the case of the individual [jars]. The eternality of the process [is possible only if] the unchangeable eternality [of Śabdaḥ] has been [first] established. Without this unchangeable [eternality] there could be no support for the [beginningless] process. For no other process can be accepted except the one that is known [to us all]. Hence the eternality [of Śabdaḥ] is being proved with a view to [establishing] the authority of the Veda."[5]

The ultimate aim of Kumārila's works in general and of the Ślokavārttikam in particular is to establish beyond the shadow of any doubt the absolute authority of the Veda. The doctrine of Śabdanityatvam as proposed in Śabara's Bhāṣyam had directly contributed little or nothing towards this aim, as its relevance had not been shown. Implicitly, of course, the early Mīmāṃsaka-s must have seen the connection between the Veda, language and human speech. They may not have thematised it but it would be difficult to explain why they would have expended so much thought on a topic which had little or no relevance to their way of thinking[6].

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[4] Ibid. 237.
arthāpattir iyaṃ coktā pakṣadharmādivarjitā /
yadi nāśini nitye vā vināśiny eva vā bhavet //

[5] Ibid. 3—7.
yadā hi kṣaṇikaḥ śabdo na śakto'rthāvadharaṇe /
yuktyāvadhāryate tatra nirmalā vedadhīr bhavet //
nirmūlair api vijñānair dṛṣṭārtheṣu bhaved gatiḥ /
śrutimātrāśrayatvāt tu dharmo dauḥsthityam āśritaḥ //
anādivyavahāratvam ādimad vastusaṃśrayam /
praty ākhyeyaṃ ghaṭatvādijātau vyaktibhramo hi saḥ //
sthite kūṭasthanityatve vyavahārasya nityatā /
kūṭasthena vinaitena na tasyālambanaṃ bhavet //
prasiddhatvād ṛte sarvo vyavahāro hi neṣyate /
tasmād vedapramāṇārthaṃ nityatvam iha sādhyate //

[6] FRAUWALLNER's suggestion that the Mīmāṃsā in formulating its queer (merkwürdige), doctrine of Śabdaḥ was influenced by the 'very curious' (eigenartigste) theory of Sphoṭaḥ of the grammarians is itself open to the same charge which is levelled against the Mīmāṃsā a few lines earlier. To make such an assumption —

In the above quotation Kumārila sketches the structure of his reasoning regarding Śabdanityatvam and Vedaprāmāṇyam in the following stages:

1. Śabdaḥ is unchangeably eternal:
1.1 because an impermanent Śabdaḥ cannot reveal its meaning,
1.2 and this would imply that the sense of the Veda would remain unfounded,
1.3 with the consequence that Dharma which has its roots only in the *śrutiḥ* would become rootless;
1.4 and lastly when such a stage has been reached, one would look for support for Dharma in the realm of perception,

Furthermore:

2. If Śabdaḥ is not unchangeably eternal
2.1 the beginningless process of human discourse cannot be satisfactorily explained if it is founded on an impermanent Śabdaḥ.
2.2 If this were the case, the beginningless process through which the Veda has been taught and learnt could not be explained.
2.3 Without such a beginningless process of Veda-learning, the authorlessness of the Veda could not be justified.
2.4 Bereft of the doctrine of authorlessness of the Veda, the authority of the Veda cannot be substantiated.

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which does not show its raison d'être — is to discredit the assumption. Concretely: it is said that the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of Śabdanityatvam though intended to prove the eternality of the Veda-s does not fulfil its purpose, since the connection of the former with the latter not being evident required to be shown. And this the Mīmāṃsā did not do. Having said this, FRAUWALLNER proceeds to suggest that this doctrine of Sabdanityatvam must have been influenced by the Sphoṭa-theory of the grammarians which at the time must have been the rage. The Mīmāṃsā might have followed the model of the grammarians but what was it that induced them to do so remains an open question. Just as we remain unconvinced of the connection of the Mīmāṃsaka-s' theory of Śabdanityatvam with Vedanityatvam so, too, one will be sceptical of the theory about the influence of the Sphoṭa-doctrine on the Śabdanityatvam of the Mīmāṃsaka-s. The reason in both cases is the same. If the Mīmāṃsaka-s were influenced by the grammarians in this matter, there must have been some inducement for this. If Śabdanityatvam was not relevant to Vedanityatvam what could have been the reason which would have made the Sphoṭa-theory aa attractive to and worthy of imitation by the Mīmāṃsaka-s? The Sphoṭa-theory must have attracted the attention of the Mīmāṃsaka-s for the same reason that made them believe that Śabdanityatvam was a contribution towards Vedanityatvam. It would go against the one-track-mindedness of the Mīmāṃsaka-s to postulate that they would formulate a doctrine under the influence of another more prominently prevailing theory, simply because it was more prominent and more prevalent. If such had been the case, they would have, in keeping with their pragmatic way of thinking, taken to doctrines like the Iśvaravādaḥ which would have brought them more sympathy and still greater support. Briefly my contention is with the logic of FRAUWALLNER's reasoning. If the Mīmāṃsaka-s did not articulate the connection between Śabdanityatvam and Vedanityatvam, then there can be two alternative explanations for this, not merely one (as FRAUWALLNER seems to assume): either there was no connection between the two doctrines or their understanding of Veda, Śabdaḥ Śabdavyavahāraḥ, etc. was such that the connection was obvious to them.

The first argument is from the viewpoint of philosophy of language (1. and 1.1). Its conclusion is then applied to the realm of belief, where it is shown that an impermanent Śabdaḥ would make one's beliefs absurd (1.2 and 1.3). The consequence of all this (1.4) would be enough to frighten any believing Mīmāṃsaka.

The second argument is based on phenomenology: the beginninglessness of vedic teaching and learning, a process about which not the least shadow of doubt would be entertained by a Mīmāṃsaka. Like in the preceding argument, here, too, the consequences of a non-eternal Śabdaḥ with regard to one's sacred beliefs are made explicit.

Whereas in the first argument the danger to the domain of Dharma is dramatized, in the second, specific dogmas are depicted as being undermined. In the first argument the meaninglessness of the whole of Dharma is shown as the inexorable consequence of the Śabdānityatva-theory; in the second, cardinal theses of the Mīmāṃsā are put forward as being threatened by danger. In all, the arguments are a masterly combination of philosophy, theology and phenomenology: a paradigm of reason at the service of faith.

Since Kumārila's terminology is not always consistent the problem of interpreting some of his statements turns out to be a hazardous enterprise. To add to this, Kumārila, though a systematic thinker, did not articulate his system. We have therefore to put two and two together and draw the conclusions.

Śabdaḥ

In vain does one search for a systematic exposition of the understanding of Śabdaḥ in Kumārila's writings. However, his most important statements on the subject are to be found in the two chapters on Sphoṭaḥ and Śabdanityatvam of the Ślokavārttikam. In general one could say that his views on Śabdaḥ are of two types:

1. Those which comment on and explain the text of the Śābarabhāṣyam, and
2. Those which expose and refute the views of the adversaries.

The very nature of such a procedure puts restrictions on any attempt towards systematization. Śabara himself limited his Bhāṣyam to explaining the text. Though this does not mean that he merely repeated what his predecessors taught, this does imply that in the context only that type of exposition could be feasible which concentrated on clarifying those concepts and principles implied by the given text. There could be no scope for any independent systematization. The views of the adversaries were similarly conditioned. They attacked whatever was different from their own position, rarely finding out if what they believed to be different from their own positions was really what their opponents stood for. It is seldom that the opponents' views are looked at in the context of the whole system. Such a manner of going about was bound to set limits both to their openness and to their understanding of the views of those who disagreed with them.

In our case this explains the existence of a number of missing links which we shall attempt to uncover, employing the criterion of consistency

among the various statements on one topic as also the criterion of coherence among the diverse tenets. A procedure like this takes for granted that Kumārila was both consistent and coherent in his thinking and articulations, which, of course, must of necessity remain an unproven assumption. But given his calibre, evidence for which we have in his writings, it is doubtful that he could be either slipshod or inconsistent in his reflections.

It would not be too far off the mark to say that generally speaking Kumārila's theory of Śabdaḥ is in line with that of the early Mīmāṃsā. The Vṛttikāraḥ whom Śabara quotes in his Bhāṣyam had sketched the early theory of Śabdaḥ thus:

"For, in everyday life the word Śabdaḥ is known [to be used] for an object [that is] apprehended through hearing. And [it is] these [syllables that are] apprehended through hearing."[7]

In a similar vein Kumārila stresses the perceptibility of Śabdaḥ through hearing. Whatever is perceived through hearing (*śrotraparicchinna-*, *śrotrabuddiḥ*, *śrotragrāhya-*), is Śabdaḥ for Kumārila. It is important to note that whatever is perceived with the help of hearing is called Śabdaḥ and not whatever leads us to know something. We would not normally, for example, call smoke Śabdaḥ though it leads us to the knowledge of fire through syllogistic reasoning. Smoke is an object of sight, not of hearing, that is why it does not qualify for Śabda-hood. The one and only qualification for Śabda-hood is its perceptibility through hearing. Kumārila is at pains to underline that Śabda-hood and perceptibility through hearing are connected with one another but not Śabda-hood and the rise of knowledge. This is a pre-emptive explanation because sooner or later the question will arise whether a syllable (*varṇaḥ*) is Śabdaḥ or not. The individual syllable does not and (normally) cannot give birth to knowledge, since it does not reveal meaning. But for Kumārila it is Śabdaḥ. This is indeed an important thesis of Kūmarila's: the justification for it is that it fulfills the criterion of Śabda-hood, namely that it is perceptible through hearing. "Merely because the syllables do not give rise to knowledge [one can] not [say that] they are not Śabdaḥ."[8]

What is this reality which is apprehended through hearing and which Kumārila calls Śabdaḥ? Kumārila says little about Śabdaḥ. However, scattered over the different chapters of his Ślokavārttikam are clues and statements which are worth our consideration. Śabdaḥ is one and unique (*ekaḥ*). Though it manifests itself in different places (*deśabhedena*) and at different times (*kālabhedena*) it is not diverse or different (*na bhidyate*, *na bhinnaḥ*)[9] Śabdaḥ is without parts, hence it does not exist piece-meal (*na cāsyāvayavāḥ santi yena varteta bhāgaśaḥ*)[10]. Śabdaḥ is not and cannot be

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[7] ŚBh 45, 8—9; 1.1.5.5: (ASS ed.)
śrotragrahaṇe hy arthe loke śabdaśabdaḥ prasiddhaḥ. te ca śrotragraṇaḥ.
[8] ŚV Sphoṭa. 7cd:
na vāpratyāyakatvāt syād ekavarṇeṣv aśabdatā.
[9] ŚV Śabdani. 199c, 200a.
[10] Ibid. 171.

restricted to or limited by space (*vibhutvam*)[11]. Śabdaḥ, like *ākāśam* (ether) does not consist of other substances (*dravye 'dravyātmake sati*) and hence cannot be destroyed (*na ca tasmin vināśitvam*)[12]. Śabdaḥ cannot be produced (*akṛtaka-*), but is manifested through speech and utterance (*uccāraṇam*). Śabdaḥ can only then be manifested when the conditions necessary for its manifestation have been fulfilled[13]. Śabdaḥ exists always but it is not always perceived[14]. Śabdaḥ is unchangeably eternal (*kūṭasthanitya-*) and because of this enables the beginningless (*anādi-*) process of human discourse (*vyavahārasya nityatā*) to be[15]. Śabdaḥ cannot increase nor can it decrease, that is to say, it cannot become louder or softer, bigger or smaller[16]. Śabdaḥ is not bound to one place (*ekadeśavṛttitvam*)[17] but penetrates and permeates (*vyāpita-*) the All and can be perceived anywhere and everywhere[18]. A non-eternal Śabdaḥ would be unable to convey meaning[19].

Besides these we have other statements connected with our topic and they are about the syllables (*varṇāḥ*). Since they are Śabdaḥ according to Kumārila's theory we shall have to study them too[20]. The individual syllables arre without parts (*anavayava-*)[21] and are present everywhere (*sarvagatāḥ*)[22]. The syllables are not 'individuals' of a class, they are singulars, that is to say, there is only one syllable of a kind. Though we might repeatedly be using the syllable ga it is the one and the same syllable that we keep on using[23]. The syllables do not share in a commonality, that is, there is no universal (*sāmānyam*) which could apply to them, besides, qualities like long, short, loud or soft are not applicable to the syllables[24]. They do not grow bigger (*na vardhate*) nor do they become smaller (*vṛddhihrāsau*)[25]. A syllable is manifested through sound. The syllables are unchangeably eternal (*kūṭasthanitya-*) and are thus the foundation of the beginningless process of human discourse[26]. The order of the phonemes (*anupūrvī*) is not the order of the syllables. The syllables make known the meaning of a word (*avabodhakaḥ*) when their corresponding sounds appear in a definite order[27].

The two groups of statements — on Śabdaḥ and syllables — create a problem: what is Śabdaḥ, what are the syllables and what is the relation of

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[11] ŚV Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāraḥ 87.
[12] ŚV Śabdani. 156cd.
[13] Ibid. 40.
[14] Ibid. 39.
[15] Ibid. 5—7.
[16] Ibid. 210cd—215.
[17] Ibid. 71.
[18] Ibid. 170—171ab.
[19] Ibid. 3.
[20] ŚV Sphoṭa. 7cd.
[21] Ibid. 11.
[22] Ibid. 65.
[23] Ibid. 21—26.
[24] Ibid. 51.
[25] Ibid. 50.
[26] ŚV Śabdani. 302.
[27] Ibid. 284—292.

the former to the latter? We have the following alternatives to choose from — and choose we must, if we wish to articulate Kumārila's theory of Śabdaḥ systematically, since he himself is silent on the matter.

One: The real reality are the syllables and Śabdaḥ is merely a collective name for them. This does not hold water since it cannot be reconciled with the different statements of Kumārila. The *varṇa*-s are many whereas Śabdaḥ is one, eternal and without parts.

Two: Śabdaḥ is a name for the *varṇa*-s in as much as it is the universal which is present in the *varṇa*-s. This appears to be the interpretation of Pārthasārathi Miśra[28]. Attractive though it is, this alternative contradicts Kumārila's doctrine of *ākṛtiḥ*[29]. According to him the *ākṛtiḥ* is not a reality which is independent of the individuals which belong to it. Indeed it is present only in them and apart from them there is no *ākṛtiḥ* at all. If Śabdaḥ were the *ākṛtiḥ* which is present in all the *varṇa*-s, it could not be a reality independent of the *varṇa*-s, which is what Kumārila says about Śabdaḥ. Thus Pārthasārthi Miśra's interpretation cannot be sustained.

Even if we were to assume that Śabdaḥ is the *ākṛtiḥ* which is present in all the *varṇa*-s and that this is just one exception to Kūmarila's teaching on *ākṛtiḥ*, still we would not be at the end of our difficulties. For, an independent *ākrtiḥ* would have to be connected to its respective individuals through 'inherence' (*samavāyaḥ*). But Kumārila explicitly rejects the category inherence[30]. Moreover, if Śabdaḥ would be the *ākṛtiḥ* of the *varṇa*-s, then in that case it would be inexplicable why Kumārila goes all out to prove that Śabdaḥ is one and without parts[31], since it is commonly accepted that an *ākṛtiḥ* is one and without parts[32].

Three: The only alternative that makes sense of the different statements of Kumārila is this: All the *varṇa*-s are Śabdaḥ but Śabdaḥ is not identical with them, it is more than all of them put together. For every time Śabdaḥ manifests itself, it does so through only one aspect at a time. The reason why Śabdaḥ appears different is because the perspective from which one looks at it is every time different. Such a perspective is what Kumārila calls *dhvaniḥ*, and a *varṇaḥ* is nothing but Śabdaḥ itself perceived through a particular perspective called *dhvaniḥ*. The difference in the *varṇa*-s cannot be attributed to Śabdaḥ, it is merely an indication of the observer's perspective.

Does this suggestion permit an integrated interpretation of the two groups of statements on Śabdaḥ and the syllables?

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[28] Ibid. 283.

[29] I say 'appears' because Pārthasārathi Miśra does not present any systematic theory. His explanations seem to me to presuppose an '*ākṛtiḥ*' (Śabdaḥ) for the phonemes (*varṇa*). Śabdatvam for Kumārila is that state of Śabdaḥ which is given when the condition of being grasped by the ear is fulfilled. Pārthasārathi Miśra however interprets Śabdatvam as an *ākṛtiḥ*, I think, NR 515, 12—17.

[30] Śabdaḥ, for Kumārila, is an independent, self-subsistent reality but not an *ākṛtiḥ*. An *ākṛtiḥ* (according to him) is not an independent, self-subsistent reality which is separate from the individuals. See the chapter on Ākṛtiḥ p. 220f.

[31] ŚV Pratyakṣa. 146—150.

[32] ŚV Sphoṭa. 67.

First of all, the characteristics of oneness, uniqueness and indivisibility of Śabdaḥ are upheld through its identification with the *varṇa*-s. Śabdaḥ is one, unique and without parts but it can be experienced from different perspectives. Its richness is not exhausted by our perspectives, much less can it be reduced to them.

Secondly, Kumārila speaks of the *sarvagatatā* of the syllables but never of their *vibhutvam*, on the one hand; and on the other, he states that Śabdaḥ is everywhere (*vyāpita-*) and *vibhuḥ* (not restricted to or limited by space)[33]. This confirms our solution, since a syllable, being Śabdaḥ, is everywhere but it is not *vibhuḥ*. The attribute *vibhutvam* is applicable only to realities which are distinct from other realities. In no case would Kumārila admit that the *varṇa*-s are realities distinct from Śabdaḥ.

Thirdly, the observation that Śabdaḥ does not exist piecemeal (*bhāga-śaḥ*) but as a whole does not contradict our interpretation. Whenever Śabdaḥ manifests itself, the whole Śabdaḥ is involved in this manifestation which is a *varṇa*-wise manifestation. It is not as if Śabdaḥ existed *varṇa*-wise; our access to it is varṇa-wise. Such an explanation does not contradict Kumārila's thesis that Śabdaḥ does not have parts.

A real difficulty however is created by the attribute unchangeable eternality (*kūṭasthanityatvam*) which is characteristic of the *varṇa*-s. It is stated expressis verbis by Kumārila that the *varṇa*-s are *kūṭasthanitya-*[34]. My interpretation appears to make the syllables dependent on human speech. This would imply that the *varṇa*-wise manifestation of Śabdaḥ is dependent on human speech, which is merely beginninglessly eternal[35]. In order to meet this challenge we shall have to examine the nature and the functioning of both Śabdaḥ and the syllables somewhat
in detail. A syllable is identical with Śabdaḥ and apart from it, it has no reality. Śabdaḥ being *kūṭasthanitya-* the syllables too are *kūṭasthanitya-*. If this is so, the point in distinguishing it from Śabdaḥ is that the name *varṇaḥ* is given to the external aspect of our experience of Śabdaḥ as well as to the internal aspect. The external aspect is the *varṇa*-sound and the internal aspect is the partial experience of Śabdaḥ. At any given moment our capacity (that is, the capacity of human speech) is limited to one *varṇa*-sound and except for this we have no other means which would make Śabdaḥ accessible to is. The consequence is that our limited capacity of experiencing Śabdaḥ is reponsible for our limited experience of it. Here it is clear that *dhvaniḥ*, the limited means of access to Śabdaḥ is the *varṇa*-sound; the partial experience of Śabdaḥ is *varṇaḥ* proper. The former is the modus quo and the latter the id quod of the *dhvani-varṇa*-experience. Whereas the modus quo is *anādinitya-*, the id quod is *kūṭasthanitya-*. It is the modus quo of Śabdaḥ-experience, not the id quod, that is dependent on the beginningless process of human speech.

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33 ŚV Śabdani. 322—323.

34 Ibid. 170d—171ab.

35 Ibid. 290cd—291ab.

The context in which Kumārila states that the syllables are *kūṭasthanitya-* does not suggest that their reality is different from that of Śabdaḥ. It is evident from the following sketch that Kumārila's intention was to prove that if a beginningless (*anādinitya-*) reality (like human discourse) is postulated its a priori condition of possibility cannot be anything other than a reality which is *kūṭasthanitya-*.

Pūrvapakṣaḥ: The meaning of a word (*padārthaḥ*) is dependent on the order of the syllables which constitute it. But the order of the syllables is not eternal. Hence it is useless to prove the eternality of the syllables (ŚV Śabdanityatvam 278—283).

Uttarapakṣaḥ: The meaning of a word is conveyed through the syllables (*varṇa*-s), only when there is a definite order in them. This order is beginningless (*anādi-*). (284—290ab).

Pūrvapakṣaḥ: In that case the *varṇa*-s need not be *kūṭasthaniya-*. That is to say, it would suffice if they are beginningless. (290cd).

Uttarapakṣaḥ: If there is such a thing as beginninglessness (*anādinityatvam*) it needs a foundation which is unchangeably eternal (*kūṭasthanityatvam*). The beginningless process of human discourse is possible only if the *varṇa*-s are *kūṭasthanitya-*. (291—293).

The one and only purpose of the above argumentation is to demonstrate that the foundation on which the beginningless process of human speech supports itself must be unchangeably eternal. The *varṇa*-s constitute this foundation.

This conclusion is strengthened by evidence from another discussion on Śabdaḥ. There Kumārila asserts:

"A beginningless process of human discourse which is based on a reality which has a beginning is to be rejected, because the [beginningless] process [of human discourse] which in the case of an individual [jar being an] error [is valid only] in the case of an universal like jarhood, etc. The eternality of the process [of human discourse is possible] only if the unchangeable eternality [of Śabdaḥ] has been established. Without the unchangeable [eternality of Śabdaḥ the process of human discourse] would be without support."[36]

Briefly, the result of this investigation is just this: Kumārila's declaration that the *varṇa*-s are *kūṭhasthanitya-* does not militate against our interpretation that the *varṇa*-s are identical with Śabdaḥ.

The really important question is: if Śabdaḥ and the *varṇa*-s are identical why does not Kumārila say this? My guess is this: It is clear from the material available to us on the early history of the Mīmāṃsā that it must have been Kumārila who first worked out a theory of Śabdaḥ as an independent reality[37]. This doctrine together with his teaching about the

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[36] ŚV Śabdani. 5—6.
anādivyavahāratvam ādimad vastusaṃśrayam /
pratyākhyeyaṃ ghaṭatvādijātau vyaktibhramo hi saḥ //
sthite kūṭasthanityatve vyavahārasya nityatā /
kūṭasthena vinaitena na tasyālambanaṃ bhavet //

[37] See p. 120 of this chapter.

varṇa-s exhibits striking similarities with the Sphoṭa-doctrine which was acrimoniously attacked by the Mīmāṃsaka-s. In a situation like this the danger of a mix-up between the Sphoṭa-doctrine and the Śabdaḥ-doctrine was very real and because of such a danger there was the fear that the arguments against the Sphoṭa-doctrine would become ineffective. It is not too much of a strain on the imagination to suppose that Kumārila went out of the way either not to stress or altogether to leave out of his exposition those similarities with the Sphoṭa-doctrine which were of no service to him or which could embarrass him.

Even if we take for granted that for Kumārila the *varṇa*-s were identical with Śabdaḥ, the question still remains as to why he makes this distinction between Śabdaḥ and the syllables at all.

The differences among the syllables and their definite order are facts that one cannot deny. If Kumārila was to account for them, he could never do so with the help of Śabdaḥ which for him was an undifferentiated reality. He himself had objected to the Sphoṭa-doctrine because it did not explain the difference and the order among the syllables, since it contends that the meaning is mediated through an entity (called Sphoṭaḥ) which is entirely different from the syllables[38]. For Kumārila it is an uncontrovertible fact that the meaning of a word (*padārthaḥ*) arises directly from the syllables which constitute that word[39]. Thus in his system Kumārila very much needed to talk about the *varṇa*-s. His problem then was to make use of both Śabdaḥ and the *varṇa*-s in such a manner that on the one hand the uniqueness and indivisibility of Śabdaḥ could be retained and on the other he could demonstrate that it still was of tremendous relevance in the process of human discourse. Kumārila achieved this extraordinary feat by postulating that our experience of Śabdaḥ is *varṇa*-wise and is brought about with the help of *dhvaniḥ*, which is the occasion of its manifestation. This, I think, is the reason why Kumārila had to make the distinction between Śabdaḥ and *varṇaḥ*.

Śabdaḥ and padam

The conclusion of the above section that the *varṇa*-s and Śabdaḥ are identical and that Śabdaḥ is more than the *varṇa*-s, leads to the further question: how do the *varṇa*-s come about? The answer to this question takes us to a study of the relation of Śabdaḥ to human discourse because it is only here that Śabdaḥ manifests itself as *varṇaḥ*.

The process of manifestation has been explained as follows: The air from the abdomen (*vāyuḥ koṣṭhyaḥ*) is pushed upwards through an effort (*prayatnābhihata-*), towards the organs of speech (*tālvādi*) with which it comes in contact. The kind of push that the air has received determines the kind of contact they communicate to the speech-organs. The result is that they begin to vibrate, producing conjunctions and disjunctions (*saṃyogavibhāgau*) of the

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[38] ŚV Sphoṭa. 34.
[39] Ibid. 135.

air particles. When these air particles leave the mouth they possess a certain velocity. Proportionate to this velocity is their length of movement. Now they are known as *dhvaniḥ* or *nādaḥ*. As the *nādaḥ* begins to move in space through the tranquil air (*stimitena vāyunā*), the vibrations of the *nādaḥ* are transmitted to the tranquil air. These in their turn undergo conjunctions and disjunctions due to the impetus from the *nādaḥ*. Thus they move along till they reach the ear of the hearer[40]. Man's hearing organism (*śrotram*) consists of ether (*dik*) which due to his earlier good and bad deeds (*puṇyāpuṇyavaśīkṛta-*) is restricted to the ear-opening (*karṇacchidraparicchinna-*)[41]. When the *nādaḥ* reaches the ear-opening, the ether in the ear-opening is impressed and formed (*saṃskriyate*) by the conjunctions and disjunction (of the *nādaḥ*).

"It is alone the impression [on the *śrotram* that is] the cause of the perception of Śabdaḥ (*śabdagrahaṇakāraṇam*)."[42]

The nādaḥ by form-ing the ether in the ear-opening manifests Śabdaḥ which is perceived by the same ear whose ether has been formed. The process of Śabda-manifestation, if analysed slightly more in detail, reveals a number of interesting implications. The speaking-hearing-process which Kumārila describes has three stages:

1) the production of the *nādaḥ* which eventually reaches the ear,
2) the form-ation of the ether in the ear and
3) the manifestation and perception of Śabdaḥ

1) Kumārila's description of the process of *nāda*-production is similar to the Vaiśeṣika-process of Śabdah-production. For, the Vaiśeṣika-s said "that when one speaks the breath moves upwards and touches the speech-organs at those junctures where articulation takes place. They asserted that because of the contact in ether Śabdaḥ is produced which after that travels to the ear of the hearer"[43]. However the difference between the Vaiśeṣika-s and Kumārila is striking: Kumārila considers that which is formed by the speech-organs and which travels through the tranquil air to the hearer's ear to be simply sound and not Śabdaḥ. But since the Vaiśeṣika-s hold that Śabdaḥ is impermanent, their explanation of how it is produced is of a piece with their whole system. Kumārila, however, insists that Śabdaḥ is eternal and immutable, and that it can merely be made to manifest itself. It is impossible therefore that Kumārila could ever approve of the Vaiśeṣika-explanation. In the process of speaking the reality which has its origin in the abdomen, and is formed by the speech-organs in the mouth, and travels through the air and is made up of air particles is the *dhvaniḥ*[44]. Because of such a nature, *dhvaniḥ* or *nādaḥ* is made up of parts and can be in different places[45]. Furthermore,

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40 ŚV Śabdani. 121cd—124.
41 Ibid. 152—155ab.
42 Ibid. 130cd:
imam eva ca saṃskāraṃ śabdagrahaṇakāraṇam.
43 E. FRAUWALLNER, Geschichte II, 59. (My Translation).
44 ŚV Śabdani. 79cd; 123ab.
45 Ibid. 79cd.

being a space-time reality there are different universals (=*jātibhedaḥ*) of *dhvaniḥ*[46]. It is the *dhvani*-s that are characterized as long or loud, swift or slow, etc.[47].

2) By asserting that it is the *dhvaniḥ* which impresses and forms (*saṃskriyate*) the hearing-organ which is made up of ether, Kumārila is actually intending to say that the kind of impression (*saṃskṛtiḥ*, *saṃskāraḥ*) that is made on the ether corresponds to the kind of *dhvaniḥ* that impresses the ear-ether[48]. Further, the hearing organ, which is not formed by sound is incapable of perceiving Śabdaḥ[49]. On several occasions in the Ślokavārttikam Kumārila is at pains to justify the assumption of such a *saṃskāraḥ*[50]. In one place, for example, he insists that the assumption of the *saṃskāraḥ* is the result of *arthāpattiḥ*[51].

"Since [the manifestation of Śabdaḥ] is otherwise not possible, [and since it has to be possible,] because the production of Śabdaḥ has been refuted, we assume the birth of a definite *saṃkṛtiḥ* [caused] by the *dhvani*-s."[52]

Fundamentally, then, the necessity of the thesis that Śabdaḥ only manifests itself is the reason why Kumārila postulates a *saṃskṛtiḥ*. On the one hand Śabdaḥ is eternal but can be made to manifest itself, on the other, the *dhvaniḥ* (which makes Śabdaḥ to manifest itself) is perishable. The bridge between the eternal Śabdaḥ and the perishable *dhvaniḥ* is the formation (*saṃskṛtiḥ*) of the hearing-organ. The hearing-organ, says Kumārila, is not as is held by some, the impression on the hearing-organ, since its existence then would be momentary. The *śrotram* is an *arthaḥ* which is in a fixed place in the human organism (*ekadeśanibaddha-*) and continues to exist, like any other sense-organ, even after the impression is no more there. And the word *saṃskāraḥ* implies that an already existing object (and not one that has first to be produced) receives the aptitude (*yogyatā*) for a definite effect[53]. The impression (*saṃskāraḥ*), accordingly, is a qualification (in the sense of an active qualifying) (*yogyatā*). In another place Kumārila calls the qualification *śaktiḥ* and describes it as *atīndriya-*[54]. These two characterizations *saṃskāraḥ* and *śaktiḥ/yogyatā* are really two aspects of the one and the same reality: *saṃskāraḥ* stresses the passive aspect of the *śrotra*'s being formed whereas *śaktiḥ* puts the accent on the active aspect of the act of perceiving through which the hearing-organ experiences Śabdaḥ.

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46 Ibid. 80.
47 Ibid. 214cd—215; 220—221ab; 301; Sphoṭa. 54.
48 ŚV Śabdani. 126cd—130ab; 79cd—83ab.
49 Ibid. 68cd—70.
50 Ibid. 65cd—87ab; 125—130ab; Sphoṭa. 97—105.
51 ŚV Sphoṭa. 82cd—83ab.
52 ŚV Śabdani. 126cd—127ab:
śabdotpatter niṣiddhatvād anyathānupapattitaḥ //
viśiṣṭasaṃskṛter janma dhvanibhyo'dhyavasīyate /
53 Ibid. 147cd—148ab.
54 Ibid. 45.

With the help of the *saṃskāra*-postulate Kumārila is in a position to explain why Śabdaḥ which is present everywhere is not perceived everywhere (when it is spoken in one place).

"Hence that hearing-organ which has not been formed [by the *dhvaniḥ*] does not perceive Śabdaḥ. There is no formation of the hearing-organ if [the *dhvani*] does not reach the ear-opening. Therefore a *saṃskāraḥ* is necessary given the plurality of [hearing] bases."[55]

Hence only those whose hearing-organ has been correspondingly formed are capable of perceiving Śabdaḥ. Thus, with the help of such a theory one can easily explain the phenomenon of deafness, where the *dhvani*-s are incapable of producing an impression on the hearing-organ because of a defect in it[56].

3) By forming the hearing-organ (*saṃskriyate*) the *dhvaniḥ* turns out to be the reason for the manifestation Śabdaḥ. Because the manifestation of Śabdaḥ does not take place if a *dhvaniḥ* is not there, it is taken to be the reason for the Śabda-manifestation. What Kumārila wants to stress is that without *dhvaniḥ* it is impossible to make Śabdaḥ manifest itself[57]. The task of the *dhvaniḥ*, says Kumārila, is similar to that of a lamp. The lamp is understood to be that which manifests the jar, because through its light it fulfills one of the conditions which is necessary for the eye in order to be able to see; similarly *dhvaniḥ*, too, is that which manifests Śabdaḥ because it helps the hearing-organ, in as much as it (*dhvaniḥ*) forms the organ[58]. The experience of Śabdaḥ is conveyed through something which is momentary (*kṣaṇikaṃ sādhanam*) just as a glimpse is made possible in a dark night by a flash of lightning[59]. A *dhvaniḥ*, though perishable, manifests the imperishable and eternal Śabdaḥ in the following way:

"These [*dhvani*-s] are the reason for the manifestation of Śabdaḥ in that they provide the organ [of hearing] with a competence [which is] beyond the senses (*atīndriya-*)."[60]

The reasoning that is involved here is this:

i) We assume that *dhvaniḥ* is the reason for the manifestation of Śabdaḥ because it takes place only when it (*dhvaniḥ*) is present[61].

ii) We accept the formation of the hearing-organ because the perception of Śabdaḥ is possible only by means of this organ[62].

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[55] Ibid. 70—71 ab:
śabdaṃ na śroṣyati śrotraṃ tenāsaṃskṛtaśaṣkuli |
aprāptakarṇadeśatvād dhvaner na śrotrasaṃskriyā ||
ato'dhiṣṭhānabhedena saṃskāraniyamasthitiḥ.

[56] Ibid. 145.

[57] Ibid. 44.

[58] Ibid. 42.

[59] Ibid. 41.

[60] Ibid. 45:
ato'tīndriyayaivete śaktyā śaktimatīndriyām |
indrīyasyādadhānāḥ syuḥ sabdābhivyaktihetavaḥ ||

[61] Ibid. 44 cd.

[62] Ibid. 126—127 ab.

iii) The formation of the hearing-organ is at the same time a capability/qualification which is beyond the senses[63].

iv) From the fact that the *dhvaniḥ* by providing the hearing-organ with a competence that is beyond the senses manifests Śabdaḥ, we conclude that the *dhvaniḥ* too possesses a competence that is beyond the senses[64].

From this we can now appreciate why a *dhvaniḥ* which consists of air-particles is more than air. That a *dhvaniḥ* cannot bring Śabdaḥ to manifest itself simply in the air is due to the fact that only a hearing-organ is capable of perceiving Śabdaḥ. This is one of the premises which form Kumārila's point of departure. Hence he does not share the opinion that the *dhvaniḥ* is perceived by the *śrotram* since it (*śrotam*) perceives the manifested Śabdaḥ. The *dhvaniḥ* is not, according to Kumārila, Śabdaḥ; it is that which makes Śabdaḥ manifest itself[65]. In this connection Kumārila raises the following problem: if the sound itself (*dhvaniḥ/nādaḥ*) is not perceived by the hearing-organ how is one to explain such phenomena as the sounds of a shell?[66]. To this Kumārila gives three answers:

i) Some say that when the syllable is manifested then the manifesting sound, too, which trans-forms the hearing-organ is heard. This answer does not fit in with Kumārila's thinking since, according to him, whatever is perceived by the hearing-organ is Śabdaḥ and sound which can never be considered as Śabdaḥ by him would, if it were heard, eo ipso have to be considered as Śabdaḥ[67].

ii) Some Mīmāṃsaka-s hold that one can explain that one can hear the sounds of a shell by postulating that there are different winds, that is to say, there are a variety of *dhvani*-s. Some which are born through conjunctions and disjunctions of the speech-organs, manifest the *varṇaḥ* clearly (*sphuṭam*). However there are others which manifest that Śabdaḥ which is at the basis of all *varṇa*-s (*sarvavarṇabhāk*)[68]. Because the sound of the second type is not distinct the Śabda-manifestation, too, is not distinct. It is not legitimate to ask: which is the *varṇaḥ* that is being manifested in the indistinct manifestation, since all *varṇa*-s, being everywhere (*varṇasarvagatatvāt*), all the *varṇa*-s, that is, the total Śabdaḥ as such is manifested[69]. Here Kumārila refers us to another place where he distinguishes two aspects in the *dhvani*-s. The first makes known the nature of the *varṇaḥ*; (*svarūpabodhārtha-*) and the second follows after and prolongs the knowledge of a *varṇaḥ* (*bodhānuvartina-*). This, he says, is to be understood in the following manner: both the *dhvani*-aspects trans-form the hearing-organ, the first in one sudden moment (*yugapat*) and

[63] Ibid. 45.

[64] Ibid. 43—44.

[65] The *śrotram* is not only the 'instrument' through which Śabdaḥ is grasped; it is also the ambience of its manifestation.

[66] ŚV Śabdani. 221cd—222.

[67] Ibid. 223—224ab.

[68] This view takes into account the fact of every sound whether articulate or not as being capable of manifesting Śabdaḥ. There seems to be a direct correspondence between the manifesting sound and the manifested Śabdaḥ.

[69] ŚV Śabdani. 224cd—228ab; Sphoṭa. 40—44.

the second, successively (*kramena*). The first type makes known the nature of the *varṇa*-s. The second kind trans-forms the hearing-organ in such a way that the hearing-organ can 'grasp' the speed of the sounds. These perishable characteristics like speed, pitch, etc. are really not of the syllable itself, since it is unalterably eternal. Kumārila introduces this distinction in order to account for language-phenomena like slow, swift, distinct, indistinct, speech[70]. We observe again that the nature of *dhvaniḥ* determines the nature of the manifestation of Śabdaḥ. From this Kumārila concludes that a *dhvaniḥ* that is itself articulate manifests a syllable articulately; if the *dhvaniḥ* is indistinct then the Śabda-manifestation, too, will be indistinct.

iii) The third alternative though terse brings in a nuance that fits in well with Kumārila's thinking. Moreover, since the last of the alternatives is usually the mind of the author, I take it to be Kumārila's own solution to the problem. The sounds which a shell produces are of a different class altogether (*jātyantaram*) compared with the classes of the *dhvani*-s which manifest the *varṇa*-s. The reason for this is that the *dhvani*-s are of diverse capacities (*śaktibhedaprakalpanam*). Studying their effects one is led to postulate them[71]. In another place Kumārila writes that the different *dhvani*-s have different capacities and that the difference in the *saṃskāra*-s is to be traced back to this fact.

"Just as for you the air impelled forth for one purpose (*arthaḥ*) does not fulfil another purpose so, too [for us the vibration] capable [of producing] a *saṃskāraḥ* [with a view to] one *varṇaḥ* does not produce another. Just as for you one *varṇaḥ* is not [produced] by contacts with the palate other [than the usual ones], so, too, [for us] the impetus [of the air towards the organs of speech meant for the production] of one *dhvaniḥ* [does not produce] another *dhvaniḥ*."[72]

Further:

"We find in all persons the kind [of things called] palate, etc. It is by means of these [speech-organs] that a speaker brings forth *dhvani*-s. And the causes for the manifestation of Śabdaḥ are either the different kinds of these [*dhvani*-s] in as much as they move towards [manifesting] a *varṇaḥ* or the individual [*dhvani*-s themselves] together with [their respective classes]. Then, the sequence of the *dhvani*-s is dependent on the sequence of the conjunctions and disjunctions of the palate, etc. Both [that is, the sequence of the *dhvani*-s as well as the sequence of the conjunctions and disjunctions of the palate being dependent on [a] class [are endowed with] eternality [as

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70 ŚV Sphoṭa. 59.
71 Śabdani. 228cd—229ab.
72 Ibid. 80cd—82ab; 297.

anyārthaṃ prerito vāyur yathānyaṃ na karoti vaḥ //
tathānyavarṇasaṃskāraśakto nānyam kariṣyati /
anyais tālvādisaṃyogair varṇo nānyao yathaiva te //
tathā dhvanyantarākṣepo na dhvanyantarasāribhiḥ /
teṣām ca jātayo bhinnāḥ śabdābhivyaktihetavaḥ /
yāvad varṇaṃ pravartante vyaktayo vā tadanvitāḥ //

far ass their pattern of functioning is concerned]. Just as in the case of [certain] motions there is a sequence of movement through parts characterized by class, so, too [we could explain the order of sequence involved in the definite contact with] the palate [resulting in the production of a definite] *dhvaniḥ* [leading to the manifestation of a definite] *varṇaḥ*. Or, because of the severe subtlety of these very individual [sequences] the class-patterns are [usually] ascertained. It is due to this [that there is an ascertainment of sequence, even though the *varṇa*-s are [really] all-pervading. In this manner the *varṇa*-s reveal different meanings in the wake of all the eternally established characteristics of the *dhvani*-s."[73]

The chief difference between the second and the third alternatives is this: In the second alternative the *varṇa*-s are said to be manifested; one is at pains to uphold the *varṇa*-character of Śabdaḥ since in every Śabda-manifestation Śabdaḥ is manifested either as a distinct or as an indistinct *varṇaḥ*. An articulate *dhvaniḥ* manifests an articulate *varṇah* and a non-articulate *dhvaniḥ* manifests Śabdaḥ non-articulately. In the third alternative the sounds of a shell manifest Śabdaḥ in a way that is peculiar to them. Since the manner of Śabda-manifestation corresponds to the manner of the *dhvaniḥ* that manifests it, and since we have both articulate as well as non-articulate *dhvani*-s, one is not heavily insistent on upholding the *varṇa*-character of Śabdaḥ. Whereas in the second solution Śabdaḥ is manifested always varna-wise, in the third this is not necessary. The last alternative explains the manifestation of Śabdaḥ not merely from the viewpoint of human speech (as is done in the second alternative) but from the viewpoint of any kind of sound.

If the syllables (*varṇāḥ*) are identical with Śabdaḥ, then the question of the pada-identity arises. From what has been explained up to now, there are four possible answers to this:

i) One could say that each individual *varṇaḥ* belongs to a class like *ga-tvam*, *ba-tvam*, etc. and the *padam 'gauḥ'* would consist of the particular *varṇa*-s *ga-kāraḥ*, *au-kāraḥ visarjanīyaḥ*. Kumārila could not accept such a view since for him it is the one and the same *varṇaḥ* (say, *gakāraḥ*) that is manifested in different places and at different times. The *varṇa*-s, in that they are really Śabdaḥ, are all-pervading and therefore stand in no need of

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[73] Ibid. 296—301:

tālvādijātayas tāvat sarvapuṃsāṃ vyavasthitāḥ /
vaktā tāvad dhvanīṃs tābhir upalakṣya nirasyati //
teṣāṃ ca jātayo bhinnāḥ śabdābhivyaktihetavaḥ /
yāvad varṇam pravartante vyaktayo vā tadanvitāḥ //
tatra tālvādisaṃyogavibhāgakramapūrvakam /
dhvanīnām ānupūrvyaṃ syāj jātyā cobhayanityatā //
yathaiva bhramaṇādīnāṃ bhāgair jātyā ca lakṣitaiḥ /
kramānuvṛttir evaṃ syāt tālvādidhvanivarṇabhāk //
vyaktīnām eva vā saukṣmyāj jātidharmāvadhāraṇam /
tadvaśena ca varṇānāṃ vyāpitve'pi kramagrahaḥ //
evaṃ dhvaniguṇān sarvān nityatvena vyavasthitān /
varṇā anupatantaḥ syur arthabhedāv abodhinaḥ //

any class. Perception confirms that it is one and the same *varṇaḥ* that is recognized time and again, not a similar one. Similarity is possible only if two or more individuals share in one or more characteristics. Since however a *varṇaḥ* is unique and indivisible, it cannot share in a common characteristic. The presuppositions for similarity to exist are missing in the case of the *varṇa*-s[74]. The objection that just as the individual cows share in the universal cow so, too, the individual *ga*-s share in the universal *ga* is not to the point, since without the universal cow one would not be able to perceive the indivual cows. But in the case of the *varṇa*-s we know that the external characteristics all belong to the *dhvani*-s who merely manifest the same *varṇaḥ*. Since a *varṇaḥ* does not possess any individual characteristics, it is one only. There is a subtle nuance which Kumārila has introduced in this matter and which is worthy of note, though we need not discuss it here at length. In the process of Śabda-manifestation there is the *saṃskāraḥ* that is produced by the *dhvaniḥ*. The *saṃskāraḥ* is an impression, a form-ation of the ether in the ear-opening. As soon as this is formed Śabdaḥ is manifested. The experience of Śabdaḥ is explicitly stated to be due to an *atīndriyā śaktiḥ*. On the one hand, we have the formation of the ear-ether, on the other Śabdaḥ is known because of an *atīndriya-śaktiḥ*. Because every time the ear is formed Śabdaḥ is known, one says that it is known through the ear. Even in the explanation of what is Śabdaḥ it was stated: *te ca śrotragrahaṇāḥ*. But here Kumārila's precision is seen at work. Śabdaḥ is known not by the ear but in the ear. Śabda-manifestation takes place as soon as the ear-ether is formed. But the one is not identical with other. On the contrary: Śabda-awareness is an activity which is *atīndriya*-. And an *atīndriya*-activity like the experience of Śabdaḥ is not subject to the condition of perceptive knowledge. Hence a *varṇaḥ* is recognized differently, and a *dhvaniḥ* is recognized differently. In the case of the latter the external particularities are cognized, but not in the case of the former[75], because the *varṇa*-s do not have *viśeṣa*-s. These belong merely to the manifesting *dhvani*-s[76]. And the same is to be said of the length of the syllables (long, short, etc.)[77].

In this connection Kumārila makes a precise statement:

"Subsequently even an assumed [*ākṛtiḥ* for the varṇa-s] would mean extreme difficulty [in proving] its all-pervasiveness, uniqueness, eternality and existence in each individual."[78]

Clearly Kumārila is speaking in the context of his own theory. Given his understanding of the *varṇa*-s it would mean unnecessary trouble to postulate an *ākṛtiḥ* for each of them. To accept the thesis that the *varṇa*-s have *ākṛti*-s

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74 ŚV Sphoṭa. 10—19.

75 Realities like Śabdaḥ, *dik* and *kālaḥ* are, according to the Mīmāṃsā world-view, in but not of this world. They are known only through their manifestations.

76 ŚV Sphoṭa. 20—23.

77 Ibid. 50.

78 Ibid. 27.

kalpayitvāpi tat paścād vibhutvaikatvanityatāḥ |
pratyekavṛttitā cāsya bhaveyur mahataḥ śramāt ||

would amount to this, that they (the *varṇa*-s) would be individuals which participate in the *ākṛtiḥ*. The *varṇa* '*ga*' would, every time it is uttered, be a different individual but participating in the same *ākṛtiḥ*. This would no more make a *varṇaḥ* unique. Further, no individual (be it a *gaḥ* or a *gauḥ*) could be stated to be eternal. In Kumārila's theory a *varṇaḥ* is eternal because it is not an individual of a class. Lastly, an individual is never all-pervasive, though its class may be all pervasive. Thus to postulate an *ākṛtiḥ* for each *varṇaḥ* would mean for Kumārila to change completely his understanding of it.

ii) The second suggestion as to what *padam* could be is this: the *padam* '*gauḥ*' for instance could be a universal. In that case the individual utterances of it would be manifestations of this universal. This possibility, too, does not find favour with Kumārila. Speaking means utterance of one syllable at one moment. Since no syllable participates in an universal how could the sum-total of syllables be a particular instance of an universal?[79]

iii) The third possibility is in line with the teaching of the Sphoṭavādin-s. The *padam* would then be interpreted as that reality which is revealed in a flash when the sequence of syllables has been uttered. This, too, is rejected by Kumārila on the basis of these reasons: First of all, the Sphoṭavādin has the onus of proving that there can be a reality called Sphoṭaḥ apart from the syllables[80]. Further, of what use is the Sphoṭaḥ when as a matter of fact the *varṇa*-s would more than suffice to explain the constituents of speech? How is it possible that there can be such a thing like a Sphoṭaḥ which on the one hand is manifested through successive *varṇa*-s and on the other is utterly different from the manifesting *varṇa*-s? How could the Sphoṭaḥ be indivisible since the meaning of a *padam* is revealed only through a succession of syllables? In everyday language it is said: *śabdād artham*: meaning arises from Śabdaḥ. This would be contradicted by the theory that meaning originates from a reality which is totally different from the syllables (*varṇebhyo vyatirekataḥ*)[81]. And in everyday language Śabdaḥ does not mean Sphoṭaḥ. When it is said that meaning arises from Śabdaḥ, then it is clear that Śabdaḥ is the cause of the rise of meaning. The Sphoṭa-doctrine, if taken seriously, would introduce a third element between Śabdaḥ and *arthaḥ*![82] Such a causal third element is not perceived. The phrase *śabdād artham* is quite intelligible if by Śabdaḥ one means *varṇa*-s. This cannot be explained by the Sphoṭa-doctrine[83]. If the Sphoṭaḥ were the cause of the word-meaning with the help of a *saṃskāraḥ*, that would imply that Śabdaḥ would be the cause in a merely figurative manner (*gauṇam*)[84]. Neither in the case of the *padam* nor in that of the *vākyam* do the *dhvani*-s

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79 Ibid. 65—66.
80 Ibid. 94.
81 Ibid. 116—117.
82 Ibid. 122—125.
83 Ibid. 126.
84 Ibid. 127.

manifest any Sphoṭaḥ[85]. Being different from the *varṇa*-s the Sphoṭaḥ cannot reveal the meaning of a *padam*[86].

iv) Kumārila's own understanding of *padam* is in keeping with his understanding of *dhvaniḥ* and *varṇaḥ*. He does not accept the reality of a *padam* like '*gauḥ*' which is different from the syllables of which it consists. The cognition '*gauḥ*', it is true, is for him not the same as the cognition of the syllables but it is not wholly different from the cognition of the nature of the syllables (*varṇasvarūpāvabodhāt*). Though the cognition '*gauḥ*' is different from the cognition of the individual *varṇa*-s, it cannot be born without the three *varṇa*-s (g,au,ḥ). The integral cognition '*gauḥ*' (*gaur iti ekamatitvam*) is not rejected by Kumārila, he merely explains it this way that the individual *varṇa*-s produce one integral meaning and that they fulfil one definite purpose, namely, to reveal the word-meaning. Because the *varṇa*-s succeed each other rapidly (*śaighryāt*) and almost without intermission (*alpāntarat-vāt*) the cognition of the unity of the word '*gauḥ*' is produced[87].

From all this is clear that, though there is one integral cognition of the word '*gauḥ*', there is no word '*gauḥ*' apart from the three *varṇa*-s which constitute it[88]. A *padam*, according to Kumārila, is a definite sequence of syllables which mediates an integral meaning[89]. That we believe that the same word '*gauḥ*' appears again and again is due to the fact that the same syllables in the same sequence produce the same meaning[90]. Kumārila would not deny that in the language of everyday life we do have and use the word'*gauḥ*' but that is a different dimension altogether. The question here is about the reality of *padam*. Kumārila's answer could be interpreted in this way: a *padam* is a definite and constant sequence of the same syllables which always produce the same meaning. There is however no entity *padam* apart from the syllables which constitute it.

Śabdaḥ: eternally unchangeable and unchangeably eternal

Unlike in the early Mīmāṃsā, the doctrine of the eternality of Śabdaḥ in Kumārila's system is both epistemological in character and theological in purpose, because his thesis is that a perishable Śabdaḥ can never reveal its meaning and because the Veda is perishable if the eternal unchangeability and the unchangeable eternality of Śabdaḥ could never be justified.

Kumārila develops his Śabdanityatva-doctrine when commenting on Jaimini-Sūtra-s 1.1.6.23. Sūtra-s 6—11 represent the opponent's view, Sūtra-s 12—17 are a reply to the above views and Sūtra-s 18—23 sketch the position of the Mīmāṃsā school. Kumārila does not comment on Sūtram 23 which is supposed to be a scriptural confirmation of the Śabdanityatva-

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85 Ibid. 131.
86 Ibid. 133.
87 Ibid. 65; 117—121.
88 Ibid. 117—121.
89 ŚV Śabdani. 284—287ab.
90 ŚV Sphoṭa. 67.

doctrine, though he has a similar *ślokaḥ* (v. 316) in the Śabdanityatva-chapter.

Kumārila formulates his thesis on Śabdanityatā- thus: "If there is in Śabdaḥ an expressive-potency [independent of its] perishability or eternality or only if it is perishable, then there is a defect [in our stand]".[91]

The implication is that without an eternal Śabdaḥ, no language is possible at all! In other words, the a priori condition of the possibility of human speech is the eternality of language. The argumentation is long and rather complex and therefore we shall have to explain in advance a few of its presuppositions.

Śabdaḥ, for Kumārila, is, if one may be allowed to say so, an ontological substance, independent and self-sufficient in its existence but related to the world of space and time through its *varṇa*-wise manner of manifestation. From what Kumārila says about it, we do not observe in it, what we would normally call, personal and personalistic characteristics. Neither however does it betray the so-called 'objective' or, for that matter, 'impersonal' traits. It is indeed a reality that is sui generis and plays an immensely important role in the Mīmāṃsā system and world-view. Usually it is lined up with other categories like *kālaḥ* and *ākāśam* since it, like them, is all pervasive, eternal, one and without parts. But what is normally overlooked is that its manner of functioning through manifestation presupposes a spiritual subject both as speaker and as hearer. Besides it is Śabdaḥ which puts man in contact with meaning and Significance, with matter and spirit. Even to come to oneself, to reflect on oneself one needs Śabdaḥ. All this, of course, in the Mīmāṃsā-world-view[92]. What we from our point of view call *varṇa*-s are nothing but the reality of Śabdaḥ itself in its relation to the world of human speech. Hence one need not wonder that it is quite usual with Kumārila to speak of Śabdaḥ, though a more precise usage would show that he is sometimes speaking of *padam*. Further when proving the eternality of the *varṇa*-s he is basically proving the eternality of Śabdaḥ, as I have pointed out earlier[93].

The stages of his argumentation (Śabdanityatādhikaraṇam vv. 238cd—301) are briefly these:

1) 238cd—241ab: The final purpose of Śabdaḥ is to enable us to act in our everyday life by making meaning known to us.

2) 241cd—277: If Śabdaḥ is to lead to meaning, word and meaning must be eternally connected with each other.

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[91] ŚV Śabdani. 237cd—238ab.
yadi nāśini nitye vā vināśiny eva vā bhavet //
śabde vācakasāmarthyaṃ tato dūṣaṇam ucyatām /

[92] Śabdaḥ, *kālaḥ* and *ākāśam* are all perceived through space-time realities but their nature is such that they presuppose a 'spiritual' Subject. But more than that their importance lies in the fact that without them the complex process of 'knowing' and 'understanding' is not possible in this world. Sequence, which is of the essence of human speech and understanding, is impossible without these three realities.

[93] See pp. 119 of this chapter.

3) 278—290ab: The connection between word and meaning is '*autpattika-*'. This is possible only if word means the same sequence of the same syllables connected with the same meaning. In other words, the sequence of syllables is beginninglessly eternal (*anādinityam*).

4) 290cd—301 : The sequence of syllables forming a word can only then be beginninglessly eternal if the syllables are unchangeably eternal (*kūṭasthanitya-*).

We can start with the argument itself.

1) Kumārila begins his proof with the basic contention formulated in Sūtram 1.1.18 (*nityas tu syād darśanasya parāthatvāt*) and in Śabara's comment on it. It is a matter of observation, according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, that the purpose of language is not language, it is for the sake of the 'others'! Śabara had said in this connection: "For if Śabdaḥ perished the moment it was uttered one would not be able to make known anything to another."[94] Taking this as his fundamental thesis Kumārila expatiates:

"Because Śabdaḥ is of no use for itself (*niṣphalatvena śabdasya*) one ascertains through its competence (*yogyatvāt*) that it is a means towards the cognition of meaning which in its turn is an instrument for fruitful activity. Therefore when one investigates through arguments whether [Śabdaḥ] is eternal or perishable, one should accept that characteristic [of Śabdaḥ] which does not contradict the main thing [about it]. For it is not proper to contradict the chief fruit out of consideration for a secondary result which is subordinated to [another]. And this is [precisely the thing] that would follow, if one would hold that [the Śabdaḥ] is perishable."[95]

Action (*vyavahāraḥ*) is, for the Mīmāṃsaka-s, of prime importance. This is especially true of ritual and religion. If we reflect a bit as to what leads one to action, we shall realize that it is usually an injunction, a command that is formulated in words. But words alone do not move us to act. For it is only when we grasp the meaning of the commands, that action becomes an immediate necessity because in that moment it is 'conceived'. Thus, one concludes, that because meaning leads to action and because meaning is transmitted through Śabdaḥ, the primary purpose of Śabdaḥ is to make us act. It does not make sense to state, Kumārila seems to argue, that Śabdaḥ is meant for Śabdaḥ, that is, for itself. To speak thus is as senseless as to assert that the eye is meant for the eye! Kumārila's reasoning here strikes a note that is as pertinent as it is perennial. A reality like Śabdaḥ which would be its own raison d'être would be solipsistic and sterile — hence senseless. Our own experience, according to Kumārila and the other early Mīmāṃsa-

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94 ŚBh 84, 7—8; 1.1.6.18.

95 ŚV Śabdani. 238cd—241ab:

phalavad vyavahārāṅgabhūtārthapratyayāṅgatā //
niṣphalatvena śabdasya yogyatvād avadhāryate /
parīkṣyamāṇas tenāsya yuktyā nityavināśayoḥ //
sa dharma 'bhyupagantavyo yaḥ pradhānaṃ na bādhate /
na hy aṅgāṅgānurodhena pradhānaphalabādhanam //
yujyate nāśipakṣe ca tad ekāntāt prasajyate /

ka-s,shows us that Śabdaḥ reveals meaning and thus makes us act. Therefore, we have to postulate in the case of Śabdaḥ all those characteristics which goad us to act. Among these characteristics, Kumārila insists, is the eternality of Śabdaḥ because if Śabdaḥ were perishable, it could never motivate us to act. The reason for this is made clear in the next step.

2) "For, Śabdaḥ whose relation with its object is not perceived cannot be expressive [of its meaning]."[96]

A word reveals its meaning only if the connection between it and its meaning is known before-hand. To put it another way: a definite word is bound up with a definite meaning.

"If the relation [of a definite word with a definite meaning] is known, then another word could not express [the same meaning]. For, if the relation of the word cow is known, [then] the word horse is not expressive [of the meaning cow]."[97]

A word like cow will, according to this theory, always refer to the meaning cow and never to the meaning horse; the word horse can never refer to the meaning cow. If this were to be denied, then any word could mean anything! The only condition in all this is that the relation between a definite word and a definite meaning has to be known.

3) What does Kumārila mean with 'definite word'? Is it the same word or is it a similar word? If one were to suggest that the later utterances of the word cow are similar to previous utterances 'cow' such an answer would be acceptable to Kumārila, under one condition only. Similarity, according to him, is based on identity. Because it is always the same *varṇa*-s that are manifested the manifesting *dhvani*-s (which because of their difference in space-time circumstances cannot be identical) are similar. The *dhvani*-s which I utter today are similar to those I uttered yesterday because they all reveal the same *varṇa*-s[98].

If however Śabdaḥ were perishable, there would be the difficulty that one would have to create a relation between the meaning and the new word which corresponds to it.

"How is one to create a relationship without first uttering the word? And there is no point in a relationship with [a word] which perishes [the moment it is] uttered. Hence the earlier [word] is meaningless, because it perishes without being related. How can the later [word], whose relationship [with its meaning] is not [yet] established, be known as having a meaning? Who could at all do these [three] actions at one and the same time, [namely the actions of] uttering the word [which is perishable], of creating its

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96 Ibid. 241cd:
na hy adṛṣṭārthasaṃbandhaḥ śabdo bhavati vācakaḥ //

97 Ibid. 243cd—244ab:
anyasmin jñātasaṃbandhe na cānyo vācako bhavet //
gośabde jñātasaṃbandhe nāśvaśabdo hi vācakaḥ /

98 Ibid. 271—277.

relationship [with the word and] of using [it, actions which] by their very nature [are] successive?"[99]

Should one think that right at the beginning when the world was brought forth (*sargādau*) and words were first made use of, there were some who understood how to make use of these words and later generations had deduced the usage from similar words, then the problem of similarity of words arises. What does this similarity consist in?

"Would the similarity be different or not different from individual [to individual]? [Would it be] one or many, eternal or merely non-eternal? In case it is different [from the individual words], unique and eternal, [then it is] the *jātiḥ* [that] is being accepted. If it is not different [from the individual words], non-eternal and pluriformic, [then this position is] similar to the one explained earlier [in *śabdānityatā*]. Thus one accepts similarity [that is] unique, eternal and non-different from the individual [words]. [With this] the eternality of the individual [word] has been reached. If this is so, [it is] accepted by us. According to you, similarity does not consist in the commonality of parts. For, this [similarity] can be proved [only] if there is no difference in the syllables [which make up a word]. But [such] a non-difference is not accepted by you. It has already been disproved earlier [that there is no such thing as] a class of the word 'cow' or of the [syllable] '*ga*'. Hence only the individual *varṇa*-s are eternal and expressive of meaning."[100]

Kumārila is here out to prove that, whatever one's understanding of a word, it is the very same syllables that appear when the word is uttered and that therefore it is the very same word that we perceive again and again. The word cow that is uttered now is not different from the word cow that was uttered yesterday, for the simple reason that it is made up of the self-same syllables!

4) A *padam* is a sequence of syllables which reveals a definite meaning. The sequence is really a characteristic of the *dhvani*-s which by nature are perishable. But to conclude from this that the sequence, too, is perishable is,

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99 Ibid. 255—257:
śabdānityatvapakṣe 'pi viśeṣeṇa sa duṣkaraḥ /
śabdaṃ tāvad anuccārya sambandhakaraṇaṃ kutaḥ //
na coccāritanaṣṭasya saṃbandhena prayojanam /
tenāsaṃbaddhya naṣṭatvāt pūrvas tāvad anarthakaḥ //
uttaro 'kṛtasaṃbandho vijñāyetārthavān katham /
śabdoccāraṇasaṃbandhakaraṇavyāvahārikāḥ //

100 Ibid. 271—275:
tathā bhinnam abhinnaṃ vā sādṛśyaṃ vyaktito bhavet /
evam ekam anekaṃ vā nityaṃ vānityam eva vā //
bhinnatvaikatvanityatve jātir eva prakalpyate /
abhedānityanānātve pūrvoktenaiva tulyatā //
vyaktyananyat tathaikaṃ ca sādṛśyaṃ nityam iṣyate /
vyaktinityatvam āpannaṃ tathā saty asmadīhitam //
na cāvayavasāmānyarūpā sadṛśatā tava /
varṇabhede hi sā siddhyen na cābhedas tvayeṣyate //
gośabdatvādigatvādi pūrvam eva nirākṛtam /
varṇavyaktaya eva syur nityās tenāvabodhakāḥ //

according to Kumārila, a non-sequitur. Even though the particular *dhvani*-s which make up the sequence have all perished, still, the sequence has kept on re-appearing. And this is so because it is independent of both the *dhvani*-s as well as the men who employ it. We use it the way we have seen or heard it used by others, and they used it the way they heard it from others, and these others used it the way they heard from their predecessors and so on without any beginning. This is the beginningless process of teaching and learning human speech. In this process the individual *dhvani*-s and the individual people come and go but the sequence in which the individual people use the individual *dhvani*-s is always the same. The sequence is the same because the meaning which is revealed through it is also the same! The total process of human discourse, according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, involves seeing, hearing, reflecting on this, both inductively and deductively, and acting accordingly. In it are included teaching and learning. All this is possible if there is some constant which does not change in any circumstances. A word here and a word there might be coined but even this presupposes a constant and continuous core through which change is possible. To this element of continuity are the sequences which are called *pada*-s. They are constantly used in the same way (*vyavahārāt nityatā, anādinityatā*)[101].

The last point is worth stressing. Kumārila, as far as my knowledge goes, is the first one to show that Anādinityatā is based on an a priori, namely, Kūṭasthanityatā! A beginningless process is what is known as *anādinitya*- and this is quite different from *kūṭasthanitya*- which is unchangeable and eternal as well. Kūṭasthanityatā is said to be the support of the Anādinityatā. Just as man has been making pots since time immemorial, not because pots are eternal but because we have atoms that are eternal and because pots are made of a class whose basic constituents are the atoms, similarly, the beginningless process of human discourse is possible because of the unchangeably eternal *varṇa*-s[102].

The last stage of the argument is but an explicitation of the conclusions arrived at in the third stage. The result of the discussion there was that the *padam* cow is made up of similar *dhvani*-s used in the same sequence manifesting the same syllables in order to reveal the same meaning. It was stressed in that context that similarity is based on identity. Finally in the last stage it was argued out that the sequence of words is beginninglessly eternal and that a concept like this does not have a justification in itself but that it is discovered to be founded on an a priori, namely, Kūṭasthanityatā.

Regarding sequence of syllables, there is an interesting passage in Kumārila:

"Just as the same [kind of] use of pots, etc. is characterized by the class (*jātyā*) [it belongs to], so, too, [the use] of the sequence [of syllables] is proved by the class (*jātidvāreṇa*) [it belongs to]. First of all there is the fact

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101 Ibid. 284—290ab.
102 Ibid. 291—305.

(*vyavasthitaḥ*) of the same kind of palate, etc. (*tālvādijātayas*) in all men. First the speaker emits forth *dhvani*-s [which prior to their emission] have been 'impressed' by these [speech organs]. And the cause of the manifestation of Śabdaḥ are either the different kinds of these [*dhvani*-s] in as much as they move towards [manifesting] a *varṇaḥ*, or, the individual [*dhvani*-s themselves] together with [their respective classes]. Then, the sequence of the *dhvani*-s is dependent on the sequence of the conjunctions and disjunctions of the palate, etc. Both [that is, the sequence of the *dhvani*-s as well as the sequence of the conjunctions and disjunctions of the palate, are, as far as their pattern of functioning is concerned, endowed with] eternality due to the class (*jātyā*) [they belong to]."[103]

What the above quotation intends to prove is that the speech-organs are individuals of a class and that because they belong to one kind they have definite characteristics, especially where their functioning is concerned. And one of the characteristics of their functioning is that they bring forth *dhvani*-s successively, one by one, in a sequence and not all together. Since all men have these speech-organs, they all speak through *dhvani*-sequences. The beginningless process of human discourse of which these phenomena are part and parcel shows that the same kind of *dhvani*-sequences are connected with the one and the same meaning. When a word reveals its meaning two more things (substances, really) are involved over and above those we have spoken of earlier: Śabdaḥ and Kālaḥ. On the one hand the syllables are the manifested aspects of Śabdaḥ, on the other, sequence, and length (= quantity) of the *dhvani*-s are divisions of time, which in itself is indivisible, one, eternal and not restricted to or by space and which appears as divided into moments in all beings of this world. Just as the undivided and indivisible Śabdaḥ appears as a *varṇaḥ* because of the manifesting *dhvaniḥ*, so, too, does time, which is undivided and indivisible in itself, appear as a sequence, long or short, etc. because of certain sequences of happenings. Such a manifestation of time determines the *dhvani*-s, too. Śabdaḥ and Kālaḥ as such have little to do with us or with our world but they are connected with us and our world through their manifestations. The syllables forming a word reveal its meaning only when their *dhvani*-s are endowed with characteristics like sequence, length, etc. This implies, that it is not enough to have mere syllables if we want to come to know the meaning of words. Time, too, has an important role to play in this context. For only when the *dhvani*-s are qualified by time through sequence, length, etc. can the syllables reveal their

[103] Ibid. 295—298:
jātyā yathā ghaṭādīnāṃ vyavahāropalakṣaṇam /
tathaiva cānupūrvyāder jātidvāreṇa setsyati //
tālvādijātayas tāvat sarvapuṃsāṃ vyavasthitāḥ /
vaktā tāvad dhvanīṃs tābhir upalakṣya nirasyati //
teṣām ca jātayo bhinnāḥ śabdābhivyaktihetavaḥ /
yāvad varṇaṃ pravartante vyaktayo vā tadanvitāḥ //
tatra tālvādisaṃyogavibhāgakramapūrvakam /
dhvanīnām ānupurvyaṃ syāj jātyā cobhayanityatā //

meaning. Accordingly, we could draw the following conclusions: Śabdaḥ and Kālaḥ are the two unchangeably eternal (*kūṭasthanitya-*)foundations of the beginningless process of human discourse. The concrete instances of human speech are the *pada*-s. These *pada*-s reveal their meaning when they are qualified by or come in relation to Śabdaḥ and Kālaḥ. This happens in the process of their (Śabdaḥ and Kālaḥ) manifestation, when Śabdaḥ is experienced through the *dhvani*-s, and Kālaḥ through the sequence and the length of the syllables which form a *padam*. Whereas Śabdaḥ and Kālaḥ are unchangeably eternal, the classes of the *dhvani*-s, the sequences, etc. are beginninglessly eternal. And this is so because a word reveals its meaning provided it is the same word, that is, the same sequence of the same kind of *dhvani*-s. Beginningless eternality is grounded in and guaranteed by unchangeable eternality[104]. This whole argumentation can,according to Kumārila, also be summed up in the form of a syllogism:

"Śabdaḥ is stable (= *sthiraḥ* i.e. eternal), since it reveals a common meaning, that is dependent on the cognition of the relation [of the word with its meaning], like the universals smoke, cow, etc."[105]

Kūmarila's stress is on Śabda's function of revealing the one and the same meaning, given the same sequence of the same *dhvani*-s, etc. His examples are the universals (like 'smoke', 'cow' etc. which are eternal, and eternally make known the one and the same meaning. The point here is not that Śabdaḥ is a universal (*jātiḥ*). If that were so, there could be no explanation for Kumārila's gigantic efforts to prove the eternality of Śabdaḥ, since almost everybody is agreed that a universal is eternal. The point of the syllogism is that a *padam* makes known a meaning that is always the same. Earlier[106] Kumārila had proved that the *padam* 'cow', for example, is not a universal but that it consists of a sequence of *dhvani*-s. Since however like a universal it always reveals the same meaning, it, too, like a universal, has to be eternal.

According to Kumārila even the one who opposes the Śabdanityatvavādaḥ presupposes (exercite) the eternality of Śabdaḥ. When he affirms or asserts something he hopes, he will be understood by others. This presupposes that the words which make up the sentence will continue to exist. In order that words reveal their meaning they have to continue to exist. If we had to produce totally new words, they would never be in a position to communicate their meaning[107]. This is the same as stating that Śabdaḥ is eternal.

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[104] Ibid. 299—308.

[105] Ibid. 311:
atrocyate sthiraḥ śabdo dhūmagotvādijātivat /
saṃbandhānubhavāpekṣasāmānyārthāvabodhanāt //

[106] See p. 136f.

[107] If a word perishes the moment it is uttered, then communication becomes impossible since a new word would not be able to communicate its meaning. New words, mean, according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, new problems. If everytime we spoke we were to produce new words the problems of finding out their meaning and of communicating them to the listener would be insurmountable.

Lastly there is in the Ślokavārttikam a hurried and sketchy argument pointing out that even Śrutiḥ is against the contention that Śabdaḥ is non-eternal.

"The perishability [of Śabdaḥ] is refuted by the Scripture (*āgamena*) of all the schools since every Scripture [is communicated through means which] are based on the [Śabda's] capabilities to reveal meaning."[108]

Every Scripture is intended to communicate its content. This presupposes however that Śabdaḥ is imperishable, since this is an a priori condition of the possibility of communicating meaning.

Kumārila adds to his arguments in favour of Śabda's eternality one more but this time based on perception (*pratyakṣam*). The core of the argument is concentrated on re-cognition (*pratyabhijñānam*). Re-cognition implies that the object that is re-cognized is the same as the object that was previously cognized. Re-cognition is based on commonalities, not on differences.

"Even in the case [of the flame] what is to be recognized is for us always something that is common. But where there is a cognition of [some] difference regarding a part through an *upādhiḥ* (= external circumstance), there we [hold that] recognition is set aside by the cognition of the difference."[109]

Re-cognition is not possible without cognition and this means that between cognition and re-cognition there is at least an element of commonality. Any difference that is noticed between the two (that is, cognition and re-cognition), makes, in that measure, re-cognition impossible. Where there is no commonality at all, there can be no recognition either. The recognition of the word is not unconnected with the recognition of the *dhvani*-sequence that is involved here, and of the *varṇa*-s that are manifested through them. Our knowledge of the word cow, for instance, is bound up with the *dhvani*-sequence involved here, which, in its turn, is not unconnected with the *varṇa*-s (which the *dhvani*-sequence manifests). When we recognize the word cow, what we are actually recognizing are the *varṇa*-s in the sequence of their manifestation.

Connected but not identical with the recognition of the word cow is the recognition of the meaning cow (which is the *ākṛtiḥ*). Hence whenever the word cow is uttered, its meaning also is recognized because the meaning cow is always and everywhere the same.

Concretely then the two reasons for recognizing the word cow are the sameness of the *varṇa*-s and the sameness of the meaning[110].

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[108] ŚV Śabdani. 316:

arthapratītisāmarthyaiḥ pratiśāstram upāśritaiḥ /
āgamenāpi nāśitvaṃ bādhyate sarvavādinām //

[109] Ibid. 414cd—415:

tatrāpi pratyabhijñeyaṃ sāmānyaṃ nityam eva naḥ //
bhedabuddhis tu yatrāṃśe syāt kenacid upādhinā /
tatra naḥ pratyabhijñānaṃ bhedabuddhyaiva vāritam //

[110] Merely recognizing a word is not all; we normally recognize the meaning too. Both are beginninglessly eternal, and this is the reason why recognition is at all possible.

"Thus [having established] the stability of Śabdaḥ even in the moment after the time of its hearing [through recognition], its perishability cannot be established any more by any [other] argument. [Things] like cloth, etc. are known to perish through instruments or through age. In the case of Śabdaḥ there is no such cause. The manner in which the *paudgalika*-Śabdaḥ [theory] was refuted is the one [to be used in order to refute the theory that Śabdaḥ] is made up of air-particles. Thus [the theory that Śabdaḥ is perishable] is a path unsupported by [any] reasoning. Hence it is obvious that [Śabdaḥ] is eternal."[111]

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[111] ŚV Śabdani. 442—444:
evaṃ sthitasya śabdasya śrutikālāt kṣaṇāntare |
saṃbhāvyate vināśitvaṃ na bhūyo'nyena hetunā ||
yathā śāstrādibhir bhedāj jarayā vā paṭādayaḥ |
naṅkṣyantīty avagamyante naivaṃ śabde 'sti kāraṇam ||
śabdo yathā paudgaliko niṣiddhaḥ syād vāyavīyasya sa eva mārgaḥ |
tasmād anirdhāritahetumārgaḥ sarvatra sākṣād bhavatīti nityaḥ ||

CHAPTER 11 ŚABDĀRTHASAMBANDHAḤ

Language includes among other things not only perception but also reflection on it; it is the bridge which joins together the 'outside' world of objects as well as the 'inside' world of our cognitions. In our unreflective moments we move effortlessly within this three-fold of language, knowledge and objects. When however we reflect and begin thematising the relationship between the three we encounter doubt and difficulty. In the Indian world-view the question has two aspects and was thus verbalized: 1. How is the relationship between word (*śabdaḥ*) and meaning (*arthaḥ*)? 2. What is the relationship between meaning and thing? The first question had historically two alternatives which were formulated as 1.1. Is the relationship between word and its meaning natural (*autpattika-*, *apauruṣeya-*) or 1.2. is it created (*pauruṣeya-*, *kṛtaka-*)? As regards question 2, we have again, two possible answers and so the question was 2.1 : Does the meaning of a word denote all things of a class? (*jātiḥ*); or 2.2. does it denote a particular thing (*vyaktiḥ*)? Language houses both meaning and thing and when in addition to this, meaningfulness enters the fold the house that language is becomes a home.

Our purpose here is to study the stand of the Mīmāṃsā. Its answer to 1.1 is that there is an originary relationship (*autpattikaḥ sambandhaḥ*) between word and meaning, and to 2.1 that a word denotes an *ākṛtiḥ*.

Kumārila answers these questions in the way the early Mīmāṃsā did, and except for the fact that his treatment is more systematic and detailed he has no new contribution to make. His terminology though not uniform is based on distinctions that betray the depth of his understanding of the problem. Thus we find him using *śabdaḥ*, *padam* and *vācakam* for word; *śabdārthaḥ*, *padārthaḥ* and *vācyam* for meaning and finally, *prameyaḥ*, *arthaḥ* and *vācyam* for thing[1]. Usually the contexts of the discussions are unambiguous and so the lack of a fixed terminology does not prove to be insurmountable.

Kumārila's discussion of the relation between word and meaning indirectly reminds us that it is not an academic discussion but that it concerns the very foundations of the Mīmāṃsā faith-experience since it is meant to set aside the non-authoritativeness of the Veda brought forward by the opponents.

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[1] Kumārila's argumentation in ŚV Pratyakṣasūtram 171—219 presupposes this distinction between word, meaning and object. There he is out to prove that the process of knowing does not change the object, and that it does not project on the outside world a 'form' which it does not have. For Kumārila, the cognitive process informs the knower of things as they are. His is a naive-realistic epistemology.

"The proof for our thesis [is] first: the vedic word is not false with regard to its message (*svārthe*) since it is independent of [any] proclaimer, just as the cognition of word and word-meaning [is independent of any creator of the relation between them]. [Secondly] the cognition that [is] produced by that [vedic source] is right because it arises from eternal sentences just like the cognition of a sentence; in this connection the reasons have already been put forward. After [the Bhāṣyakāraḥ] has taken his stand on the eternal (=constant) relations between words and meanings because of the above-mentioned argumentation to prove the self-validity [of the Veda and] to disprove its invalidity, [it is only then that] the opponent declares the falsity [of the Veda] because [its cognitions] arise from [words which have] no relation [with their meanings]."[2]

We see here the theological concern of Kumārila: the *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ* is necessary to uphold the authority of the Veda. The opponent, realizing this, aims his attacks at the very basis of such a theological stand. He rejects the Mīmāṃsā-thesis of the Veda's validity because vedic words like Svargaḥ, etc. are not connected with any real meaning or object. Hence the vedic sentences are at best a fantasy exercise. Though the opponent is making a general attack against the assumption of any natural relationship between word and meaning, the thrust is specific. By stating that words and meanings are not connected, since words, meanings and their corresponding objects are never found together, the adversary is, attacking in fact the Mīmāṃsā-thesis of Vedaprāmāṇyam. The Mīmāṃsaka cannot agree to the stand that language is a matter of convention. This would be throwing away the baby of the Veda with the bath of language. That this interpretation is correct is attested to by Kumārila himself.

"A relation [between word and meaning] exists and it is eternal: this has been stated by [the Sūtra-words] *autpattika-*, etc. with a view to refuting the falsity [of the Veda]. Both [these theses] have been denied by the adversaries[3].

The reality of 'relation' can impossibly be denied by anyone, since, in that case, one would have to deny so obvious a relationship like the one between father and son[4]. Hence given the reality of relation, we can say in general that the question of the relation between word and meaning is not futile from the very start. Word is the name which expresses, it is expressive of (*vācaka-*), an object, while meaning refers to what is expressed (*vācya-*). To

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[2] ŚV Saṃbandhākṣepavādaḥ 1—3:
svapakṣasādhanaṃ tāvan na mṛṣā vaidikaṃ vacaḥ /
svārthe vaktranapekṣatvāt padārthapadabuddhivat //
tatkṛtaḥ pratyayaḥ samyaṅ nityavākyodbhavatvataḥ /
vākyabuddhivad evātra pūrvoktāś cāpi hetavaḥ //
nityān śabdārthasaṃbandhān āśrityoktena hetunā /
svataḥ prāmāṇyasiddhyartham aprāmāṇye nirākṛte //

[3] Ibid. 4cd—5ab:
saṃbandho 'sti ca nityaś cety uktam autpattikādinā /
mithyātvasya nirāsārthaṃ tatparair neṣyate dvayam //

[4] Ibid. 9—10.

deny this would be to end the process of human discourse, since the denial itself would be a contradiction in terms (*virodhaś ca svavākyena*):

"To deny the relationship between *vācyavācaka-* is to deny ordinary language. For there is [first of all] a contradiction with regard to his own statement [and secondly] the opponent cannot express the meaning of his thesis with words which are not connected with their meanings."[5]

It is not logical to reject the denotative power of words and still to use human language. The phenomenon of human language is sufficient proof of the power of words. As we shall see a little later, if this potency were not inherent, then no amount of external help would make the words exercise such a function. The eyes are meant to see and not to hear; hence no external assistance would make the eyes hear. Similarly, the necessity of 'out-side' help to know the denotative power of words, does not negate it altogether[6].

As a matter of fact the denotative power is double-edged: word by its very nature points to a definite meaning and meaning by its very nature has a name. The word has an active part (*kartṛ or karaṇam*) whereas meaning is, so to speak, passive (*karma*)[7]. But activity and passivity are two aspects of the one and the same phenomenon that is known as the denotative process (*abhidhānakriyā*). Just as 'making' implies 'becoming', so, too, 'naming' implies a 'being named'. This means of course that language is not a one-sided process, a one-way traffic determined by man.

Since word and meaning are bound up with one another, one might be led to believe that the relationship is of the type called *avinābhāvaḥ* (=necessary connection of one thing with another, according to Monier Williams, Sanskrit Dictionary). This is not the case however. For the *avinābhāva*-relation must first be known if it is to be of use in reasoning that is inferential. But with regard to words, one must first come to know their denotative potency before one can ascertain that they lead to the cognition of their meanings.

"There the [inferential cognition] caused by the [invariable concomitance is given only] when the [invariable concomitance] has been [first] ascertained. In the case [of inferential reasoning] the cognition of [something] as leading to the cognition [of something else] does not arise before [the invariable concomitance has been ascertained]. Here [in the case of word and meaning] the cognition of invariable concomitance [cannot rise] before [the cognition of] the denotative [potency]."[8]

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[5] Ibid. 11—12ab:
vācyavācakasaṃbandhaniṣedhe lokabādhanam /
virodhaś ca svavākyena na hi saṃbandhavarjitaiḥ //
pratijñārthaṃ padaiḥ śakyaḥ pratipādayituṃ paraḥ /

[6] Ibid. 34—44.

[7] Ibid. 12.

[8] Ibid. 19—20ab:
nirūpite 'vinābhāve tatra tatkāritā hy asau /
gamakatvena pūrvaṃ ca tatra notpadyate matiḥ //
iha vācakatāyāḥ prāṅ nāvinābhāvitāmatiḥ /

A child comes to know the denotative function of words through and in the process of human discourse. Sometimes he is explicitly taught by the elders:

"This word denotes this thing."[9]

This last example might indicate that the denotative power ascribed to words could best be explained through human convention rather than by saying that it is part of human discourse which being beginninglessly eternal does not have a definite origin or an originator. The example of proper names appears to confirm this trend of reasoning. To this Kumārila replies:

"Just as it is through the process of human discourse alone that one knows that a word [can] lead to the knowledge [of its object] so, too, [it is through the process of human discourse alone that] one knows that the cognition of [its denotative] power is the means [of knowing that a word denotes such or such a thing][10].

Because of the process of human discourse we know that this word means this thing. Similarly it is the process of human discourse which makes us aware of the denotative power of words first and then only the thing denoted. It is due to this fact that we know that definite words are connected with definite meanings. Though it is true that in the process of human discourse it is the elders who point out to us the denotative power of words this does not mean that they are the cause of it. They are only an occasion to come to know the denotative power. True, in this there is dependence here on human beings. But a dependence like this is such that the essence of the relationship is never affected, at most only its effectiveness in some cases. Human beings could perhaps mislead some about the denotative power of certain words but without presupposing and making use of it they could not even mislead.

"One thing is [sometimes] said to be the most effective means for another. The dependence of the latter [on the former] for help does not destroy the latter's powers."[11]

Light is necessary for the eye to see but it does not deny the eye's capability to see. For, no amount of light would make a blind man see. In the same fashion the dependence on the cognition of the denotative power as a pre-condition for the functioning of the relation between word and meaning is no denial of the denotative power of the word[12].

"Thus here, too, the cognition of the relationship [between word and meaning] is known to be a help."[13]

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[9] Ibid. 22ab:
kvacid vācaka ity evaṃ vācyo 'yam iti cocyate /

[10] Ibid. 34:
yathaiva gamakaḥ śabdo vyavahārāt pratīyate /
tathaiva śaktivijñānaṃ tasyopāyo 'vagamyate //

[11] Ibid. 36:
yatsādhakatamatvena kasyacit kiñcid ucyate /
tasyānugrāhakāpekṣā na svaśaktivighātinī //

[12] Ibid. 38—44.

[13] Ibid. 42ab:
tathaivehāpi saṃbandhajñānam aṅgaṃ prasiddhitaḥ /

The instance of proper names is quite different, says Kumārila. Besides there is a latent power even in proper names as we shall see later in this chapter.

Till now Kumārila's argument has been about the cognition of the relationship between word and meaning, not about the relationship itself. He has granted that this cognition is dependent on human beings but that such dependence does not affect the relationship between word and meaning. He now proceeds to argue that this relationship does not originate in or through any person (*apauruṣeya-*) but it is self-explanatory.

The only other alternative to this is that of its dependence on convention — human or divine. If convention is taken as the origin of the relationship between word and meaning, then three possibilities present themselves: i) such a convention is created by every speaker, ii) it is made in every statement and iii) it has been created by one person alone. Kumārila rejects the second alternative with the lapidary remark that it has already been refuted by the Bhāṣyakāraḥ[14]. We shall not discuss the third alternative here because as there is no place for an absolute Creator in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, as we shall see when discussing the doctrine of Apauruṣeyatvam, it would be more convenient to postpone the exposition of his arguments to that chapter. Kumārila does discuss this in the chapter on Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāraḥ 43—117 but the topics that are treated, though connected among themselves, are not relevant to our discussion here.

The consequences of the thesis that the convention about word and meaning is created by every speaker, are insurmountable. The first question would be: is such a relationship the same for all or would it differ from speaker to speaker? If it were the same, how would one explain the element of uniformity in acceptance? That is, how would one communicate this to another in a situation where no single word would be commonly accepted by all. If the convention is different, there will be no end to, and no way out of, the confusion that would follow from it. Human discourse is possible only in a community based on commonality between speaker and hearer. When such a commonality is accepted, only then is human discourse possible. If however the situation does not presuppose the least bit of agreement on anything, then no convention can be created, much less can it be communicated. Every attempt to do so is bound to end miserably[15].

Besides, before accepting a convention made by someone, one has to accept his credibility and his competence in the matter. In a situation as the one explained above where the creator of the convention is not known this is not possible. Thus acceptance of the convention by the rest of the people remains unexplained[16].

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[14] ŚV Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāraḥ 42ab.

[15] Ibid. 12—39. In this passage the typical Kumārila becomes apparent with his inexorable logic. Every possibility is taken and all the impossibilities connected with it are demolished step by step. I have merely picked and chosen what seemed to me to be of importance.

[16] Ibid. 123—128ab.

Syllogistic reasoning, too, is of no help in proving that the relationship has to be created.

"One who [observing the inability] of sense-perception, etc. [in this matter] would like to prove a convention-maker for cow, etc. through inference [the reason for this being, that words are] related, like Ḍittha [is related], then this is the refutation for it: everyone [without exception] learns the relation of the word cow etc. from another [the reason being that he] uses words as I do."[17]

For Kumārila his syllogism would be more convincing, since it, unlike that of the opponent, is based on perceptive experience.

Could one say that there are a few words which are 'autpattika-lly' connected with their meanings and that with their help the relationships of all the other words have been constructed? It would be impossible to discern which are the words which by nature are connected with their meanings and which are not. Further, this difference is not noticeable in today's language[18].

Gestures, etc. too would not help in establishing relationships between words and meanings, because of the same difficulty which we encountered earlier, namely, the impossibility of establishing an agreement as to which gesture means what. In order to make gestures in the context of our task we need gestures that are agreed upon by and acceptable to all concerned. In order to establish such an agreement for gestures one would require some agreement which would make clear what it is all about, and what it is that one has set out to do. The problem in such a situation would always be this: the condition of possibility for a convention would be an earlier convention, unless of course one accepts that we have words which are naturally related to meanings[19] and this is the only way out of such an impasse. Words are naturally connected with their meanings and we learn these connections from our elders in the process of human discourse.

"In the case [of the process of human discourse] i) one observes through perception, word, elders and object, [and] ii) through syllogistic reasoning, that the hearer has grasped [the command]; and iii) through *arthāpattiḥ*, since there is no other possibility, he recognizes the power based on both [word and meaning]. [Thus] he comes to know the relationship [between word and meaning] through a triple means of knowledge."[20]

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[17] Ibid. 118—119:
pratyakṣādau upakṣīṇe yo 'numānena ḍitthavat /
saṃbandhitvān nityoktāraṃ gavādau api kalpayet //
gavādiśabdasaṃbandhaṃ sarvo 'nyasmāt prapadyate /
madvat tad vyavahāritvāt tasyaitat pratisādhanam //

[18] Ibid. 134cd—136ab.

[19] Ibid. 139cd—140ab.

[20] Ibid. 140cd—141:
śabdavṛddhābhidheyāṃś ca pratyakṣenātra paśyati //
śrotuś ca pratipannatvam anumānena ceṣṭayā /
anyathānupapatyā ca buddhyec chaktiṃ dvayāśritām /
arthāpatyāvabuddhyante saṃbandhaṃ tripramāṇakam //

The classic example of the Mīmāṃsaka-s for the process of human discourse is the context in which a command is issued; for commands and imperatives, are, according to their understanding of language, the highest form of language, as it were — especially the vedic commands. By translating word into work imperatives contribute towards the comprehensive understanding of 'meaning'. Indicative sentences, however, do not lead to action, that is, to a realization of the total meaning of a sentence. Because of a command there is (usually) visible execution. The child who does not know the relationships between words and meanings hears the commands, sees the actions that follow it and gradually through a process of combination and elimination begins to realise this word means this and that word means that. When sometimes he hears the command 'bring the cow' and sees that a cow is brought, and later on hears the command 'bring the horse' and sees that a horse is brought, he begins by and by to connect the object horse with the word horse and the object cow with the word cow. The most important factor in this explanation is that the process through which we all become familiar with human discourse is the same for one and all, with absolutely no exception. This implies that we all discover the relationships between words and meanings that are already present in the process of human discourse. The further implication of this is, that just as the process of human discourse is beginningless, so, too, is the relationship between word and meaning beginningless.

If, however, word is naturally connected with its meaning, why is it that certain people do not understand the meaning? Kumārila explains this with the example of those who see and those who are blind. When a white object is placed before them the former see it but not the latter. It is similarly the case with those who know the relation between a certain word and its meaning and those who do not know it[21].

How would a Mīmāmsaka (who because of his dogmatic determinations usually does not accept any reality which is not perceptible or whose existence is not demanded by perceptible experience) explain words which refer to transspatio-temporal meanings? How do we comprehend such meanings which refer to invisible effects (like the *adṛṣṭam*) of Dharma? For, we understand the meaning only when we have perceived the object. To such and similar questions I have not been able to find any direct answer in Kumārila's works. But we can guess the general direction in which he would have probably answered. What we call transcendent realities are really not transcendent in the Mīmāṃsā world-view. Transcendence implies in the western (christian) world-view (where the term is at home) a dimension that is inaccessible to spatio-temporal categories; a dimension where the language of subject-object is hopelessly inadequate and if it is used to speak of it, then one does so with the proviso that its use is asymptotic. At the basis of such thinking is the use of analogy or the language of myth, symbol and

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[21] Ibid. 34cd—41.

parable[22]. But this type of thinking and language is totally foreign to the Mīmāṃsā world-view where univocity of language is paraded as a paradigm for imitation and a principle for interpretation[23]. It is true that the Mīmāṃsaka does conclude by means of *arthāpattiḥ* to the existence of imperceptible and invisible realities like *apūrvam* and Svargaḥ and his understanding of it is per viam negationis et eminentiae. It is more of a carte blanche on which he can write whatever would correspond to and fulfil his innermost desires and urges than a concept in the real sense of the word[24].

Kumārila's explanation of the origin of the relationship between word and meaning gives rise to a number of problems to which we could now turn — at least very briefly.

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[22] For an introduction to the subject see THOMAS FAWCETT: The Symbolic Language of Religion. An Introductory Study. SCM Press 1970.

[23] The Mīmāṃsā rejects anything which cannot be explained in space-time categories. With an eye to ritual practice the Mīmāṃsā developed its principles of interpretation taking the *vidhiḥ* as the model sentence. The *vidhiḥ* aimed at the most accurate and faithful execution of the ritual; and so its language, (that is, the nature of the *vidhi*-language) was such as to restrict it to the pragmatic realm. And in this realm the model-language had to be verifiable/falsifiable, with a sort of one-to-one correspondence between what is said and what is meant. If the Mīmāṃsā had by some accident taken the *arthavāda*-sentence as its model, its whole frame of reference would have been different. The *arthavāda*-examples that are given in the Mīmāṃsā literature are, it seems to me, from the view-point of their purpose and their structure, to be understood in the direction of Ānandavardhana's *dhvaniḥ*. If the Mīmāṃsaka-s had kept in mind the primary meaning of Dharma (*yaḥ puruṣaṃ niḥśreyasena saṃyunakti*) and been less rigid with their ritualistic pre-occupation they would have drawn up a philosophy of language which would have taken cognizance of realms of human experience over and above the ritual-experience. They concentrated on the descriptive aspect of language and the price they paid for it was the complete neglect of the evocative power of language.

[24] One of the distinctive features of the Mīmāṃsā is its extensive use of the *arthāpatti-pramāṇam*. It applied it so rigorously that it did not hesitate to accept realities like Svargaḥ and *apūrvam*. On the one hand it showed their logic and on the other their honesty. But above all, it demonstrated their perceptiveness, in spite of their limited horizon. To give one example from G. JHĀ's Translation of the TV pp. 336f.: "So also the word 'Svarga' is found to signify either the starry regions, or the regions situated on the summit of Mount Meru, as described in the Arthavāda passages of the Veda, and in various Purāṇas and Itihāsas; e.g. we read in the Veda — "those men of pious deed who proceed to heaven, attain the regions of the star", and "they conquer those bright regions of the pious". As it may be taken to mean the summit of Mount Meru, as described in Purāṇas and Itihāsas. Or again, it may be taken as signifying pure pleasure, duly differentiated by means of negative and affirmative concomitances, which is experienced during a thousand years, and which is capable of being experienced in some other region, as is distinctly proved by the Apparent Inconsistency of the fact of such pleasure being free from all taint of such sources of pain, as hunger, thirst and the like; (all the pleasure in this world being always found to be mixed with more or less of pain). Though any such pleasure has never been experienced in this world, yet we can form an idea of it by abstracting it from the mixed experiences that we have; and thus the word 'Svarga' directly denoting such pleasure, can only indirectly indicate the genus 'Being' which cannot be admitted to form part of its direct denotation."

If words and meanings are naturally connected with one another, how does one explain the fact of proper names which undoubtedly have a beginning in time. It is only after Devadatta's birth that the name Devadatta was given to him. So it was with us all. Kumārila's answer is restricted to names which have a meaning, Devadatta, Kṛṣṇa, etc. These words, too, are eternal and are eternally connected with their meaning. He has therefore no problem in granting that it is through convention that these words are used to designate (not denote) definite individuals and that this convention is not beginningless because all this does not go against his teaching. Names which do not have a meaning but which are sheer designations are not discussed by Kumārila[25]. His main concern is about Saṃskṛta which is the language of the Veda and it is the Veda alone that can authoritatively talk about Dharma. This language has no beginning and is not a creation of men. That after this, there could arise man-made languages is a point that would in no way militate against his main thesis. Saṃskṛta is, on this understanding, the language of Dharma and the mother of languages. In his main contention Kumārila is at pains to deny that the language which gave rise to all other languages could arise through a convention. It is against the background of such an understanding of Saṃskṛta that his reasoning has to be projected. Later languages and later usages different from the vedic would cause no headaches to Kumārila. He was least concerned about them, Saṃskṛta being his preoccupation.

"Therefore the knowledge of the inhabitants of Āryāvarta is authoritative as regards words and their meanings concerning Dharma and its accessories, since they take their stand on the [vedic] scriptures[26].

Similar passages in the Tantravārttikam confirm our suspicions that Kumārila is concerned not so much about phenomenology of language but about theology of language (and more particularly of Saṃskṛta).

Other difficulties that arise for and from the thesis that words and meanings are naturally connected with each other are the following: i) How does this theory account for homonyms and synonyms, since both appear to contradict the basic presupposition of the Mīmāṃsā-doctrine of one word, one meaning? ii) How does Kumārila explain the plurality of languages?

With regard to homonyms and synonyms the basic attitude of the Mīmāṃsaka school is clear: because of the *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ* between a word and its meaning, it is reasonable to hold that one word is connected with one meaning.

"A denotative relation that [is] a definite potency of the expressed and the expressive, if [assumed to be] manifold by nature would disappear [altogether]; because of mutual implication between the meaning (*vācya-*) and the word (*vācaka-*) which are of one essence there is a determined

[25] ŚV Pratyakṣasūtram 223—224; Saṃbandhākṣepavādaḥ 43cd; Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāraḥ 119—120.

[26] TV 220, 3—4:
ataḥ śātrābhiyuktatvād āryāvartanivāsinām /
yā matiḥ saiva dharmāṅgaśabdārthatvapramā matā //

mutuality. If either of these were manifold the definite [relationship] would disappear. By means of *arthāpattiḥ* the potency of all beings is known; the meaning [of a word] being established by means of one potency, a plurality [of such potencies] is not obtained [through *arthāpattiḥ*]".[27]

Mostly, synonyms and homonyms are the result of the incapacity of certain men to pronounce the words properly:

"Hence even if [there be] multiple usage one alone [is] connected with the meaning. The others lead to the meaning by reminding (*upasthāpanena*) [one of the original expressions and are] born out of an incapacity [to pronounce the original word properly]."[28]

Both Kumārila and Śabara admit that there are some synonyms like *karaḥ*, *hastaḥ*, *pāṇiḥ* which are real synonyms, for which there is no explanation and which have to be accepted as a fact of our experience. That they are genuine is vouched for by the *smṛti*-s[29]. It is however explicitly stated that this is not the usual thing; if it were, the denotative power and its relation would no more function. Though Kumārila does not discuss homonyms, whatever has been said of synonyms is equally applicable to them.

Kumārila, as far as my knowledge goes, nowhere discusses the problem of the plurality of languages. However, we have to keep in mind that his primary concern was with Saṃskṛta alone, the language of the Veda, and the ritual which had to be shown to be beginningless. Since he was not busy with phenomenology of religion but with theology of the Saṃskṛta language he would not care to speak about the other languages which, according to his premises, having nothing to say about Dharma, could not be beginningless. If pressed to account for the origin of the other languages he might have perhaps made use of his contention with regard to words misused or mispronounced by the Mlecchas as a paradigm for the formation of later languages. The basic incapacity of certain sections of the people to pronounce properly would have led them gradually to evolve (on the basis of their mispronunciations) a different language altogether[30].

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[27] Ibid. 277, 17—22:
vācyavācakasāmarthyaniyamo yo 'bhidhāgataḥ |
saṃbandhas tadanekatve svarūpāt so 'pi hīyate ||
ekātmayor eva hi vācyavācakayor anyonyākṣepāt parasparaniyamaḥ saṃbhavaty anyatarasyāpi tv anekatve satī vyabhicārān niyamahāniḥ. kiṃ ca —
sāmarthyaṃ sarvabhāvānām arthāpattyāvagamyate |
ekasāmarthyasiddhye 'rthe nānekaṃ tac ca labhyate ||

[28] Ibid. 278, 15—16:
tenānekaprayoge 'pi kaścid evārthasaṃgataḥ |
tadupasthāpanenānye bodhakās tad aśaktijāḥ ||

[29] Ibid. 278, 7—12.

[30] Ibid. 278, 13—14.

CHAPTER 12 ĀKṚTIVĀDAḤ

Kumārila has argued till now that a word is eternal and that it has an originary relationship to its meaning. The next step is to examine the term of reference of meaning, that is, the exact denotation of a word: is it a universal referring to one and all the individuals that have been, are and will be in that class, or does it refer merely and solely to a particular? Does the meaning refer to the 'meaning' in one's head, as it were, or is it the particular thing outside? The Mīmāṃsā answer has consistently been that the denotation of a word is the *ākṛtiḥ*, not the vyaktiḥ. In the following pages our discussion will centre around two major themes: i) Kumārila's understanding of the term *ākṛtih* and ii) his reasons for holding that *ākṛtiḥ* and not *vyaktiḥ* is the denotation of a word. These themes will not be discussed separately one after the other; their nature is such that they will have to be treated of together in an integrated manner rather than in compartments. The second aspect of *ākṛtiḥ* (as put forward above) is that of a common concept. Traditionally this has been referred to as the *jātiḥ*.

Right at the outset Kumārila is honest enough to confess the motivation behind the purpose of this chapter:

"Having realised that if the meaning [of a word] were something other than the *ākṛtiḥ*, the relation [between word and meaning] and its eternality could not be established, [what] is being stated here [is that] the [*ākṛtiḥ*] is the denotation [of a word]."[1]

Kumārila admits firstly that he must establish a relation and a permanent one at that between word and meaning, and secondly that this aim cannot be achieved without proving that *ākṛtiḥ* is the denotation of a word. Such a procedure is understandable in a theological but not in a philosophical enterprise. Theological philosophy i) begins with assumptions based on an experience which is beyond the ken of reason and logic, and ii) proceeds on the basis of a philosophical methodology.

Kumārila explains what he means by *ākṛtiḥ* thus:

"[It is] the *jātiḥ* [that] they call *ākṛtiḥ* [namely that] through which an individual [of a class] is form-ed. And this commonality is the source of a unified cognition of [all] individuals [of a class]. And this source, whatever it may be, is the common object (=denotation) of a word."[2]

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[1] ŚV Ākṛtivādaḥ 1:

ākṛtivyatirikte 'rthe saṃbandho nityatāsya ca /
na siddhyetām iti jñātvā tad vācyatvam ihocyate //

[2] Ibid. 3—4ab:

jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā /
sāmānyaṃ tac ca piṇḍānām ekabuddhinibandhanam //
tan nimittaṃ ca yat kiñcit sāmānyaṃ śabdagocaram /

Ākṛtiḥ then is for Kumārila a commonality and this commonality has two aspects: the common denotation of a word and the common concept. In the above quotation we find two functions of *ākṛtiḥ* in its denotative aspect: first, that through which an individual of a class is formed, and second, the common denotation. The first is the ontic function and is really the origin and cause of the second, which is, the epistemological function. When I notice a cow I first perceive the common element through which that particular cow has been formed. The perception of the common element (*ākṛtiḥ*) is based on the epistemological function while the 'formation' is dependent on the ontic[3].

More precisely however *jātiḥ* is not *piṇḍānām ekabuddhinibandhanaṃ sāmānyam: jātiḥ* is *piṇḍānām ekabuddhhiḥ* 'the unified cognition of the individuals [of a class]: And *ākṛtiḥ* is *piṇḍānām ekabuddhinibandhanaṃ* 'the commonality [that is] the cause of the unified cognition of the individuals [of a class]'. Many commentators have unreflectingly accepted Kumārila's statement *jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur* at its face-value, overlooking the fact that by making this identification he was giving a special nuance of his own to the word *jātiḥ*. What follows, I hope, will substantiate this[4].

Our knowledge of objects (*sarvavastuṣu buddhiś ca*) has two functions: one centrifugal (*vyāvṛttiḥ*) and the other centripetal (*anugamaḥ*) and, if knowledge of objects is somehow connected with objects themselves, these two functions must have some correspondence in the objects, too. The centrifugal function would then account for the particularity of an object and the centripetal for its universality[5]. However one may conceive of the universal and the particular, there is one point which, according to Kumārila, no one can deny. Whatever it is in an object that produces a unified cognition, it cannot be the particular qua particular since by definition it is not amenable to it[6]. On the other hand there is not a single school that would deny the fact of a unified cognition except by admitting the existence of an *ākṛtiḥ* in the particulars.

"Hence *jātiḥ* has to be agreed upon [as] different from the individual potencies and [as] pervading individually and collectively [the particulars]. Therefore for us there is a natural property of individuals [which] is the

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[3] The step from the experience of the *ākṛtiḥ* to the concept is spontaneous, almost 'automatic'. Hence there is no difficulty in admitting that *ākṛtiḥ* is *jātiḥ*, the more so since one cannot speak of the *ākṛtiḥ* without using a *jāti*-expression. But it must be kept in mind that strictly speaking the *ākṛtiḥ* refers to the ontic and *jātiḥ* to the epistemic element of our knowing.

[4] See Note 3. *jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur*, I feel, is more of a captatio benevolentiae than a precise phrase. The *sāmānyam* that is in the individuals of a class and the *sāmānyam* that a concept expresses are not one and the same. For one thing the former exists and is perceptible in the individuals only and for another, the latter is the only vehicle through which the *ākṛtiḥ* can reach the world of expression.

[5] SV Ākṛtivādaḥ 5.

[6] Ibid. 4.

object of a unified cognition. It may be called *sāmānyam*, *ākṛtiḥ*, *jātiḥ or śaktiḥ*."[7]

Not every commonality is for Kumārila a *jātiḥ* or an *ākṛtiḥ*. We have, for example, innumerable commonalities which are products of the process of abstraction. We have the capacity to conceptualize and to compare anything with anything. We can conceptualize in different ways. One instance of this is the well-known arbor porphyriana which begins with being as common to all, and descends by introducing at every step a differentiating element till we come to particular individuals of different species. In reality we have, of course, just these particular individuals belonging to different species: men, trees, cats, fish, etc. Our tendency to bring together different species under an ever comprehensive genus produces commonalities. Apart from the pragmatic value of such an enterprise, it simplifies our speculation and proposes possibilities of conceptualization which have great influence in our lives. Philosophy, for instance, is possible thanks to our capacity to conceptualize Being, be-ing and becoming. Our lives, unlike our philosophies, are not made up of beings or substances or things. These are conceptualizations, that is, mere concepts and constructs, perhaps cum fundamento in re. Kumārila would not acknowledge these as *ākṛti*-s because they do not form (*akryate*) the individuals they refer to. The commonality cow refers to the individual cows which are 'form-ed' by this commonality, and that is why it is accepted as an *ākṛtiḥ*. But commonalities like being or substance do not 'form' individual beings and substances since they are abstractions. The particular individuals we meet with can be named substances, things and beings in accordance with a pragmatic purpose but in the process of our knowing we know them (in contradistinction to 'we know of them') as man or cow or tree. We have commonalities like being, substance and thing and we have commonalities like man or cow or tree. The first are mere concepts, the second are real *ākṛti*-s. It is the *ākṛti*-s which help us in 'conceiving' the concepts. With the help of these concepts we can go on constructing ever more abstract concepts; the *ākṛtiḥ* is bound up with, and concretized in, the individuals; *piṇḍeṣv eva ca sāmānyam*[8]. The construct-character of the former is evidenced by the phenomenon that verbally (= nominally) at least we can construct a commonality with two or more commonalities. In the case of the *ākṛtiḥ* however no such process is even thinkable[9].

Pūrvapakṣaḥ: "Is there not even in diversity a commonality with reference to being, etc. (*sattādau*)? [For] without another commonality how is such a cognition possible?" Uttarapakṣaḥ: "This argument that is put

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[7] Ibid. 17—18:

bhinnā viśeṣaśaktibhyaḥ sarvatrānugatāpi ca /
pratyekaṃ samavetā ca tasmāj jātir apīṣyatām //
tenātmadharmo bhedānām ekadhīviṣayo 'sti naḥ /
sāmānyam ākṛtir jātiḥ śaktir vā so 'bhidhīyatām //

[8] Ibid. 24a.

[9] TV 295, 1—24.

forward by you is similar to the argument of the forest (in the Vanavāda-section of the ŚV). For, the idea of *gotvādi* is not mistaken [though] the idea of *vanam*, etc. is mistaken, because prior to the [utterances of the] word there is [in the case of *sattādi*] no unified cognition as in the case of cow, etc. Some explain that here too [in the case of *sattādi*] there is a common property [called] *vastutvam*. The answer to this is that in the case of such an assumption there would be an endless number of commonalities. For the idea of commonality it is ever there between it [*vastutvam*] and the other [commonalities that have been constructed]. There would be the idea that there is a commonality among the particulars too as in the case of sattā, etc. because they too, are things. Thus commonality is impossible [in the case of *sattā*, etc.]. Therefore in the case of *sattā*, etc. the word *sāmānyam* is bound up with this application of the one to the many or to the production of a unified cognition."[10]

Granted the existence of an *ākṛtiḥ*, how is it related to the *vyaktiḥ* (= the concrete particular)? The one and the same object embodies the dual function of centrifugality concretized in a particular and that of centripetality as seen in a commonality. It is not possible for pure particularity or for universality as such either to exist or to be known. Kumārila says:

"There is an eternally mutual dependence between the universal and the particular. For the universal is of the particulars and they of the [universal]. A universal without particulars does not exist, [it would be] like the horns of a hare. And the particulars without the universal [would be] like them, too."[11]

First of all, universals as such and particulars as such do not, indeed cannot exist. That leads to the conclusion that Kumārila's *ākṛtiḥ* is fundamentally different from that of the Vaiśeṣikam. The difference is to be sought in the following. An *ākṛtiḥ* that is concretized in the particular, cannot be for

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[10] ŚV Ākṛtivādaḥ 19—24:

nanu bhinne 'pi sattādau sāmānyam iti jāyate /
buddhir vināpi sāmānyād anyasmāt sā katham bhavet //
vanopanyāsatulyo 'yam upanyāsaḥ kṛtas tvayā /
bhrāntitvena hi naitasyā bhrāntir gotvādidhīr api //
śabdāt pūrvaṃ hi sarveṣu gavādav iva naikadhīḥ /
vastutvaṃ cātra sāmānyaṃ dharmaṃ kecit pracakṣate //
evaṃ tu kalpyamāne syāt sāmānyānām anantatā /
punas tena sahānyeṣu sāmānyamatir asti hi //
viśeṣeṣv api vastutvāt sāmānyam iti dhīr bhavet /
sattādiṣv iva tenaitat sāmānyaṃ nopapadyate //
tasmād ekasya bhinneṣu yā vṛttis tan nibandhanaḥ /
sāmānyaśabdaḥ sattādav ekadhīkaraṇena vā //

[11] Ibid. 8—10:

mukhyayoś cāpy adṛṣṭatvān nopacāreṇa kalpanā /
bāhyārthaviṣayatvaṃ ca buddhīnāṃ pratipāditam //
anyonyāpekṣitā nityaṃ syāt sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ /
viśeṣāṇāṃ ca sāmānyaṃ te ca tasya bhavanti hi //
nirviśeṣaṃ na sāmānyaṃ bhavet śaśaviṣāṇavat /
sāmānyarahitatvāc ca viśeṣās tadvad eva hi //

Kumārila an independent entity, as it is taught in the Vaiśeṣika-system. In Kumārila's thought an *ākṛtiḥ* is to be found only in concrete individuals[12].

Secondly, particularity as such without an *ākṛtiḥ* is impossible both ontically and epistemologically as well. For though our perception is always of a concretized particular, it presupposes an *ākṛtiḥ* through which and in which the particular is cognized.

"Therefore the difference between an individual and an universal is not absolute."[13]

The Buddhist objection to this would be: if the universal is not totally different from the individual then why postulate a universal at all? One could assume that the individual has the capacity to produce a unified cognition. To this Kumārila's answer is typical:

"Is this capacity knowable or not knowable: one [in all] or different [in each individual]? If it is one and knowable then it is indeed the universal under another name. If the capacity is not known, then the cognition is without any qualification because no object can be accepted as merely existing. The individuals [as such] are not cognized through unified cognitions because they are different from one another [and because of this no unified cognition is possible at all]. And their capability is not seen because of the lack of an object. If the capabilities [in the individuals] are different, then no unified cognition is possible. If the capability were non-different from the individual, [then] the cognition would be like that, [that is, non-different from the individual]. Hence *jātiḥ* has to be accepted [as] different from the individual capabilities and [as] pervading individually and collectively [the particulars]. Therefore for us there is a natural property of individuals [which] is the object of an unified cognition. It may be called *sāmānyam, ākṛtiḥ, jātiḥ or śaktiḥ.*"[14]

The universal is to be found in the concrete individuals, though it is not completely different (*atyantabheda-*) from them, it is nevertheless not fully identical with them either. The universal is a natural property (*ātmadhar-*

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[12] Ibid. 24a.

[13] Ibid. 11cd:

tena nātyantabhedo 'pi syāt sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ //

[14] Ibid. 13—18:

grāhyā kiṃ vāpy asaṃbodhā bhinnaikā vā tathaiva ca /
gṛhyate yadi saikā ca jātir evānyaśabdikā //
bhaven nirviṣayā buddhir yadi śaktir na gṛhyate /
na hi sadbhāvamātreṇa viṣayaḥ kaścid iṣyate //
parasparavibhinnatvād viśeṣā naikabuddhibhiḥ /
gṛhyante viṣayāsattvāt chaktiś caiṣāṃ na vidyate /
bhinnatve vāpi śaktīnām ekabuddhir na labhyate /
viśeṣaśaktyabhede ca tāvan mātramatir bhavet //
bhinnā viśeṣaśaktibhyaḥ sarvatrānugatāpi ca /
pratyekaṃ samavetā ca tasmāj jātir apīṣyatām //
tenātmadharmo bhedānām ekadhīviṣayo 'sti naḥ /
sāmānyam ākṛtir jātiḥ śaktir vā so 'bhidhīyatām //

maḥ). From this we can conclude that the relation of an universal to the particular is that of qualifier-qualified (*dharmadharmiṇoḥ saṃbandhaḥ*). As a matter of fact Kumārila stipulates this in another place. He does not accept the category *samavāyaḥ* (=inherence) through which the Vaiśeṣikam, for example, explained the relation between the universal and the particular. Hence he needs to explain this in another manner. When discussing his rejection of inherence, he states that the relation between a universal and a particular is that of a qualifier-qualified[15].

With the help of this explanation of qualifier-qualified, Kumārila is in a position to account for the phenomenon that the universal exists in many individuals and the many individuals in one universal.

"When the particular is cognized as non-different from the universal then the [universal] can exist in many (*anekavṛttitā*). The non-different existence [is possible] because the [universal] has the same existence as the particular (*viśeṣātmaikabhāvataḥ*). In this manner the idea of difference and non-difference [of the one and the same thing] is to be rejected. Through one [we may have] unity of nature (*ātmanaikatvam*) and through another diversity. But one who speaks of the manifold of the universal must be shown that this is due to the particular and that unity of objects is due to the universal."[16]

Keeping in mind that Kumārila rejects the existence of a universal as such or a particular as such it becomes clear that for him a particular is an individualized universal and a universal is a generalized particular. Our imprecise use of language might create misconception in this regard. Because, the concrete individual is neither a pure particular nor mere commonness. We have both in one being. Depending then on our accent we can abstract from either and then talk of either the common or the particular element.

"Just as we can fix our gaze on any one colour in a multicoloured picture because it is multi-coloured, so, too, is our ascertainment of difference and non-difference [in the case of the universal and the particular]... If the universal is perceived as non-different from the concrete individuals then the reality [which is perceived] appears to be merely particular. And because of this appearance [of the particular] the universal [not showing its universality lies latent and] remains accommodating to the nature (*tadbhāvānuguṇasaṃsthitam*) of the [particular]. Though existing, the [universal] appears to us as not existing, because its form is not perceived. When one perceives the

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[15] ŚV Pratyakṣa. 147—150.

[16] ŚV Ākṛtivādaḥ 54cd—57ab:
sāmānyānanyavijñāte viśeṣe naikavṛttitā //
sāmānyānanyavṛttitvaṃ viśeṣātmaikabhāvataḥ /
evaṃ ca parihartavyā bhinnābhinnatvakalpanā //
kenacid dhyātmanaikatvaṃ nānātvaṃ časya kenacit /
sāmānyasya tu yo bhedaṃ brūte tasya viśeṣataḥ //
darśayitvābhyupetavyam viśeṣaikyaṃ ca jātitaḥ /

individuals also as non-different from the universal, then one perceives merely the universal."[17]

In the light of the above explanations many of Kumārila's statements on *ākṛtiḥ* begin to make sense. He does not accept, for example, any *ākṛtiḥ* for being, etc. With that he means that there is no *ākṛtiḥ* for an *ākṛtiḥ*. This is of a piece with his understanding of *ākṛtiḥ*. According to him an *ākṛtiḥ* exists only in the concrete individuals in which and through which it is perceived. The *ākṛtiḥ* man is to be found only in individual men and is perceived in and through them. This is the reason, too, why there can be no *ākṛtiḥ* for being, etc. because there are no concrete individual beings in which and through which the *ākṛtiḥ* being could be perceived. If one were to insist on an *ākṛtiḥ* for an *ākṛtiḥ*, this word-game would have no end. Similarly, Kumārila does not accept an *ākṛtiḥ* for colour because we do not have concrete particulars in which and through which it could be perceived. We always have this or that colour — and for this there is an *ākṛtiḥ*. We can now also understand why Kumārila rejects the category *viśeṣaḥ*[18]. Having regard to his way of looking at an *ākṛtiḥ* there can be no particularity apart from universality, just as the universality itself is not different from the concrete individual. Because of his rejection also of the category inherence (*samavāyaḥ*) Kumārila could not accept the category particularity. Unlike in the Vaiśeṣikam where the universal leads an independent existence and hence is in need of the category inherence in order to coexist with the particular, the *ākṛtiḥ* in Kumārila's system is not independent of the concrete individuals; hence there is no need of inherence[19].

In the Tantravārttikam there is a rather lengthy and complex discussion about the niceties of the various possible positions in the matter of *ākṛtiḥ* and *vyaktiḥ*. The tenth Adhikaraṇam (Sūtra-s 30—35) of the third Pādaḥ of the first Adhyāyaḥ which treats of *ākṛtiḥ* and *vyaktiḥ* is a doublette in two senses: i) Sūtram 30 is explained as having two sections: one about whether there is a difference between the words of the Veda and those of everyday language, and the other about the denotation of words. ii) Sūtra-s 30—33 have two expositions though Sūtram 32 is omitted in both. Originally Sūtram 30 must have discussed the difference or otherwise between vedic and non-

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[17] Ibid. 57cd—58ab; 59cd—62ab:
yathā kalmāṣavarṇasya yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanigrahaḥ //
citratvād vastuno py evaṃ bhedābhedāvadhāraṇam /
bhedebhyo 'nanyarūpeṇa sāmānyaṃ gṛhyate yadā //
tadā viśeṣamātreṇa vastu pratyavabhāsate /
tadudbhūtyā ca sāmānyaṃ tadbhāvānuguṇaṃ sthitam //
sad apy agrāhyarūpatvād asadvat pratibhāti naḥ /
viśeṣān api sāmānyād yadā bhedena buddhyate //
tadā sāmānyamātratvam evam eva pratīyate /

[18] E. FRAUWALLNER: Geschichte II, 153.

[19] The category 'inherence' explains how the universal and the particular can be present in one individual. If one rejects inherence, there is no way of upholding particularity; one cannot however give up the universal since it is only by means of it that one can explain similarity among individuals.

vedic words and with that concluded the whole Adhikaraṇam as well as the Pādaḥ. The forced manner in which the problem of the denotation of a word is introduced into Sūtram 30 is both slovenly and suspect. This suspicion is further strengthened by the two sets of expositions of the whole Adhikaraṇam.

Perhaps one could explain this situation thus: when the topic of word-denotation was introduced into the Mīmāṃsā and more specifically in 1.3.30 at least two explanations vied with one another to get official recognition from and entry into the Bhāṣyam. My own guess is that the second explanation being simple and short and taking little or no cognisance of the problem of word-denotation from the speculative and philosophical standpoint is an older formulation of the problematic. Its one and only concern is the interpretation of the ritual-injunctions. As a matter of fact, Kumārila appears to be embarrassed by the naive manner of reasoning and so he hastens to add a third short but speculative Siddhāntaḥ immediately after this. The Pūrvapakṣa-s that follow this final Siddhāntaḥ are on quite a different level.

Here we are concerned with the different shades of explanations about the understanding of and the relationship between *ākṛtiḥ* and *vyaktiḥ* in Kumārila's writings, and not so much with locating the time, place and person connected with this or that shade of interpretation. Not that this is either unimportant or uninteresting. But it is only when one has located the exact shade of meaning, that one will be in a position to initiate the work of tracing it back to its source.

In the first exposition there is no explanation of Śabara's definition of *ākṛtiḥ: dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ sāmānyamātram ākṛtiḥ.* Only illustrations are given for the different types of *dravyam, guṇaḥ* and *karma* though the comment on *mātram* throws some light on the definitions:

"Hence *mātram* has been used with the intention [of asserting that] whatever commonality is prior to the individual substance, properties and *guṇa*-s, just all that is *ākṛtiḥ.*"[20]

This is best understood in the light of the definition of *vyaktiḥ* in the same passage:

asādhāraṇaviśeṣā vyaktiḥ[21]

The first explanation as a *karmadhārayaḥ* (*viśeṣā ye te 'sādhāraṇāḥ*) is rejected on two grounds: first, the *vyaktiḥ* cannot be identified with the *viśeṣāḥ* since they are found in others too but *vyaktiḥ* is not repeatable: second, the singular *vyaktiḥ* and the plural *viśeṣāḥ* are grammatically incompatible[22].

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[20] TV 296, 5—6:
ataś ca dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ yāvat kiñcit prāg vyaktibhyaḥ sāmānyaṃ tat sarvam ākṛtir evetyabhipretya mātraśabdaḥ prayuktaḥ.

[21] Ibid. 296, 7.

[22] Ibid. 296, 7—17.

The second explanation takes the compound to be a *bahuvrīhiḥ*:

tasmād asādhāraṇā viśeṣā yasyāṃ sā vyaktir ity evaṃ vyākhyeyam. Therefore it must be explained this way: *vyaktiḥ* is that which has uncommon properties."[23]

This is explained in detail:

"...we do not mean that each Individual is to have any property peculiar to itself exclusively, all that we mean is that certain characteristics, two or three together, are always recognized as being conjointly peculiar to a certain object, even when each of them singly may be found to belong to other objects as well. That is to say, even though certain properties may have been found to exist separately in many objects, yet taken together they are found only in a certain individual: and such an individual may be said to be specifically characterized by these peculiarities (collectively). And as a matter of fact we find that certain properties that have been perceived in a certain object are never found to exist, exactly in the same proportions, in any other object, and the particular combination of properties that, never having been perceived elsewhere, is perceived in any object, comes to be recognised as its specific peculiarity. And thus though there be an endless number of individuals yet that does not make it necessary to assume specific characteristics. Thus then, the necessary specifying peculiarity always being found, by only slight modifications, among a definite number of properties, all lesser (= less extensive) classes also come to be recognised as individuals under the higher (= more extensive) ones. And it is only the particular combinations of properties that come to be known by the name of 'Viśeṣā' (Specific Peculiarity)."[24]

According to this explanation vyaktitvaṃ consists in the particular combination of substance, properties and *guṇa*-s. This presupposes a specific combination of substance, properties and *guṇa*-s, and this is called *ākṛtiḥ*. Hence the *ākṛtiḥ* cow is to be found only in individual cows, not in individual horses, since the specific combination of substance, properties and *guṇa*-s that we call the *ākṛtiḥ* cow is present in the former but not in the latter. Śabara's *dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ sāmānyamātram ākṛtiḥ* refers to that element in a cow which makes it a cow and not a horse. It is this ontic factor that has an epistemological function because due to it we know, when we perceive a cow, that it is a cow and not a horse. However the *ākṛtiḥ* cow is present in any and every individual cow not as a complete independent entity, but as a concretized individual. Our perception of a concretized individual is not capable of seeing either the individualisation as such or the common element as such. We always perceive a concretized, individualized *ākṛtiḥ*.

The Siddhāntaḥ that sets out to prove that *ākṛtiḥ* is the *śabdārthaḥ* begins with the only two possibilities of interpretation where passages like *śyenacitaṃ cinvīta* are considered:

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[23] Ibid. 296, 17—18.

[24] G. JHĀ's Translation (pp. 332—333) of TV 296, 20—29.

"For there could be only two meanings for the sentence (*śyenacitaṃ cinvīta*): one should construct by building [either] an individual *śyena* [bird] or an *ākṛtiḥ* [of it][25].

The first is impossible since building a live bird out of bricks is out of the question. Further to interpret the compound *śyenacitam* as *śyenena citam* would go against Pāṇini III, 2, 12. Similarly the second alternative, too, is ruled out:

"In the same manner (1) it is equally impossible to build up the class '*śyena*' with bricks and mortar, as it is created by God alone: (2) such an interpretation would necessitate the assumption of some purpose for this making of the Class: (3) and also the taking of the word '*cinvīta*' in a sense not its own: and (4) this would also involve breach of the grammatical rule quoted above. Hence the passage cannot be taken even to mean that one should make the Class 'śyena'"[26].

The only possible way out is to interpret the compound *śyenacitam* as: *śyena iva citam agnisthalaṃ cayanena nirvartayed iti vākyārthaḥ.* "The meaning of the sentence is: one should construct and build an altar (= *agnisthalam*) like a *śyena*-bird."[27]

The reasoning supporting statements like the above is a concrete specimen of the world-view in which its adherents lived.

"In this case it is impossible for the altar to be made similar to any particular *śyena*-bird, and we cannot make it similar to all the individual birds, specially as it is absolutely impossible to ascertain the similitude of such birds as have not yet been born, or of those that are yet to be born, and it is only possible to make an altar having a shape that is common to the whole Class '*śyena*'. Hence we conclude that the Class alone can be held to be denoted by the word."[28]

Clearly Kumārila is either dissatisfied or even embarrassed by this kind of reasoning. He quickly brings in arguments first in support of the *ākṛti*-doctrine and then against the *vyakti*-theory that display an acumen that is both scholarly and scholastic. But the latter's understanding of *ākṛtiḥ* is wide apart from the former's. Though the thinking in this Siddhāntaḥ is close to Śabara's, one must admit that its stress on *sādṛśyam* is a step backwards in the Mīmāṃsā understanding of *ākṛtiḥ*. This will become obvious by contrast with the arguments Kumārila adds in this place.

All the three arguments that follow presuppose a major Mīmāṃsā-doctrine namely, the doctrine of *vṛddhavyavahāraḥ* through which we learn the meaning and use of words from the perceptive experience of their respective objects aided by *anumānam* and *arthāpattiḥ*[29]. From the fact of

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25 TV 313, 26—27:
atra hi śyenavyaktiṃ cayanena kuryād ākṛtiṃ veti vākyārthau syātām.

26 G. JHĀ's Translation (p. 361) of the TV 313, 29—314, 2.

27 TV 314, 2—3.

28 G. JHĀ's Translation (p. 361) of the TV 314, 3—5.

29 ŚV Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāraḥ 140ab—141.

hearing the same set of words and seeing the same set of actions, one infers that the one who executes the commands has understood the meaning of these words and with the help of *arthāpattiḥ* concludes that this word means this thing. In this process what should not be lost sight of (in the context of our discussion) is that word-meaning-thing are shown to be related to each other.

When one utters the word cow, one first comes to know the *ākṛtiḥ* before one cognizes the individual cows. If, for instance, the *ākṛtiḥ* cow is not known, the individual cows will not be cognized either. The word therefore denotes the *ākṛtiḥ*[30].

If the meaning of a word were the *vyaktiḥ*, then the cognition produced by a word would be a mixture of the various cows that have been perceived. But our experience reveals that the cognition we have of a cow is a unified cognition (*ekākārā buddiḥ*). Hence the word cow cannot denote the individual cows of our previous perceptions but the *ākṛtiḥ* cow which is responsible for the unified cognition cow.

Finally when one obeys the order to bring a cow, one brings any cow and not one particular cow, the reason is that, *ākṛtiḥ* being the meaning of the word, any cow that is brought is a particularized version of the *ākṛtiḥ* cow. This would not be the case, if the word denoted an individual cow[31].

If the thesis of the *vyaktiḥ* as the *śabdārthaḥ* is taken seriously then it could mean three different things, either all the *vyakti*-s are denoted individually, or all together, or only one *vyaktiḥ* is denoted. A word cannot denote all the *vyakti*-s individually for several reasons. One would have to postulate that the word has as many potencies as individuals in order to denote them individually. The relationship between word and meaning would be impermanent. Practical life would be impossible, since the denotation of the word would not be clear due to the impossibility of understanding its full significance. Except for the plural the other uses of the singular and the dual would be impossible in the case of a word. Since the word cow would denote all cows individually, expressions like *gauḥ śuklaḥ* would be impossible. Finally the realization of the vedic commands *paśunā yajeta* would become impossible since all animals would have to be slaughtered[32]. In similar fashion though in details a bit differently Kumārila disposes of the other two possibilities.

In the question-and-answer sequel the following points emerge: The *vyakti*-theory would imply that no idea of another cow would be possible and that hence the same word could not be used of other cows: To use the same word for two or more cows would mean a certain commonality among them. If this were denied, then it would follow that due to lack of a definite commonality the word cow could also be applicable to a horse: Mere usage is not enough to explain the denotation of a word, for otherwise the word cow

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30 TV 314, 25—27.
31 Ibid. 314, 29—315, 3.
32 Ibid. 315, 5—10.

could not be applied to a new-born cow which has never been called a cow. Further there is no need to postulate that both *ākṛtiḥ* and *vyaktiḥ* are denoted by a word, since it is indefensible to admit more than one denotation and since there is no need for such a postulate, as the *vyaktiḥ* can be known through the *ākṛtiḥ*. Again we come to the same conclusion through invariable concomitance. A person who is familiar with the *ākṛtiḥ* cow, recognizes an individual cow, even if the word cow is not uttered. On the other hand though one may hear the word cow, if one has not known the *ākṛtiḥ* cow one will not cognize an individual cow either. Still further, the theory that would suggest that the *ākṛtiḥ* qualified by the *vyaktiḥ* is what is denoted by the word is disqualified on the grounds similar to the previous ones, that is, one would have to assume innumerable potencies in each word and again, one could not apply a word qualified by one individual to another individual. One could grant that the intention of the speaker would determine whether he is using a word for an *ākṛtiḥ* or an individual but this does not militate against the *ākṛti*-theory. On the contrary, since there is a definite denotation, the speaker's wish to produce unambiguous expressions is at all possible. The example of the word *daṇḍī* only proves that unless one has first known the qualifier/qualification one will not cognize the qualified. Apart from other differences between the instance *daṇḍī* and an *ākṛtiḥ*, there is not in an *ākṛtiḥ* anything like *daṇḍaḥ* forming a part of *daṇḍī*[33]. The final conclusion is: "Therefore *ākṛtiḥ* alone is the *śabdārthaḥ*."[34]

1) Since it has been asserted that *ākṛtiḥ* is perceived in the individuals one might be misled into thinking that *ākṛtiḥ* is the external shape (*saṃsthānam*) that is common to any species. But the external shape is destroyed and is inapplicable to realities like light, water, air and ether, and in entities like space, time *ātmā* and *manaḥ* the question of their shape does not arise at all. But *ākṛtiḥ* is applicable to all realities whether material or incorporeal. This is so because it is the specific combination of a substance with its properties and actions prior to its individualized combination. Such combination is naturally applicable to each and every individual that has been formed (*ākriyate*) in a specific manner[35].

2) Concepts like 'being-hood' (*sattā*) and 'thing-ness' (*vastutvam*) cannot form part of the denotation of a word since they are not commonalities (*sāmānyam*) which form (*ākriyate*) the concrete individual. They are abstract concepts with, as the European school-men would say, a grounding in reality (cum fundamento in re). The concept of being is an abstraction of the second of the six kinds of states of existence (*bhāvavikāraḥ*)[30] and hence its functioning is of a different type altogether (*dharmāntaratvavṛttiḥ*). But the concept of vastutvam belongs to the order of essence and though it also is an

[33] Ibid. 315, 17—318, 28.
[34] Ibid. 318, 28.
[35] Ibid. 294, 26—296, 6.
[36] Ibid. 297, 22.

abstraction it could be considered as somehow connected with the *ākṛtiḥ* (which, in scholastic terms, is the essence of things).

3) The carrying out of the vedic imperative *śyenacitaṃ cinvīta* could not mean that one has to construct an *ākṛtiḥ* with the help of bricks, since it is impossible to build even a single living śyena-bird with such material. The only feasible meaning in the context is that one should construct an altar that has a similarity to any and every *śyena*-bird. This implies that the stress of the imperative is not on the individualized *ākṛtiḥ* but on the *ākṛtiḥ* that is found in each of the individualized particulars. Hence, though the individualization of the *śyena*-altar that is produced with bricks does not correspond to any one particular *śyena*-bird, still it has a similarity (*sādṛśyam*) with any *śyena*-bird that is born or is yet to be born in the future. In this context a remark is made on the nature of particularity as such which is of definite help in making our discussion more precise.

"A thing similar to individuality as such being unimaginable (= does not possess any essential qualification which would make verbalization possible) is independent of [anything that is either] common or specific [and is thus] unreliable because it would be like a thing [without any differentiating mark]."[38]

What all this points to is that individuality as such is a pure abstraction. To talk of *vyaktimātrasādṛśyam* is to indulge in non-sensical language. The individualized element is known through perception and not through word[39].

If the question were posed that just as individuality as such does not exist except in an individualized *ākṛtiḥ*, could we not say that *ākṛtiḥ* as such does not exist except as an individualized *ākṛtiḥ*? What we have is an individual with two aspects. Thus whether one wants to talk of the individual as such or of the essential as such depends merely on the intention of the speaker.

Though the problem of the role of the speaker's intention in this matter is discussed and though one concedes this freedom to make a word refer either to the common or to the individual element, yet the above question does not come up for discussion in all its complexity. However what is said in this context serves to point to a possible total answer from the Mīmāṃsaka point of view.

Uttarapakṣaḥ: "It is the *jātiḥ* alone that is the meaning of a word." Purvapakṣaḥ: "But is it not so that the [*jātiḥ*] is cognized as secondary (*guṇabhūtā*) and that there must be another denotation [which is] primary?" Uttarapakṣaḥ: "It is not so. First of all the (*jātiḥ*) alone is denoted by the word. If the primary or the secondary character of denotation depends on the strength of the [speaker's] wish let it be [so]. With that [however our thesis

[37] Ibid. 298, 17—22.

[38] Ibid. 302, 25:
nirvikalpatvāt sāmānyaviśeṣānapekṣam vyaktimātrasādṛśyam avidheyaṃ sarvadravyeṣu tulyatvāt.

[39] Ibid. 303, 26.

of the *jātiḥ* being] the denotation of a word is not sacrificed. When the [*jātiḥ*] is denoted by the word, then the secondary character [of the *jātiḥ*] is not cognized. Hence the knowledge of the secondary character [of the *jātiḥ*] because of the purpose [of the speaker] is no objection (*adoṣaḥ*) [against our thesis]."[40]

Implied in this reasoning is the premise that even to be able to make use of the word according to one's intention presupposes that the word has a specific nature with definite possibilities. It is not as if one could do whatever one liked with it. It has its own possibilities as well as its limitations. It can talk about tree in general or of this particular tree in front of the window. The function of the word when talking of tree in general is not altogether similar to this function when talking of this particular tree. The similar function is that in both cases the word tree reveals a meaning which enables us to understand what it is referring to, that it is speaking, for example, about trees and not trays is made clear by the mere mention of the word tree. The dissimilar function is that when speaking of a particular tree it is found that the word tree is incapable of denoting a particular tree, hence the speaker's intention in this matter is of importance. So the speaker makes use of demonstrative words, (adjectives, adverbs, etc.) which help point to the particularity of the tree. This is a demonstrative, not a denotative, function.

Now, to answer our original question, the main function of a word is denotative and this denotation is the *ākṛtiḥ*. It can take on other functions like the demonstrative function which points to (but cannot denote) an individual. It cannot however give up its denotative function. If it did, then the word would cease to be a word. Though it is true, that a particularity as such exists as little as a commonality as such can exist, and that it is the individual alone that really exists, still a commonality is by its very nature a repeatable concretizable commonality. Both of them do not exist in their abstract condition (that is, commonality as such and particularity as such) but, and here is the difference, in their concretization one is repeatable and the other not. The repeatable alone is expressed by the word, and it is known as the *ākṛtiḥ*.

The very last section of the *ākṛtivādaḥ* in the Tantravārttikam is a commentary on Sūtram 35. The point of the discussion is that *apūrvam* is connected with *dravyam* and not with *ākṛtiḥ*. Does this mean that the doctrine of the *ākṛtiḥ* has no relevance here? It is stated in reply that *ākṛtiḥ* is there not for itself but for identifying the *dravyam* which will produce the *apūrvam*. The chain of thinking then is this: with the help of the *ākṛtiḥ* one finds out what *dravya*-s are needed for the performance of the *yāga*-s which

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40 Ibid. 317, 16—20:
tena jātir eva śabdārthaḥ. nanu guṇabhūtā pratīyate 'taś cānyena pradhānenābhidheyena bhavitavyam iti. naivaṃ śabdena tāvat saivābhidhīyate. yadi vivakṣāvaśena arthād guṇatvaṃ prādhānyaṃ vā bhavati; bhavatu nāma na tāvatā śabdābhidheyatvaṃ vyāhanyate. yadā cāsau śabdenābhidhīyate tadā guṇatvaṃ naiva pratīyate tenārthād guṇatvapratītir adoṣaḥ.

are enjoined, for it is through their performance alone that the *apūrvam* can be realized. Kumārila's interpretation of the Sūtram *tadarthatvāt prayogasyā-vibhāgaḥ* is that there is a 'connection (*avibhāgaḥ*) between the performance [of the ritual actions with the *dravya*-s which are identified with the help of the *ākṛtiḥ* and the *ākṛtiḥ* itself] since the purpose [of the *ākṛtiḥ* is] the [*apūrvam*]'.

It is one of the interesting phenomena of the Mīmāṃsā that some of its more important categories like *śabdaḥ*, *ākṛtiḥ*, *yāgaḥ*, etc. have this characteristic: *parārthatvam*, that is, 'for the sake of the other', their purpose is to serve another aim.

CHAPTER 13 ABHIHITĀNVAYAVĀDAḤ AND BHĀVANĀ

Among the manifold theories of sentence and meaning we come across three main traditions: i) the Sphoṭa-doctrine of the grammarians who claimed the Sphoṭaḥ to be a supra-sensible reality which reveals the meaning of a sentence not piece-meal but in a flash, ii) the Anvitābhidhna-theory which holds that only a sentence as such is meaningful and that from it alone we derive the word-meanings, and finally iii) the Abhihitānvaya-school which teaches that a sentence can become meaningful only when the words which compose it are meaningful and join together to produce a united meaning for it[1]. Bhartṛhari belongs to the first group, Prabhākara is a representative of the second school whereas Kumārila adheres to the third.

Since in Kumārila's theory words play such an important role we shall first examine how in his theory words reveal their meaning. In an earlier chapter we saw that for Kumārila a word (*padam*) is not different from its constituent syllables (g, au and ḥ) for they alone constitute the word *gauḥ*[2]. In what follows it will be of help to keep this explanation before our eyes.

Kumārila says:

"The syllables reveal so much of their meaning as much as their capability regarding revealing of meaning is cognized. Still one assumes for the [syllables] that are [of] secondary [importance] in the revelation of (their) meaning both a speaker as well as a sequence."[3]

With this Kumārila rejects a supra-sensible Sphoṭaḥ that is different from the syllables. For if a set of syllables are spoken i) by a speaker ii) in a definite sequence, they become 'charged' with a capability that leads to the revelation of the meaning of a sentence. In such a process the syllables as such are secondary because they become 'capable' only when they are qualified by these two characteristics.

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[1] J. BROUGH: Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians, Transactions of the Philological Society 1951. Pp. 27—46; Idem: Some Indian Theories of Meaning, TPS 1953. Pp. 161—176; K. KUNJUNNI RAJA: Indian Theories of Meaning, pp. 95—148 and 189—227; M. BIARDEAU: Théorie de la Connaissance et Philosophie de la Parole dans le brahmanisme classique, pp. 153—203 and 251—442; GAURINATH SASTRI: The Philosophy of Word and Meaning, pp. 172—287; P. K. MAZUMDAR: The Philosophy of Language, Calcutta 1977, esp. pp. 94—146; K. A. SUBRAMANYA IYER: Pratibhā as the Meaning of a Sentence, Proceedings of the Tenth All-India Oriental Conference, Tirupathi 1940, pp. 326—332.

[2] See Ch. Śabdanityatā P.

[3] ŚV Sphoṭavādaḥ 69—70:

yāvanto yādṛśā ye ca yadarthapratipādane /
varṇāḥ prajñātasāmarthyās te tathaivāvabodhakāḥ //
teṣāṃ tu guṇabhūtānām arthapratyāyanaṃ prati /
sāhityam ekakartrādikramaś cāpi vivakṣitaḥ //

i) A word becomes intelligible usually when it is uttered by a speaker. An accident could produce a combination and sequence of syllables which would have a meaning but this is not the normal speech phenomenon. The activity of speaking is both complex and comprehensive. In it and through it words take on shades of Significance that cannot be rendered through other media. In such an activity the pauses appear to be as important as the syllables themselves.

ii) The importance of the syllable-sequence is gathered from the fact that it is impossible for man to utter the syllables at 'one shot', in a flash, as it were. The activity of speaking demands (and our physical organism corresponds to these demands) that the syllables are spoken successively. In the word *gauḥ* every syllable is important and contributes its mite. The meaning of this word is revealed by these three syllables but only in the sequence g, au and ḥ. It is true that each of them separately does not and cannot express the whole word but this does not mean that they are equally helpless collectively. If we take the parts of a cart separately, no movement is possible but taken together they form a cart and enable movement. The pre-condition for this is that each part fits in well with the whole and plays its role faithfully. Moreover, we observe that in certain cases even individual syllables, like ka occasionally express a meaning like Prajāpati[4]. But usually it is a complex of syllables in a definite sequence that reveals a definite meaning. Such a sequence is not invented by us, we find it already there in the structure of human speech when we start learning the use of words. We do not find, however, that one day someone begins a new sequence for an old word; that whereas up till now we used the sequence g, au, ḥ when we intended to speak of a cow, someone now says, we should utter these syllables in a different sequence. On the contrary, we try to learn a word as it is used in human speech. Because of this Kumārila concludes that the syllable-sequence of a word is beginninglessly eternal just as human speech itself[5].

In the context of the manifestation of Śabdaḥ we spoke of the fact that every sound-syllable (*dhvaniḥ*, *nādaḥ*) impresses and forms the ether that is contained in the cavity of the ear[6]. It is this form-ation of the ear-ether that makes it possible for the respective syllable to be perceived. The last syllable of a word conveys the meaning of the word in this way: When it is perceived there arises a cognition of all the earlier syllables (*samastavarṇavijñānam*) and it is this collective cognition of the syllables constituting a word that causes the revelation of the word-meaning (*tadarthajñānakaraṇam*). Kumārila gives two explanations of the *samastavarṇavijñānam* without deciding definitively for the one or the other. Either one perceives the last syllable and then remembers at the same time all the previous syllables belonging to

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4 Ibid. 84—90.

5 ŚV Śabdanityatādhikaraṇam 284—290ab.

6 See Ch. 9 Śabdanityatā.

the same word, or remembers them all after they have been perceived one by one[7].

"And even if the cognitions [of the syllables arise] according to a sequence, all schools take for granted in this way a mental collective cognition with regard to all the [word-] meanings. If one would not accept this, then there would be no collective cognition of the [syllables that] have been perceived in a sequence [and that has] the form [of, for example, the number] hundred, etc."[8]

What the exact nature of the working of memory and hearing is, is (one notices here) not of much interest to Kumārila. He is not interested in the physiology, as it were, of knowledge. There is one point that he stresses in all this and that is the 'backward glance', gathering together the already uttered syllables; because, according to him, it is this backward glance that enables the rise of meaning.

Though the syllables are perceived successively, Kumārila can explain with the help of the backward glance how a unified cognition of the word occurs. It does not mean, of course, that the cognition of the word-meaning is totally different from the cognition of the individual syllables. What is right is that the cognition of the individual syllables is different from the cognition of the word-meaning. But it is equally true that without the cognition of the individual syllables the cognition of the word-meaning is impossible. In no case is Kumārila willing to concede that between the cognition of the syllables and that of the word-meaning there is a reality (like the Sphoṭaḥ) which is responsible for the transmission of the cognition of the meaning. Kumārila firmly believes that to explain the unity of a word the syllables are more than enough. The speedy sequence of syllables creates the impression that the syllables are one unit, a unity. The backward glance is (mistakenly) interpreted by some to be the Sphoṭaḥ. But such an assumption is as superfluous as it is supersensory, because it overlooks the fact that the meaning of a word arises from the cognition of its syllables. Therefore, too, the popular phrase: *śabdād arthaḥ*, 'from word [alone arise] meaning'[9]. Hence the Sphoṭaḥ would be more of a hindrance (*vyavāyaḥ*, *vyavadhānam*) than a help in explaining the meaning of a word, because according to the Sphoṭa-doctrine its existence and function is between the cognition of the syllables and the cognition of the word-meaning. But in the case of a word it is not so. Over and above the perception of the syllables and the cognition of the word-meaning there is absolutely no need of a third factor.

"Therefore Śabdaḥ is called [cause of the cognition of word-meaning] due to the result [it produces], since it is meant for this. But in no way is it a

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[7] ŚV Sphoṭavādaḥ 108—110.

[8] Ibid. 113—114:

sarveṣu caivam artheṣu mānasaṃ sarvavādinām /
iṣṭaṃ samuccayajñānaṃ kramajñāneṣu satsv api //
na cet tadābhyupeyetakramadṛṣṭeṣu naiva hi /
śatādirūpaṃ jāyeta tatsamuccayadarśanam //

[9] Ibid. 116—121.

hindrance in the matter of the collective cognition."[10]

We could summarize thus: the cognition of the meaning of a word occurs when every sound-syllable 'forms' the ear-ether (*saṃskriyate*) during the process of the manifestation of Śabdaḥ; through the fact of the collective backward glance at the sound-syllables one is reminded of the syllables. This backward glance produces the cognition of word-meaning.

With this we can now turn our attention to Kumārila's doctrine of sentence-meaning: Abhihitānvayavādaḥ, 'the doctrine that sentence-meaning arises from the connection between meaningful words'. Almost like a leit-motiv Kumārila repeats throughout this discussion that the meaning of a sentence is possible only when the word-meanings have been grasped.

"In this context [the following] is our teaching: though there is no other foundation [for the sentence-meaning] it is observed that the word-meanings are the foundation because [only] in the presence of the [word-meanings] is the [sentence-meaning] possible."[11]

Briefly: without-meanings and their comprehension by the hearer the meaning of a sentence cannot be understood. There is such a 'causal' relationship between the word-meanings and the sentence-meaning that one can state generally that to grasp the meaning of a sentence the meanings of all the important words in that sentence have first to be comprehended.

"And always [only] that sentence-meaning is cognized, which corresponds to the word-meanings. Therefore the fact that a sentence has a definite meaning (*viśiṣṭārthatā*) does not prove that it is independent [of the word-meanings]. In the matter of sentence-meaning we do not [hold that] the words lose their own capability. Once these [words] have been ascertained the [sentence-meaning] is cognized from the word-meanings. And even if the meaning of a sentence had nothing to do with Śabdaḥ, [it does] not [follow] that the word-meanings [too] have nothing to do with Śabdaḥ. Only for the sentence-meaning is there another cause, [but] not for the [word-meanings]. And these [word] meanings lead to the cognition of a connected [and] constant [sentence-] meaning. For commonality without particularity is not possible."[12]

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[10] Ibid. 129:
tasmāt tādarthyataḥ śabdaḥ phalena vyapadiśyate /
samuccayāvabodhe tu vyavadhānaṃ na kenacit //

[11] ŚV Vākyādhikaraṇam 110cd—111ab:
atrābhidhīyate yady apy asti mūlāntaraṃ na naḥ //
padārthānāṃ tu mūlatvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tadbhāvabhāvataḥ /

[12] Ibid. 228—231:
padārthānugataś caiṣa vākyārtho gamyate sadā /
na viśiṣṭārthatā tasmād vākyasvātantryasādhinī //
na vimuñcanti sāmarthyaṃ vākyārtheṣu padāni naḥ /
tanmātrāvasiteṣv eṣu padārthebhyaḥ sa gamyate //
aśābde cāpi vākyārthe na padārtheṣv aśābdatā /
vākyārthasyeva naiteṣāṃ nimittāntarasaṃbhavaḥ //
saṃbaddham eva caite 'rthaṃ gamayanty avinābhuvam /
sāmānyaṃ svaviśeṣeṇa vinā na hy upapadyate //

The meaning of a sentence cannot be considered as merely the sum of the word-meanings. If this were so, the role of the word-sequence would be completely overlooked. But it is true that it is only from the word-meanings that a definite sentence-meaning (*viśiṣṭārthaḥ*) arises. This, of course, does not establish that the meaning of a sentence is independent of the word-meanings. The words in a sentence retain their capacity to reveal their meanings. The same word-meanings would, if their sequence were changed, combine together to produce another sentence-meaning. Every word has its own definite meaning. This meaning becomes known when its syllables are uttered by a speaker in a fixed sequence. Because it is the Śabda-syllables that lead to the meaning of a word, the word-meaning is connected with Śabdaḥ. The case of the meaning of a sentence is slightly different. The sentence-meaning does not consist of Śabda-syllables and in this sense it is true that it is not directly connected with Śabdaḥ but with word-meanings. Whereas the syllables (that is to say, Śabdaḥ) are the cause of the word-meaning, the word-meanings and not the syllables (that is to say, Śabdaḥ) are the cause of the sentence-meaning. If we are agreed that a word in a sentence retains its power to reveal its meaning, then it follows that all the word-meanings of the words in a sentence combine together to produce one, unified sentence-meaning.

A word-meaning denotes a universal with no relation to any definite particular. But human language, like human beings, cannot exist without some relations. Language like life is possible because of relations! When therefore Kumārila says that 'commonality without particularity is not possible' he is referring to just this: language is made up not of universal and relationless word-meanings but of related word-meanings. It is because of this that they produce a definite sentence-meaning. In a sentence words which in themselves refer to universals that are free of relationships to particulars enter into mutual relationship by determining each other. All this amounts to the following: we do not have in human speech words that are unconnected and unconditioned. Words occur only in sentences and sentences give birth to meaning with the help of the word-meanings. These word-meanings though by nature universal become related in the context of a sentence. The sentence-meaning is in effect the expression of a compound and complex relationship.

It would be a mistake to conclude that the sentence-meaning is the result of syllogistic reasoning.

"This sentence-meaning is cognized as 'coloured' by the word-meanings. [The word-meanings] lead to the [sentence-meaning] not independently of themselves, as [for example] the smoke [is cognized without the fire] as having fire."[13]

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[13] Ibid. 233:
padārthair anurakto 'sau vākyārthaḥ sampratīyate |
nātmanā gamayanty enaṃ vinā dhūmo 'gnimattvavat ||

When one sees smoke and concludes to the existence of fire, then one can assert that the conclusion (existence of fire) is not contained in the major-premise (existence of smoke). The birth of sentence-meaning from word-meanings cannot be a syllogistic conclusion, for in that case the word-meanings would be occuring both in the major-premise as well as in the final conclusion[14].

"Therefore the sentence-meaning cannot be conveyed through the sentence because it (the sentence-meaning) is explained through some other thing [that is to say, through the word-meanings], or because one does not understand the [sentence-meaning], even if one has heard the [sentence], just as tree-hood [is not conveyed] through [the word] *palāśaḥ*. Or the syllables do not lead to the cognition of the [sentence-meaning] because they lead to the cognition of the [word-] meanings with which they are connected, or because the [syllables] do not lead to the cognition of the [sentence-meaning] even if they are present, just as [the word] *śiṃśapaḥ* [does not lead to the cognition of the [sentence-meaning]; if there is a doubt, then the individual [word-meaning] is cognized, because the [sentence-] meaning is conveyed [only] when they all [are cognized], like a crow on a post. Or this [sentence-meaning] is cognized through the [word-meanings], because there is no cognition [of the sentence-meaning] when the [cognition of the word-meanings] is not there. For Śabdaḥ is said to be audible because there is no cognition of Śabdaḥ when the hearing-organ is not there."[15]

A sentence cannot explain the sentence-meaning without the word-meanings, simply because the meaning of a sentence is built up of word-meanings. The proof for this is simple enough. When one does not understand the word-meanings, one does not understand the sentence-meaning either. For, when one utters the word '*palāśaḥ*' one does not know what it means. Once one knows that it is the name of a tree, one connects it with tree-hood. Kumārila's intention is to refute the *vākyasphoṭaḥ* through this argument. The *vākyasphoṭaḥ* is supposed to be a reality that is totally different from the word-meanings[16].

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[14] Ibid. 232—246.

[15] Ibid. 361—364:

vākyena tena nocyeta vākyārtho 'nyair nirūpaṇāt /
tac chrutav apy abodhād vā palāśeneva vṛkṣatā //
varṇā vā na bruvanty enaṃ tatsaṃbandhyarthabodhanāt /
sattve 'py agamakatvād vā vṛkṣatvam iva śiṃśapā //
padārthā gamayanty etaṃ pratyekaṃ saṃśaye sati /
sāmastye nirṇayotpādāt sthāṇur mūrddhasthakākavat //
tadabhāvāpratīter vā tadgamyo 'yaṃ bhaviṣyati /
śrotrābhāvāpratīter hi śrautraṃ śabdaṃ pracakṣate //

[16] The implication is that the Sphoṭa-theory could be upheld only if it were possible to understand the meaning of a sentence even without understanding the meanings of all the words in the sentence. According to the Sphoṭavādin-s, the Sphoṭaḥ is supposed to reveal the meaning of a sentence 'in a flash', as it were. The illustration of *palāśaḥ* is intended to prove that the sentence-meaning cannot be comprehended if a single word like *palāśaḥ* has not been understood.

Even the syllables are not in a position to convey the meaning of a sentence because their task is to lead to the cognition of the word-meanings, not to that of the sentence-meaning. Otherwise the syllables would be burdened with a double duty and this would indeed be difficult to explain since they disappear immediately after fulfilling their main task. For as soon as the sound-syllables reveal the word-meaning they are no more. Were one to assert that at the perception of the last sound-syllable of a sentence one remembers the whole lot, then this would hardly be possible, since the word-meaning which is connected with a word arises immediately after the utterance of that word. If one were to accept this thesis, that would mean the giving up of the word's potentiality to make known its meaning the moment it is heard as a whole[17]. The illustration of *śiṃśapaḥ* is meant to show that, when one does not know that it is a tree, one hardly thinks of tree-hood, when the word *śiṃśapaḥ* is uttered.

From the fact that, when there is doubt about one single word, the meaning of the sentence does not become clear, it should prove that it is indeed the word-meanings that lead to the cognition of the sentence-meaning. It is only when all word-meanings have been understood that one understands the meaning of the sentence. The example of the crow and the pole is meant to illustrate the fact that when one is not clear about either the pole or the crow then the total phenomenon remains unclear. It does not help if only the one (say, the crow) or the other (say, the pole) is known; only when both are cognized for what they are can one assert that there is a crow sitting on the pole. This is meant to be an illustration of his doctrine that the meaning of a sentence is understood, once the meanings of its words are known. By means of *arthāpattiḥ* Kumārila sets out to prove that sentence-meaning is produced by the word-meanings. For, just as one concludes to the audibility of Śabdaḥ from the fact that when the speaker is deaf he does not perceive it, so too, one concludes that the sentence-meaning is produced by the word-meanings from the fact that it is not cognized when the word-meanings are not known.

In order to explain the meaning of a sentence what Kumārila needs are words which are capable of conveying their meaning.

"If one assumes a minimal potency only in these words then [we have] an endless number of sentences through different combinations of inclusions and exclusions [of words]. It is not right to assume a greater potency if the [sentence-] meaning is possible through a smaller potency. Hence there is [no need of an] *arthāpattiḥ* for [assuming] an endless number of sentences and potencies."[18]

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[17] ŚV Vākyādhikaraṇam 112cd—118ab.

[18] Ibid. 121—122:

teṣv eva ca padārtheṣu praklptastokaśaktiṣu /
āvāpodvāparacanābhedād vākyeṣv anantatā //
stokaśakty upapanne 'rthe bahuśaktyapramāṇatā /
vākyatacchaktyanantatve nārthāpattis tato bhavet //

Words are capable by themselves of leading to a cognition of their meaning. Hence what is the purpose served by postulating either a *vākasphoṭaḥ* or a *padasphoṭaḥ*? For without either of them we can account for the variety and multiplicity of sentences and sentence-meanings.

With this we can now turn our attention to the question 'how does the sentence-meaning arise from the word-meanings'? Kumārila's answer lays stress on the verb. The verb in a sentence expresses an action, a making, occasionally a 'passion', a being made, a becoming. The action which the verb expresses connects the various word-meanings which occur in a sentence together[19]. As has been repeatedly stated, the meaning of a sentence is not the same as the sum of the word-meanings, because there is the 'new element', namely the relationship that is produced between the different word-meanings themselves, and between them and the action. At the root of the new relationship is the action itself that is expressed by the verb. In itself no word-meaning is related to another word-meaning. The meaning of the word cow is clear in itself and unrelated to anything else. But in the context of the action of a sentence the word-meanings enter new relationships. How does one discover this new relationship? There are three principles which are of help in this matter: syntactic expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), phonetic contiguity (*saṃnidhiḥ*) and logical consistency (*yogyatā*)[20]. If we take, for example, the command 'bring the white cow', then it is obvious that the connection between the three words is due to the action that is commanded.

"Thus syntactic expectancy is proved through the coming together. And the mutual relationship [is produced] when white and cow are cognized [in the context] of one action."[21]

The relations between the word-meanings and the unity of these relations (which is the same thing as the sentence-meaning!) are produced through the action which is expressed by the verb 'bring'. The action that is ordered introduces a relationship (in the context of this particular sentence) between cow and white, since the command is about cow and white. Though in itself each of these words denotes a universal, the context of the command unites the two words. Every word has unlimited combination-possibilities and this is actuated by the command, so that one understands that it is the white cow that is to be fetched[22].

All this we could call the general theory of the meaning of a sentence. But Kumārila puts forward in addition a special theory of sentence-meaning, the theory, that is, of *bhāvanā* which he builds on the foundations laid by the early Mīmāṃsā for the interpretation of the *utpattividhi*-s[23]. "They are the

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[19] Ibid. 267. Also TV 455, 16—17.

[20] P. K. MAZUMDAR: The Philosophy of Language, pp. 37—61; K. KUNJUNNI RAJA, Indian Theories of Meaning, pp. 149—187.

[21] ŚV Vākyādhikaraṇam 267:

ākāṅkṣaivam avicchedasiddhā śuklagavādiṣu /
ekakriyāgṛhīteṣu saṃbandhaś ca parasparam //

[22] Ibid. 267—271.

[23] P. K. MAZUMDAR: The Philosophy of Language, Calcutta 1977, pp. 37—61; E. FRAUWALLNER: Bhāvanā und Vidhiḥ bei Maṇḍanamiśra, WZKM XXXVI,

so-called basic injunctions (*utpattividhayaḥ*), that is to say, injunctions through which the sacrifices are first of all prescribed in general. Regarding these injunctions what the Mīmāṃsā wanted was to ascertain the fundamental relationship between the main constituents of the sacrifice, and that is why, they were concerned about giving them a form from which this relationship could be deduced in a way that corresponded to their expectations. This happened more or less in the following manner. They said: it is not possible that the injunctions were concerned only about the realization of the sacrifice. For, men allow themselves to be determined by an injunction to action only if they see therein a desired result. This desired result cannot however be the sacrifice itself. Consequently the real meaning of the injunction is this: one should realize some desired thing and this desired thing is obviously the coveted heaven. The sacrifice is on the other hand to be considered as the means to this. For if the striving for heaven has been commanded, then the question is, with what means is this to be done. And the sacrifice that is mentioned in the same injunction is naturally above all the only thing that can here be considered as the means to it. The injunctions that are mentioned assert that one should realize heaven through sacrifice and should be meaningfully formulated thus: *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet*. One should further note that heaven is not realized immediately after the execution of the sacrifice. Heaven therefore cannot be effected, realized immediately. What is achieved without delay is an invisible force that did not exist here-to-fore (*apūrvam*), which on its part will bring forth heaven. Hence it is meaningful to assume that what is prescribed is not so much the realization of heaven as the realization of the invisible potency. With this reformulation and re-interpretation of the injunctions under discussion the Mīmāṃsā had reached its desired goal: The relationship between the constituents of the sacrifice were defined in accordance with their views. In the centre was the action, the effecting and realization of the desired thing with the help of the sacrifice. The result of this was the invisible potency which on its part produces the definitive fruit. The sacrifice itself constitutes the means of achieving this goal. The determination and definition of the relationship of the constituents of the sacrifice was of fundamental Significance for the whole Mīmāṃsā interpretation. For together with it was given as it were a framework for the understanding of the structure of each individual sacrifice. Within this frame-work the constituents of the various sacrifices could be determined in detail with the help of other injunctions, while everything else followed this as the manner of executing the sacrifice (*itikartavyatā*). The transformation and interpretation of the injunctions under consideration is accordingly the starting-point and the model as regards the interpretation of all the remaining injunctions and therefore I

pp. 212—251. Since both MAZUMDAR and FRAUWALLNER have treated of Kumārila's teaching on *bhāvanā* rather elaborately, there is not much justification in repeating it here. What is missing in their treatment however is an attempt to work out the implications of the doctrine of *bhāvanā* in the context of the whole system.

call the fundamental transformation on which the interpretation is constructed, *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet*, the basic formula of Mīmāṃsā-interpretation."[24]

For the Mīmāṃsaka there could not be the least shadow of doubt that the vedic injunction contained *bhāvanā* and this because of the following reasons: Sentences can be, according ot him, divided into two kinds: i) those whose subject is ready and existing (*siddha-*) and therefore whose activity is directed to another, and ii) those whose subject is incomplete and not fully existing (*asiddha-*) and whose activity is therefore directed towards itself. Sentences of the first kind contain an effecting, a making (*karoti*) and those of the second kind a being-made, a becoming (*bhavati*). An effecting, a making is expressed through many ways, especially when one asks 'what is he doing?' and gets a reply to it 'he is cooking'. This means, that verbs like cooking etc. express two things: a making and a means of making or effecting. If one asks 'what is he doing?', one cannot reply 'he is'[25]. And still, there is a certain relation between making and becoming. For the subject of making presupposes occasionally an object and this object of making is the subject of becoming[26]. Some verbs express only a making and some only a becoming, others express a making and hint at a becoming, still others express a becoming and suggest a making, and finally some express both a making and a becoming. The relationship between making and becoming is best expressed by the verb *bhāvayati*, which expresses making as well as becoming in such a manner that the making causes the becoming[27].

If we now take the sentence 'he cooks rice', then the following will strike us: 'by means of cooking he makes the rice boil' (*pākena odanaṃ bhavati*). This 'making' is the *bhāvanā* which, as the illustration shows, is not identical with the subject of the verb (cook). This making (*bhāvanā*) can be expressed through all the tenses and moods. What is of interest to us here is the doctrine of *bhāvanā* which is expressed through the Optative (as well as the Imperative and the Gerundive)[28].

The concern here is about the basic prescriptions like '*somena svargakāmo yajeta*'. According to Kumārila these prescriptions are not about sacrifice but about effecting heaven through sacrifice. This is to be explained thus: The verb *yajeta* expresses by means of the optative-suffix an effecting and by means of the root an object (sacrifice). When we read the injunction, there arises a question, 'why or for what is one to sacrifice?' The answer to this however is not to be found in the verb. All the same, one cognizes with the help of syntactic expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and phonetic contiguity (*pratyāsat-*

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[24] E. FRAUWALLNER: Bhāvanā und Vidhiḥ bei Maṇḍanamiśra. WZKM XXXVI, pp. 217—218. Also J. F. STAAL: Sanskrit Philosophy of Language, Current Trends in Linguistics. Vol. 5 (1967), pp. 499—531.

[25] TV 376, 24—377, 8.

[26] Ibid. 377, 9—14.

[27] Ibid. 377, 17—378, 8.

[28] Ibid. 385, 8—19.

tiḥ), that heaven is to be effected[29]. Consequently one asks, with what is one to effect heaven? As we have seen the verb expresses an object and we begin to suspect that this object could perhaps be the means of effecting heaven. With the help of the third principle, namely, logical consistency (*yogyatā*)[30] we conclude that it is only this object which is expressed by the verbal root that could be the means, since there is no other means that is mentioned and since one would not know how else to explain the function and purpose of this object. Now, the injunction appears to be: one should effect heaven by means of the sacrifice. The question 'how should one do this'? (that is, the question about the way of realizing the command = *itikartavyatā*) need not be answered by the injunction itself. This can be done by the other significant sentences (*arthavādāḥ*) in the context, that is to say, the sentences which in the context explain and praise the injunctions. Should one ask, how does one know that this *arthavādaḥ* concerns this injunction, then the three principles of *ākāṅkṣā*, *saṃnidhiḥ* and *yogyatā* are to be made use of[31].

With that we can now turn our attention to Kumārila's special theory of the sentence-meaning. Above all, of interest to us here is the *bhāvanā* which is expressed through the Optative (and the Imperative and the Gerundive), and which is at the core of the Bhāvanā-doctrine.

Kumārila distinguishes between the *śabdabhāvanā* (*abhidhā-bhāvanā*) and the *arthabhāvanā*[32]. The *śabdabhāvanā* is expressed in the *vidhiḥ* and is that factor which goads one into action. That which urges a person to act and is expressed in an injunction or command is what is known as '*śabdabhāvanā*. Because it is contained in and expressed by a sentence it is called *śabdabhāvanā*. In contrast with this is the *arthabhāvanā*, which, as the name suggests, has to do with the *arthaḥ*, that is, the object that is desired. Whereas the *śabdabhāvanā*'s task is to provoke a person into (ritual) action, the goal of the *arthabhāvanā* is to see to it that the action of the person produces the desired object heaven. In the first instance, the *bhāvanā*, that is, the efficient-force[33],

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[29] The concepts of *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhiḥ* have become part of the general semantic tradition of India. Whereas the 'action' which is the centre of gravity of a sentence is the 'source' of sentence-meaning, these three factors are the means through which the *bhāvanā* produces a unified sentence-meaning. Because of this, it is these very same factors which help the hearer in becoming aware of a sentence-meaning which is a complex but unified experience. The *ākāṅkṣā* shows whether and how the sentence-meaning is complete or whether it stands in need of completion; the *yogyatā* makes clear the connection between words on the basis of what is suitable to what; and finally the *saṃnidhiḥ* is a contributing factor in both *ākāṅkṣā* and *yogyatā*.

[30] In the injunction that is being discussed the yajñaḥ is the means of attaining Svargaḥ. The *ākāṅkṣā* leads us to believe that only Svargaḥ can be the appropriate aim of a ritual enterprise.

[31] ŚV Vākyādhikaraṇam 251—266.

[32] For a somewhat longer explanation of *arthabhāvanā* and *śabdabhāvanā* see G. JHĀ's Translation of the Ślokavārttikam, pp. xxvii—xxx.

[33] I have taken the term 'efficient-force' for *bhāvanā* from F. EDGERTON: "... the heart of each injunction is the efficient-force, the bhāvanā. This word is a noun of action from the causative of the root bhū, 'to come into being', and means

is present in the injunction but in the second, it is present in the prescribed ritual action. The purpose of the first is to make a person perform the prescribed sacrifice, and that of the second is to make the performance of the sacrifice effective and efficient. These are not two *bhāvanā*-s, they are merely two stages of one process. If the process is once begun then it infallibly leads to the end. It is not as if it could fail or break down after the first stage and there would be no doubts as to its efficiency in the second stage. If a person were once to allow the *śabdabhāvanā* to work on him, it would inevitably lead him to heaven, since it would not only persuade him to perform the prescribed injunction but it would see to it that the performance achieves its objective (heaven)[34].

What was the purpose of such a doctrine, why was it developed at all and how did it fit in with the rest of the system — these are some of the questions we shall have to answer in what follows. When explaining the relationship between *bhavati* (becoming) and *karoti* (making), Kumārila had stated that it was a *prayojaka-vyāpāraḥ*, that is to say, a process of cause and effect, of action and passion, a project of planned purpose and execution[35]. Together with this we have to consider another of Kumārila's assertion that the *bhāvanā* is the *prayojanam* of a sentence[36]. We now apply all this to the transformulation of the vedic injunction: *svargakāmo yajeta* was changed to *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet*, one should cause heaven by means of the sacrifice. The *bhāvanā* (which is the *prayojanam*) is said to cause heaven (which is the *prayojya-*) by means of the sacrifice. In other words, the efficiency of such an injunction is not extraneous to it, the purpose of such an injunction is not extrinsic to it, nor is it dependent on the intention of a person. A vedic injunction is self-explanatory and its ratio sufficiens is not to be sought outside of itself. For, the *bhāvanā*-doctrine is one of the main props which support the a-theistic world-view of the Mīmāṃsā. Unlike the other *darśana*-s the Mīmāṃsā does not postulate a Creator or a composer for the Veda-s, and the *bhāvanā*-doctrine was there to account for the purposive statements of the Veda-s. Meaningfulness and Significance are always connected in some way or the other with aim and purpose. What is of Significance must have a purpose; whether or not there is a person behind this purpose, the Mīmāṃsaka-s would say, is secondary and does not affect the core of the matter. Of course, one takes for granted, when a command is issued by a human being that there is a purpose behind it, even if it is not explicitly expressed. But in the case of the vedic statements, where there is no author, the Mīmāṃsaka owes an explanation as to how purpose is possible without a person. When the Mīmāṃsaka asserts that the *bhāvanā* is the aim

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accordingly 'a causing to come into being', a bringing-about, tendency to produce something; or, as I have rendered it, 'efficient-force'." Mīmāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa, New Haven 1929, p. 5.

34 TV 378, 20—28; 114, 15—22.

35 Ibid. 377, 26ff.

36 ŚV Vākyādhikaraṇam 344—346, esp. 344ab: *prayojanatayā caiṣām artham icchanti bhāvanām.*

and purpose of the vedic injunctions and that this *bhāvanā* is contained in the injunction itself (as has been shown in and through its transformulation) then, if I am not gravely mistaken, there are three objectives involved here:

Firstly, the intention of the Mīmāṃsaka is to prove that the vedic injunctions, though they have not been composed by any being, human or divine, are basically at least as meaningful as those issued by persons. True, the purpose might not always be clear and unambiguous, but the interpretative process of transformulation has shown beyond doubt that the vedic injunction does contain a purpose.

Secondly, (and this is the most important contribution of the *bhāvanā*-doctrine to the Mīmāṃsā-system,) its intention is to fill up the lacuna left by its a-theism with a sort of an Absolute that accounts for a number of things. The vedic injunction is, if we analyse its structure, of a conditional nature: if one wants to reach Svargaḥ one should sacrifice, *svargakāmo yajeta*. One of the primary purposes of the transformulation was to jettison this conditional element and thus to elevate it to a dimension that is free of all conditions. Now, if we study the transformulation carefully we shall observe what has taken place. The injunction

svargakāmo yajeta

is transformulated into

yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet.

The *kāma*-factor has disappeared altogether in the transformulation, or more precisely, in keeping with the spirit of the system, one would have to say that what appeared to be conditional was as a matter of fact really an absolute. For, in this case *kāmaḥ* is an expression of the constant and continuing search of man for *prītiḥ*[37]. Svargaḥ must be effected. The vedic

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[37] T. VETTER asserts in his edition of Sarvajñātman's Saṃkṣepaśārīrakam p. 13: "1. Für Kumārila ist eine vedische Weisung nur bedingt gültig. Man befolgt sie, wenn man ein bestimmtes Resultat erreichen will. 2. Alle Handlungen können auf natürliche Begierde zurückgeführt werden. 3. Die vedische Weisung ist eine Vorschrift, kein Gebot. 4. Doch wird ihr Einfluss auf den Menschen, der etwas begehrt, fast mechanisch gedacht." (My numbering). On all four counts I find the statements 'un-mīmāṃsaka'. 1. Though it is true that there are *vidhi*-s that are conditional, it must be pointed out that those about which the Mīmāṃsaka-s are concerned are the *utpattividhi*-s like *somena yajeta svargakāmaḥ*. These are interpretatively transformulated in the context of the *bhāvanā*-doctrine thus: *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet*. This implies that in the transformulation there is no conditional factor left at all. (See E. FRAUWALLNER: Bhāvanā und Vidhiḥ bei Maṇḍanamiśra. WZKM XXXVI, pp. 121 ff.). 2. It is not clear what is meant by "natürliche Begierde" in this context. If it stands for the *lipsā*, as both Śabara and Kumārila call that impulse in man which moves him in all his actions, then still less is VETTER's thesis tenable, since there can be no conditional element in the *lipsā*. According to Śabara "all men are *svargakāmāḥ*. Why? Because *prītiḥ* [is] *svargaḥ* and everyone strives for *prītiḥ*." (ŚBh 1256, 6—7). 3. In the light of all this, it is difficult to comprehend now one can say that such a *vidhiḥ* is a "Vorschrift, kein Gebot". 4. The contradiction in VETTER's statements becomes glaring when on the one hand he asserts that the *vidhiḥ* is "bedingt gültig" and on the other he states that its influence on human beings is "fast mechanisch". Apart from the fact that Vetter does not cite a single text to corroborate his views, the impressionistic character of his remarks shows a lack of

injunction is now interpreted as: Svargaḥ must be realized by means of the sacrifice. The aim of this whole discourse is to show that the commands contained in the authorless Veda are as absolute as the commands of any Absolute Being[38].

Thirdly, the purpose of the transformulation was to state authoritatively that ritual action was the most important duty in life. For to say that the vedic injunction alone can lead to the cognition of the means to Svargaḥ and that Svargaḥ must be attained is to assert the absolute importance and indispensability of the ritual action.

Kumārila's Bhāvanā-doctrine teaches that there is in the vedic injunctions a 'must', a 'must become' that is absolute and unconditional. With that the Mīmāṃsā's intention of claiming an absolute Authority for the vedic injunctions becomes crystal clear. Ultimate intelligibility which in the other systems is provided for by the postulate of an Absolute (whatever its label) is here substituted by an authority that was as subtle as it was central in the life of the Mīmāṃsaka. Because of its absolute authority the question 'why should one effect Svargaḥ by means of the sacrifice?' can afford to remain unanswered. It is true that one could say that Svargaḥ is the ultimate *puruṣārthaḥ* but the further question as to why one should act according to the dictates of the *puruṣārthaḥ* is not answered here. Kumārila's laconic answer is:

"If we prescind from the fact of their [that is, Dharma and Adharma] being prescribed or forbidden then we have no other reason to know Dharma or Adharma."[39]

We have to work to attain Svargaḥ because it is prescribed in the Veda-s. Moreover, the transformulation of the injunction has revealed that this command of the Veda-s is absolute and unconditional.

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acquaintance with the major constitutents of the Mīmāṃsā world-view. I find no support for his views in the texts. On the contrary, off and on one comes across texts like the following which Vetter would find difficult to explain:

vidhau anāśrite sādhyaḥ puruṣārtho na labhyate /
śrutasvargādibādhena dhātvarthaḥ sādhyatāṃ vrajet //
vidhau tu tam atikramya svargādeḥ sādhyateṣyate /
tatsādhanasya dharmatvam evaṃ sati ca labhyate //
ŚV Autpattikasūtram 14—15.

[38] However bizarre it might sound, one has to remember that the Mīmāṃsaka-s were attempting an interpretation of a phenomenon. (*guruśiṣyaparamparā*) that was an integral part of their lives. It was for them a fact about whose reality there could be no doubt at all. Having proved the impossibility of error in the Veda, its authorlessness and its imperative character, the Veda fulfilled all the conditions of an Absolute, at least on the pragmatic level.

[39] ŚV Codanā. 242cd—243a.

CHAPTER 14 SVATAḤPRĀMĀṆYAM

The vedic statements may be meaningful but that does not guarantee that they are authoritative. For, to say that the sentences are meaningful is not the same as saying that they are authoritative and valid (=*pramāṇam*). In this chapter I have set myself the task of examining Kumārila's theory of *svataḥprāmāṇyam* and of finding out how he applied it to the vedic statements.

Prāmāṇyam is both validity and authority. Kumārila describes it thus:

"Therefore that cognition [that] is stable (*dṛḍha-*), actually arisen (*utpanna-*) and is not contradicted by another cognition is to be known as *pramāṇam*."[1]

What is striking about this explanation is that a cognition (*vijñānam*) is called *pramāṇam*. With that Kumārila implies that in this type of discussion it is secondary whether the object of the discussion is the process of cognition or its product. According to him, then, though the product by definition is not the same as the process, yet in the matter of cognition whatever is said about the validity or otherwise of the process would apply equally to the product as well, and vice versa. Concretely, the discussion is as much about the means of knowing as it is about the cognitions that arise through these means. Both are treated as *pramāṇam*. And *pramāṇam* means either valid/authoritative (an adjective) or a means of knowing (a substantive). If applied to the Veda, for example, this would mean that the knowledge produced by it is valid/authoritative, and/or that it is a means of knowing. Though this may not be the most precise manner of speaking, still it does not alter the nature of the discussion. But it will be useful to keep the distinction in mind during the following investigation[2].

In the above description of *pramāṇam* Kumārila stresses unambiguously three qualitities: a cognition should be stable (*dṛḍha-*); it should have actually arisen (*utpanna-*) and finally, it should not be contradicted by another cognition. We may, while we are it, take up Kumārila's description of *aprāmāṇyam* as well:

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[1] ŚV Codanā. 80:

tasmād dṛḍhaṃ yad utpannam nāpi saṃvādam ṛcchati /
jñānāntareṇa vijñānaṃ tat pramāṇaṃ pratīyatām //

[2] This in no way implies that Kumārila was unaware of the distinction between *pramāṇam* and *pramāṇaphalam*. On the contrary, he explicitly polemizes in this connection against the Bauddha-s. ŚV Pratyakṣa. 74—75. See also MASAAKI HATTORI: Dignāga, On Perception. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1968, pp. 99—100. As a general description of *pramāṇam* we have, for example, the statement of the Vṛttikāraḥ: *yena yena hi pramīyate tat tat pramāṇam* (ŚBh 48, 18—19). Also Vyomavatī (Chowkhamba S. S. No. 61 Banāras 1930. 556, 20): *pratīyate 'nena iti pramāṇam.*

"*aprāmāṇyam* is classified (*bhinna-*) in three ways: falsity (*mithyātvam*), non-cognition (*ajñānam*) and doubt (*saṃśayaḥ*)."[3]

If we compare this with the description of *pramāṇam* then the correspondence is the following:

dṛḍham	*saṃśayaḥ*
utpannaṃ jñānam	*ajñānam*
na visaṃvādam ṛcchati jñānāntareṇa	*mithyātvam*

All these three qualifications are important. The first set of contraries (*dṛḍham* and *saṃśayaḥ*) refers to a state (status) both of being (entis) and of the mind (mentis). For a cognition to be a *pramāṇam* it must be *dṛḍha-*, this implies that it must be stable not only psychologically (= certainty of the mind) but also ontically (= true to its own nature, that is, function according to its kind). But if the cognition instead of being *dṛḍha-* is characterized by *saṃśayaḥ* it implies not only a psychological state of doubt but refers to its functioning as well. Because of certain defects, for example, the eye is not true to its nature. It sees and at the same time projects (as when afflicted with jaundice). There is thus doubt about its concrete nature. In psychological doubt, the stress is on cognition as a product and hence one cannot either make up one's mind or one is totally unsure. But where doubt is about the nature of the means of knowing, the focus of the doubt is on the means of knowing and hence the doubt is about the very process of cognition. That both kinds of doubt are mutually connected is not being denied here; the accent is on the characteristics (psychological or ontical) of the state called about or *dṛḍha-*.

The second set of qualifications (*utpannaṃ jñānam* and *ajñānam*) reveals interesting details by mutual contrast. If we take the phrase *utpannaṃ jñānam* seriously its opposite number should be *anutpannaṃ jñānam*. I suggest that it is thus intended by Kumārila. As a matter of fact Kumārila himself says this a little later:

"In the case of *avijñānam* however the working of the defects is not admitted since there is no cause just as you have asserted."[4]

In an epistemological context, that is, in a context where the subject-matter is cognition itself, a phrase like *kāraṇābhāvataḥ* could only mean that there is no cognition that is produced. If then it is said of the *doṣāḥ* (which could vitiate a cognition and its process) that they are not active because there is no cause, this could only mean that there was no process of cognition and consequently no cognition as product either. It is only because of this that the *doṣāḥ* could not be active. But what of the absence of the *doṣāḥ* when a *pramāṇam* is at work? This objection is inapplicable here, since we are explicitly speaking about *apramāṇam*. The conclusion I draw from this is

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[3] ŚV Codanā. 54ab:
aprāmāṇyaṃ tridhā bhinnaṃ mithyātvājñānasaṃśayaiḥ /

[4] Ibid. 55:
avijñāne tu doṣāṇām vyāpāro naiva kalpyate /
kāraṇābhāvatas tv eva tat siddhaṃ nas tvad uktivat //

that *ajñānam* or *avijñānam* simply means in our present context: the absence of the cognitive process and this in the strict sense of the word. We might be tempted perhaps to confuse information with cognition. It is not often realized that the technical term for information in Saṃskṛta is *smṛtiḥ* and not *jñānam* or *vijñānam*. *jñānam* or *vijñānam* refers rather to the act of knowing as well as to its result. To qualify for *prāmāṇyam* the act or process of knowing has to be involved. Mere information can never qualify since by nature it belongs rather to the category of hear-say than of direct experience of the object. To qualify for *prāmāṇyam* there is, according to Kumārila, no need of a new cognition in the sense of new knowledge but there has always to be a new and fresh act of cognition. When there is no new act, then the talk is about information (*smṛtiḥ*). Information cannot be a *pramāṇam* because it merely repeats in words what is not a result of the process of cognition but which is very far removed from such a process. It is not that repetition is a disqualification for *prāmāṇyam*. One can repeatedly go to the Veda and be repeatedly enlightened as to Dharma and its performance, and every such cognition will be valid and authoritative, in spite of the fact that one might have acquired such cognitions innumerable times. Information and memory (both have ultimately the same basis) are merely mental repetitions, not repetitions of the experience. In the realm of its competence the Veda-cognitions will always be valid, because *śabdapramāṇam* when repeated does not lose any of its 'freshness', just as in perceptive experience, every fresh act of perception even though of the same object is valid and authoritative. Everytime one reads or hears the Veda anew there arises a cognition which is valid and authoritative because the rise of the cognition is by means of a *pramāṇam*. But in the case of information and memory, the repetition does not take place through a *pramāṇam* which produced it the first time. Since neither memory nor information presuppose a fresh cognitive act, validity and authority do not apply to them.

What Kumārila means by *mithyātvam* is the state of being different from the object (*arthānyathātvam*)[5]. The opposite of *mithyātvam* is the condition of not being contradicted and disproved by another cognition[6]. This is an important point. One would have expected from Kumārila that he speak of *mithyātvam* in a manner that would be correspondingly contrary to that in which he speaks of truth. We have to recall that Kumārila needs a definition that fits in with his understanding of the *codanā*, the vedic injunction. In this case the question which he has to answer is this: does the implementation of the vedic injunction produce the promised result Svargaḥ or not? Kumārila together with all the Mīmāṃsaka-s teaches that Svargaḥ can be realized through the implementation of the vedic prescriptions and that in this sense the knowledge from the Veda is a *pramāṇam*. But since we do not have another *pramāṇam* to check up whether what the vedic injunctions promise is actually fulfilled, such a type of *pramāṇam* would be of no avail. Kumārila

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[5] Ibid. 53cd.
[6] Ibid. 80.

has therefore to look out for some other definition of truth which would do justice to his understanding of the *codanā*. Had he taken up a kind of correspondence-theory of truth, he would then have had no means of checking up the correspondence, and for lack of a proof, the theory would collapse. Hence he formulates a principle which is of a piece with his total system, and especially, with his view of the Veda and its origin. His solution: *na visaṃvādam ṛcchati jñānāntareṇa*, 'it is not contradicted by another [valid and authoritative] cognition'. The ideal of truth will accordingly be in such an understanding the absence of every possibility of being contradicted. As a matter of fact it is this ideal that Kumārila chose for the *prāmāṇyam* of the Veda.

For *prāmāṇyam* we require all the three conditions to be present unlike in the case of *aprāmāṇyam*. We have *aprāmāṇyam* when either only one, or two, or all three of them are lacking. This shows, too, that truth and *prāmāṇyam* are not identical. There may be truth as in the case of memory or information but that is not enough to qualify it for *prāmāṇyam*.

The question we have to tackle now is the one of the nature of *prāmāṇyam* and *aprāmāṇyam*[7]. Kumārila considers the following possibilities: i) Both are intrinsic (*svataḥ*), since what is not from within, cannot be brought forth (*svato 'satām asādhyatvāt*)[8]. Kumārila considers this to be a contradiction. ii) Both are extrinsic, that is, from outside (*parataḥ*), since they depend on whether there are excellent qualities or defects in the causes of the cognitions (*kāraṇotpannaguṇadoṣāvadhāraṇāt*)[9]. This, too, is rejected by Kumārila, since the cognition in this case would be without any definite nature (*niḥsvabhāvatvam*). iii) *prāmāṇyam* is from outside, that is, extrinsic, and *aprāmāṇyam* is intrinsic. The reasoning behind this is: *prāmāṇyam* is something positive (*vastutvam*) and depends on the excellent qualities of the causes of cognition. These qualities are the cause of *prāmāṇyam*, because of which it is from outside, that is, from the qualities. *aprāmāṇyam*, on the other hand, is something negative (*avastutvam*) and hence cannot be produced by the defects in the causes of cognition. It is due to this, that the extrinsicality of *aprāmāṇyam* is asserted[10]. According to this theory, *aprāmāṇyam* is a natural phenomenon and can be removed by means of the excellent qualities of the causes of cognition. *prāmāṇyam* is ascertained only when the excellent qualities have been ascertained. If one cannot ascertain the sound condition of the cause (*kāraṇaśuddhatvam*), then one can assume from the very start that the natural *aprāmāṇyam* is at work there[11]. The main reason for rejecting this theory is, according to Kumārila, the fact that it leads to an infinite regress. If one cannot accept the *prāmāṇyam* of a cognition till one has first ascertained the soundness of its cause, then this

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[7] L. SCHMITHAUSEN: Maṇḍanamiśra's Vibhramavivekaḥ, pp. 189ff.
[8] ŚV Codanā. 34ab.
[9] Ibid. 34cd; 35cd.
[10] Ibid. 38—39.
[11] Ibid. 40—46.

implies, that one will have to ascertain before that the soundness of the cognition which is out to prove the soundness of the cause of the first; this further implies, that the soundness of the cognition which intends to test the soundness of the previous cognition (which in its turn set out to examine the soundness of the cause of the first cognition) will have to be proved. But the soundness of this last one will first have to be proved ... in this way we shall get nowhere. iv) The last alternative that *prāmāṇyam* is *svataḥ* and *aprāmāṇyam* is *parataḥ* is the one that is acceptable to Kumārila and his school.

"One should hold to the fact that the *prāmāṇyam* of all the means of knowing is intrinsic (*svataḥ*). For, a capability that is not intrinsic, cannot be induced [from outside] by means of anything."[12]

The point under consideration is the *prāmāṇyam* of all the means of knowing. Every such means of knowing is a *pramāṇam* by itself, without any extrinsic prop or support. Such a natural state of things is called a *śaktiḥ* which in Kumārila's thinking is a constitutive of the thing of which it is predicated[13]. An entity either has it or it does not have it. True, there are certain 'things' that can be induced into or onto another thing but then they cannot be said to be constitutive of that thing. Here is how Kumārila explains the matter:

"For, beings depend on causes for their coming into existence, but the working of [beings that are already] born is with regard to their effects from within themselves."[14]

Kumārila does not deny that one being can depend on another, but such dependence is regarding their coming into being. Once they are born they are responsible for their own activity and are independent as regards their causes. Applying this to cognition the consequence is that no outside influence could change the nature of cognition. The eye could depend on the person as to whether it should see or not see but once the decision is made and the eye is allowed to see, it then functions according to its own nature, that is, its *prāmāṇyam* is from within.

"Hence there is a dependence of cognitions from their own causes only in connection with their origin but not in connection with the certainty of their own excellent qualities. For the activity of these [cognitions] is like

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[12] Ibid. 47:

svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyam iti gamyatām /
na hi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate //

TS 2810cd—2811ab. In this connection see E. FRAUWALLNER: Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā, WZKSO 6 (1962), pp. 78ff. FRAUWALLNER rightly ascribes 2812—2815 and 2846—2918 from the TS to Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā.

[13] According to Kumārila there is a *śaktiḥ* which determines the nature of both the signified and the signifier (*vācyavācakaśaktiḥ*). The *śaktiḥ* is none other than the relation between word and meaning which determines the nature of word and meaning. In other words there is an intrinsic (*autpattika-*) relation between word and its meaning. Cfr. ŚV Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāraḥ 28.

[14] ŚV Codanā. 48:

ātmalābhe ca bhāvānāṃ kāraṇāpekṣatā bhavet /
labdhātmanāṃ svakāryeṣu pravṛttiḥ svayam eva tu //

TS 2847.

that of the pot, etc. which [activity] in connection with the production of certainty of validity and of the object is self-reliant and independent of its causes. In cannection with its production a pot is dependent on clay, on the [potter's] stick, on the wheel, etc. But this dependence of the [pot] is not observable in the case of carrying of water [in the pot]. Thus finally intrinsic *pramāṇatvam* is a sheer necessity."[15]

With this not every type of dependence is rejected; only that dependence which would make a substance untrue to its nature.

Kumārila proceeds to establish the intrinsic validity of cognition in the following manner:

"For, if *pramāṇatvam* were dependent on others, there would be an infinite regress. If *pramāṇatvam* had roots [outside of itself then there would be for it] a being-proved-by-another *pramāṇam*. [If we] wanted such a thing we would never come to an end. For just as the first cognition depends on a confirmation so too one must look for another confirmation for the [first] confirmation. But if for any one [of these confirmations] *prāmāṇyam* is to be granted, then what is the reason for an aversion to such a state [of *prāmāṇyam*] in the case of the [very] first cognition?"[16]

The reasoning in favour of the thesis of *svataḥprāmāṇyam* is simple but substantial. Rejection of this thesis implies an infinite regress from which there is no way out. Without taking the *svataḥprāmāṇyam* thesis for granted, one cannot prove anything since one would be in a constant and continual search for a fool-proof proof standing in need of a fool-proof proof!

But if one were to grant that *prāmāṇyam* is *svataḥ*, would the problem of error not be formidable?

"The *prāmāṇyam* of a cognition which has been achieved through the fact that it has led to the cognition [of an object], cannot be impaired by either the knowledge of an error in the cause or by the fact that the object is not as [has been represented]."[17]

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[15] TS 2848—2851 ab:
utpādamātra evāto vyapekṣāsti svahetuṣu /
jñānānāṃ svaguṇeṣveṣā na tu niścayajanmani //
janane hi svatantrāṇāṃ prāmāṇyārthaviniściteḥ /
svahetunirapekṣāṇāṃ teṣāṃ vṛttir ghaṭādivat //
mṛtpiṇḍadaṇḍacakrādi ghaṭo janmany apekṣate /
udakāharaṇe tv asya tadapekṣā na vidyate //
evaṃ svataḥpramāṇatvam ante cāvaśyam eva tat /

[16] Ibid. 2851 cd—2854:
parādhīne pramāṇatve hy anavasthā prasajyate //
maulike ca pramāṇatve pramāṇāntarasādhyatā /
tava (tatra?) tatraivam icchanto na vyavasthāṃ labhemahi //
yathaiva prathamaṃ jñānaṃ tatsaṃvādam apekṣyate /
saṃvādenāpi saṃvādaḥ punar mṛgyas tathaiva hi //
kasyacit tu yad iṣyeta svata eva pramāṇatā /
prathamasya tathābhāve pradveṣaḥ kena hetunā //

[17] ŚV Codanā. 53:
tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā /
arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānād apodyate //

Furthermore:

"This [prāmāṇyam] is prejudiced by [either] a nullification [or] by the cognition of a defect in the cause. Even if in this case it were dependent on another there is no regress [into infinity]. For this would depend on *prāmāṇyam* and it is intrinsic."[18]

What follows from the above is this: *prāmāṇyam* is impaired in two instances. i) Either there is another cognition which nullifies the first because it shows that the object is represented in a way that is different from its reality of ii) one discovers a defect in the cause of cognition (say, in a sense-organ). These two can introduce *aprāmāṇyam*. Does this mean that there is no infinite regress in spite of such dependence? Since *prāmāṇyam* is intrinsic and not an extrinsic determination there can be for Kumārila no infinite regress. That is to say, as soon as one has ascertained that a cognition is *apramāṇam*, the ascertainment itself is *pramāṇam*. If however the validity of this ascertaining statement were dependent on the ascertainment of the soundness of the cause then one would not be in a position to know which cognition is valid, since everyone of them would stand in need of an ascertainment.

But validity is natural and intrinsic.

"For, just as *pramāṇam* is not established by means of another *pramāṇam* so too *apramāṇam* is not established by means of another *apramāṇam*. For an [infinite] regress is unavoidable, when the foundation is of the same kind [as that which rests on it]. If the [support] however is of a different kind, then the basic root is firm."[19]

Kumārila had proved the validity of cognition by showing the impossibility of any other alternative that would avoid an infinite regress. A *pramāṇam* cannot be proved by another *pramāṇam*, similarly its opposite, *apramāṇam*. Dependence need not lead to an infinite regress. If the dependent thing is by nature different from that on which it is dependent, then there can be no regress. If, for example, a finite thing were dependent on another finite thing, there would be cause for infinite regress. This is not the case when the finite depends on the infinite.

The question of verification or falsification is for Kumārila fundamentally a practical, not a theoretical, matter. Any process of verification or falsification always will presuppose the doctrine of *svataḥprāmāṇyam*. In Kumārila's system it is not so much verification as falsification that is used as a principle for the establishment of validity. It is only when a nullifying

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[18] TS 2861 cd—2862:

bā*dhakāraṇaduṣṭatvajñānābhyāṃ tad apohyate* //
parāyatte 'pi caitasmin nānavasthā prasajyate /
pramāṇādhīnaṃ etad dhi svatas tac ca pratiṣṭhitam //

[19] *Ibid.* 2863—2864:

pramāṇaṃ hi pramāṇena yathā nānyena sādhyate /
na sidhyatya apramāṇatvam apramāṇāt tathaiva hi //
tulyajātāśrayatve hi pratiṣṭhā nopapadyate /
vijātes tv anyahetutvād dṛḍhamūlapratiṣṭhitā //

cognition arises that the nullified cognition is given up as *apramāṇam*. As a matter of fact there is no reason why this nullifying cognitions itself could not be later nullified by another cognition. Given care and prudence of judgment two or three such nullifying cognitions will reassure us that normally there is no cause for concern that there could perhaps be a further nullifying cognition, thus making practical life impossible. But how could one ascertain the validity of a cognition in the field of everyday life? One always begins with the fact that a cognition in itself is valid and authoritative. Given such a starting point, one keeps an eye on the possible existence of defects in the process and means of knowledge. Signs of the presence of such defects are extreme emotions like deep attachment or hatred, drunkeness, passion, hunger and thirst, etc.[20]. Should one discover no defects in spite of a repeated and intensive search for them, then one should take for granted that the validity of these cognitions has not been impaired.

"If no cognition of defects arises, then one need not fear invalidity."[21]

This, as is evident from such a statement, is a pragmatical consideration, and does not affect the theoretical basis of Kumārila's thinking. Theoretically the answer to the question "when is the natural self-validity of a particular cognition unimpaired?" quite clear: When this cognition is neither contradicted by another valid cognition nor is there any defect discovered in its cause, then its self-validity remained unimpaired. Practically it is impossible to reach a stage where absolute certainty in this matter will be attained. That is the reason for Kumārila's saying that about three cognitions should suffice in order to reach certainty about the validity of a particular cognition. This, of course, is meant as a practical procedure for daily life, not a philosophical principle[22].

The theory of *svataḥprāmāṇyam* was not an isolated doctrine for Kumārila. Its purpose was primarily not epistemological but theological, since it was developed first and foremost with the validity of the Veda in view. Śabdaḥ is *pramāṇam* in two specifically different cases: i) in the case of human statements and ii) in the case of the vedic statements, which according to the Mīmāṃsā are of supra-personal origin.

"In the case of Śabda-[pramāṇam] it is certain that the birth of defects is dependent on the Speaker. Occasionally it happens that there is no [defect], because the Speaker possesses excellent qualities [and] since it is

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[20] Ibid. 2879—2880:
tathā hi candradigmohavedavarṇasvarādiṣu /
puruṣāntarasampraśnād anyathātve 'vadhāraṇam //
rāgadveṣamadonmādakṣuttṛṣṇādikṣatendriyaiḥ /
durjñāne jñāyamāne 'rthe tadabhāvād viparyayaḥ //

[21] ŚV Codanā. 60cd:
doṣajñāne tv anutpanne na śaṅkyā niṣpramāṇatā //

[22] Unlike the Vṛttikāraḥ Kumārila is quite realistic about the *prāmāṇyam* of human assertions. Though the intrinsic validity of such assertions is always to oo be defended the possibility that it could have been extrinsically impaired can theoretically never be ruled out. See TS 2894—2895.

impossible that the [defects] destroyed by the excellent qualities could enter Śabdaḥ. Or, [it is also possible that] there are no defects, which due to absence of a Speaker are without a foundation."[23]

With that we have a sketch of an applied theory of *svataḥprāmāṇyam*. Śabdaḥ is valid intrisically and if there are defects sometimes connected with it, they are there not because of Śabdaḥ but because of a human author. Where there are no human beings involved, there is then no possibility of any error either.

Kumārila analyses statements of human origin thus:

"In the case of human [statements] one abserves two things: the absence of defects as also [the presence of] excellent qualities. In this connection it has been explained that *prāmāṇyam* is not due to the excellent qualities. Because of this the absence of defects is due to the excellent qualities. Since these [defects] are absent, the two kinds of invalidity [that is, doubt and falsity] are not there. Hence the natural [capacity] remains unimpaired. The validity of a human statement is nullified because it gives rise to a cognition."[24]

If, when we study a statement of human origin, we do not find there any errors, we shall discover the excellent qualities. It is these excellent qualities that see to it that there are no defects. What does Kumārila mean by defects and excellent qualities? As far as my knowledge goes, Kumārila speaks about these defects in one solitary instance[25] but about the excellent qualities he is silent. In the Bṛhaṭṭīkā Kumārila speaks about *āptapraṇītaṃ vākyam*; *āptaḥ* is a Nyāya-term which implies that a competent and conscientious man represents an object the way he directly perceives it[26]. For Kumārila this means: competence and conscientiousness, (that is to say, the ability to portrary the object the way it is perceived), is not examined, it is only assumed. To demand credentials from him, would lead to an infinite regress. What is examined and must be examined are the defects. If however no defects are discovered then only can one calmly state that the natural

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[23] ŚV Codanā. 62—63

śabde doṣodbhavas tāvad vaktradhīna iti sthitiḥ
tadabhāvaḥ kvacit tāvad guṇavadvaktṛkatvataḥ //
tadguṇair apakṛṣṭānāṃ śabde saṃkrānty asaṃbhavāt /
yadā vaktur abhāvena na syur doṣā nirāśrayāḥ //

TS 2886—2887.

[24] ŚV Codanā. 64—66ab:

pauruṣeye dvayaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ doṣābhāvo guṇās tathā /
prāmāṇyaṃ tatra guṇato naiva syād ity udāhṛtam //
tasmād guṇebhyo doṣāṇām abhāvas tadabhāvataḥ /
aprāmāṇyadvayāsattvaṃ tenotsargo 'napoditaḥ //
pratyayotpattihetutvāt prāmāṇyaṃ nāpanīyate /

TS 2888—2889.

[25] TS 2879—2880. See Note 20 of this Chapter.

[26] NSū. 1.1.7: *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*. Vātsyāyana's commentary on this is: *āptaḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya cikhyāpayiṣayā prayukta upadeṣṭā. sākṣātkaraṇam arthasyāptiḥ.*

validity of cognition has not been impaired. Does this not really lead to an infinite regress? Kumārila's answer is this:

"This defect is absent [in our theory]. At that time there is no dependence on the cognition of the defects. The excellent qualities do not become active, [only] when they are known. All these [excellent qualities] are capable of removing the defects, merely through their presence. When the [excellent qualities] are present, the cognition [which] arises is without human defects. Since no [defects] are cognized, validity is not prejudiced by [any] defects. And this [validity] which is proved to be unimpaired is intrinsic."[27]

Kumārila introduces here a subtle distinction between the presence of the excellent qualities and their cognition. The defects are removed merely by their presence and not by knowing them. When one does not discover any defects, this only means that the excellent qualities are at work in such a way that they hinder either the birth of defects or their continuing existence. Through the fact that the excellent qualities hinder the appearance of the defects merely through their presence, the natural validity of cognition remains untouched.

Kumārila is not unaware that this explanation cannot enable any ultimate irrefutable certainty where human statements are concerned.

"In the case of human [statements] however there is the uneasiness as to whether there are defects or not. In the case of the Veda however there is for us no such fear of defects, since there is no speaker. Hence just as in the case of the Veda, validity is predicated because of independence [from a speaker], so, too, even in the case of a [statement] from a competent and conscientious man [its] intrinsic validity is easily established."[28]

As long as there is a speaker there is an inherent fear that defects could be there. But the theoretical foundation is quite clear: even in the case of human statements there is intrinsic validity because no amount of competence and conscientiousness can create validity. The case of the Veda however is totally different. Since it has no composer or creator, the insights which it conveys and communicates are both theoretically and practically absolutely stable and beyond the least shadow of doubt.

But to come back to human statements, if there can be no absolute certainty that any particular human statement is such that its intrinsic

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[27] TS 2891—2893:
naiṣa doṣaḥ guṇajñānaṃ tadā naiva hy apekṣyate /
jñāyamānatayā naiva guṇās tatropakāriṇaḥ //
sattāmātreṇa te sarve doṣavyāvarttanakṣamāḥ /
nṛdoṣaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ yeṣu satsu na jāyate //
doṣaiś cājñāyamānatvān na prāmāṇyam apodyate /
anapoditasiddhaṃ ca tad ihāpi svataḥ sthitam //

[28] Ibid. 2894—2895:
doṣāḥ santi na santīti pauruṣeye tu śaṅkyate /
vede kartur abhāvāc ca doṣāśaṅkaiva nāsti naḥ //
ato yadanapekṣatvād vede prāmāṇyam ucyate /
tadāptena praṇīte 'pi sutarāṃ siddhyati svataḥ //

validity has not been tampered with, why does one postulate its intrinsic validity at all? The Prābhākara school appears to be more consistent in that it accepts the intrinsic validity of the Veda alone but not of human statements which are interpreted as syllogistic conclusions[29]. The answer, I feel, is to be sought in the following: The Mīmāṃsaka-s hold that the language of the Veda (which consists of words) is the same as the language of everyday life[30]. When we learn a language we learn it in everyday life with the help of human statements, not with the help of the vedic language. If the human statements were not intrinsically valid, then it would be impossible to establish the validity of vedic cognitions. For, our access to the vedic statements is given through human statements. But if human statements were the product of syllogistic reasoning, then, not having a firmly established foundation, there would inevitably follow an infinite regress, since each conclusion would depend on another conclusion in order to establish its validity. For, wherever intrinsic validity is absent its place is taken over by an infinite regress. Kumārila attacks a fellow Mīmāṃsaka (probably of the Prābhākara school) in this connection and forces him to admit that our cognitions about words can only be got from other human beings[31].

There is however still a doubt in the matter. Given the nature of human statements, is it at all possible that they can be characterized by intrinsic validity? The content of such statements, it must be noted, does not have its origin in the words and their peculiar arrangements (as is the case with the Veda) but is really only a reporting of cognitions through other *pramāṇa*-s. In the Veda, one can say (using an expression of the Vṛttikāraḥ) that the word itself speaks. Human statements are made to speak by men. If the tongue, for example, tastes something, then to speak of it is not the same as to taste it because here the words merely report the experience of the tongue. But in the case of the Veda it is the words themselves that are the source of the meaning of the sentences. Vedic knowledge is not informative but transformative. How then can we seriously talk of intrinsic validity in the matter of human statements, too?

Intrinsic validity is not concerned with the source of the content of a statement but with the proper functioning of a *pramāṇam*. A *pramāṇam* must lead to the cognition of that which comes within its sphere. An eye, for instance, is meant to see and its validity and authority is guaranteed when its functioning is reliable and competent. In the same way, the task of a statement is to convey its content. The *prāmāṇyam* of any means of knowing is guaranteed only when its proper functioning is guaranteed. If a friend reports to me about some happening, the *prāmāṇyam* of this reporting is established if its process of reporting (that is, attentive listening and faithful reproduction of the message) is free of extrinsic factors that could vitiate it. Whether the message itself corresponds to factors or not, is not the main

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[29] See G. JHĀ: Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, p. 124.
[30] ŚBh 1.1.1.1 and 1.3.10a.30.
[31] ŚV Śabdaparicchedaḥ 38—39.

consideration but whether the medium of the message allows it free scope is the point under consideration. If a jaundiced eye sees something or everything as yellow, the human statement reporting this would be *pramāṇam* though it is quite obvious that the eye is not functioning as it should. The main duty of a *pramāṇam* is to report what is to be reported and not to concoct a report. The quality of *prāmāṇyam* is present not when a *pramāṇam* is capable of producing its own content but when it faithfully reports what is happening. Only in the case of the Veda, it is true, there is the unique circumstance which makes the medium the message but this is not a characteristic of a *pramāṇam* as such, it is the characteristic of the Veda.

In this connection one could ask the question: what is the role and character of confirmation of cognition through one *pramāṇam* by the other *pramāṇa*-s? Has the information supplied by one *pramāṇam* to be confirmed by another *pramāṇam*? Kumārila's answer is negative lest it should lead to an infinite regress. If confirmation were a must, that would imply that the results supplied by *śabdapramāṇam*, for example, would first have to be confirmed by another *pramāṇam*; such a procedure would be endless and hence meaningless[32].

Kumārila stresses the fact that the circumstance that the other *pramāṇa*-s have nothing to say about the vedic *codanā*-s demonstrates that the Veda-cognitions are not a repetition[33]. One might be tempted to conclude from this that according to Kumārila, each *pramāṇam* must have its own realm of validity and that two *pramāṇa*-s cannot be valid where one and the same object is concerned. Kumārila's answer is not quite clear but it seems to point to the direction that though the material-object of two *pramāṇa*-s is and could be the same, still their formal-object has to be different if their *prāmāṇyam* is to be acknowledged. The competence of the eye would be the realm of shape and shade while that of the ear would be sound. But then Kumārila also makes a mysterious statement:

"If there is more than one alternative for the same objects, then only one [of them] is a *pramāṇam*."[34]

The impression given here is that it is possible (at least in some cases) for two or more *pramāṇa*-s to speak validly in the same field but that when one accepts one of them as *pramāṇam*, the others cease to be *pramāṇam*.

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[32] ŚV Codanā. 72—75. TS 2896—2898.
[33] ŚV Codanā. 72. TS 2896.
[34] TS 2897cd:
tulyārthānāṃ vikalpena hy ekasyaiva pramāṇatā ||

CHAPTER 15 VEDĀPAURUṢEYATVAM AND VEDAPRĀMĀṆYAM

Kumārila's argument in favour of the validity of the Veda is essentially based on the doctrine of its authorlessness. This is the way he himself puts it:[1]

"The cognition produced by a vedic statement is a *pramāṇam* i) because its origin is due to faultless causes just like the cognition [produced] by a syllogism, by a statement of a competent and credible person [and] by perception: [and] ii) because it is born of statements which are not the product of incompetent and incredible persons and iii) because, like the statement of a competent and credible person, it is not nullified at different times, places, etc."[2]

The cardinal thesis here is that of Apauruṣeyatvam, that is, the doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda. It has already been proved that there can be no error in the Veda; more still, that there can be no possibility of error because of its not having been composed by anyone. Due to such a stand, the objections about its incompetence and its eventual nullification do not touch the core of its essence. It is this stance that we shall now examine.

Apauruṣeyatvam

Kumārila's treatment of Apauruṣeyatvam can be studied from his statements on three distinct but not disconnected topics: i) the rejection of an omniscient person[3], ii) the unacceptability of a creator for this world[4], and ii) the beginningless tradition of Veda-recitation-and-learning[5].

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[1] That the theme of Vedaprāmāṇyam has been stressed in season and out of season is not astonishing since the whole effort of the Mīmāṃsā is directed towards its justification. For the Mīmāṃsā, Vedaprāmāṇyam means that in the matter of Dharma the Veda alone can give us authentic and authoritative directives. The Mīmāṃsā system was elaborated with a view to proving that this is true and that the directives have to be followed. Hence the appellation 'Karma-Mīmāṃsā': whereas Mīmāṃsā refers to the speculative aspect, Karma points to the pragmatic.

[2] ŚV Codanā. 184—185:

codanājanitā buddhiḥ pramāṇaṃ doṣavarjitaiḥ /
kāraṇair janyamānatvāl liṅgāptoktyakṣabuddhivat //
tathānāptāpraṇītoktijanyatvād bādhavarjanāt /
deśakālādibhedādau cāptoktipratyayo yathā //

Compare TS 2347—2348. The TS quotes a good deal from Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā. Throughout this chapter I shall also give references to it (TS). Regarding the Bṛhaṭṭīkā, see E. FRAUWALLNER: Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā, WZKSO 6 (1962), pp. 78—90.

[3] ŚV Codanā. 116—136. TS 3128—3246.

[4] ŚV Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāraḥ 42—117.

[5] ŚV Vedanityatādhikaraṇam 1—13; Vākyādhikaraṇam 367—369.

Sarvajñatvam

There are two main reasons for Kumārila's attacks against Theism. First, by establishing the impossibility of an omniscient person, he will have undermined the validity of the Buddhist Scriptures and the theist's argument in favour of Vedapramāṇam; and second, the way is thus cleared for the doctrine that there is no author for the Veda. It should however be kept in mind that Kumārila is not against every type of omniscient person.

"If there is an omniscient [person] who knows everything through the six *pramāṇa*-s, how can he be refuted?"[6]

But Kumārila cannot accept an Omniscient Being whose omniscience is independent of the six means of knowing:

"Anyone who teaches that one can know everything [just] by one *pramāṇam* is [really] teaching that [the Omniscient Being perceives, for example,] taste, etc. by means of the eyes."[7]

Kumārila sets out to prove that none of the six accepted *pramāṇa*-s can lead to the knowledge of an Omniscient Being[8]. Perception cannot prove his existence:

First of all, an Omniscient Being is not perceived."[9] Similary there is no scope in syllogistic reasoning for proving the existence of such a Being. Syllogistic reasoning proceeds from the known to the unknown which is connected with the known. Reasoning is not only incapable of proving that an unknown Omniscient Being is connected with the known but rather it can prove that there cannot be such a Being[10].

Even Scripture (*āgamaḥ*) is not in a position to prove that an Omniscient Being exists. If Scripture were to do this, this would lead to a vicious circle (*ananyasaṃśrayaḥ*): the existence of Scripture would be attributed to the Omniscient Being and the existence of the Omniscient Being to Scripture.

"How would one know of the validity of the [Scripture] composed by another man?"[11]

This is possible, only if we accept a Scripture that is eternal. If this is granted then the postulate in favour of an Omniscient Being becomes

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[6] ŚV Codanā. 111cd:
yadi ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ syāt sarvajñaḥ kena vāryate //

[7] ŚV Codanā. 112:
ekena tu pramāṇena sarvajño yena kalpyate /
nūnaṃ sa cakṣuṣā sarvān rasādīn pratipadyate //
TS 3136, 3145, 3158.

[8] TS 3127—3245 (G. O. S. Ed. 3128—3246) dealing with the problem of Sarvajñatvam are ascribed to the Bṛhaṭṭīkā.

[9] ŚV Codanā. 117ab:
sarvajño dṛśyate tāvan nedānīm asmadādibhiḥ /
TS 3186ab.

[10] ŚV Codanā. 117cd. TS 3186ab.

[11] ŚV Codanā. 118cd:
narāntarapraṇītasya prāmāṇyaṃ gamyate katham //
TS 3187.

superfluous, since whatever is to be known about Dharma can be found out from the Scripture itself. Furthermore it is impossible to prove the eternality of any Scripture, except that of the Veda[12]. Should one not accept an eternal Scripture and still attempt to base the validity of the Scripture on the ground that it has been proclaimed by a competent and credible person, then this is how Kumārila replies:

"One who accepts [validity] in the realm of the ritual that has to be performed (*śraddheya-*) on the basis of statements [of those persons whose] credibility in matters connected with the objects of the senses has been experienced, will have to establish [the *āpta*'s] credibility and competence by means of something else. Were *prāmāṇyam* to be intrinsic, then what is the purpose of making it depend on the senses, etc."[13]

Clearly the dig here is at the Naiyāyika-s who build their argument in favour of the Omniscience of their *āpta*-s on the basis of their competence in matters of medicine, etc. If some have proved their omniscience by their competence in matters of the senses, for example, by prescribing the right medicine for diseases etc., (and this was possible only because they knew the cause of the diseases, the effect of their medicine and the connection between the two), then there is no reason for rejecting their competence and credibility in matters pertaining to Dharma. For, to know the connection between the cause of the disease and the effect of the medicine means to know things from 'inside', to know them 'through and through'[14]. It is against such reasoning that Kumārila is polemising. First, such reasoning bases the proof for validity on something outside of validity, and this has been shown to be impossible as it leads to an infinite regress. Second, the validity of the competent and credible person appears to be dependent on perception since it is argued that, because we perceive the infallibility of the *āpta*-s' statements in one field, they must be infallible in another too. If this were really so, then the Dharma-statements would depend on our perception[15]. One would then have to judge everything according to one's own perception of things[16]. Kumārila proceeds with sarcasm which is typical of him in such instances:

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[12] ŚV Codanā. 119—120.

[13] ŚV Codanā. 121—122:

yo 'pīndriyārthasaṃbandhavoiṣaye satyavāditām /
dṛṣṭvā tadvacanatvena śraddheye 'rthe 'pi kalpayet //
tenāpi pāratantryeṇa bādhitā syāt pramāṇatā /
prāmāṇyaṃ cet svayaṃ tasya kāpekṣānyendriyādiṣu //

TS 3165—3173.

[14] NSū. 1.1.7 and Vātsyāyana's comment on it could be cited in this connection. For a modern discussion of it see G. OBERHAMMER: Die Überlieferungsautorität im Hinduismus, in: Offenbarung, geistige Realität des Menschen, pp. 50f.

[15] ŚV Codanā. 123—124.

[16] Ibid. 125.

"My statement 'Buddha and the rest are not omniscient' is true, since it is my statement, just like [my statement] 'Fire is warm and bright'."[17] Further:

"My statement is perceptible, [but] your statement must be established by you. Hence my reason (*hetuḥ*) [proves], yours is doubtful and [hence] unestablished."[18]

What Kumārila wants to prove on the basis of a perceptive fact is that the Buddha and the rest are not omniscient. On the other hand he demands from the opponent a proof that the so-called statements of the Buddha are really from the Buddha and that he is in fact omniscient.

Tradition (*smṛtiḥ*) which is beginningless and uninterrupted is similarly incapable of supporting the thesis that an Omniscient Being exists.

"Even on the basis of an uninterrupted tradition an Omniscient Being is not accepted, since the [tradition] of an Omniscient Being is both controversial and diversely rooted [and] since it is accepted by only a few."[19]

The most massive argument against accepting the existence of an Omniscient Being is the following:

"He is omniscient — how was this [fact] known to those who at that time wanted to know but who did not have the [direct] experience of his cognitions and their content? And [besides this] you would have to accept [not just one Omniscient Being but] several of them. [For], one who is not omniscient, cannot cognize an Omniscient Being."[20]

With that Kumārila lays bare a weakness in the whole philosophical tradition of India up to his time, namely, the absence of an articulation of the analogy of Being. Similar difficulties will cross our path when discussing the existence of a creator. Without an analogy of Being it will be impossible for anyone to uphold the thesis that it is possible for a non-omniscient being to cognize an Omniscient Being. Hence, the existence of an Omniscient Being is as far as non-omniscient beings are concerned, as good as non-existing, since he would be like any other non-omniscient being (if he could be cognized)[21].

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[17] Ibid. 130:
buddhādīnām asārvajñam iti satyaṃ vaco mama /
maduktatvād yathaivāgnir uṣṇo bhāsvara ity api //
TS 3190.

[18] Ibid. 131:
pratyakṣaṃ ca maduktatvaṃ tvayā sādhyā taduktatā /
tena hetur madīyaḥ syāt saṃdigdhāsiddhatā tava //

[19] Ibid. 133:
na cāpi smṛtyavicchedāt sarvajñaḥ parikalpyate /
vigānāt chinnamūlatvāt kaiścid eva parigrahāt //

[20] Ibid. 134—135:
sarvajño 'sāv iti hy eva tatkāle tu bubhutsubhiḥ /
tajjñānajñeyavijñānarahitair gamyate katham //
kalpanīyāś ca sarvajñā bhaveyur bahavas tava /
ya eva syād asarvajñaḥ sa sarvajñaṃ na budhyate //
TS 3191—3193.

[21] Ibid. 136.

Asraṣṭṛtvam

The main arguments against the postulate of an almighty Creator are thus formulated by Kumārila:

"The postulate about the existence of a Creator is to be refuted the way the one about an Omniscient Being [was refuted]. Except for Dharma the [Creator] cannot be different from the [rest of] the world. And there is no Dharma which has not been merited [through the sacrificial ritual]. Dharma is not possible without a knowledge [of it]. And this [knowledge] is impossible without the Veda. And the Veda without words does not exist. Hence all these words, etc. existed even before the Creator. [Thus] he [too] has to presuppose the Veda, since he [too] is an intellectual being as we [are]."[22]

Kumārila sees the difference between a normal creature and a Creator in one point only: the Creator's quantum of Dharma would be more abundant than a creature's. But even this merely points to the fact that the Veda existed prior to the Creator. If we remember that this argumentation is formulated in the context of the relationship between word and meaning, then its importance will not be lost on us. The Creator has (according to Kumārila's understanding of him) to presuppose the Veda; more still, he is dependent on the Veda, if he is to know what Dharma and Adharma mean. Has one agreed to such a dependence of the Creator on the Veda, then it is obvious that the Creator is in no way almighty since such a dependence implies that he does not exist from all eternity; that he did not create the relationship between word and meaning, and finally that even he has to learn from the Veda the meaning of and the difference between Dharma and Adharma.

There are still two types of arguments against the postulate in favour of a Creator: the first is about the Creator himself and the second about our knowledge of him, i) How could a Creator have a body? It is impossible that he himself could create it. Since he would be by nature an *ātmā* like a liberated *ātmā* (*ātmā muktātmavat*) it would be difficult to conceive of his creative activity on the analogy of the potter and his pot[23]. Besides, his desire to create cannot be satisfactorily explained. He could not have created the world out of pity since there would have been then no one on whom he could have showered his pity. Furthermore, he would have created only happy beings, since everything would be directly dependent on him. With what aim could he create this world? There must have been some purpose behind all this creative activity.

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[22] ŚV Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāraḥ 114—116:
sarvajñavan niṣedhyā ca sraṣṭuḥ sadbhāvakalpanā |
na ca dharmād ṛte tasya bhavel lokād viśiṣṭatā ||
na cānanuṣṭhito dharmo nānuṣṭhānam ṛte mateḥ |
na ca vedād ṛte sā syād vedo na ca padādibhiḥ ||
tasmāt prāgapi sarve 'mī sraṣṭur āsan padādayaḥ |
syāt tatpūrvakatā cāsya caitanyād asmadādivat ||

[23] Ibid. 48—49ab; 77—82ab.

"For without a purpose not even an idiot strains himself."[24] Were he to use some material in his creative activity, he would thereby become dependent on it, and thus lose his independence. His creativity could not have been pure fun and frolic, for the amount of work involved must have taken its toll on him[25]. In addition to all this, he would stand in need of means and instruments[26]. Finally his desire to destroy the world is unintelligible. This would bring him in conflict with the *karma*-laws. Should one suggest that he is above them, then there would be no purpose in having them at all[27].

ii) The objections regarding the acceptance of a Creator from the viewpoint of our cognition of him have their centre of gravity in the following principle:

"The [Creator] can never be known by anybody else."[28]

No one has seen him at work or during his creative activity. And since perception is of no use in the matter, a fortiori, syllogistic reasoning will be of much less use, since the latter is based on the former. Then again, the statements of the Creator himself would not possess credibility, since there is the possibility that he could mislead us[29].

Vedākartṛtvam

That there is no author for the Veda is obvious from the fact that, just as in the case of the relation between word and meaning, there is no remembrance of the agent, and given the type of oral Veda-recitation-and-learning-process that was possible only in the Guruśiṣya-system, there should have been some remembrance of the agent. Since there is no memory of such an agent, Kumārila concludes that there could not have been one at all[30].

The objection that certain sections of the Veda are named after definite historical personages is rejected by Kumārila on the score that such statements are basically *arthavāda*-s; and therefore they cannot be interpreted this way[31].

Vedānādinityatvam

It has been asserted that the Mīmāṃsā as a whole did not establish the eternality of the vedic *saṃhitā*-s[32]. What follows will show that this remark is not pertinent in the case of Kumārila. His brief argument is as follows:

"The eternality of the [vedic] statements is to be established from the argumentation for the non-production of the relationship [between word and

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24 Ibid. 55ab.
25 Ibid. 49cd—56.
26 Ibid. 50—51.
27 Ibid. 68—72.
28 Ibid. 57cd.
29 Ibid. 58—60.
30 ŚV Vākyādhikaraṇam 365ab:
saṃbandhākaraṇanyāyād vaktavyā vākyanityatā /
31 Ibid. 367—369; Vedanityatādhikaraṇam 1—13.
32 E. FRAUWALLNER: Mīmāṃsāsūtram I, 1, 6—23.

meaning]. The following refutation is directed against the thesis that the [vedic sentence] is a [human] putting together [of words]. Every recitation and learning of the Veda presupposes a recitation and learning of the Veda by the Gutu himself, because the characteristic of Veda-recitation-and-learning is like today's Veda-recitation-and-learning."[33]

There are two arguments here i) the way the eternality of the relationship between word and meaning was proved, in the same manner the eternality of the vedic sentences must be established. The argument there was that there is no remembrance of the agent who could have joined word with its meaning, though in a matter like this there definitely should have been some remembrance of him. In the case of the Veda, too, there should have been some remembrance of the composer but since there is no such remembrance, Kumārila concludes that there was no author for the Veda[34]. ii) The process of Veda-recitation-and-learning is such that it always presupposes Veda-recitation-and-learning on the part of the teacher. Such a process is without beginning. The argumentation for the sequence of syllables of a word was similar. Kumārila asserted there that such a sequence has no beginning[35]. One utters the syllables the way and in the sequence one learnt from others. The similarity in the argumentation is to be sought in the fact that just as in the case of the sequence of the syllables we learnt it from others, so, too, in the case of the sequence of the words of the Veda-sentences we learn it from others. And this process, too, has no beginning.

Vedaprāmāṇyam

This section is merely a putting together of the results of the various previous sections so that the leit-motif of the whole undertaking stands out in clear relief. In different places and in diverse sections Kumārila had repeatedly stated that the topic under consideration had as its goal the validity and authority of the Veda. Here I shall be concerned with showing the connection between the doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā.

The very last verse of the Ślokavārttikam begins thus: "Up to now it has been proved logically that the vedic statements are *pramāṇam* with regard to Dharma."[36]

That is to say, all the theories that Kumārila has expounded have had the direct or the indirect purpose of establishing Vedapramāṇatvam in the matter of Dharma. In other words, the cognition conveyed by the Veda regarding Dharma is valid and authoritative. In order to prove Vedaprāmā-

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33 ŚV Vākyādhikaraṇam 365—366:
saṃbandhākaraṇanyāyād vaktavyā vākyanityatā /
saṃghātatvasya vaktavyam īdṛśaṃ pratisādhanam //
vedasyādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam /
vedādhyayanavācyatvād adhunādhyayanaṃ yathā //

34 ŚV Saṃbandhākṣepaḥ 123cd—134ab.

35 See Ch. 10 Śabdanityatā, pp. 137ff. of this book.

36 ŚV Vedanityatādhikaraṇam 14ab:
nityasya nitya evārthaḥ kṛtakasyāpramāṇatā /

ṇyam Kumārila had established the doctrines of Vedānādinityatvam, Svataḥprāmāṇyam, Bhāvanā, Abhihitānvayavāḥ, Ākṛtiḥ, Śabdārthasaṃbandhaḥ and Śabdanityatvam.

The Veda communicates cognition in the form of sentences. Kumārila's task is to prove that the vedic sentences are authorless, eternal and intrisically valid. In this process he took over from the early Mīmāṃsā the theories of the Authorlessness and the eternality of the Veda, and integrated them into his system. Or to express it in another way (which might be more fair to his purpose): he built a system in order to support these two pillars of the Mīmāṃsā.

Kumārila's doctrine of Śabdaḥ is complex but none-the-less well-knit. Though the avowed aim of the entire project is theological (i. e. to explain and expound the authority of the Veda), the method is phenomenologico-philosophical. That is, he picks and chooses those phenomena which are grist to the mill and then philosophizes on them. I say, picks and chooses, because he is guided in all this by a theological starting-point, an article of faith, so to speak.

Concretely, this is how his Śabda-doctrine takes shape. The Veda whose authority has to be justified, is found to consist of words. This implies that he has to examine the nature of word, its appearance in human discourse, its connection with meaning, the origin and nature of this connection, the relation between word and syllables and sounds and Śabdaḥ and, above all, the relationship between words, word-meanings and sentence-meaning. Kumārila's analysis begins with the sounds and the syllables which make up a padam, then proceeds to the manifestation of Śabdaḥ, taking into account all the while the physiological aspects of the process. In his analysis the basic principle that is constantly in use is the phenomenon of human discourse and its ultimate meaningfulness. With the aid of this principle he finds that he can explain the nature of the relation between word and meaning, and of the denotation of a word. With this he has the tools necessary for an analysis of a sentence and its meanings. An ideal sentence for the Mīmāṃsaka-s is an imperative and this is investigated with care and in detail. At the heart of such a sentence, he discovers, is an efficient-force called *bhāvanā* which is responsible for the connection, coordination and mutual qualification of the word-meanings. The sentence-meaning is thus shown to arise from the word-meanings but at the same time it is proved that it cannot be reduced to the sum of the word-meanings because of the tertium quid which is the *bhāvanā*. All this however can only prove that the Veda-sentences are meaningful but nothing more follows from this.

Kumārila could not rest content with this. Realizing the relation between truth and meaning, and being bent on demonstrating that the Veda-sentences are not only meaningful but true, he investigated the nature of truth and error in the case of the *pauruṣeya-* and the *apauruṣeya-*statements and concluded that the conditions which characterize a human statement are not applicable to the Veda. This means that the Veda is not only authorless and eternal but true and authoritative, independently of any being. An

important step towards this conclusion was the phenomenon of the *guruśiṣyaparamparā* which was interpreted as the basis of the beliefs in the beginninglessness of vedic tradition and the authorlessness of the Veda.

Throughout, Kumārila stresses the two characteristics of all Mīmāṃsā-doctrines: their givenness and their self-explanatory character, both of which are of a piece with the original Mīmāṃsā mythos.

CHAPTER 16 CONCLUSION II

To remain in orbit the balance between the centripetal and the centrifugal forces must be maintained. This is true also of the world of meaning and meaningfulness, around which we orbit. Here, too, the centripetal force of systematization has to be neatly balanced against the centrifugal force of innovation. Both of course are part and parcel of the world of Significance. For innovation is first and foremost a search for personal Significance, and systematization is the effort to make available to all and sundry the fruits of personalized Significance. When either of these two forces gets out of hand, it is all over with the orbital movement.

The aspect of the Mīmāṃsā which we have studied in these pages is an illustration of this. The time of the Sūtrakāraḥ, the Bhāṣyakāraḥ and the Vṛttikāraḥ was clearly a period of search characterised by discovery and disappointment. Kumārila, on the other hand, is the great systematizer; he took on himself the task of coordinating and complementing, of bridging the gaps and polishing the edges, as it were. But there is not a single insight in Kumārila's doctrine of Śabdaprāmāṇyam which has not been prepared by the early Mīmāṃsā.

All this should not give us the impression that there was no systematization in the early Mīmāṃsā; far from it. We may not be far from wrong if we say that though they inherited a search for Significance, it was really the Bhāṣyakāraḥ and the Vṛttikāraḥ who actually initiated the process of systematization. For with them the symbols of the system came to be substantialized, and logic, not metaphor, became the main vehicle of communication. If however we wish to know first-hand the type of thinking the early Mīmāṃsaka-s indulged in, we have only to turn to the pages of the Śābarabhāṣyam after the Tarkapādaḥ. In spite of the touch of sophistication that is evident there, the concern is through and through pragmatic.

But there is no denying that there was method in their madness. Without the stability of an upaniṣadic Absolute for a firm foundation or the care of a Creator as the source of unconditioned love, the Mīmāṃsaka-s ventured on a search for Significance that was as extraordinary as it was exasperating, as positivistic as it was profound. Their beliefs might appear silly but their reasoning was surely not shallow. Bereft of the security offered by a Saviour they became inventive enough to discover the foot-prints of Significance on the sands of time and space, sound and sentence. For them the fact of the Veda-saṃhita-s was an unshakeable as the fact of perceptive experience. And though they (exteriorly) insisted that the language of the one was not different from the language of the other, they wisely worked out their respective rules of relevance. And though they began as extreme

positivists, not willing to admit any invisible reality, they ended by accepting an Adṛṣṭam as the invisible effect of all major sacrifices.

Their philosophy of language was worked out from the view-point of the ritual-performance, not (unfortunately) from the view-point of their basic principle of the ultimate Significance of human discourse, though they made copious use of it. In unguarded moments they did reason out from the standpoint of the latter principle but their ritualistic preoccupation was so comprehensive that it engulfed all the initiatives that issued from other sources. When they excluded all metaphor-meanings from their interpretations this was done from the view-point of their ritual frame-work. But they could not have been unaware of the different dimension of meaning their doctrine of the *arthavāda*-s introduced into the discussion.

Similarly with their doctrine of the *bhāvanā*. True, it did emanate from their pragmatic procedure but it signified the unity of the personal and the a-personal, the visible and the invisible, the indicative and the imperative. But given their theological bias, they selectively stuck to the a-personal, invisible and imperative side of reality, taking it not as a complement to, but a model for, the personal, the visible and the indicative.

In the *bhāvanā* the Mīmāṃsaka-s discovered the centre of gravity not only of their own lives but of the life of the world. It not only gave meaning and maintained unity but urged men, by goading them to act, to realise the unity of the world. For, the *bhāvanā* explained not only the unity and meaning of a sentence but the unity and meaning of life itself. It thus became at one and the same time the source of intelligibility and inspiration and the force behind the imperatives of life.

Positivistic as the Mīmāṃsaka-s were, they believed, as no one else, in the ultimate unity of all reality, because of which they saw an intrinsic but inexplicable connection between the fleeting syllables of sound and the severe unchangeability of the external Śabdaḥ and the world of meaning, between word-meanings and sentence-meaning, between sentence, speaker and hearer, between the hearer and the outside world; in short, between matter and mind, between the changeable and the unchangeable, and between time and eternity.

But that was not all: it was the *bhāvanā* which helped bridge the otherwise logically inexplicable gap between an imperative and an indicative sentence, that is, the gap between the 'is' and the 'ought'.

The basic Mīmāṃsā insight that the 'given' contains not only an indicative but also an imperative, that is by nature both independent and self-explanatory, is a truth of existential relevance. That it came to wear diverse garbs with different names is a matter of historical interest.

The Mīmāṃsā did not err in its insight; rather it erred in that it failed to stress it and to explicitate its implications; and being unduly preoccupied with Vedapramāṇam, it did not hesitate to sacrifice it at this altar. If the Mīmāṃsā had to bear more than its share of misunderstanding this was due in no small measure to its own lop-sided stress on its dogmatic theses and not on its insight. Our study of the Mīmāṃsa has shown, I hope, that the

Mīmāṃsā was found wanting not because of the significant symbols it discovered but because having discovered them it substantialized them. The expressions it coined were a far cry from the experience it had to offer.

It is rarely realised that the primacy of experience can be upheld only by the power of expression. The Mystery of life lends itself to perspective only when the eye of experience harmonizes with the eye of expression. To neglect expression is to sign the death-knell of experience; at the same time, however to lay exclusive store by expression is to empty it of content. The Mīmāṃsā became irrelevant not because it de-mythologized the gods but because it reified its goals. It lost its Significance not because it stressed ritual but because it substantialized it. It was not so much loss of piety that ruined it as loss of poetry. Whereas what the Mīmāṃsā really needed to renew itself was a poetic turn of mind, it gave up whatever little it had of it. Above all else, the insights of the Mīmāṃsā needed not merely priests but poets, who would turn sacrifice into sacrament. Instead they turned it into ritualism.

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